

THE  
POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY

OF  
AUGUSTE COMTE.

*FREELY TRANSLATED AND CONDENSED*

BY  
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*IN TWO VOLUMES.*

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THE  
POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY  
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BOOK VI.  
*SOCIAL PHYSICS.*

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CHAPTER I.

NECESSITY AND OPPORTUNENESS OF THIS NEW SCIENCE.

IN the five foregoing parts of this work, our investigation proceeded on an ascertained and undisputed scientific basis ; and our business was to exhibit the progress made in each science ; to free it from entanglement with the ancient philosophy ; and to show what further improvements might be anticipated. Our task is a different, and a much harder one, in the case of the sixth and last science that I am about to treat of. The theories of social science are still, even in the mind of the best thinkers, completely implicated with the theologico-metaphysical philosophy ; and are even supposed to be, by a fatal separation from all other science, condemned to remain so involved for ever. The philosophical procedure which I have undertaken to carry through becomes more difficult and bold, from this point onwards, without at all changing its nature or object ; and it must so far present a new character as it must henceforth be employed in creating a wholly new order of scientific conceptions, instead of judging, arranging, and improving such as already existed.

It is not to be expected that this new science can be at once  
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raised to a level with even the most imperfect of those which we have been reviewing. All that can be rationally proposed in our day is to recognize the character of positivity in social as in all other science, and to ascertain the chief bases on which it is founded; but this is enough, as I hope to show, to satisfy our most urgent intellectual necessities, and even the most imperative needs of immediate social practice. In its scientific connection with the rest of this work, all that I can hope to do is to exhibit the

*Proposal of  
the subject.*

general considerations of the case, so as to resolve the intellectual anarchy which is the main source of our moral anarchy first, and then of the political, which I shall treat of only through its originating causes. The extreme novelty of such a doctrine and method renders it necessary, before entering upon the immediate subject, to set forth the importance of such a procedure, and the futility of the chief attempts which have been indirectly made to investigate social science. However unquestionable may be the need of such science, and the obligation to discover it, the best minds have not yet attained a point of view from which they can estimate its depth and breadth and true position. In its nascent state every science is implicated with its corresponding art; and remains implicated with it, as we have seen, the longer in proportion to the complexity of the phenomena concerned. If biological science, which is more advanced than social, is still too closely connected with the medical art, as we have seen that it is, we cannot be surprised that men are insensible to the value of all social speculations which are not immediately connected with practical affairs. We cannot be surprised at any obstinacy in repelling them, as long as it is supposed that by rejecting them, society is preserved from chimerical and mischievous schemes: though experience has abundantly shown that the precaution has never availed, and that it does not now prevent our being daily invaded by the most illusory proposals on social matters. It is in deference to as much as is reasonable in this apprehension that I propose to state, first, how the institution of a science of Social Physics bears upon the principal needs and grievances of society, in its present deplorable state of anarchy. Such a representation may perhaps convince men worthy of the name of statesmen that there is a real and eminent utility in labours of this kind, worthy of the anxious attention of men who profess to devote themselves to the task of resolving the alarming revolutionary constitution of modern societies.

From the point of view to which we have been raised by our study of the preceding sciences, we are able to survey the social situation of our own time in its fullest extent and broadest light; and what we see is that there is a deep and widely-spread anarchy of the whole intellectual system, which has been in this state of disturbance during the long interregnum, resulting from the decline

of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy. At the present time, the old philosophy is in a state of imbecility; while the development of the positive philosophy, though always proceeding, has not yet been bold, broad, and general enough to comprehend the mental government of the human race. We must go back through that interregnum to understand truly the present floating and contradictory state of all great social ideas, and to perceive how society is to be delivered from the peril of dissolution, and brought under a new organization, more consistent and more progressive than that which once rested on the theological philosophy. When we have duly observed the powerlessness of conflicting political schools, we shall see the necessity of introducing an entirely new spirit into the organization of society, by which these useless and passionate struggles may be put an end to, and society led out of the revolutionary state in which it has been tossed about for three centuries past.

The ancients used to suppose Order and Progress to be irreconcilable: but both are indispensable conditions in a state of modern civilization; and their combination is at once the grand difficulty and the main resource of every genuine political system. No real order can be established, and still less can it last, if it is not fully compatible with progress: and no great progress can be accomplished if it does not tend to the consolidation of order. Any conception which is so devoted to one of these needs as to prejudice the other, is sure of rejection, sooner or later, as mistaking the nature of the political problem. Therefore, in positive social science, the chief feature must be the union of these two conditions, which will be two aspects, constant and inseparable, of the same principle. Throughout the whole range of science, thus far, we have seen that the conditions of combination and of progress are originally identical: and I trust we shall see, after looking into social science in the same way, that ideas of Order and Progress are, in Social Physics, as rigorously inseparable as the ideas of Organization and Life in Biology; from whence indeed they are, in a scientific view, evidently derived.

The misfortune of our actual state is that the two ideas are set up in radical opposition to each other,—the retrograde spirit having directed all efforts in favour of Order, and anarchical doctrine having arrogated to itself the charge of Social Progress; and, in this state of things, the reproaches exchanged between the respective parties are only too well merited by both. In this vicious circle is society now confined; and the only issue from it is by the undisputed preponderance of a doctrine equally progressive and hierarchical. The observations which I have to make on this subject are applicable to all European societies, which have, in fact, all undergone a common disorganization, though in different degrees, and

with various modifications, and which cannot be separately reorganized, however they may be for a time restrained ; but I shall keep the French nation chiefly in view, not only because the revolutionary state has been most conspicuous in them, but because they are, in all important respects, better prepared, in spite of appearances, than any other, for a true reorganization.

Among the infinite variety of political ideas which appear to be striving in society, there are in fact only two orders, the mingling of which in various proportions occasions the apparent multiplicity : and of these two, the one is really only the negation of the other. If we wish to understand our own condition, we must look at it as the result and last term of the general conflict undertaken, for three centuries past, for the gradual demolition of the old political system. So regarding it, we see that whereas, for above half a century, the irremediable decay of the old system has proved the necessity of founding a new one, we have not been sufficiently aware of the need to have formed an original and direct conception, adequate to the purpose ; so that our theoretical ideas have remained inferior to our practical necessities, which, in a healthy state of the social organism, they habitually anticipate, to prepare for their regular and peaceable satisfaction. Though the political movement could not but have changed its nature, from that time forward, becoming organic instead of critical, yet, for want of a basis in science, it has proceeded on the same old ideas that had actuated the past struggle ; and we have witnessed the spectacle of defenders and assailants alike endeavouring to convert their old weapons of war into instruments of reorganization, without suspecting the inevitable failure which must ensue to both parties. Such is the state that we find ourselves in now. All ideas of order in the political world are derived from the old doctrine of the theological and military system, regarded especially in its Catholic and feudal constitution : a doctrine which from our point of view in this work, represents the theological state of social science : and, in the same way, all ideas of progress are still derived from the purely negative philosophy which, issuing from Protestantism, assumed its final form and development in the last century, and which, applied to social affairs, constitutes the metaphysical state of politics. The different classes of society range themselves on the one side or the other, according to their inclination for conservatism or amelioration. With every new uprising of a social difficulty, we see the retrograde school proposing, as the only certain and universal remedy, the restoration of the corresponding part of the old political system ; and the critical school referring the evil exclusively to the destruction of the old system not being complete. We do not often see the two doctrines presented without modification. They so exist only in purely speculative minds. But when we see them in monstrous alliance, as we do in all degrees of existing political

opinion, we cannot but know that such an alliance cannot yield any virtue which its elements do not contain, and that it can only exhibit their mutual neutralization. We must here, it is clear, regard the theological and the metaphysical polities separately, in the first place, that we may afterwards understand their present antagonism, and form an estimate of the futile combinations into which men have endeavoured to force them.

Pernicious as the theological polity may be in our day, no true philosopher will ever forget that it afforded the *The theological polity.* beneficent guardianship under which the formation and earliest development of modern societies took place. But it is equally incontestable that, for three centuries past, its influence among the most advanced nations has been essentially retrograde, notwithstanding some partial services. We need not go into any discussion of its doctrine, in order to ascertain its powerlessness for future service: for it is plain that a polity that could not hold its ground before the natural progress of intelligence and of society can never again serve as a basis of social order. The historical analysis which I shall have to offer of the causes that have dissolved the Catholic and feudal system will show, better than any argument, how radical and irretrievable is the decay. The theological school explains the fact, as far as it can, by fortuitous and, we might almost say, personal causes: and, when they will no longer suffice, resorts to its common supposition, of a mysterious caprice of Providence which has allotted to social order a season of probation, of which no account can be given, either as to its date or its duration, or even its character. A contemplation of historical facts however shows that all the great successive modifications of the theological and military system have, from the beginning and increasingly, tended to the complete elimination of a *régime* which, by the fundamental law of social evolution, could never be more than provisional, however indispensable. And if any efforts to restore the system could achieve a temporary success, they would not bring back society to a normal state, but would merely restore the very situation which compelled the revolutionary crisis, by obliging it to set about the work of destruction again, with more violence, because the *régime* has altogether ceased to be compatible with progress in the most essential respects. While avoiding all controversy on so plain a case, I must briefly present a new view which appears to me to point out the simplest and surest criterion of the value of any social doctrine, and which emphatically condemns the theological polity.

Regarded from the logical point of view, the problem of our social reorganization seems to me reducible to this *Criterion of social doctrine.* one condition: to construct rationally a political doctrine which, in the whole of its active development, shall be always fully consequent on its own principles. No existing doc-



trines approach to a fulfilment of this condition: all contain, as indispensable elements, numerous and direct contradictions on the greater number of important points. It may be laid down as a principle that the doctrine which furnishes accordant solutions on the various leading questions of polity, without failing in this one respect in the course of application, must, by this indirect test alone, be recognized as sufficiently adapted to reorganize society; since this intellectual reorganization must mainly consist in re-establishing harmony in the troubled system of our social ideas. When such a regeneration shall have been accomplished in an individual mind (and in that way it must begin), its generalization, sooner or later, is secure; for the number of minds cannot increase the difficulty of the intellectual convergence, but only defer the success. We shall hereafter find how great is the superiority of the positive philosophy in this view; because, once extended to social phenomena, it must connect the different orders of human ideas more completely than could be done in any other way.

The accomplishment of this great logical condition might be expected from the theological polity above all others, because its doctrine is limited to co-ordinating a system so clearly defined by its long application, and so fully developed in all its essential parts, that it may well be supposed secure from all serious inconsistency. The retrograde school accordingly extols habitually, as its characteristic attribute, the perfect coherence of its ideas, in contrast with the contradictions of the revolutionary school. Yet, though the theological polity is less inconsistent than the metaphysical, it shows a daily increasing tendency to concessions of the most radical importance, directly contrary to all its essential principles. This is evidence enough of the futility of a doctrine which does not even possess the one quality most spontaneously correspondent to its nature. The old political system is seen to be destroyed as soon as its most devoted adherents have lost the true general sentiment of it: and this may now be observed, not only in active practice, but among purely speculative minds of a high order, which are unconsciously modified by the irresistible influences of their age. If examples are desired, we need only bring the retrograde doctrine into comparison with the elements of modern civilization. There can be no doubt that the development of the sciences, of industry, and even of the fine arts, was historically the principal, though latent cause, in the first instance, of the irretrievable decline of the theological and military system. At present, it is the ascendancy of the scientific spirit which preserves us from any real restoration of the theological spirit; as, again, the industrial spirit, in its perpetual extension, constitutes our best safeguard against any serious recurrence of the military or feudal spirit. Whatever may be the names given to our political struggles, this is the real character of

our social antagonism. Now, amidst this state of things, do we hear of such a thing as any government, or even any school, seriously proposing a systematic repression of science, industry, and art? Do not all powers (with an eccentric exception here and there) claim the honour of encouraging their progress? Here we have the first inconsistency of the retrograde polity, annulling its own project of a restoration of the past: and though the inconsistency is less apparent than some others, it must be regarded as the most decisive of all, because it is more universal and more instinctive than any other. Napoleon Bonaparte himself, the hero of retrogression in our time, set himself up, in all sincerity, as the protector of industry, art, and science. Purely speculative minds, though more easily separating themselves from any prevalent tendency, have escaped no better from the influence of their times. How many have been the attempts, for instance, for two centuries past, on the part of some of the most eminent minds, to subordinate reason to faith, according to the theological formula; reason itself being made the supreme judge of such a submission, and thus evidencing the contradictory character of the proposition! The most eminent thinker of the Catholic school, the illustrious De Maistre, bore involuntary testimony to the necessity of his time when he endeavoured, in his principal work, to re-establish the papal supremacy on historical and political reasonings, instead of ordaining it by divine right, which is the only ground appropriate to such a doctrine, and the only ground he would have proposed in any age but one in which the general state of intelligence precluded such a plea. Instances like these may spare us further illustration.

As for more direct inconsistencies, more striking, though less profound, and comprehended within the present times, we see in every sect of the retrograde school a direct opposition to some fundamental part of their common doctrine. Perhaps the only point on which there is now any unanimity in that school is in the consent to break up the very basis of the Catholic and feudal system, by surrendering the division between the spiritual and temporal power; or, what comes to the same thing, acquiescing in the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal authority. In this respect, the kings are showing themselves as revolutionary as their peoples; and the priests have ratified their own degradation, in Catholic countries no less than Protestant. If their desire is to restore the old system, their first step must be to unite the innumerable sects which have sprung out of the decline of Christianity: but every attempt of the sort has failed through the blind and obstinate determination of the governments to retain the supreme direction of the theological power, the centralization of which they thus render impossible. Napoleon only showed an exaggerated copy, in his violent inconsistencies, of what many princes had done before him: and after his fall, when the sovereigns o

Europe united to set up a power in opposition to revolutionary tendencies, they usurped the attributes of the old spiritual authority and exhibited the spectacle of a high council composed of heretic chiefs, and governed by a schismatic prince. After this, it was manifestly impossible to introduce the papal power into the alliance, in any way whatever. Such instances of the postponement of religious principles to temporal convenience are not new; but they show how the main idea of the old political system has ceased to preponderate in the minds of the very persons who undertook to restore it. The divisions in the retrograde school have been of late apparent under all circumstances, whether of success or defeat. Any temporary success ought to rally all dissentients, in a school which boasts of the unity of its doctrine: yet, through a long course of years we have witnessed successive, and more and more serious schisms among the subdivisions of the triumphant party. The advocates of Catholicism and those of feudality have quarrelled: and the latter have split into partisans of aristocracy and defenders of royalty. Under the completest restored supremacy, the schisms would only break out again, with more violence, through the incompatibility of the existing social state with the old political system. The vague assent to its general principles which is yielded in a speculative sense, must give way in their application; and every practical development must engender further divisions: and this is the scientific description of any theory which is incompatible with the facts.

When the retrograde party is reduced to the rank of an opposition, it has recourse to the principles of the revolutionary doctrine. This has been the case repeatedly during the last three centuries, when that party has been put upon the defensive. Thus we see the Catholics in England, and yet more in Ireland, asserting the claim of liberty of conscience, while still clamouring for the repression of Protestantism in France, Austria, and elsewhere. Again, when the sovereigns of Europe invoked the aid of the peoples to put down Napoleon, they surrendered their retrograde doctrine, and testified to the power of the critical, as that which was really influencing civilized society, even though they were proposing, all the while, to effect the restoration of the ancient polity. We have seen something even more wonderful since that struggle. We have seen the retrograde party taking possession of the whole body of critical doctrine, endeavouring to systematize it for its own uses, and sanctioning all its anarchical consequences; trying to set up the Catholic and feudal *régime* by the very means which have destroyed it; and believing that a mere change in the person of the sovereign would intercept the consequences of a political movement which they had done nothing to modify.\* This is simply a new way of signing a political abdication, however the ability of those

\* This was written during the reign of Louis Philippe, and the administration of M. Guizot.

who do it may be extolled.—We need not look further for illustrations of the pregnant fact that a polity which is the type of unity and permanence has been full of schisms, and now contains elements directly incompatible with its fundamental principles; and that, as when we find De Maistre reproaching Bossuet with mistaking the nature of Catholicism, and then himself falling into inconsistencies, the party of Order is proposing to re-establish that which is not comprehended by its most illustrious defenders.

Turning now to the Metaphysical polity, we must first observe and carefully remember that its doctrine, though *The Metaphysical polity.* exclusively critical, and therefore revolutionary, has still always had the virtue of being progressive, having, in fact, superintended the chief political progress accomplished during the last three centuries, which must be, in the first instance, essentially negative. What this doctrine had to do was to break up a system which, having directed the early growth of the human mind and society, tended to protract that infantile period: and thus, the political triumph of the metaphysical school was a necessary preparation for the advent of the positive school, for which the task is exclusively reserved of terminating the revolutionary period by the formation of a system uniting Order with Progress. Though the metaphysical system, considered by itself, presents a character of direct anarchy, an historical view of it, such as we shall take hereafter, shows that, considered in its origin, and in its antagonism to the old system, it constitutes a necessary provisional state, and must be dangerously active till the new political organization which is to succeed it is ready to put an end to its agitations.

The passage from one social system to another can never be continuous and direct. There is always a transitional state of anarchy which lasts for some generations at least; and lasts the longer the more complete is the renovation to be wrought. The best political progress that can be made during such a period is in gradually demolishing the former system, the foundations of which had been sapped before. While this inevitable process is going on, the elements of the new system are taking form as political institutions, and the reorganization is stimulated by the experience of the evils of anarchy. There is another reason why the constitution of the new system cannot take place before the destruction of the old; that without that destruction no adequate conception could be formed of what must be done. Short as is our life, and feeble as is our reason, we cannot emancipate ourselves from the influence of our environment. Even the wildest dreamers reflect in their dreams the contemporary social state: and much more impossible is it to form a conception of a true political system, radically different from that amidst which we live. The highest order of minds cannot discern the characteristics of the coming period till they are close upon it; and before that, the incrustations of the old system will have been pretty much broken away, and the popular mind

will have been used to the spectacle of its demolition. The strongest head of all antiquity is an example of this. Aristotle could not conceive of a state of society that was not founded on slavery, the irrevocable abolition of which took place some centuries after him.—These considerations are illustrative of our own times, for which all former transition periods were merely a preparation. Never before was the destined renovation so extensive and so thorough; and never before, therefore, was the critical preparatory period so protracted and so perilous. For the first time in the history of the world, the revolutionary action is attached to a complete doctrine of methodical negation of all regular government. Such being the origin of the existing critical doctrine, we can explain the services which that doctrine has hitherto rendered, and the obstacles which it now opposes to the reorganization of modern society. We shall see hereafter how each of its principal dogmas has sprung out of some corresponding decay in the old social order; a decay which then proceeded all the faster for the opposition having become a dogma. The misfortune of the case lies in the doctrine which was thus necessarily relative to the old system coming by degrees to be supposed absolute: but we may leave it to those who desire it to blame the political conduct of our fathers, without whose energetic perseverance we should not have found ourselves at our present stage of progress, or have been able to conceive of the better polity that is approaching. The absolute or metaphysical spirit was necessary to direct the formation of the critical and anti-theological doctrine, which needed all possible energy to overthrow the great ancient system; and this energy could no otherwise be imparted to the dogmas of the critical philosophy. The necessity and the fact of the case are obvious enough: but not the less must we deplore the consequence,—that the energy imparted to the anarchical principle has gone on to impede the institution of the very political order for which it came to prepare the way. When, in the natural course of events, any doctrine has become hostile to the purposes it was destined to serve, it is evidently done with; and its end, or the close of its activity, is near. We have seen that the retrograde or theological polity has become as disturbing as the metaphysical or revolutionary: if we find also that the latter, whose office was to aid progress, has become obstructive, it is clear that both doctrines are worn out, and must soon be replaced by a new philosophy.—This condition of the metaphysical polity is a matter so serious that we must dwell upon it a little, to see how so provisional an influence can have produced the appearance of a new and stable system.

*Becomes ob-  
structive.*

The spirit of revolutionary polity is to erect into a permanency the temporary action which it prompts. For instance, being in antagonism with ancient order, its tendency is to represent all government as being the

enemy of society, and the duty of society to be to keep up a perpetual suspicion and vigilance, restricting the activity of government more and more, in order to guard against its encroachments, so as to reduce it at length to mere functions of police, in no way participating in the supreme direction of collective action and social development. This was the inevitable action by which the social evolution was brought about: and it is our misfortune that it now remains as an obstacle to the reorganization that we need. As the process could not but occupy several centuries, the power that wrought it must needs be invested with something definitive and absolute in the popular view, which cannot look far beyond the present: and it was well that it was so; for the old system could not have been deprived of its directing powers, if they had not been stripped off from the governments, and assumed by the polity which had arisen to supersede them.

Regarding the doctrine in a more special view, it is clear that its most important principle is the right of free inquiry, or the dogma of unbounded liberty of conscience; involving the immediate consequences of the liberty of the press, or of any other mode of expression, and of communication of opinions. This is the rallying-point of the revolutionary doctrine, to which all orders of minds have come up,—the proud and the humble, the wise and the weak,—those whose other opinions were compatible with this dogma, and those who unconsciously held views of an opposite order. The impulse of this emancipation was irresistible; and the revolutionary contagion was, in this one respect, universal. It is a chief characteristic of the mind of society in this century. The most zealous partisans of the theological polity are as apt as their adversaries to judge by their personal knowledge; and those who, in their writings, set up as defenders of spiritual government, recognize, like the revolutionists whom they attack, no other supreme authority than that of their own reason. Now if we look at what is the real meaning of this dogma of the universal and absolute right of inquiry, we shall find that it is the mere abstract expression (such as is common in metaphysics) of the temporary state of unbounded liberty in which the human mind was left by the decay of the theological philosophy, and which must last till the social advent of the positive philosophy. Such an embodiment of the fact of the absence of intellectual regulation powerfully concurred in expediting the dissolution of the old system. The formula could not but appear absolute at the time, because no one could foresee the scope of the transitional state which it marked; a state which is even now mistaken by many enlightened minds for a definitive one. Negative as we now see this dogma to be, signifying release from old authority while waiting for the necessity of positive science (a necessity which already puts

*Dogma of  
liberty of  
conscience.*

liberty of conscience out of the question in astronomy and physics, etc.), the absolute character supposed to reside in it gave it energy to fulfil its revolutionary destination ; enabled philosophers to explore the principles of a new organization ; and, by admitting the right of all to a similar research, encouraged the discussion which must precede and effect the triumph of those principles. Whenever those principles shall have become established, the right of free inquiry will abide within its natural and permanent limits : that is, men will discuss, under appropriate intellectual conditions, the real connection of various consequences with fundamental rules uniformly respected. Till then, the opinions which will hereafter bring understandings into submission to an exact continuous discipline by embodying the principles of the new social order can appear only as simple individual thoughts, produced in virtue of the right of free inquiry ; since their final supremacy can result in no other way than from the voluntary assent of numbers, after the freest discussion. I shall enter further into this subject hereafter : and what I have said will, I hope, prevent any one being shocked by my general appreciation of the revolutionary dogma of free inquiry, as it is plain that without it this book would never have been written.

Indispensable and salutary as it has been, this dogma can never be an organic principle : and, moreover, it constitutes an obstacle to reorganization, now that its activity is no longer absorbed by the demolition of the old political order. In any case, private or public, the state of inquiry can evidently be only provisional, indicating the condition of mind which precedes and prepares for a final decision, towards which our reason is always tending, even when it is renouncing old principles, in order to form new ones. It is taking the exception for the rule when we set up, as a natural and permanent state, the precarious situation which belongs to the period of transition ; and we ignore the deepest necessities of human reason when we would protract that scepticism which is produced by the passage from one mode of belief to another, and which is, in our need of fixed points of conviction, a kind of morbid perturbation which cannot be prolonged beyond the corresponding crisis without serious danger. To be always examining and never deciding would be regarded as something like madness in private conduct : and no dogmatic consecration of such conduct in all individuals could constitute any perfection of social order, with regard to ideas which it is much more essential, and much more difficult to establish beyond the reach of dispute. There are very few persons who consider themselves fit to sit in judgment on the astronomical, physical, and chemical ideas which are destined to enter into social circulation ; and everybody is willing that those ideas should direct corresponding operations ; and here we see the beginnings of intellectual government. Can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are

accessible to only a small number of highly-prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds? If such an anomaly could be imagined permanent, a dissolution of the social state must ensue, through the ever-growing divergence of individual understandings, delivered over to their disorderly natural impulses in the most vague and easily perverted of all orders of ideas. The speculative inertia common to most minds, and perhaps, to a certain extent, the wise reserve of popular good sense, tend, no doubt, to restrict such political aberrations: but these are influences too feeble to root out the pretension of every man to set himself up as a sovereign arbiter of social theories;—a pretension which every intelligent man blames in others, with a reservation, more or less explicit, of his own personal competency. Now the intellectual reorganization cannot proceed amidst such a state of things, because the convergence of minds requires the renunciation by the greater number of their right of individual inquiry on subjects above their qualifications, and requiring, more than any others, a real and permanent agreement. Then again, the unbridled ambition of ill-prepared intellects rushes in among the most complex and obscure questions: and these disturbances, though they must finally neutralize each other, make terrible devastation in the interval; and each one that is destroyed makes way for another; so that the issue of these controversies is a perpetual aggravation of the intellectual anarchy.

No association whatever, even of the smallest number of individuals, and for the most temporary objects, can subsist without a certain degree of reciprocal confidence, intellectual and moral, among its members, each one of whom has incessantly to act upon views which he must admit on the faith of some one else. If it is so in this limited case, there is something monstrous in proposing the opposite procedure in the case of the whole human race, each one of whom is at an extreme distance from the collective point of view, and is the last person of the whole number fit to judge of the rules by which his personal action should be directed. Be the intellectual development of each and all what it may, social order must ever be incompatible with a perpetual discussion of the foundations of society. Systematic toleration can exist only with regard to opinions which are considered indifferent or doubtful, as we see in that aspect of the revolutionary spirit which takes its stand on Protestantism, where the innumerable Christian sects are too weak to pretend to spiritual dominion, but where there is as fierce an intolerance about any common point of doctrine or discipline as in the Romish Church itself. And when the critical doctrine was, at the beginning of the French Revolution, supposed to be organic, we know how the directors of the movement strove to obtain a general assent, voluntary or forced, to the dogmas of the revolutionary philosophy, which they regarded as the bases of social order, and therefore above controversy. We



shall see hereafter what are the due limits of the right of free inquiry, in a general way, and in regard to our own social period. It is enough to observe here that political good sense has adopted, to express the first requisite of all organization, that fine axiom of the Catholic Church ; *in necessary things, unity : in doubtful things, liberty : in all things, charity* :—a maxim which admirably proposes the problem, without, however, suggesting the principles by which it must be solved, and that unity attained which would be a mere illusion if it did not result, in the first instance, from free discussion.

The dogma which ranks next in importance to that of free inquiry is that of Equality ; and in the same way, it is taken to be absolute when it is only relative, and permanent, while it expresses merely the position of minds employed in breaking up the old system. It is an immediate consequence of liberty of conscience, which brings after it the most fundamental equality of all,—that of intelligence. The supposition of its being absolute was not less necessary in this case than the former : for, if all social classification had not been systematically disallowed, the old corporations would have preserved their sway, from the impossibility of their conceiving of any other classification. To this day we have no sufficiently distinct notion ourselves of such an arrangement as would be truly appropriate to a new state of civilization. When the dogma of equality had achieved the overthrow of the old politics, it could not but become an obstacle to any reorganization, because its activity must then be directed against the bases of any new classification whatever ; for, of course, any classification must be incompatible with the equality that was claimed for all. Since the abolition of slavery, there has been no denial, from any quarter, of the right of every man (innocent of strong anti-social conduct) to expect from all others the fulfilment of the conditions necessary to the natural development of his personal activity, suitably directed : but beyond that undisputed right, men cannot be made, because they are not, equal, nor even equivalent ; and they cannot therefore possess, in a state of association, any identical rights beyond the great original one. The simple physical inequalities which fix the attention of superficial observers are much less marked than intellectual and moral differences ; and the progress of civilization tends to increase these more important differences, as much as to lessen the inferior kind : and, applied to any assemblage of persons thus developed, the dogma of equality becomes anarchical, and directly hostile to its original destination.

The second result of the dogma of liberty of conscience is the Sovereignty of the people : and, like the former, it wrought at first the double service of destroying the old *régime* and preparing for a new one. Till the final system could be constituted, the only safeguard against the renewed supremacy of the old one was in the setting up of provisional

*Dogma of the  
Sovereignty of  
the People.*

institutions, which the peoples claimed the absolute right to change at will. It was only by means of the doctrine of popular sovereignty that that succession of political endeavours could take place which must precede the installation of a true system of government, whenever the intellectual renovation of society shall be sufficiently advanced to settle the conditions and natural extent of the different sovereignties. Meanwhile, in discharging its function, this dogma proves its revolutionary character before our eyes, by opposing all reorganization, condemning, as it does, all the superior to an arbitrary dependence on the multitude of the inferior; by a kind of transference to the peoples of the divine right which had become the opprobrium of kings.

The revolutionary spirit of the critical doctrine manifests itself no less clearly when we look at international relations. The necessity of order being in this case more equivocal and obscure, the absence of all regulating power has been more ingenuously declared than in other cases. When the ancient spiritual power was politically annulled, the dissolution of European order followed spontaneously from the principle of liberty of conscience; and the most natural papal function was at an end. Till the new social organization shall show us the law by which the nations shall become once more connected, the metaphysical notions of national isolation, and therefore of mutual non-intervention, must prevail; and they will be regarded as absolute till it appears how they defeat their own end. As all attempts at European co-ordination must otherwise be directed by the ancient system, we owe to the doctrine of national independence our rescue from the monstrous arrangement of the most civilized nations being politically subordinated to the least advanced, because the latter were least changed from their ancient state, and would be sure therefore to be placed at the head of such an association. But, if such a doctrine were more than provisional, the nations would sink below their state in the Middle Ages; and at the very time when they are marked out, by an ever-growing resemblance, for an association more extensive, and at the same time more regular, than that which was proposed by the old Catholic and feudal system. It is clear that when the dogma of national isolation has fulfilled its function of separating the nations, in order to a preparation for a new union, its further action must be as purely anarchical as that of its predecessors.

*Dogma of National Independence.*

A brief notice of the logical inconsistency of the revolutionary doctrine will conclude our preliminary review of it.

This inconsistency is more radical and more manifest than in the case of the retrograde or theological doctrine; but it does not imply so utter a condemnation; not only on account of its recent formation, but because such a vice does not prevent its fulfilling its critical office.

*Inconsistency of the Metaphysical doctrine.*

Notwithstanding profound differences, the adversaries of the old polity found no difficulty in uniting for successive partial demolitions about which they were agreed, postponing till their period of success their contests about the ulterior developments of their doctrine; a course which would be impossible in the case of any organic operation, in which each part must be considered in its relation to the whole. Thus far only, however, can the inconsistency be tolerated. When once the whole of any doctrine becomes hostile to its original purposes, it is condemned: and this is true of the metaphysical doctrine, which at once opposes the progress it professed to aid, and sustains the foundations of the political system it proposed to destroy.

Its culminating-point was at the most marked period of the first French Revolution, when it was, by an unavoidable illusion, taken to be the principle of social reorganization. It was then seen in its best aspect of consistency and power; and then it was that, the ancient system being disposed of, its vices became apparent. It showed itself hostile to all social reorganization, and became actually retrograde in its character by setting itself up in violent opposition to the movement of modern civilization. For one illustration, look

*Notion of a  
state of Na-  
ture.*

at the strange metaphysical notion of a supposed state of nature, which was to be the primitive and invariable type of every social state. This doctrine is not to be attributed to Rousseau alone. It is that of all philosophers, in all times and countries, who have unconsciously concurred in developing the revolutionary metaphysical doctrine which Rousseau, by his urgent dialectics, only pushed to its real conclusions. His doctrine, which represents a state of civilization as an ever-growing degeneracy from the primitive ideal type, is common to all modern metaphysicians; and we shall see hereafter that it is only the metaphysical form of the theological dogma of the degradation of the human race by original sin. According to such a principle, all political reformation must be regarded as destined to re-establish that primitive state: and what is that but organizing a universal retrogradation, though with progressive intentions? The applications of this doctrine have been in conformity to its philosophical constitution. When it was necessary to replace the feudal and Catholic *régime*, men did not fix their contemplation on the social future, but summoned up their imperfect remembrances of a very distant past, trying to substitute for a decrepit system a more ancient and decrepit system still, but, for that very reason, nearer to the primitive type. Instead of a worn-out Catholicism, they proposed a sort of metaphysical polytheism, at the same time that, in polity, they desired to replace the Middle Age system by the radically inferior *régime* of the Greeks and Romans. The very elements of modern civilization, the only possible germs of a new social state, were endangered by barbaric condemnation of the

industrial and artistic advancement of modern society, in the name of primitive virtue and simplicity. Even the scientific spirit, which is the only principle of intellectual organization, was stigmatized as tending to institute an aristocracy of knowledge which was as incompatible as any other aristocracy with the original equality that was to be set up again. Lavoisier was the martyr of this state of opinion; and it is his case that will illustrate the period to our remotest posterity. It is useless for the metaphysical school to represent such results as portentous or eccentric incidents. Their legitimate descent from the revolutionary polity is evident and certain; and we should witness a repetition of them if it were possible (which it is not) for this polity to become prevalent again. The tendency to social retrogradation, under the idea of returning to the primitive state, so thoroughly belongs to the metaphysical polity, that the new sects who, in their brief day, have most haughtily censured the revolutionary imitation of Greek and Roman types, have unconsciously reproduced the same error in a far more marked way by striving to re-establish the confusion between the temporal and spiritual power, and extolling, as the highest social perfection, a return to the Egyptian or Hebrew theocracy, founded on fetichism, disguised under the name of pantheism.

As the metaphysical doctrine was the issue of the theological, and destined to modify it, it was a matter of course *Adhesion to the worn-out.* that it should vindicate the general foundations of the old system, even after having destroyed its chief conditions of existence. Every reformer, for three centuries past, while urging the development of the critical spirit further than his predecessors, assumed to set immutable bounds to it; deriving his limitations from the old system. All the absolute rights proclaimed as the basis of the new doctrine were guaranteed by a sort of religious consecration, in the last resort; and this was indispensable, if their efficacy was not to be impaired by continual discussion. It was always with an invocation of the principles of the old polity on their lips that the reformers proceeded to demolish the spiritual and temporal institutions in which they were embodied; and the whole *régime* fell through the conflict of its chief elements. Hence there arose, in the intellectual region, a Christianity more and more attenuated or simplified, and reduced at last to that vague and impotent theism which, by a monstrous conjunction of terms, metaphysicians have entitled *Natural Religion*, as if all religion were not necessarily supernatural. The pretension to direct a social reorganization by this strange conception is merely a recurrence to the old principle that social order must rest on a theological basis. This is now the most fatal inconsistency of the revolutionary school; and while armed with such a concession, the advocates of Catholicism will always have an incontestable logical superiority over the irrational defamers of the old faith, who proclaim the need of a

religious organization, and yet disallow all the necessary conditions. It is clear that society would be condemned to a perpetuity of the intellectual anarchy which characterizes it at present if it were to be for ever made up of minds which admit the want of a theological *régime* on the one hand, while on the other they reject its principal conditions of existence; and those who thus acknowledge themselves incapable have no right to discredit the only rational way to reorganization which remains open, and by which every other order of human conceptions has been happily retrieved and established. The social application of the positive philosophy remains as the resource, and the only resource, after the failure of both the preceding systems.

In its temporal application the inconsistency of the metaphysical doctrine is as conspicuous as in the spiritual. It *Recurrence to war.* strives to preserve, if not the feudal, at least the military spirit, in which the feudal had its origin. The French nation did, it is true, in their revolutionary enthusiasm, proscribe war from that time forward: but when the armed coalition of the retrograde forces of Europe brought out an immense amount of energy for self-defence, for the sake of the progressive movement, the sentiment, which was grounded on no principle, soon disappeared, and France was distinguished by the most conspicuous military activity, invested with its most oppressive characteristics. The military spirit is in fact so congenial with the critical doctrine that any pretext will serve for its indulgence: as for instance, when it is proposed to regulate by war the action of the more advanced nations upon the less advanced. The true logical consequence of this would be a universal uproar; but, happily, the nature of modern civilization saves us from the danger. The tendency of the critical *régime* in this respect is shown by the perpetual endeavours of the various sections of the revolutionary school to reinstate the memory of the man who, of all others, strove for political retrogradation, by wasting an enormous amount of power in the restoration of the military and theological system.

Before quitting the subject of the inconsistencies of this school, I must, in justice, point out one more contradiction *Principle of Political Centralization.* which, as being of a progressive character, is honourable to those most advanced minds which entertain it, and which alone understand its necessity, opposed as it is to the dogmas of independence and isolation which constitute the spirit of the critical school. I refer to the principle of political centralization. The two parties seem here to have changed sides. The retrograde doctrine, notwithstanding its proud pretensions to order and unity, preaches the distribution of political centres, in the secret hope of preserving the old system yet a while longer among the most backward of the populations, by keeping them aloof from the

general centres of civilization; while the revolutionary policy, on the other hand, proud of having withstood, in France, the coalition of the old powers, discards its own maxims to recommend the subordination of the secondary to the principal centres by which such a noble stand has already been made, and which must become a most valuable auxiliary of reorganization. Thus alone can the reorganization be, in the first place, restricted to a choice population. In brief, the revolutionary school alone has understood that the increasing anarchy of the time, intellectual and moral, requires, to prevent a complete dislocation of society, a growing concentration of political action, properly so called.

Thus, after three centuries, employed in the necessary demolition of the ancient *régime*, the critical doctrine shows itself as incapable of other application, and as inconsistent as we have now seen it to be. It is no more fit to secure Progress than the old doctrine to maintain Order. But, feeble as they are apart, they actually sustain each other by their very antagonism. It is universally understood that neither can ever again achieve a permanent triumph: but so strong is the apprehension of even the temporary preponderance of either, that the general mind, for want of a more rational point of support, employs each doctrine in turn to restrain the encroachments of the other. This miserable oscillation of our social life must proceed till a real doctrine, as truly organic as progressive, shall reconcile for us the two aspects of the great political problem. Then, at last, the two opposite doctrines will disappear for ever in the new conception that will be seen to be completely adapted to fulfil the destination of both. Often has each party, blinded by some temporary success, believed that it had annihilated the other; and never has the event failed to mock the ignorant exultation. The critical doctrine seemed to have humbled for ever the Catholic-feudal school; but that school arose again. Napoleon thought he had accomplished a retrograde reaction; but the very energy of his efforts caused a reaction in favour of revolutionary principles. And thus society continues to vibrate between conflicting influences; and those influences continue to exist only by their mutual neutralization. For that purpose only, indeed, are they now ever applied. Neither could be spared before the advent of the state which is to succeed them. Without the one, we should lose the sentiment of Order, and without the other, that of Progress: and the keeping alive this sentiment, on either hand, is the only practical efficacy which now remains to them. Feeble as the conception must be, in the absence of any principle which unites the two requisites, it is preserved by the presence of the two decaying systems; and they keep before the minds of both philosophers and the public the true conditions of social reorganization, which otherwise our feeble nature might misconceive or lose sight of. Having the two types before us, we see

the solution of the great problem to be, to form a doctrine which shall be more organic than the theological, and more progressive than the metaphysical.

The old political system can be no pattern for a *régime* suitable to a widely different civilization ; but we are not under the less obligation to study it, in order to learn what are the essential attributes of all social organization, which must reappear in an improved state in the future. The general conception of the theological and military system even seems to me to have passed too much out of sight. And, as to the Critical system, there can be no question of its affording, by its progressive character, and its exposure of the preceding *régime*, a most valuable stimulus to society to seek for something better than mere modifications of systems that have failed. The common complaint that it renders all government impossible, is a mere avowal of impotence on the part of those who utter it. Whatever are its imperfections, it fulfilled for a time one of the two requisites : its abolition would in no way assist the re-establishment of Order ; and no declamations against the revolutionary philosophy will affect the instinctive attachment of society to principles which have directed its political progress for three centuries past, and which are believed to represent the indispensable conditions of its future development. Each of its dogmas affords an indication of how the improvement is to be effected. Each expresses the political aspect of certain high moral obligations which the retrograde school, with all its pretensions, was compelled to ignore, because its system had lost all power to fulfil them. In this way, the dogma of Free Inquiry decides that the spiritual reorganization must result from purely intellectual action, providing for a final voluntary and unanimous assent, without the disturbing intervention of any heterogeneous power. Again, the dogmas of Equality and the Sovereignty of the people devolve on the new powers and classes of society the duty of a public-spirited social conduct, instead of working the many for the interests of the few. The old system practised these moralities in its best days ; but they are now maintained only by the revolutionary doctrine, which it would be fatal to part with till we have some substitute in these particular respects ; for the effect would be that we should be delivered over to the dark despotism of the old system ;—to the restorers of religions, for instance, who, if proselytism failed, would have recourse to tyranny to compel unity, if once the principle of free inquiry were lost from among us.

It is useless to declaim against the critical philosophy, and to deplore, in the name of social order, the dissolving energy of the spirit of analysis and inquiry. It is only by their use that we can obtain materials for reorganization ; materials which shall have been thoroughly tested by free discussion, carried on till general conviction is secured. The philosophy which will arise out of this

satisfaction of the public reason will then assign the rational limits which must obviate the abuse of the analytical spirit, by establishing that distinction in social matters, between the field of reasoning and that of pure observation, which we have found already marked out in regard to every other kind of science.

Though consigned, by the course of events, to a negative doctrine for a while, society has never renounced the laws of human reason: and when the proper time arrives, society will use the rights of this reason to organize itself anew, on principles which will then have been ascertained and estimated. The existing state of no-government seems necessary at present, in order to that ascertainment of principles; but it does not at all follow, as some eccentric individuals seem to think, that the right of inquiry imposes the duty of never deciding. The prolonged indecision proves merely that the principles which are to close the deliberation are not yet sufficiently established. In the same way, because society claims the right of choosing and varying its institutions and governing powers, it by no means follows that the right is for ever to be used in choosing and varying, when its indefinite use shall have become injurious. When the right conditions shall have been ascertained, society will submit its choice to the rules which will secure its efficacy; and in the interval, nothing can be more favourable to future order than that the political course should be kept open, to admit of the free rise of the new social system. As it happens, the peoples have, thus far, erred on the side of too hasty a desire for reorganization, and a too generous confidence in every promise of social order, instead of having shown the systematic distrust attributed to the revolutionary doctrine by those whose worn-out claims will not bear discussion. There is more promise of political reorganization in the revolutionary doctrine than in the retrograde, though it is the supreme claim of the latter to be the safeguard of social Order.

Such is the vicious circle in which we are at present confined. We have seen what is the antagonism of two doctrines *The Stationary doctrine.* that are powerless apart, and have no operation but in neutralizing each other. They have lost their activity as preponderating influences, and are seen now in the form of political debate, which they daily direct by the one furnishing all the essential ideas of government, and the other the principles of opposition. At shorter and shorter intervals, a partial and transient superiority is allowed to the one or the other, when its antagonist threatens danger. Out of these oscillations a third opinion has arisen, which is constructed out of their ruins, and takes its station between them. I suppose we must give the name of Doctrine to this intermediate opinion, bastard and inconsistent as is its character; for it is presented by very earnest doctors, who urge it upon us as a type of the final political philosophy. We must call it the Stationary Doctrine; and we see it, in virtue of that quality, occupying the



scene of politics, among the most advanced people, for above a quarter of a century. Essentially provisional as it is, the Stationary school naturally serves as a guide to society in preserving the material order, without which a true doctrine could not have its free growth. It may be necessary for our weakness that the leaders of this school should suppose that they have a doctrine which is destined to triumph; but whatever benefits arise from their action are much impaired by the mistake of supposing our miserable transition state a permanent type of the social condition. The stationary polity not only contains inconsistencies, but it is itself inconsistency erected into a principle. It acknowledges the essential principles of the other systems, but prevents their action. Disdainful of Utopias, it proposes the wildest of them all;—that of fixing society for ever in a contradictory position between retrogradation and regeneration. The theory serves to keep in check the other two philosophies; and this may be a good: but, on the other hand, it helps to keep them alive; and it is, in so far, an obstacle to reorganization. When I present my historical review of society, I shall explain the special assemblage of social conditions which gave England her parliamentary monarchy, so lauded by the school of mixed doctrine, but, in fact, an exceptional institution, whose inevitable end cannot be very far off. When we enter upon that analysis, we shall see how great is the error of philosophers and statesmen when they have taken up a singular and transient case as the solution of the revolutionary crisis of modern societies, and have endeavoured to transplant on the European continent a purely local system, which would be deprived in the process of its very roots: for it is an organized Protestantism which is its main spiritual basis in England. The expectation attached to this single specious aspect of the stationary doctrine will make a future examination of it important; and we shall then see how hopeless is the constitutional metaphysics of the balance of powers, judged by that instance which serves as the common ground of such social fictions. After all the vast efforts made to nationalize elsewhere the stationary compromise, it has never succeeded anywhere but in its native land; and this proves its powerlessness in regard to the great social problem. The only possible result is that the mischief should pass from the acute to the chronic state, becoming incurable by the recognition as a principle of the transient antagonism which is its chief symptom. Its principal merit is that it admits the double aspect of the social problem, and the necessity of reconciling Order and Progress: but it introduces no new idea; and its recognition amounts therefore to nothing more than an equal sacrifice, when necessary, of the one and the other. The order that it protects is a merely material order; and it therefore fails in that function precisely in crises when it is most wanted. On the other hand, this function continues to be attributed to

royalty, which is the only power of the old polity that is still active : now, the balance which is instituted by the stationary doctrine surrounds the royal power with bonds that are always tightening, while declaring that royal power to be the chief basis of the government. It is only a question of time when the function of sovereignty, thus embarrassed, shall cease, and the pretended balance be destroyed. This parliamentary polity serves the cause of progress no better than that of order : for, as it proposes no new principle, the restraints which it puts upon the revolutionary spirit are all derived from the ancient system, and therefore tend to become more and more retrograde and oppressive. An example of this is, the restrictions on the right of election ; restrictions always derived from irrational material conditions, which, being arbitrary in their character, oppress and irritate, without answering their proposed purpose, and leave the multitude of the excluded much more offended than the small number of the privileged are gratified.

There is no need to say more in this place of the mixed or Stationary doctrine, which is, in fact, only a last phase of the metaphysical polity. The reader cannot but see that a theory so precarious and subaltern, so far from being able to reorganize modern society, can only regulate, by protracting, the political conflict, and discharge the negative office of preventing kings from retrograding and peoples from destroying. Whatever the value of this service may be, we cannot expect regeneration to be accomplished by means of impediments.

We have now seen the worth of these three systems. To complete our conviction of the need of a better, we must briefly notice the chief social dangers which result from the deplorable protraction of such an intellectual condition, and which must, from their nature, be aggravated from day to day. The dangers are imputable to all the three systems ; though the revolutionary and stationary systems assume that the blame of our disorders rests with the retrograde school : but they are certainly no less guilty ; for, powerless to discover the remedy, they protract the mischief, and embarrass the treatment. And again, the discordance between the movement of governments and of their peoples is to be attributed quite as much to the hostile spirit of the directing power as to the anarchical tendency of popular opinions. The social perturbations, the aspects of which we are about to examine, proceed no less from the kings than from their peoples, with this aggravated disgrace,—that it seems as if the solution ought to emanate from the kings.

The first, the most fatal, and the most universal consequence of this situation is the alarming and ever-widening extent of the intellectual anarchy which all acknowledge, however they may differ about its cause and termination. This evil is charged almost exclusively on the revolutionary philosophy ;

*Dangers of the  
critical period.*

*Intellectual  
anarchy.*

and that school too readily admits the charge. But, as we have seen, that doctrine does not prohibit decision, when the requisite grounds are ascertained: and it is the stationary theory that ought to bear the blame of the absence of those grounds: and yet more the retrograde, which is chargeable with urging the restoration of the same worn-out principles which, by their decrepitude, have caused all this anarchy. The stationary school does not want to hear of any such principles, and interdicts them; and the retrograde school insists that the old ones will do over again. So that, if the revolutionary school first encouraged the anarchy, the other two protract it.

Of all questions, there are none which have so much claim as social problems to be consigned to a small number of choice minds which shall have been prepared by a high order of discipline and instruction for the investigation of questions so complex and so mixed up with human passions. Such is, at least, the natural state of the human mind, in contrast with which its condition in revolutionary periods may be regarded as, in a manner, pathological, however inevitable. The social malady must be very serious when we see all manner of persons, however inferior their intelligence, and however unprepared, stimulated, in the highest manner, and from day to day, to cut the knot of the most intricate political questions, without any guidance or restraint. The wonder is, not that the divergence of opinion is what it is, but that any points of agreement at all are left amidst all this dissolution of social maxims. The evil has reached such a point that all political opinions, though of course derived from one of the three schools, differ through so many degrees as to become individual;—through all degrees, in fact, that the combination of three orders of vicious principles admits of. Except on occasion of emergency, when there is a temporary coalition (amidst which each one usually hopes to have his own way) it becomes more and more difficult to make even a very small number of minds adhere to a plain and explicit profession of political faith. This inability to co-operate prevails in all the three camps,—as we ought carefully to observe: and each party has often, in its ingenuous moments, bitterly deplored the intense disagreement with which it supposed itself to be especially afflicted; whereas, the others were no better organized; and the chief difference in the three cases was that each was most acutely sensible of its own misery.

In countries where this intellectual anarchy has been sanctioned by the political preponderance of Protestantism, the divergences have been more multiplied than elsewhere, without being less serious. It could not but be so from the tendency of the general mind, in its then infantile state, to use its new emancipation to plunge into the indefinite discussion of religious opinions—(the most vague and discordant of all),—in the absence of a restraining spiritual authority.

In the United States, for instance, there are hundreds of Christian sects, radically discordant, and incessantly parting off into opinions which are really little more than individual, which it is impossible to classify, and which are already becoming implicated with innumerable political differences. The nations which, like the French, have escaped the treacherous stage of Protestantism, and have passed at once from the Catholic to the fully revolutionary state, were not, on that account, entirely exempt from the intellectual anarchy inherent in any prolonged exercise of the absolute right of free individual inquiry. All that can be said is that their aberrations, without being less anti-social, have a less vague character, and are less in the way of the final reorganization. They arise, take possession for a while of even healthy and well-trained intellects, and then give place to others that have their day, and in their turn are superseded. In our time, we hear of proposals, entertained here and there even by men who know what positive science is in some one department of study, which it is a shock to one's hopes to see so advocated; proposals, for instance, to abolish money and recur to a state of barter; to destroy the great capitals in order to restore rural innocence; to have a fixed rate of wages, and the same rate for every kind of labour, and so forth. Such opinions are daily given out, side by side with those which are the most philosophical and the most carefully elaborated; and none have any chance of being established under the rule of any intellectual discipline whatever, though the wise are compromised with the foolish in the eyes of public reason. The inevitable result of such a chronic epidemic is the gradual destruction of the public *morale*, which is not sustained, among the generality of men, so much by the direct sentiment as by habit, guided by the uniform assent of individual wills to invariable and general rules, adapted to fix, on every serious occasion, the true idea of the public good. So complex is the nature of social questions that there is much that is to be said on all sides; and there is no institution, however indispensable, which does not involve serious and numerous inconveniences, more or less partial and transient; and, on the other hand, there is no Utopia so wild as not to offer some incontestable advantages: and few are the minds which are not so preoccupied by ideas, or stimulated by passion, as to be able to contemplate at once all the aspects of any social subject. Thus it is that almost all the great maxims of public morality are condemned on account of their salient faults, while their determining grounds are hidden till exhibited by an exact analysis, which must in many cases be extremely delicate. Thus, again, it is that all true moral order is incompatible with the existing vagabond liberty of individual minds if such license were to last; for the great social rules which should become customary cannot be abandoned to the blind and arbitrary decision of an incompetent public without losing all their efficacy. The

*Destruction  
of public  
morality.*

requisite convergence of the best minds cannot be obtained without the voluntary renunciation, on the part of most of them, of their sovereign right of free inquiry, which they will doubtless be willing to abdicate, as soon as they have found organs worthy to exercise appropriately their vain provisional supremacy. If it is so in problems of science, there is every reason to expect it in the more difficult questions of social principle. Meanwhile, all vague notions of public good, degenerating into an indistinct philanthropy, must succumb to the energetic forces of a highly stimulated selfishness. In the daily course of our political conflicts we see accordingly the most conscientious men taxing each other with wickedness and folly; and, on every serious occasion, the most opposite doctrines maintained by persons equally worthy of confidence: and, while all deep and steady conviction is thus rendered impossible, no true political morality can be hoped for by those who desire it most.

This public demoralization has, it must be admitted, been sensibly retarded, in our time, by the preponderance of that revolutionary doctrine which has borne the imputation of causing it; for the revolutionary party, progressive in character, could not but be animated, more than the others, by sincere convictions, which, in their depth and activity, must tend to restrain, and even annihilate, individual selfishness. This was especially remarkable during the season when the revolutionary doctrine was, by a general illusion, supposed to be destined to reorganize society. Under the impulse of this persuasion, the strongest social devotedness that can shed honour upon contemporary history was manifested. But this could be only for a time. As the illusion disappeared, the convictions which arose from it became first weakened, and then mingled with the influences of the stationary, and even the retrograde polity: and though they are still of a higher order than those which are inspired by the other doctrines, and especially among the young, they have not energy to resist the dissolving action of the revolutionary philosophy, even among its own advocates; so that this philosophy now contributes, almost as much as its two antagonists, to the spread of political demoralization.

Private morality is, happily, much less dependent on established opinions. Other conditions enter into this case; and in the commonest questions, natural sentiment is far more operative than in public relations. Disorganizing influences are strongly counteracted by the continuous amelioration of our manners, through a more equable intellectual development, by a juster sense and more familiar taste for the various fine arts, and by the gradual improvement of social condition in consequence of steady industrial progress. The common rules of domestic and personal morality have guarded private life longer than political from the invasion of disorganizing influences, and the intrusion of individual analysis. But the time has arrived for these inevitable

disturbances, long concealed, to manifest their dangerous activity. So long ago as the first rise of the revolutionary state, this deleterious influence on morality, properly so called, began with a serious innovation on the institution of Marriage, which would have been radically changed, by the permission of divorce in Protestant countries, if public decency and private good sense had not, up to this time, weakened the pernicious effects of theologico-metaphysical extravagances. Still, private morality could be reached only through the destruction of political morals: and now, that barrier being broken through, the dissolving action threatens domestic, and even personal morality, which is the necessary foundation of every other. Whichever way we look at it, whether as to the relations of the sexes, to those of ages, or of conditions, it is clear that the elements of all social life are directly compromised by a corrosive discussion which is not directed by true principles, and which brings into question, without the possibility of solution, even the least important ideas of duty. Even the Family, which, amidst the fiercest revolutionary tumults, had been on the whole respected, has been assailed in our day in its very foundations, by attacks on the hereditary principle and on marriage. We have even seen the commonest principle of personal morality, the subjection of the passions to reason, denied by pretended reformers who, in defiance of all experience and such positive science as we have, have proposed as a fundamental dogma of their regenerated morality, the systematic dominion of the passions, which they have striven, not to restrain, but to excite by the strongest stimulants. These speculations have so far penetrated social life, that any one is now at liberty to make an easy merit of the most turbulent passions; so that, if such license could last, insatiable stomachs might at length get to pride themselves on their own voracity. It is in vain for the retrograde school to throw the blame of all this on the revolutionary school. The censure rests upon themselves, inasmuch as they have persisted in extolling, as the only intellectual bases of social duty, principles which have betrayed their impotence in this very case; for, if theological conceptions are, in truth, the immutable bases of future as well as past morality, how is it that they now fail to obviate such license? What are we to think of the attempt to shore up by laborious artifices, the religious principles which are proposed, after they have lost their strength, as the only supports of moral order? No supreme function can be assigned to convictions that have themselves given way before the development of human reason, which is not likely to use its mature power to reconstruct the bonds which it broke through in the efforts of its youth. It is remarkable that the license I have spoken of has been proposed by the ardent restorers of religious theories, in their exasperation against all positive philosophy; and this has, for some time past, been the case with Protestant, no less than Catholic

advocates. So far from furnishing bases for morality, domestic or personal, religious convictions have long tended to its injury, both by hindering its erection on more solid foundations among those who are free from their control, and by being insufficient for their own subjects, without the active intervention of a sacerdotal authority; that authority meanwhile perpetually losing its hold over the more advanced populations, and being more and more absorbed by the care of its own preservation, instead of venturing upon any unpopular scheme of discipline. Daily experience shows that the ordinary morality of religious men is not, at present, in spite of our intellectual anarchy, superior to that of the average of those who have quitted the churches. The chief practical tendency of religious convictions is, in our present social life, to inspire an instinctive and insurmountable hatred against all who have emancipated themselves, without any useful emulation having arisen from the conflict. Thus the chief assaults, direct and indirect, on private as well as public morality, are as strictly imputable to the stationary, and yet more to the retrograde, than to the revolutionary philosophy, which is commonly made to bear all the blame. It is indeed but too evident that the three doctrines are almost equally powerless to restrain the development of individual selfishness, which grows bolder, from day to day, in clamouring for the license of the least social passions, in the name of universal intellectual anarchy.

The second characteristic of our condition follows from the first.

*Political  
corruption.*

It is the systematic corruption which is set up as an indispensable instrument of government. The three doctrines bear their share, though it may be an unequal one, in this disgraceful result, because all exclude, as we have seen, true political convictions. Amidst the absence, or the discredit, of general ideas, which have now no power to command genuine acts, there is no other daily resource for the maintenance of even a rough and precarious order than an appeal, more or less immediate, to personal interests. Such an influence is scarcely ever needed with men of deep convictions. Even in the lower order of characters, human nature is rarely so debased as to allow a course of political conduct in opposition to any strong convictions; and such contrariety, if persevered in, would soon paralyse the faculties. In the scientific class, in which philosophical convictions are at present most common and best marked, active corruption is scarcely practicable, though minds are there much of the same quality as they are elsewhere. Thus, exceptional cases apart, the rapid spread of a corruption which avails itself of the half-convictions that are prevalent in the political world must be attributed mainly to the undecided and fluctuating state in which social ideas are kept by the intellectual anarchy of our time. Not only does this disorder of minds permit the political corruption: it even requires it, as the only means of obtaining any sort of practical convergence,

such as is necessary for the mere preservation of the social state in its grossest interests : and we must prepare ourselves for the continuous extension of the evil, as long as intellectual anarchy goes on destroying all strong political conviction. Rulers and the ruled are alike guilty in regard to this vice : the rulers by their disdain of all social theory ; by their repression of mind, and by their application of the instrument which they cannot dispense with to their own, instead of the general interest ; and the ruled by their acceptance of the proffered corruption, and by their intellectual condition rendering the use of it inevitable. If individuals cannot co-operate on any other ground than that of private interest, they have no right to complain that governments take the same ground to procure the assistance that they cannot dispense with, during a period in which it is scarcely possible to see clearly what the public good really consists in. All that can be said for such a state of things is that matters would be worse if individual eccentricities were not somewhat restrained by personal interest, in the absence of better influences ; and that it is the natural result of the situation to which it applies, and therefore certainly destined to disappear whenever society shall begin to admit of a better discipline. Till then we must expect to see this miserable expedient more and more resorted to ; as is proved by the constant experience of all peoples living under a prolonged constitutional or representative *régime*, as we now call it, always compelled to organize in this manner a certain material discipline in the midst of a complete intellectual, and therefore moral anarchy. All that we have a right to require is that governments, instead of welcoming this disastrous necessity, and making an eager use of the facilities it offers, should set themselves to favour, systematically, by all the means at their command, the great philosophical elaboration through which modern society may enter upon a better course.

By corruption, I do not mean only direct venality, nor yet the holding of honorary distinctions which are merely flattering to the vanity. The scope offered to various kinds of ambition is a more corrupting influence. In some countries this had been carried so far, in the form of creation of offices, that nations are farmed by the functionaries of their governments. The danger of such a course is obvious enough ; for the number of aspirants, where offices are very numerous, must always largely exceed that of the chosen ; and their disappointment must awaken passions anything but favourable to the established *régime*. Moreover, the practice must spread the more it is resorted to ; and it will go on extending till the time for social reorganization has arrived. Here, again, all the three schools must share the blame. The Revolutionary school supplied, as we have seen, the dissolving influence which rendered the system of corruption necessary. The Stationary school even sets it up as a type, declaring the equal admission of all to public



functions to be the final destination of the general social movement ; and aggravating the case by connecting the conditions of order with the mere possession of fortune, however obtained. As for the Retrograde school, with all its pretensions to moral purity, it employs corruption as fatally as the other two, under the special form which it appropriates,—that of systematic hypocrisy. From the opening of the revolutionary period, in the sixteenth century, this system of hypocrisy has been more and more elaborated in practice, permitting the emancipation of all minds of a certain bearing, on the tacit condition that they should aid in protracting the submission of the masses. This was, eminently, the policy of the Jesuits. Thus has the retrograde school suffered under this vice as early as the others ; and it cannot but resort to corruption more and more, in proportion to its own opposition to the general movement of the society which it pretends to rule.

This, then, is our state. For want of a moral authority, material order requires the use of either terror or corruption ; and the latter is both more durable, less inconvenient, and more accordant with the nature of modern society than the former. But, while admitting the inevitable character of the evil, it is impossible not to lament, bitterly and mournfully, the blindness which prevents the social powers of our time from facilitating to the utmost the philosophical evolution by which alone we can issue into a better state. It seems as if statesmen of all parties were agreed to close this sole avenue of safety by visiting with stupid reprobation all elaboration of social theories. This again, however, is only another consequence of the present state of the most civilized nations ; and, as a consequence, not less necessary or characteristic than those that have gone before.

The third symptom of our social situation is the growing preponderance of material and immediate considerations in regard to political questions. There is something more concerned here than the ordinary antagonism between theory and practice, aggravated by the weakness of attempts at theory in an infantile period of social science. The repugnance to theory is further attributable to the historical circumstance that when, three centuries ago, the spiritual power was finally annulled or absorbed by the temporal, all lofty social speculations were more and more devolved upon minds which were always pre-occupied by practical affairs. Thus kings and their peoples concurred in exalting the lower order of considerations ; and the tendency belonged to all the three schools of polity. If the crowning evil of our time be its intellectual anarchy, it is clear that we cannot too strongly lament this irrational unanimity of the political world in closing the path of progress by proscribing speculative researches. We see the consequences in our experience of the past century. In seeking social reorganization, men

*Low aims  
of political  
questions.*

*Fatal to  
Progress.*

have not first looked to the doctrines of a new social order, and then to the corresponding manners; but have gone straight to the construction of institutions, at a time when we have all possible evidence that institutions can be nothing more than provisional, restricted to the most indispensable objects, and having no other relation to the future than such facility as they may afford to the process of political regeneration. The making of institutions in our day consists in parcelling out the old political powers, minutely organizing factitious and complex antagonisms among them, rendering them more and more precarious by submitting them to election for terms; but in no way changing either the general nature of the ancient *régime* or the spirit which worked it. For want of all social doctrine, nothing more has been attempted than restraining the powers thus preserved, till there is every danger of their being altogether annulled, while the principles which were to direct their application were left doubtful and obscure. The pompous name of a Constitution is then given to this piece of work, and it is consecrated to the eternal admiration of posterity. Though the average duration of these constitutions has been at most ten years, each new system set up on the very ground of the failure of the last, has claimed, under pains and penalties, a general faith in its absolute and indefinite triumph. The only action of such institutions is in preventing all social reorganization by fixing minds on puerile questions of political forms, and by interdicting speculations and philosophical discussions which would disclose the principles of reorganization. By this action, the character of the disease has been concealed as much as possible, and any gradual and specific cure has been almost impracticable. It is strange that minds should be so self-deceived as to disclaim all speculative prejudices while they propose the most absurd of all political Utopias,—the construction of a system of government which rests upon no true social doctrine. Such an absurdity is referrible to the cloudy prevalence of the metaphysical philosophy, which perverts and confuses men's notions in politics, as it did formerly, during its short triumph, in all other orders of human conceptions.

It is not only as an impediment to progress that the preponderance of material conceptions is to be deplored. It is dangerous to order. When all political evils are imputed to institutions instead of to ideas and social manners, which are now the real seat of the mischief; the remedy is vainly sought in changes, each more serious than the last, in institutions and existing powers. The failure of the last change is forgotten; and hopes are concentrated on the next, showing how ineffectual are the lessons of experience when the results are not elucidated by a rational analysis. Such changes must occur, in our progress to a better state. What it is fair to require in regard to them is that they should be recognized as provisional, and be guided by some philoso-

phical consideration of the social question at large. Another consequence of the prevalent preference of institutions to doctrines is, besides its prematurity, its engendering errors of the most serious kind, and of a permanent character, by including in the domain of temporal government what belongs to the spiritual. For their neglect of this grand distinction, the various governments of Europe have been punished by becoming responsible for all the evils of society, whencesoever they might have arisen. The illusion is yet more injurious to society itself through the disturbances and mortifications which it induces. An illustration of the case is presented by the discussions and attacks which have so often menaced the institution of Property. It is impossible to deny that, when all exaggerations are stripped away, an unquestionable amount of evil remains in connection with property, which ought to be taken in hand, and remedied, as far as our modern social state permits. But it is equally evident that the remedy must arise from opinions, customs, and manners, and that political regulations can have no radical efficacy; for the question refers us to public prepossessions and usages which must habitually direct, for the interest of society, the exercise of property, in whose hands soever it may be lodged. We may see here how futile and how blind, and also how disturbing, is this tendency to refer everything to political institutions, instead of fixing expectation on an intellectual and moral reorganization.

Thus we proceed, securing neither order nor progress, while we consider our sufferings to be of a physical, whereas they are really of a moral nature. Modifications of ancient systems have been tried, and have given no relief; and our ideas of political progress are narrowing down to that of a substitution of persons,—the most disgraceful political degradation of all, because, directed by no plan, it tends to subject society to an interminable series of catastrophes. The material order, which is all that is contemplated, is confided to a power which is regarded as hostile, and perpetually enfeebled by a systematic antagonism. The restricted view of each of the agents of such a mechanism prevents their co-operation, except under the immediate alarm of material anarchy, when they suspend their useless controversies till the storm has blown over, when they go on as before, till some catastrophe ensues, taking everybody by surprise, though any one might have foreseen it. In this discarding of social speculation for the sake of material and immediate considerations, we see a fresh indication that intellectual anarchy is the main cause of our social maladies.

A fourth characteristic of our social condition is a natural consequence and complement of the preceding; the *incompetence of political leaders.* incompetence of the minds which occupy the chief political stations, during such a condition of affairs, and even their antipathy to a true reorganization: so that a final, and not less disastrous illusion of modern society is that the solution of the pro-

blem may be looked for from those who can do nothing but hinder it. From what we have already seen, we must be aware that the gradual demolition of all social maxims, and, at the same time, the attenuation of political action, must tend to remove elevated minds and superior understandings from such a career, and to deliver over the political world to the rule of charlatanism and mediocrity. The absence of any distinct and large conception of a social future is favourable to the more vulgar forms of ambition; and presumptuous and enterprising mediocrity has never before had so fortunate a chance. While social principles are not even sought, charlatanism will always attract by the magnificence of its promises; and its transient successes will dazzle society, while in a suffering condition, and deprived of all rational hope. Every impulse of noble ambition must turn the best men away from a field of action where there is no chance of scope and permanence, such as are requisite to the carrying out of generous schemes. It is, as M. Guizot has well said, a social period when *men will feebly, but desire immensely*. It is a state of half-conviction and half-will, resulting from intellectual and moral anarchy, offering many obstacles to the solution of our difficulties. It is important, however, not to exaggerate those obstacles. This very state of half-conviction and half-will tends to facilitate by anticipation the prevalence of a true conception of society which, once produced, will have no active resistance to withstand, because it will repose on serious convictions: and at present, the dispersion of social interests tends to preserve the material order which is an indispensable condition of philosophical growth. It would be a mere satirical exaggeration to describe existing society as preferring political quackery and illusion to that wise settlement which it has not had opportunity to obtain. When the choice is offered, it will be seen whether the attraction of deceptive promises, and the power of former habit, will prevent our age from entering, with ardour and steadiness, upon a better course. There are evident symptoms that the choice will be a wise one, though the circumstances of the time operate to place the direction of the movement in hands which are anything but fittest for the purpose. This inconvenience dates from the beginning of the revolutionary period, and is not a new, but an aggravated evil. For three centuries past, the most eminent minds have been chiefly engaged with science, and have neglected politics; thus differing widely from the wisest men in ancient times, and even in the Middle Ages. The consequence of this is that the most difficult and urgent questions have been committed to the class which is essentially one under two names,—the civilians and the metaphysicians, or, under their common title, the lawyers and men of letters, whose position in regard to statesmanship is naturally a subordinate one. We shall see hereafter that, from its origin to the time of the first French Revolution, the system of metaphysical polity was expressed and

directed by the universities on the one hand and the great judiciary corporations on the other : the first constituting a sort of spiritual, and the other the temporal power. This state of things is still traceable in most countries of the Continent ; while in France, for above half a century, the arrangement has degenerated into such an abuse that the judges are superseded by the bar, and the doctors (as they used to be called) by mere men of letters ; so that now, any man who can hold a pen may aspire to the spiritual regulation of society, through the press or from the professional chair, unconditionally, and whatever may be his qualifications. When the time comes for the constitution of an organic condition, the reign of sophists and declaimers will have come to an end ; but there will be the impediment to surmount of their having been provisionally in possession of public confidence.

The survey that we have made must convince us only too well of the anarchical state of existing society, under its destitution of guiding and governing ideas, and amidst its conflict of opinions and passions, which there is no power in any of the three schools to cure or moderate. As preliminary considerations, these facts are deeply disheartening ; and we cannot wonder that some generous and able, but ill-prepared minds should have sunk into a kind of philosophical despair about the future of society, which appears to them doomed to fall under a gloomy despotism or into mere anarchy, or to oscillate between the two. I trust that the study we are about to enter upon will give rise to a consoling conviction that the movement of regeneration is going on, though quietly in comparison with the apparent decomposition, and that the most advanced of the human race are at the threshold of a social order worthy of their nature and their needs. I shall conclude this introduction by showing what must necessarily be the intellectual character of the salutary philosophy which is to lead us into this better future : and its dogmatic exposition will follow in the next chapters.

The preliminary survey which I have just concluded led us necessarily into the domain of politics. We must now return from this excursion, and take our stand again at the point of view of this whole Work, and contemplate the condition and prospects of society from the ground of positive philosophy. Every other ground has been found untenable. The theological and metaphysical philosophies have failed to secure permanent social welfare, while the positive philosophy has uniformly succeeded, and conspicuously for three centuries past, in reorganizing, to the unanimous satisfaction of the intellectual world, all the anterior orders of human conceptions, which had been till then in the same chaotic state that we now deplore, in regard to social science. Contemporary opinion regarded the state of each of those sciences as hopeless till the positive philosophy brought them out of it. There is no reason why it should fail in the latest

*Advent of  
the Positive  
Philosophy.*

application, after having succeeded in all the earlier. Advancing from the less complex categories of ideas to the more complex and final one, and comparing with this experience the picture just given of our present social condition, we cannot but see that the political analysis and the scientific concur in demonstrating that the positive philosophy, carried on to its completion, is the only possible agent in the reorganization of modern society. I wish to establish this principle first, and in this place, apart from all considerations about my way of proving my point; so that, if my attempt should be hereafter condemned, no unfavourable inference may be drawn in regard to a method which alone can save society, and that public reason should have nothing to do but to require from happier successors more effectual endeavours in the same direction. In all cases, and especially in this, the method is of even more importance than the doctrine; and it is for this reason that I think it right, before closing my long introduction, to offer, in a brief form, some last prefatory considerations.

This is not the place in which to enter upon any comparison between the positive political philosophy and the other social theories which have been tried; but, while still deferring the scientific appreciation of the positive method, and before quitting the political ground on which I have, for the occasion, taken my stand, I must point out in a direct and general way, the relation of the positive philosophy to the two great necessities of our age.

The ascendancy of a positive social doctrine is secured by its perfect logical coherence in its entire application—a characteristic property which enables us at once to connect the political with the scientific point of view.

*Logical coherence of the doctrine.*

The positive polity will embrace at once all the essential aspects of the present state of civilization, and will dissolve the deplorable opposition that now exists between the two orders of social needs, the common satisfaction of which will henceforth depend on the same principle. It will impart a homogeneous and rational character to the desultory politics of our day, and it will by the same act connect this co-ordinated present with the whole past, so as to establish a general harmony in the entire system of social ideas, by exhibiting the fundamental uniformity of the collective life of humanity; for this conception cannot, by its nature, be applied to the actual social state till it has undergone the test of explaining, from the same point of view, the continuous series of the chief former transformations of society. It is important to note this difference between the positive principle and that of the two other schools. The critical school treats all times prior to the revolutionary period with a blind reprobation. The retrograde school equally fails in uniting the present with the past, and uniformly disparages the position of modern society during the last three centuries. It is the exclusive property of the positive principle to

recognize the fundamental law of continuous human development, representing the existing evolution as the necessary result of the gradual series of former transformations, by simply extending to social phenomena the spirit which governs the treatment of all other natural phenomena. This coherence and homogeneousness of the positive principle is further shown by its operation in not only comprehending all the various social ideas in one whole, but in connecting the system with the whole of natural philosophy, and constituting thus the aggregate of human knowledge as a complete scientific hierarchy. We shall see hereafter how this is accomplished, and I mention it now to show how the positive philosophy, finding thus a general fulcrum in all minds, cannot but spread to a universal extension. In the present chaotic state of our political ideas we can scarcely imagine what must be the irresistible energy of a philosophical movement, in which the entire renovation of social science will be directed by the same spirit which is unanimously recognized as effectual in all other departments of human knowledge. Meantime, it finds some points of contact in the most wilful minds, from whence it may proceed to work a regeneration of views. It speaks to every class of society, and to every political party, the language best adapted to produce conviction, while maintaining the invincible originality of its fundamental character. It alone, embracing in its survey the whole of the social question, can render exact justice to the conflicting schools, by estimating their past and present services. It alone can exhibit to each party its highest destination, prescribing order in the name of progress, and progress in the name of order, so that each, instead of annulling, may strengthen the other. Bringing no stains from the past, this new polity is subject to no imputation of retrograde tyranny, or of revolutionary anarchy. The only charge that can be brought against it is that of novelty; and the answer is furnished by the evident insufficiency of all existing theories, and by the fact that for two centuries past its success has been uniform and complete, wherever it has been applied.

As to its operation upon Order, it is plain that true science has  
*Its effect* no other aim than the establishment of intellectual  
*on Order.* order, which is the basis of every other. Disorder dreads the scientific spirit even more than the theological, and, in the field of politics, minds which rebelled against metaphysical hypotheses and theological fictions submit without difficulty to the discipline of the positive method. We even see that while the mind of our day is accused of tending towards absolute scepticism, it eagerly welcomes the least appearance of positive demonstration, however premature and imperfect. The eagerness would be full as great if the idea were once formed that social science might also be conducted by the positive spirit. The conception of invariable natural laws, the foundation of every idea of order, in all depart-

ments, would have the same philosophical efficacy here as elsewhere, as soon as it was sufficiently generalized to be applied to social phenomena, thenceforth referred, like all other phenomena, to such laws. It is only by the positive polity that the revolutionary spirit can be restrained, because by it alone can the influence of the critical doctrine be justly estimated and circumscribed. No longer roused to resistance, as by the retrograde school, and seeing its work done better than by itself, it will merge in a doctrine which leaves it nothing to do or to desire. Under the rule of the positive spirit, again, all the difficult and delicate questions which now keep up a perpetual irritation in the bosom of society, and which can never be settled while mere political solutions are proposed, will be scientifically estimated, to the great furtherance of social peace. By admitting at once that the institutions of modern societies must necessarily be merely provisional, the positive spirit will abate unreasonable expectations from them, and concentrate effort upon a fundamental renovation of social ideas, and consequently of public morals. Instead of indifference being caused by this carrying forward of political aims, there will be a new source of interest in so modifying modern institutions as to make them contributory to the inevitable intellectual and moral evolution. At the same time, it will be teaching society that, in the present state of their ideas, no political change can be of supreme importance, while the perturbation attending change is supremely mischievous, in the way both of immediate hindrance, and of diverting attention from the true need and procedure. And again, order will profit by the recognition of the relative spirit of the positive philosophy, which discredits the absolute spirit of the theological and metaphysical schools. It cannot but dissipate the illusion by which those schools are for ever striving to set up, in all stages of civilization, their respective types of immutable government; as when, for instance, they propose to civilize Tahiti by a wholesale importation of Protestantism and a Parliamentary system. Again, the positive spirit tends to consolidate order, by the rational development of a wise resignation to incurable political evils. Negative as is the character of this virtue, it affords an aid under the pains of the human lot which cannot be dispensed with, and which has no place under the metaphysical polity, which regards political action as indefinite. Religious, and especially Christian resignation is, in plain truth, only a prudent temporizing, which enjoins the endurance of present suffering in view of an ultimate ineffable felicity. A true resignation—that is, a permanent disposition to endure, steadily, and without hope of compensation, all inevitable evils, can proceed only from a deep sense of the connection of all kinds of natural phenomena with invariable laws. If there are (as I doubt not there are) political evils which, like some personal sufferings, cannot be remedied by science, science at least proves to us that they are incurable, so as



to calm our restlessness under pain by the conviction that it is by natural laws that they are rendered insurmountable. Human nature suffers in its relations with the astronomical world, and the physical, chemical, and biological, as well as the political. How is it that we turbulently resist in the last case, while, in the others, we are calm and resigned, under pain as signal, and as repugnant to our nature? Surely it is because the positive philosophy has as yet developed our sense of the natural laws only in regard to the simpler phenomena; and when the same sense shall have been awakened with regard to the more complex phenomena of social life, it will fortify us with a similar resignation, general or special, provisional or indefinite, in the case of political suffering. An habitual conviction of this kind cannot but conduce to public tranquillity, by obviating vain efforts for redress, while it equally excludes the apathy which belongs to the passive character of religious resignation, by requiring submission to nothing but necessity, and encouraging the noblest exercises of human activity, wherever the analysis of the occasion opens any prospect whatever of genuine remedy. Finally, the positive philosophy befriends public order by bringing back men's understandings to a normal state through the influence of its method alone, before it has had time to establish any social theory. It dissipates disorder at once by imposing a series of indisputable scientific conditions on the study of political questions. By including social science in the scientific hierarchy, the positive spirit admits to success in this study only well-prepared and disciplined minds, so trained in the preceding departments of knowledge as to be fit for the complex problems of the last. The long and difficult preliminary elaboration must disgust and deter vulgar and ill-prepared minds, and subdue the most rebellious. This consideration, if there were no other, would prove the eminently organic tendency of the new political philosophy.

I have dwelt on this influence of the Positive philosophy, in  
*Its effect on*      favour of Order, because it is that which is, as yet,  
*Progress.*      least recognized, while the retrograde and stationary  
 schools continue to found their claims upon that very point. There is less mistake about its favourable influence on Progress. In all its applications, the positive spirit is directly progressive; its express office being to increase our knowledge, and perfect the connection of its parts. Even the illustrations of progression are, at the present day, derived from the positive sciences. Whatever rational idea of social progress (that is, of continuous development, with a steady tendency towards a determinate end), anywhere exists, should, as we shall hereafter see, be attributed to the unperceived influence of the positive philosophy, in disengaging this great notion from its present vague and fluctuating state by clearly assigning the aim and the general course of progress. Though Christianity

certainly bore a part in originating the sentiment of social progress by proclaiming the superiority of the new law to the old, it is evident that the theological polity, proceeding upon an immutable type, which was realized only in the past, must have become radically incompatible with ideas of continuous progression, and manifests, on the contrary, a thoroughly retrograde character. The metaphysical polity, in its dogmatic aspect, has the same incompatibility, though the feeble connection of its doctrines renders it more accessible to the spirit of our time. Indeed, it was only after the decline of that school had begun, that ideas of progress took any general possession of the public mind. Thus the progressive, as well as the organic instinct, is to be developed by the positive philosophy alone.

The only idea of progress which is really proper to the revolutionary philosophy, is that of the continuous extension of liberty; that is, in positive terms, the gradual expansion of human powers. Now, even in the restricted and negative sense in which this is true,—that of the perpetual diminution of obstacles,—the positive philosophy is incontestably superior: for true liberty is nothing else than a rational submission to the preponderance of the laws of nature, in release from all arbitrary personal dictation. Decisions of sovereign assemblies have been called laws by the metaphysical polity, and have been fictitiously regarded as a manifestation of popular will. But no such homage paid to constitutional entities can disguise the arbitrary tendency which marks all the philosophies but the positive. The arbitrary can never be excluded while political phenomena are referred to Will, divine or human, instead of being connected with invariable natural laws; and liberty will remain illusory and precarious, notwithstanding all constitutional artifices, and whatever be the will to which we pay our daily obedience. By substituting the empire of genuine convictions for that of arbitrary will, the positive philosophy will put an end to the absolute liberty of the revolutionary school,—the license of running from one extravagance to another,—and, by establishing social principles, will meet the need at once of order and of progress. The special office of the revolutionary philosophy, that of extinguishing all but the historical existence of the ancient political system, is virtually committed to the positive principle; and, in fact, the power exercised by the critical doctrine in this direction has been owing to its serving the purpose of a provisional organ to the positive philosophy. In other sciences, the critical action, however energetic, is only a collateral consequence of its organic development; and the organic development, which is fatal to the old theological system, involves in the same condemnation the metaphysical spirit, which is even the less logical of the two. The most serious difficulty of contemporary politics is the condition of the lower classes; and in this case, the positive philosophy affords

practical amelioration most favourable to progress. The revolutionary polity opened only an insurrectionary issue to this difficulty, and merely shifted without solving the question. The question is not settled by opening a way to popular ambition, the gratification of which must be confined to a few (probably deserters from their class), and can do nothing to soothe the murmurs of the multitude. The general lot is even aggravated by the excitement of unreasonable hopes, and by the elevation of a few by the chances of the political game. As it is the inevitable lot of the majority of men to live on the more or less precarious fruits of daily labour, the great social problem is to ameliorate the condition of this majority, without destroying its classification, and disturbing the general economy: and this is the function of the positive polity, regarded as regulating the final classification of modern society. We shall have occasion to see hereafter that the mental reorganization, by habitually interposing a common moral authority between the working classes and the leaders of society, will offer the only regular basis of a pacific and equitable reconciliation of their chief conflicts, nearly abandoned in the present day to the savage discipline of a purely material antagonism.

In this brief sketch of the prominent characteristics of the positive polity, we have seen that, notwithstanding its severe estimate of the different existing parties, it commands access to the spirit of each by proving itself adapted to fulfil the aims which each has pursued too exclusively. It can also turn to the profit of its gradual ascendancy all the important incidents of existing society which it could not intercept. Whether in its hour of exultation, the one school manifests its insufficiency; or whether, in the despair of failure, the other shows a disposition to welcome new means of political action; or whether, again, a kind of universal torpor exhibits in its nakedness the aggregate of social needs, the new philosophy can always lay hold of a certain general issue to introduce, by a daily application, its fundamental instruction. In doing this however, we must, it seems to me, lay aside all hope of a real conversion of the retrograde school. Setting aside some happy individual anomalies, such as always exist, and may become more frequent, it remains indisputable that there is such an antipathy, in regard to social questions, between the theological and the positive philosophies, that the one can never estimate the other, and must disappear before it, without being able to undergo any radical modification of its present form. It is, in fact, not Order that the ancient *régime* aims at, but only its own preconception of a unique order, connected with its habits of mind and special interests, outside of which everything appears disorderly, and therefore indifferent. In the midst of its pretended devotion to general order, the retrograde school has often betrayed its tendency to care for the means more than the end. It is through the stationary school, whose love

of order is at least more impartial, if not more disinterested, that the positive polity must obtain the access which it could not hope for from the retrograde school. The metaphysical fictions of the parliamentary or constitutional philosophy may have diverted the mind of the stationary school from the true issue; but they have not attained such an ascendancy among the nations of the European continent as to render them deaf to the rational voice of the new philosophy, when it appeals to a school so openly disposed as is the stationary party to establish permanent order, on whatever principles, in modern society. Some useful action may therefore be hoped for through this medium.—Nevertheless, I avow that it is on the revolutionary school alone that, in my opinion, we can expect that the positive polity can exercise a predominant influence, because this school is the only one that is always open to new action on behalf of progress. All its indispensable provisional doctrines will be absorbed by the new philosophy, while all its anarchical tendencies will be extinguished. There will be more explosions of revolutionary doctrine, as long as there are any remains of the retrograde system; for the natural course of events does not wait for our slow philosophical preparation. Whether in virtue of our intellectual condition, or of faults committed by existing governments, such outbreaks will occur; and perhaps they may be necessary to the uprooting of all hope of reconstructing social order on the old basis; but the positive philosophy will have foreseen such conflicts, and will take no part in them, further than to make use of the instruction that they afford. It will not interfere with the last operations of the revolutionary preponderance;—knowing that they are the last. Nor will it paralyse so important a general disposition as that which constitutes the critical spirit, properly so called. By subordinating it for ever to the organic spirit, it will open to it broad political aims; it will afford it employment in destroying all metaphysical and theological interference, using for this end the satirical faculties which produced nothing in the last century, but which may be of a secondary value in influencing the development of the political character that will be finally assigned to each school. On the whole, we may hope that the positive philosophy will find grounds of support among the most advanced sections of the revolutionary school; and, whatever may be the hopes of that school from different political parties, it will be unable to dispense with the scientific superiority of the positive doctrine, which is the certain cause and guarantee of its gradual ascendancy.

It might have been hoped that the renovation we are anticipating would have been largely aided by the scientific class of society, as that which must be most familiar with positive science. But it is not so. At present the anarchical tendencies of that class appear to be as strong as any. The indifference of scientific men to the most interesting and most

*Anarchical  
tendencies of  
the scientific  
class.*

urgent of all classes of problems may be partly accounted for by their deep intellectual disgust at the irrational character of the social doctrines of their day; but there are other reasons, even less honourable than this. They are themselves defective in scientific discipline. They abhor generalities, and have a systematic predilection for specialities. Under the idea of an organization of labour, they restrict their several pursuits within the narrowest bounds, without providing for the investigation of general relations; and thus, science becomes a pastime, grounded on no adequate preparation. It is not wonderful then that they have no interest in the entire generality which is the indispensable attribute of any philosophy that aspires to the moral government of mankind. Daily experience shows that, when learned bodies are brought into junction, for any political purpose, with sensible men who know nothing of science, but are accustomed to general views, the superiority rests with the latter, even in regard to matters which particularly concern the scientific class. As long as this is the case, the scientific class decrees its own political subordination. Their social sentiment is on a par with their ideas; and their egotism is aggravated by their devotion to specialities, when it ought to be subdued by a mastery of positive science; and would be so, if they could admit its general ideas. This is no fault of individuals among them. It is imputable to the defective scientific education of our time; and all that men of science are censurable for is their dogmatic denial of the need of a better. We must, however, abandon all hope of their co-operation in extending the positive method to the study of social phenomena. If we may anticipate anything in that direction, it must be from a rising generation for whom a more adequate training must be provided, and who will be led by a really scientific education beyond the special and isolated studies to which they now conceive themselves to be destined, and which constitute at present their only idea of scientific pursuit.

I have now presented a view of the chief points of support which

*Conclusion.* the present state of the social world affords to the renovating influence of the new political philosophy.

This introduction may appear long; but it will abridge my future labour by furnishing my readers with a kind of rational programme of the conditions of the subject. Yet more, it indicates clearly what is apt to escape the notice of minds habituated to the superficial and irrational treatment of social questions,—the complete political efficacy of the positive philosophy. The high practical utility of the theory I am about to offer cannot be questioned by the haughtiest politician when it has once been demonstrated that the deepest want of modern society is, in its nature, eminently theoretical, and that, consequently, an intellectual, and then a moral re-organization must precede and direct the political.—This mutual relation being established, with a care proportionate to its importance, we must now

return,—not again to quit it,—to the strictly scientific point of view of this work, and pursue the study of the phenomena of social physics in a disposition of mind as purely speculative as that in which we surveyed the other fundamental sciences, with no other intellectual ambition than to discover the natural laws of a final order of phenomena, remarkable in the extreme, and never before examined in this way.

Before proceeding, however, to this direct examination, I propose to consider, briefly, the principal philosophical attempts to constitute social science; as a general estimate of this kind will tend to illustrate the nature and spirit of this last great department of positive philosophy.

## CHAPTER II.

PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHICAL ATTEMPTS TO CONSTITUTE  
A SOCIAL SYSTEM.

WE have seen that the complex and special nature of social phenomena is the chief reason why the study has remained imperfect to the last ; it being impossible to analyse them till the simpler departments of science were understood, and till the great discovery of cerebral physiology had opened a rational access to their examination. To this main consideration we must now add another, which explains more specially why it has never till now been possible to establish social science on a positive basis. This consideration is, that we have not till now been in possession of a range of facts wide enough to disclose the natural laws of social phenomena.

The first rise of speculative doctrine has always, in all sciences, taken place from the theological method, as I have shown. In the case of the anterior sciences, this did not preclude the formation of a positive theory, when once there had been a sufficient perpetuity of phenomena. The materials were ready before there were observers qualified to make a scientific use of them. But, even if observers had been ready, the phenomena of social life were not ample and various enough in early days to admit of their philosophical analysis. Many and profound modifications of the primitive civilization were necessary to afford a sufficient basis for experiment. We shall see hereafter how indispensable was the operation of the theological philosophy in directing the earliest progress of the human mind and of society. Our present business is to notice the obstacles which it presented to the formation of a true social science. It was not, in fact, till modern political revolutions, and especially the French, had proved the insufficiency of the old political system for the social needs of the age that the great idea of Progress could acquire sufficient firmness, distinctness, and generality, to serve a scientific purpose. The direction of the social movement was not determined ; and social speculation was embarrassed by fanciful notions of oscillating or circular movements, such as even now cause hesitation in able but ill-prepared minds as to the real nature of human progression. Till it is known in what this progression consists, the fact itself may be disputed ; since, from such a point of view, humanity may appear to be doomed to an arbitrary succession of

identical phases, without ever experiencing a new transformation, gradually directed towards an end determined by the whole constitution of human nature.

Thus all idea of social progress was interdicted to the philosophers of antiquity, for want of materials of political observation. The most eminent and sagacious of them were subject to the common tendency to suppose the contemporary state of things inferior to that of former times. This supposition was the more natural and legitimate because the philosophical works which contained this view coincided, as to date, with the decline of the Greek and Roman *régime*. This decline, which, in relation to the whole of human history, was in fact progress, could not appear so to the ancients, who did not anticipate what was to come. I have before intimated that the first dawning sense of human progression was inspired by Christianity, which, by proclaiming the superiority of the law of Jesus to that of Moses, gave form to the idea of a more perfect state replacing a less perfect, which had been necessary as a preparation. Though Catholicism\* was, in this, simply the organ of expression of human reason, the service it thus rendered entitles it not the less, as all true philosophers will agree, to our eternal gratitude. But, apart from the mischief of the mysticism and vague obscurity which belong to all applications of the theological method, such a beginning could not possibly suggest any scientific view of social progression: for any such progression was barred at once by the claim of Christianity to be the ultimate stage at which the human mind must stop. The social efficacy of the theological philosophy is now exhausted, and it has become therefore retrograde, as we have seen; but the condition of continuity is an indispensable element in the conception of progress; an idea which would have no power to guide social speculation if it represented progress as limited by its nature to a determinate condition attained long ago.

It is thus evident that the conception of progress belongs exclusively to the positive philosophy. This philosophy alone can indicate the final term which human nature will be for ever approaching and never attaining; and it alone can prescribe the general course of this gradual development. Accordingly, the only rational ideas of continuous advance are of modern origin, and relate especially to the expansion of the positive sciences which gave birth to them. It may even be worth observing that the first satisfactory view of general progression was proposed by a philosopher whose genius was essentially mathematical; and therefore conversant with the simplest form of the scientific spirit. Whatever may be the value

\* This great idea belongs essentially to Catholicism, from which Protestantism derived it in an imperfect and corrupt manner,—not only by recurring irrationally to the period of the primitive Church, but also by offering for popular guidance the most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures—that which relates to Hebrew antiquity. Mohammedanism pursued the same practice, and thus instituted a mere imitation of Judaic barbarism, without introducing any real amelioration.



of this observation, it is certain that Pascal was animated by a sense of the progress of the sciences when he uttered the immortal aphorism: "The entire succession of men, through the whole course of ages, must be regarded as one man, always living and incessantly learning." Whatever may have been the actual effect of this first ray of light, it must be admitted that the idea of continuous progress had no scientific consistency, or public regard, till after the memorable controversy, at the beginning of the last century, about a general comparison of the ancients and moderns. In my view, that solemn discussion constitutes a ripe event in the history of the human mind, which thus, for the first time, declared that it had made an irreversible advance. It is needless to point out that the leaders of this great philosophical movement derived all the force of their arguments from the scientific spirit: but it is remarkable that their most illustrious adversaries committed the inconsistency of declaring that they preferred the philosophy of Descartes to that which preceded it.—From this scientific origin the conception spread more and more in a political direction, till, at length, the French Revolution manifested the tendency of humanity toward a political system, indeterminate enough, but radically different from the old system. This was the negative view of social progress; ineffectual in itself, but necessary as a preparation for the advent of the positive philosophy, when it should have made its induction from social phenomena, and ascertained their laws.

Having thus seen how impossible was the formation of social science in ancient times, we are in a condition to appreciate the attempts which were here and there prematurely made. The foregoing analysis shows that the political conditions of the subject are, generally, precisely coincident with the scientific, so as to retard by their competition the possibility of establishing social science on a positive basis. This obstacle has existed even up to our own generation, who can only make a mere beginning in seeking in the past a basis for social science, in virtue of their experience of a revolutionary period, and of their opening perception of the positive principle, as they see it established in the other departments of human knowledge, including that of intellectual and moral phenomena. It would be waste of time, and a departure from my object, to analyse fully the attempts of ancient philosophers to form a political science which was thus clearly impracticable in their day; and I shall therefore merely point out the essential vice of each speculation, thereby justifying the judgment that we have just passed by anticipation, and disclosing the true nature of an enterprise which remains to be begun.

The name of Aristotle first presents itself, his memorable *Aristotle's* "Politics" being one of the finest productions of antiquity, and furnishing the general type of most of the works on that subject that have followed. This treatise could

not possibly disclose any sense of the progressive tendencies of humanity, nor the slightest glimpse of the natural laws of civilization; and it was necessarily occupied by metaphysical discussions of the principle and form of government: but it is truly marvellous that any mind should have produced a work so advanced, and even nearer to a positive view than his other works, at a time when political observation was restricted to a uniform and preliminary social state, and when the nascent positive spirit lived feebly in geometry alone. The analysis by which he refuted the dangerous fancies of Plato and his imitators about community of property evidences a rectitude, a sagacity, and a strength which, in their application to such subjects, have been rarely equalled, and never surpassed. Thus much I have said, in the way of homage to the first manifestation of human genius on the great subject of government, notwithstanding the evident influence that it has exercised upon philosophical meditation, from its own day to this.

The works which succeeded need not detain us. They were merely an accumulation of fresh materials, classified by the type that Aristotle had furnished. The next period worth notice is that in which the preponderance of the positive spirit in the study of phenomena caused the first clear comprehension of the meaning of general laws, and in which the idea of human progress began to assume some consistency; and, to find these two conditions in concurrence, we can hardly go further back than the middle of the last century. The first and most important series of works which then presents itself is that of Montesquieu, first, in his treatise on the "Greatness and Decline of the *Montesquieu.* Romans," and afterwards in his "Spirit of Laws." The great strength of this memorable work appears to me to lie in its tendency to regard political phenomena as subject to invariable laws, like all other phenomena. This is manifested at the very outset, in the preliminary chapter, in which, for the first time in the history of the human mind, the general idea of *law* is directly defined, in relation to all, even to political subjects, in the same sense in which it is applied in the simplest positive investigations. The progress of science which had been effected by the labours of Descartes, Galileo, and Kepler, a century before, had rendered the most advanced minds familiar with an incomplete notion of progress: Montesquieu's conception was a generalization of this incomplete notion: and, instead of denying originality to so eminent a service, we may well be amazed that such a conception should be offered, before the positive method had extended beyond the simplest natural phenomena,—being scarcely admitted into the department of chemistry, and not yet heard of in the study of living bodies. And, in the other view, a man must have been in advance of his time, who could conceive of natural laws as the basis of social speculation and action, while all other able men

were talking about the absolute and indefinite power of legislators, when armed with due authority, to modify at will the social state. The very qualities, however, which give its pre-eminence to Montesquieu's work prove to us the impossibility of success in an enterprise so premature in regard to its proposed object, the very conditions of which were still impracticable. The project of the work is not fulfilled in its course; and, admirable as are some of its details, it falls back, like all others, upon the primitive type offered by Aristotle's treatise. We find no reference of social phenomena to the laws whose existence was announced at the outset; nor any scientific selection and connection of facts. The general nature of his practical conclusions seems to show how far the execution of his work was from corresponding with his original intention; for his desultory review of the whole mass of social subjects ends in his setting up, as a universal political type, the English parliamentary system, the insufficiency of which, for the satisfaction of modern social requirements, was not, it is true, so conspicuous in his day as it is now, but still discernible enough, as we shall have occasion to see. It was honourable to Montesquieu's philosophical character, that he steered wide of the metaphysical Utopias which lay in his way, and resorted rather to the narrow anchorage at which he rested; but such a resort, so narrow and so barren, proves that he had wandered away from the course announced by himself. The only part of the book which bears any true marks of sustained positivity is that in which the social influence of permanent local causes,—of that which in political language we may call climate,—is considered. This view, evidently derived from Hippocrates, manifests a tendency to attach observed phenomena to forces able to produce them, as in natural philosophy; but the aim has failed. The true political influence of climate is misconceived, and usually much exaggerated, through the common error of analysing a mere modification before the main action is fully understood; which is much like trying to determine planetary perturbations before ascertaining the chief gravitations. This error was inevitable under Montesquieu's necessary ignorance of the great social laws, while he was bent upon introducing the positive spirit into the domain of politics. He naturally betook himself to the only class of social speculations which seemed fit for his purpose. Pardonable or unavoidable as was his failure, it is a new evidence of the vast gap which lies open at the outset of the science. Montesquieu did not even perceive, any more than others, the fact which should regulate the whole political theory of climate;—that local physical causes, very powerful in the early days of civilization, lose their force in proportion as human development admits of their being neutralized:—a view which would certainly have occurred to Montesquieu if he had possessed himself of the fundamental notion of human pro-

gression before he treated of the political theory of climate. Thus, this great philosopher proposed a grand enterprise which was premature in two senses, and in which he could not but fail,—first, by bringing social phenomena under the operation of the positive spirit before it had been introduced into the system of biological science; and again, in proposing social reorganization during a period marked out for revolutionary action. This explains why a mind so eminent should have exercised, through its very advancement, an immediate influence very inferior to that of a mere sophist, like Rousseau, whose intellectual state, much better adapted to the disposition of his contemporaries, allowed him to constitute himself, with so remarkable a success, the natural organ of the revolutionary movement of the time. It is by our posterity that Montesquieu will be duly estimated, when the extension of the positive philosophy to social speculations will disclose the high value of the precocious attempts which, though doomed to failure, yield the light by which the general question must be laid down.

After Montesquieu, the next great addition to Sociology (which is the term I may be allowed to invent to designate *Condorcet.* Social Physics) was made by Condorcet, proceeding on the views suggested by his illustrious friend Turgot. Turgot's suggestions with regard to the theory of the perfectibility of human nature were doubtless the basis of Condorcet's speculation exhibited in his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind*, in which the scientific conception of the social progression of the race was, for the first time, clearly and directly proposed, with a distinct assertion of its primary importance. The strength of the work lies in its introduction, in which Condorcet exhibits his general idea, and proposes his philosophical project of studying the radical connection of the various social states of mankind. These few immortal pages leave really nothing to be desired in regard to the position of the sociological question at large, which will, in my opinion, rest, through all future time, on this admirable statement. The execution is far from corresponding with the greatness of the project; but no failure in the carrying out can impair the value of the design. The success and the failure may both be easily accounted for by a consideration of the scientific and political knowledge of the time. The expansion of the natural sciences, and especially of chemistry, during the second half of the last century, had thoroughly established in the best minds of the period the idea of positive laws; and the study of living bodies, in the departments of anatomy and taxonomy, if not of physiology, began to assume a truly scientific character. Condorcet's mind was rationally prepared by mathematical study, under the direction of D'Alembert: by his philosophical position in society, he had all the advantage of the expansion of physico-chemical science then taking place; and of the labours of Haller, Jussieu, Linnæus, Buffon, and Vicq-d'Azir

in the principal departments of biological knowledge; and it was natural that he should conceive the enterprise of carrying into the speculative study of social phenomena the same positive method which, from the time of Descartes, had been regenerating the entire system of human knowledge. With equal advantages, and his higher order of genius, Montesquieu would, no doubt, have achieved higher results than he has left us. Still, even Condorcet's project was premature, though less so than that of Montesquieu; for a great deficiency remained in the imperfect state of biological knowledge, and especially in the exclusion of intellectual and moral phenomena from treatment by the positive method: and the unfortunate Condorcet did not live to see them assume their proper place. In their absence, he lost himself in wanderings after an indefinite perfectibility, and chimerical and absurd anticipations. Such aberrations, affecting such men, are a lesson to us as to the impossibility of unaided reason overleaping the intervals which have not been steadily explored in the gradual advance of the human mind. As to the political circumstances of the time,—the idea of social progression was certainly more distinct and more firm in Condorcet's than in Montesquieu's time: for the tendency of society to relinquish the ancient social system was becoming evident, though the new system which was to succeed it was but vaguely suspected, even where it was not wholly misconceived. The evil influence of the revolutionary doctrine is singularly exhibited in Condorcet's work, in the form of an inconsistency which must strike every reader. The human race is there represented as having attained a vast degree of perfection at the close of the eighteenth century, while the author attributes an entirely retrogressive influence to almost every doctrine, institution, and preponderant power throughout the whole past. Whereas, the total progress accomplished can be nothing else than the result of the various kinds of partial progress realized since the beginning of civilization, in virtue of the gradual onward course of human nature. Such a state of things as Condorcet describes would be nothing else than a perpetual miracle; and it is not to him, therefore, that we can look for any disclosure of the laws of human development, any appreciation of the transitory nature of the revolutionary philosophy, or any general conception of the future of society. Here again we recognize the philosophical superiority of Montesquieu, who, not having Condorcet's opportunities of estimating the revolutionary spirit, had been able to free his mind from those critical prejudices in regard to the past which formed the views of all around him, and had injured his own earlier speculations. This brief survey of the labours of these great men shows us that the basis of true social science can be fixed only after the revolutionary spirit has begun to decline; and thus the political, as well as the scientific indications of the subject point to our own

time as that in which such a science is to be founded. Condorcet gave us a clear exposition of the nature of the enterprise; but the whole accomplishment yet remains to be achieved.

These two attempts are really all that have been made in the right road to social science; for they are the only speculations which have been based on the aggregate of historical facts. I shall have occasion, further on, to notice some attempts which are not worthy to rank with these, and which merely testify to the existing need of social science by showing how various are the directions in which it is sought. On one subject, however, I shall here make a few observations, in order to illustrate further the aim and spirit of my own efforts to constitute a basis for social science. That subject is the nature and object of what is called Political Economy.

We cannot impute to political economists any design to establish social science; for it is the express assertion of the most classical among them that their subject is wholly *Political economy.* distinct from, and independent of, general political science. Yet, sincere as they doubtless are in their dogma of isolation, they are no less sincerely persuaded that they have applied the positive spirit to economical science; and they perpetually set forth their method as the type by which all social theories will be finally regenerated. As this pretension has obtained credit enough to procure the establishment of several professorships for this species of instruction, I find myself obliged to explain why it is that I cannot, as would be very desirable, propose to carry on my enterprise from the point reached by these philosophers, but must begin from the beginning. My criticism on political economy in this place is merely for the purpose of showing that it is not the philosophical creation that we want; and I must refer to my exposition as a whole any objectors to my summary estimate of political economy.

It is unfavourable to the philosophical pretensions of the economists that, being almost invariably lawyers or literary men, they have had no opportunity of discipline in that spirit of positive rationality which they suppose they have introduced into their researches. Precluded by their education from any idea of scientific observation of even the smallest phenomena, from any notion of natural laws, from all perception of what demonstration is, they must obviously be incapable of applying, impromptu, a method in which they have had no practice to the most difficult of all analyses. The only philosophical preparation that they can show is a set of vague precepts of general logic, susceptible of no real use; and thus, their conceptions present a purely metaphysical character. There is one great exceptional case which I must at once exempt from this criticism,—that of the illustrious philosopher, Adam Smith, who made no pretension to found a new special science; but merely proposed (what he admirably achieved) to illustrate some leading points of social philosophy by luminous analyses relating to the

division of employments, the function of money, the general action of banks, etc., and other chief portions of the industrial developments of the human race. Though involved, like all his contemporaries, in the metaphysical philosophy, a mind of such quality as his could not, however distinguished in the metaphysical school, be blinded by its illusions, because his preparatory studies had impressed him with a sense of what constitutes a true scientific method, as is clearly proved by the valuable sketches of the philosophical history of the sciences, and of astronomy in particular, which are published among his posthumous works. The economists have no right to claim Adam Smith as their authority while the whole dogmatic part of their science presents a merely metaphysical character, dressed up with special forms and a list of scientific terms, taken bodily from former philosophical expositions,—as, for instance, from the theologico-metaphysical writings of Spinoza. The contemporary history of this so-called science confirms this judgment of its nature. The most certain signs of conceptions being scientific are continuousness and fertility: and when existing works, instead of being the result and development of those that have gone before, have a character as personal as that of their authors, and bring the most fundamental ideas into question; and when, again, the dogmatic constitution provides for no real and sustained progress, but only for a barren reproduction of old controversies, it is clear that we are dealing with no positive doctrine whatever, but merely with theological or metaphysical dissertations. And this is the spectacle which political economy has presented for half a century past. If our economists were really the scientific successors of Adam Smith, they would show us where they had carried on and completed their master's doctrine, and what new discoveries they had added to his primitive surveys; but looking with an impartial eye upon their disputes on the most elementary ideas of value, utility, production, etc., we might imagine ourselves present at the strangest conferences of the scholiasts of the Middle Ages about the attributes of their metaphysical entities; which indeed economical conceptions resemble more and more, in proportion as they are dogmatized and refined upon. The result in both cases is, but too often, the perversion of the valuable indications of popular good sense, which become confused, inapplicable, and productive only of idle disputes about words. All intelligent men, for instance, understand what is meant by the terms *product* and *producer*; but, from the time that economical metaphysics undertook to define them, the idea of production has become, through vicious generalizations, so indeterminate, that conscientious and clear writers are obliged to use circuitous explanations to avoid the use of terms which have become obscure and equivocal. Such abuse is analogous to that which metaphysics has introduced into the study of the human understanding, with regard, for instance, to the general ideas of analysis and synthesis and the

like. The avowal of the economists that their science is isolated from that of social philosophy in general, is itself a sufficient confirmation of my judgment; for it is a universal fact in social, as in biological science, that all the various general aspects of the subject are scientifically one, and rationally inseparable, so that they cannot be illustrated but by each other. Thus, the economical or industrial analysis of society cannot be effected in the positive method, apart from its intellectual, moral, and political analysis, past and present. And thus does the boasted isolation of political economy testify to its being grounded on a metaphysical basis.

This is the dogmatic aspect of the science. But it would be unjust to forget that, looking at this doctrine historically, and more with a political than a scientific view, it constitutes a final essential part of the system of critical philosophy, which has exercised an indispensable, though transitory influence during the revolutionary period. Political Economy has borne an honourable share in this vast intellectual conflict, by thoroughly discrediting the industrial polity of the Middle Ages, which became more and more injurious, in its descent to our time, to the industry which it had once protected. Such is the credit due to Political Economy. Its worst practical fault is that, like the other portions of the metaphysical philosophy, it systematizes anarchy; and the danger is only aggravated by its use of modern scientific forms. It has not been satisfied with criticizing, in much too absolute a way, the industrial polity of the old European sovereignties, without which the industrial development of modern times could never have taken place: it goes far beyond this; it sets up as a universal dogma the absence of all regulating intervention whatever as the best means of promoting the spontaneous rise of society; so that, on every serious occasion, this doctrine can respond to urgent practical needs only by the uniform reproduction of this systematic negation. Because it perceives a natural tendency in society to arrange itself in a certain order, not seeing in this a suggestion of an order to be promoted by social arrangements, it preaches an absence of regulation which, if carried out to the limit of the principle, would lead to the methodical abolition of all government. But here we meet the compensating virtue that political economy insists on all human interests being bound up together, and therefore susceptible of a permanent reconciliation. Though this may be simply the expression of the convictions of popular good sense, philosophy owes a tribute of eternal gratitude to the economists for their excellent service in extinguishing the disastrous and immoral prejudice which concluded the amelioration of the condition of some to be obtained by the deterioration of the condition of somebody else; and that the total amount of wealth was always the same; which is as much as denying industrial development altogether. Notwithstanding this great service, political economy has dangerous tendencies



through its opposition to the institution of all industrial discipline. As each serious difficulty arises, in the course of industrial development, political economy ignores it. In the great question of Machinery this is remarkably illustrated. This is one of the cases of inconvenience inherent in every industrial improvement, from its tendency to disturb, more or less, and for a longer or shorter time, the mode of life of the labouring classes. Instead of recognizing in the urgent remonstrances called forth by this chasm in our social order one of the most eminent and pressing occasions for the application of social science, our economists can do nothing better than repeat, with pitiless pedantry, their barren aphorism of absolute industrial liberty. Without considering that all human questions, practically regarded, are reducible to mere questions of time, they venture to reply to all complaints that, in the long-run, all classes, and especially the one most injured on the existing occasion, will enjoy a real and permanent amelioration; a reply which will be regarded as derisive, as long as man's life is incapable of being indefinitely lengthened. Such a doctrine publishes its own weakness by showing its want of relation to the aggregate of our practical needs. Would the copyists who were thrown out of employment by the invention of printing have been completely consoled by being convinced that, in the next generation, there would be an equal number of persons living by printing, and many more in succeeding centuries? Yet such is the consolation habitually offered by political economy; and if there were no other evidence, this inefficiency would prove its unfitness to direct, as it proposes to do, the industrial expansion of modern society. And thus it stands condemned, as to its scientific pretensions, and in spite of some important services, from the political as much as from the scientific point of view.

The temporary predilection of men's minds for political economy is, in truth, a new and strong illustration of the instinctive need which prevails to subject social researches to positive methods; and if that were once done, the interest in political economy would disappear. Various other signs of the times testify to the same disposition, which indeed pervades the whole action of our intelligences. I will refer to only one among the multitude of those signs; but it is one which aids in bringing about the satisfaction of the need. I mean the growing inclination for historical study, and the great improvement in that kind of research within two centuries.

Bossuet was, unquestionably, the first who proposed to survey, from a lofty point of view, the whole of the past of society.

*Growth of  
historical  
study.*

We cannot adopt his explanations, easily derived from theological resources; but the spirit of universality, so

thoroughly appreciated, and, under the circumstances, so wonderfully sustained, will always preserve this admirable composition\* as a model,

\* 'Discourse on Universal History.'

suggesting the true result of historical analysis;—the rational co-ordination of the great series of human events, according to a single design; which must, however, be more genuine and complete than that of Bossuet. There is no doubt that this fine piece of instruction has contributed, during both the past and the present century, to the improvement in the character of the chief historical compositions, especially in France and England, and afterwards in Germany. Still, history has more of a literary and descriptive than of a scientific character. It does not yet establish a rational filiation in the series of social events, so as to admit (as in other sciences, and allowing for its greater complexity) of any degree of systematic prevision of their future succession. Perhaps the imputation of rashness cast upon the mere proposal of such a treatment of history is the strongest confirmation we could have of its present unscientific character: for such prevision is everywhere else admitted to be the ultimate scientific test. Another evidence exists in the easy credit daily obtained by misty historical theories which explain nothing, and which testify to the literary and metaphysical bias under which history is studied, by minds unacquainted with the great scientific movement of modern times. Again, another evidence is the dogmatic separation which it is attempted to keep up between history and politics. Still, we must admit the growing taste of our age for historical labours to be a happy symptom of philosophical regeneration, however the inclination may be wasted upon superficial and misleading works, sometimes written with a view to immediate popularity by ministering to the popular taste. One of the most promising incidents of the time is the introduction into the highly metaphysical class of jurists of an historical school which has undertaken to connect, during every period of history, the whole of its legislation with the corresponding state of society.

If the preceding chapter disclosed the destination of the great philosophical creation of which I am treating, the present exhibits its necessity, and the opportuneness of the time. Attempts to constitute a science of society would not have been so obstinate, nor pursued in ways so various, if an instinctive need of it had not been deeply felt. At the same time, the general analysis of the chief efforts hitherto made explains their failure, and convinces us that the whole enterprise remains to be even conceived of in a manner which will secure its accomplishment. Nothing now prevents our going on to the fulfilment of this proposed task, by entering, in the next chapter, on the study of the method in Social Physics. We have so ascertained and cleared our ground, by first taking a survey of our condition from a political point of view, and then reviewing the preparation made, that we are at full liberty to follow the speculative development that will prevail throughout the rest of this book, which will close with the co-ordination between the theory and practice of Social Physics.

## CHAPTER III.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POSITIVE METHOD IN ITS APPLICATION  
TO SOCIAL PHENOMENA.

IN every science conceptions which relate to method are inseparable from those which relate to the doctrine under consideration. The method has to be so varied in its application, and so largely modified by the complexity and special nature of the phenomena, in each case, that any general notions of method would be too indefinite for actual use. If, therefore, we have not separated the method from the doctrine in the simpler departments of science, much less should we think of doing so when treating of the complex phenomena of social life, to say nothing of the great feature of this last case,—its want of positivity. In the formation of a new science the general spirit of it must be seized before its particular parts can be investigated: that is, we must have some notion of the doctrine before examining the method, and then the method cannot be estimated in any other way than by its use. Thus, I have not to offer a logical exposition of method in social physics before proceeding to the science itself; but I must follow the same plan here as in the case of the anterior sciences,—ascertaining its general spirit, and what are the collective resources proper to it. Though these subjects may be said to belong to the science itself, we may consider them as belonging to the method, as they are absolutely necessary to direct our understandings in the pursuit of this difficult study.

In the higher order of sciences,—in those which are the simplest and the most advanced,—the philosophical definition of each was almost sufficient to characterize their condition and general resources, to which no doubt could attach. But the case is otherwise with a recent and extremely complex study, the very nature of which has to be settled by laborious discussions, which are happily needless in regard to the preceding sciences. In treating of Biology, we found it necessary to dwell upon preparatory explanations which would have seemed puerile in any of the foregoing departments, because the chief bases of a science about which there were still so many disputes must be indisputably settled before it could take rank in the positive series. It is evident that the same process is even more needful, and must be more laborious, in the case of the science of social

development, which has hitherto had no character of positivity at all, and which some of the ablest minds of our time sentence never to have any. We must not be surprised then if, after applying here the simplest and most radical ideas of positive philosophy, such as would indeed appear trivial in their formal application to the more advanced sciences, the result should appear to many even among the enlightened, to constitute too bold an innovation, though the conditions may be no more than the barest equivalent of those which are admitted in every other case.

If we look with a philosophical eye upon the present state of social science, we cannot but recognize in it the combination of all the features of that theologico-metaphysical infancy which all the other sciences have had to pass through. The present condition of political science revives before our eyes the analogy of what astrology was to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry, and the search for the universal panacea to the system of medical studies. We may, for our present purpose, consider the theological and the metaphysical polities together,—the second being only a modification of the first in its relation to social science. Their attributes are the same, consisting, in regard to method, in the preponderance of imagination over observation; and, in regard to doctrine, in the exclusive investigation of absolute ideas; the result of both of which is an inevitable tendency to exercise an arbitrary and indefinite action over phenomena which are not regarded as subject to invariable natural laws. In short, the general spirit of all speculation at that stage is at once ideal in its course, absolute in its conception, and arbitrary in its application; and these are unquestionably the prevailing characteristics of social speculation at present, regarded from any point of view whatever. If we reverse all the three aspects, we shall have precisely the spirit which must actuate the formation of positive sociology, and which must afterwards direct its continuous development. The scientific spirit is radically distinguished from the theological and metaphysical by the steady subordination of the imagination to observation; and though the positive philosophy offers the vastest and richest field to human imagination, it restricts it to discovering and perfecting the co-ordination of observed facts, and the means of effecting new researches: and it is this habit of subjecting scientific conceptions to the facts whose connection has to be disclosed, which it is above all things necessary to introduce into social researches; for the observations hitherto made have been vague and ill-circumscribed, so as to afford no adequate foundation for scientific reasoning; and they are usually modified themselves at the pleasure of an imagination stimulated by the most fluctuating passions. From their complexity, and their closer connection with human passions, political speculations must be detained longer than any others in this deplorable philosophical condition, in which they are still involved,

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while simpler and less stimulating sciences have successively obtained emancipation; but we must remember that all other kinds of scientific conception have gone through the same stage, from which they have issued with the more difficulty and delay exactly in proportion to their complexity and special nature. It is, indeed, only in our own day that the more complex have issued from that condition at all, as we saw to be the case with the intellectual and moral phenomena of individual life, which are still studied in a way almost as anti-scientific as political phenomena themselves. We must not, then, consider that uncertainty and vagueness in observation are proper to political subjects. It is only that the same imperfection which has had its day throughout the whole range of speculation is here more intense and protracted; and the same theory which shows how this must be the case gives us full assurance of a philosophical regeneration in this department of science analogous to that which has taken place in the rest, though by means of severer intellectual difficulty, and the embarrassment which may arise from collision with the predominant passions of men; a liability which cannot but stimulate the endeavours of real thinkers.

If we contemplate the positive spirit in its relation to scientific conception, rather than the mode of procedure, we shall find that this philosophy is distinguished from the theologico-metaphysical by its tendency to render relative the ideas which were at first absolute. This inevitable passage from the absolute to the relative is one of the most important philosophical results of each of the intellectual revolutions which has carried on every kind of speculation from the theological or metaphysical to the scientific state. In a scientific view, this contrast between the relative and the absolute may be regarded as the most decisive manifestation of the antipathy between the modern philosophy and the ancient. All investigation into the nature of beings, and their first and final causes, must always be absolute; whereas the study of the laws of phenomena must be relative, since it supposes a continuous progress of speculation subject to the gradual improvement of observation, without the precise reality being ever fully disclosed: so that the relative character of scientific conceptions is inseparable from the true idea of natural laws, just as the chimerical inclination for absolute knowledge accompanies every use of theological fictions and metaphysical entities. Now, it is obvious that the absolute spirit characterizes social speculation now, wherever it exists, as the different schools are all agreed in looking for an immutable political type, which makes no allowance for the regular modification of political conceptions according to the variable state of civilization. This absolute spirit having prevailed through all social changes, and their corresponding philosophical divergences, is now so inherent in existing political science that it affords, amidst all its enormous evils, the only means of restraining individual eccentricities,

and excluding the influx of arbitrarily variable opinions. Thus, such philosophers as have desired to emancipate themselves from this absolutism, without having risen to the conception of a positive social philosophy, have justly incurred the reproach of representing political ideas as uncertain and even arbitrary in their nature, because they have deprived them of whatever character of consistency they had, without substituting any other. They have even cast a sort of discredit upon all philosophical enterprise in the direction of political science, which, losing its absolutism, seemed to lose its stability, and therefore its morality. A positive sociology, however, would put to flight all these natural, though empirical fears; for all antecedent experience shows that in other departments of natural philosophy, scientific ideas have not become arbitrary by becoming relative, but have, on the contrary, acquired a new consistence and stability by being implicated in a system of relations which is ever extending and strengthening, and more and more restraining all serious aberration. There is therefore no fear of falling into a dangerous scepticism by destroying the absolute spirit, if it is done in the natural course of passing on towards the positive state. Here, as elsewhere, it is characteristic of the positive philosophy to destroy no means of intellectual co-ordination without substituting one more effectual and more extended; and it is evident that this transition from the absolute to the relative offers the only existing means of attaining to political conceptions that can gradually secure an unanimous and permanent assent.

The importance and soundness of these conditions are less conspicuous than they might be, on account of the too close connection which, in social science more than any other, still exists between theory and practice, in consequence of which all speculative and abstract appreciation, however supremely important, excites only a feeble interest and inadequate attention. To show how this confusion results from the imperfection of social science, as the most complex of all, we must look at the existing political spirit in relation to its general application, and not for the moment in relation to the science itself. In this view we see that the existing political spirit is marked by its disposition to exercise an illimitable action over the corresponding phenomena, as it was once supposed possible to do in other departments of philosophy. Men were long in learning that Man's power of modifying phenomena can result only from his knowledge of their natural laws; and in the infancy of each science, they believed themselves able to exert an unbounded influence over the phenomena of that science. As this happened precisely at the period when they had the least power over phenomena, from ignorance of their laws, they rested their confidence on expectations of aid from supernatural agents, or mysterious forces supposed to be inherent in all that they saw. The delusion

*Presumptuous  
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was protracted, and the growth of true science hindered in proportion, by the increasing complexity of the descending sciences, as each order of phenomena exhibited less generality than the last, and obscured the perception as to what the modifying power of Man really is. Social phenomena are, of course, from their extreme complexity, the last to be freed from this pretension: but it is therefore only the more necessary to remember that the pretension existed with regard to all the rest, in their earliest stage, and to anticipate therefore that social science will, in its turn, be emancipated from the delusion. It still hangs about the class of intellectual and moral phenomena; but otherwise it is now confined to social subjects. There, amidst the dawning of a sounder philosophy, we see statesmen and politicians still supposing that social phenomena can be modified at will, the human race having in their view no spontaneous impulsion, but being always ready to yield to any influence of the legislator, spiritual or temporal, provided he is invested with a sufficient authority. We see the theological polity, as before, more consistent than the metaphysical, explaining the monstrous disproportion between slight causes and vast effects, by regarding the legislator as merely the organ of a supernatural and absolute power: and again, we see the metaphysical school following the same course, merely substituting for Providence its unintelligible entities, and especially its grand entity, Nature, which comprehends all the rest, and is evidently only an abstract deterioration of the theological principle. Going further than the theological school in its disdain of the subjection of effects to causes, it escapes from difficulty by attributing observed events to chance, and sometimes, when that method is too obviously absurd, exaggerating ridiculously the influence of the individual mind upon the course of human affairs. The result is the same in both cases. It represents the social action of Man to be indefinite and arbitrary, as was once thought in regard to biological, chemical, physical, and even astronomical phenomena, in the earlier stages of their respective sciences. It is easy to see that true political science would be unacceptable, because it must impose limits on political action, by dissipating for ever the pretension of governing at will this class of phenomena, and withdrawing them from human or super-human caprice. In close connection with the tendency to absolute conceptions, we must recognize in this delusion the chief intellectual cause of the social disturbance which now exists; for the human race finds itself delivered over, without logical protection, to the ill-regulated experimentation of the various political schools, each one of which strives to set up, for all future time, its own immutable type of government. We have seen what are the chaotic results of such a strife: and we shall find that there is no chance of order and agreement but in subjecting social phenomena, like all others, to

invariable natural laws, which shall, as a whole, prescribe for each period, with entire certainty, the limits and character of political action:—in other words, introducing into the study of social phenomena the same positive spirit which has regenerated every other branch of human speculation. Such a procedure is the true scientific basis of human dignity; as the chief tendencies of man's nature thus acquire a solemn character of authority which must be always respected by rational legislation; whereas the existing belief in the indefinite power of political combinations, which seems at first to exalt the importance of Man, issues in attributing to him a sort of social automatism passively directed by some supremacy of either Providence or the human ruler. I have said enough to show that the central difficulty in the task of regenerating political science is to rectify such an error of conception, at a time when our prevailing intellectual habits render it difficult to seize social conceptions in any other than their practical aspect, and when their scientific, and yet more, their logical relations are obscured by the prepossessions of the general mind.

The last of the preliminary considerations that we have to review is that of the scientific prevision of phenomena, which, as the test of true science, includes all the rest. We have to contemplate social phenomena as susceptible of prevision, like all other classes, within the limits of exactness compatible with their higher complexity. *Prevision of social phenomena.* Comprehending the three characteristics of political science which we have been examining, prevision of social phenomena supposes first, that we have abandoned the region of metaphysical idealities, to assume the ground of observed realities by a systematic subordination of imagination to observation; secondly, that political conceptions have ceased to be absolute, and have become relative to the variable state of civilization, so that theories, following the natural course of facts, may admit of our foreseeing them; and, thirdly, that permanent political action is limited by determinate laws, since, if social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible. Thus, we may concentrate the conditions of the spirit of positive social philosophy on this one great attribute of scientific prevision. This concentration is all the more apt for the purpose of our inquiry, because there is no other view in which the new social philosophy is so clearly distinguished from the old. Events ordered by a supernatural will may leave room for a supposition of revelation; but the very thought of prevision in that case is sacrilegious: and the case is essentially the same when the direction of events is assigned to metaphysical entities, except that it leaves the chance of revelation; the existence of which chance shows that the metaphysical conception is a mere modification of the theological. The old con-



ceptions may evidently be applied to explain opposite facts equally well; and they can never afford the slightest indication of those which are yet future. And, if it be objected that, at all times, a great number of secondary political facts have been considered susceptible of prevision, this only proves that the old philosophy has never been strictly universal, but has always been tempered by an admixture of feeble and imperfect positivism, without more or less of which society could not have held on its course. This admixture has, however, been hitherto insufficient to allow anything worthy the name of prevision,—anything more than a sort of popular forecast of some secondary and partial matters,—never rising above an uncertain and rough empiricism, which might be of some provisional use, but could not in any degree supply the need of a true political philosophy.

Having now ascertained the fundamental position of the problems of political philosophy, and thus obtained guidance as to the scientific aim to be attained, the next step is to exhibit the general spirit of Social Physics, whose conditions we have been deciding.

The philosophical principle of the science being that social phenomena are subject to natural laws, admitting of rational prevision, we have to ascertain what is the precise subject, and what the peculiar character of those laws. The distinction between the Statical and Dynamical conditions of the subject must be extended to social science; and I shall treat of the conditions of social existence as, in biology, I treated of organization under the head of anatomy; and then of the laws of social movement, as in biology of those of life, under the head of physiology. This division, necessary for exploratory purposes, must not be stretched beyond that use: and, as we saw in Biology, that the distinction becomes weaker with the advance of science, so shall we see that when the science of social physics is fully constituted, this division will remain for analytical purposes, but not as a real separation of the science into two parts. The distinction is not between two classes of facts, but between two aspects of a theory. It corresponds with the double conception of order and progress: for order consists (in a positive sense) in a permanent harmony among the conditions of social existence; and progress consists in social development; and the conditions in the one case, and the laws of movement in the other, constitute the statics and dynamics of social physics.—And here we find again the constant relation between the science and the art,—the theory and the practice. A science which proposes a positive study of the laws of order and of progress cannot be charged with speculative rashness by practical men of any intelligence, since it offers the only rational basis for the practical means of satisfying the needs of society, as to order and progress; and the correspondence in this case will be found to be analogous to that which we have seen to exist between

biological science and the arts which relate to it,—the medical art especially.—One view of the deepest interest in this connection is that the ideas of order and progress which are in perpetual conflict in existing society, occasioning infinite disturbance, are thus reconciled, and made necessary to each other, becoming as truly inseparable as the ideas of organization and life in the individual being. The further we go in the study of the conditions of human society, the more clearly will the organizing and progressive spirit of the positive philosophy become manifest.

The statical study of sociology consists in the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system,—apart, for the occasion, from the *Statistical study.* fundamental movement which is always gradually modifying them. In this view, sociological prevision, founded upon the exact general knowledge of those relations, acts by judging by each other the various statical indications of each mode of social existence, in conformity with direct observation,—just as is done daily in the case of anatomy. This view condemns the existing philosophical practice of contemplating social elements separately, as if they had an independent existence; and it leads us to regard them as in mutual relation, and forming a whole which compels us to treat them in combination. By this method, not only are we furnished with the only possible basis for the study of social movement, but we are put in possession of an important aid to direct observation; since many social elements which cannot be investigated by immediate observation may be estimated by their scientific relation to others already known. When we have a scientific knowledge of the interior relation of the parts of any science or art; and again, of the relations of the sciences to each other: and again, of the relations of arts to their respective sciences, the observation of certain portions of the scheme enables us to pronounce on the state of other portions with a true philosophical security. The case is the same when, instead of studying the collective social phenomena of a single nation, we include in the study those of contemporary nations whose reciprocal influence cannot be disputed, though it is much reduced in modern times, and, as in the instance of western Europe and eastern Asia, apparently almost effaced.

The only essential case in which this fundamental relation is misconceived or neglected is that which is the most *Social Organization.* important of all,—involving, as it does, social organization, properly so called. The theory of social organization is still conceived of as absolute and isolated, independent altogether of the general analysis of the corresponding civilization, of which it can, in fact, constitute only one of the principal elements. This vice is chargeable in an almost equal degree upon the most opposite political schools, which agree in abstract discussions of political systems, without thinking of the coexisting state of civilization, and usually

conclude with making their immutable political type coincide with an infantile state of human development. If we ascend to the philosophical source of this error, we shall find it, I think, in the great theological dogma of the Fall of Man. This fundamental dogma, which reappears, in one form or another, in all religions, and which is supported in its intellectual influence by the natural propensity of men to admire the past, tends, directly and necessarily, to make the continuous deterioration of society coincide with the extension of civilization. We have noticed before how, when it passes from the theological into the metaphysical state, this dogma takes the form of the celebrated hypothesis of a chimerical state of nature, superior to the social state, and the more remote, the further we advance in civilization. We cannot fail to perceive the extreme seriousness, in a political as well as a philosophical sense, of an error so completely incorporated with existing doctrines, and so deeply influencing, in an unconscious way, our collective social speculations,—the more disastrously perhaps for not being expressly maintained as a general principle.—If it were so presented, it must immediately give way before sound philosophical discussion; for it is in direct contradiction to many ideas in political philosophy which, without having attained any scientific consistency, are obtaining some intellectual ascendancy, through the natural course of events, or the expansion of the general mind. For instance, all enlightened political writers acknowledge more or less mutual relation between political institutions; and this is the first direct step towards the rational conception of the agreement of the special

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rence.*

system of institutions with the total system of civilization. We now see the best thinkers admitting a constant mutual connection between the political and the civil power: which means, in scientific language, that preponderating social forces always end in assuming the direction of society. Such partial advances towards a right view,—such fortunate feeling after the right path, must not, however, induce us to relax in our requirements of a true philosophical conception of that general social agreement which can alone constitute organization. Desultory indications, more literary than scientific, can never supply the place of a strict philosophical doctrine, as we may see from the fact that, from Aristotle downwards (and even from an earlier period), the greater number of philosophers have constantly reproduced the famous aphorism of the necessary subordination of laws to manners, without this germ of sound philosophy having had any effect on the general habit of regarding institutions as independent of the coexisting state of civilization,—however strange it may seem that such a contradiction should live through twenty centuries. This is, however, the natural course with intellectual principles and philosophical opinions, as well as with social manners and political institutions. When once they have obtained possession of men's

minds, they live on, notwithstanding their admitted impotence and inconvenience, giving occasion to more and more serious inconsistencies, till the expansion of human reason originates new principles, of equivalent generality and superior rationality. We must not therefore take for more than their worth the desultory attempts that we see made in the right direction, but must insist on the principle which lies at the heart of every scheme of social organization, —the necessary participation of the collective political *régime* in the universal consensus of the social body.

The scientific principle of the relation between the political and the social condition is simply this;—that there must always be a spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts of the social system, the elements of which must inevitably be, sooner or later, combined in a mode entirely conformable to their nature. It is evident that not only must political institutions and social manners on the one hand, and manners and ideas on the other, be always mutually connected; but, further, that this consolidated whole must be always connected, by its nature, with the corresponding state of the integral development of humanity, considered in all its aspects, of intellectual, moral, and physical activity: and the only object of any political system whatever, temporal or spiritual, is to regulate the spontaneous expansion so as best to direct it towards its determinate end. Even during revolutionary periods, when the harmony appears furthest from being duly realized, it still exists: for without it there would be a total dissolution of the social organism. During those exceptional seasons, the political *régime* is still, in the long-run, in conformity with the corresponding state of civilization, as the disturbances which are manifest in the one proceed from equivalent derangements in the other. It is observable that when the popular theory attributes to the legislator the permanent power of infringing the harmony we are speaking of, it supposes him to be armed with a sufficient authority. But every social power, whether called authority or anything else, is constituted by a corresponding assent, spontaneous or deliberate, explicit or implicit, of various individual wills, resolved, from certain preparatory convictions, to concur in a common action, of which his power is first the organ, and then the regulator. Thus, authority is derived from concurrence, and not concurrence from authority (setting aside the necessary reaction): so that no great power can arise otherwise than from the strongly prevalent disposition of the society in which it exists: and when there is no strong preponderance, such powers as exist are weak accordingly: and the more extensive the society, the more irresistible is the correspondence. On the other hand, there is no denying the influence which, by a necessary reaction, the political system, as a whole, exercises over the general system of civilization, and which is so often exhibited in the action, fortunate or disastrous, of institutions,

measures, or purely political events, even upon the course of the sciences and arts, in all ages of society, and especially the earliest. We need not dwell on this; for no one denies it. The common error, indeed, is to exaggerate it, so as to place the reaction before the primary action. It is evident, considering their scientific relation to each other, that both concur in creating that fundamental agreement of the social organism which I propose to set forth in a brief manner, as the philosophical principle of statical sociology. We shall have to advert repeatedly to the subject of the general correspondence between the political *régime* and the contemporary state of civilization, in connection with the question of the necessary limits of political action, and in the chapter which I must devote to social statics: but I did not think fit to wait for these explanations before pointing out that the political system ought always to be regarded as relative. The relative point of view, substituted for the absolute tendency of the ordinary theories, certainly constitutes the chief scientific character of the positive philosophy in its political application. If, on the one hand, the conception of this connection between government and civilization presents all ideas of political good or evil as necessarily relative and variable (which is quite another thing than being arbitrary), on the other hand, it provides a rational basis for a positive theory of the spontaneous order of human society, already vaguely perceived, in regard to some minor relations, by that part of the metaphysical polity which we call political economy; for if the value of any political system can consist in nothing but its harmony with the corresponding social state, it follows that in the natural course of events, and in the absence of intervention, such a harmony must necessarily be established.

There are two principal considerations which induce me to insist on this elementary idea of the radical consensus proper to the social organism: first, the extreme philosophical importance of this master-thought of social statics, which must, from its nature, constitute the rational basis of any new political philosophy; and, secondly, in an accessory way, that dynamical considerations of sociology must prevail throughout the rest of this work, as being at present more interesting, and therefore better understood; and it is, on that account, the more necessary to characterize now the general spirit of social statics, which will henceforth be treated only in an indirect and implicit way. As all artificial and voluntary order is simply a prolongation of the natural and involuntary order to which all human society tends, every rational political institution must rest upon an exact preparatory analysis of corresponding spontaneous tendencies, which alone can furnish a sufficiently solid basis. In brief, it is our business to contemplate order, that we may perfect it; and not to create it; which would be impossible. In a scientific view, this master-thought of universal social interconnection becomes the

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of the social  
organism.*

consequence and complement of a fundamental idea established, in our view of biology, as eminently proper to the study of living bodies. Not that this idea of interconnection is peculiar to that study: it is necessarily common to all phenomena; but amidst immense differences in intensity and variety, and therefore in philosophical importance. It is, in fact, true that wherever there is any system whatever, a certain interconnection must exist. The purely mechanical phenomena of astronomy offer the first suggestion of it; for the perturbations of one planet may sensibly affect another, through a modified gravitation. But the relation becomes closer and more marked in proportion to the complexity and diminished generality of the phenomena, and thus, it is in organic systems that we must look for the fullest mutual connection. Hitherto, it had been merely an accessory idea; but then it becomes the basis of positive conceptions; and it becomes more marked, the more compound are the organisms, and the more complex the phenomena in question,—the animal interconnection being more complete than the vegetable, and the human more than the brute; the nervous system being the chief seat of the biological interconnection. The idea must therefore be scientifically preponderant in social physics, even more than in biology, where it is so decisively recognized by the best order of students. But the existing political philosophy supposes the absence of any such interconnection among the aspects of society: and it is this which has rendered it necessary for me now to establish the point,—leaving the illustration of it to a future portion of the volume. Its consideration is, in fact, as indispensable in assigning its encyclopædic rank to social science as we before saw it to be in instituting Social Physics a science at all.

It follows from this attribute that there can be no scientific study of society, either in its conditions or its movements, if it is separated into portions, and its divisions are studied apart. I have already remarked upon this, in regard to what is called political economy. Materials may be furnished by the observation of different departments; and such observation may be necessary for that object: but it cannot be called science. The methodical division of studies which takes place in the simple inorganic sciences is thoroughly irrational in the recent and complex science of society, and can produce no results. The day may come when some sort of subdivision may be practicable and desirable; but it is impossible for us now to anticipate what the principle of distribution may be; for the principle itself must arise from the development of the science; and that development can take place no otherwise than by our formation of the science as a whole. The complete body will indicate for itself, at the right season, the particular points which need investigation; and then will be the time for such special study as may be required. By any other method of proceeding, we shall

only find ourselves encumbered with special discussions, badly instituted, worse pursued, and accomplishing no other purpose than that of impeding the formation of real science. It is no easy matter to study social phenomena in the only right way,—viewing each element in the light of the whole system. It is no easy matter to exercise such vigilance as that no one of the number of contemporary aspects shall be lost sight of. But it is the right and the only way; and we may perceive in it a clear suggestion that this lofty study should be reserved for the highest order of scientific minds, better prepared than others, by wise educational discipline, for sustained speculative efforts, aided by an habitual subordination of the passions to the reason. There is no need to draw out any lengthened comparison between this state of things as it should be and that which is. And no existing degree of social disturbance can surprise us when we consider how intellectual anarchy is at the bottom of such disturbance, and see how anarchical our intellectual condition appears in the presence of the principle I have laid down.

Before we go on to the subject of social dynamics, I will just remark that the prominent interconnection we have been considering prescribes a procedure in organic studies different from that which suits inorganic. The metaphysicians announce as an aphorism that we should always, in every kind of study, proceed from the simple to the compound: whereas, it appears most rational to suppose that we should follow that or the reverse method, as may best suit our subject. There can be no absolute merit in the method enjoined, apart from its suitability. The rule should rather be (and there probably was a time when the two rules were one) that we must proceed from the more known to the less. Now, in the organic sciences, the elements are much better known to us than the whole which they constitute: so that in that case we must proceed from the simple to the compound. But the reverse method is necessary in the study of Man and of Society; Man and Society as a whole being better known to us, and more accessible subjects of study, than the parts which constitute them. In exploring the universe, it is as a whole that it is inaccessible to us; whereas, in investigating Man or Society, our difficulty is in penetrating the details. We have seen, in our survey of biology, that the general idea of animal nature is more distinct to our minds than the simpler notion of vegetable nature; and that man is the biological unity; the idea of Man being at once the most compound, and the starting-point of speculation in regard to vital existence. Thus, if we compare the two halves of natural philosophy, we shall find that in the one case it is the last degree of composition, and in the other the last degree of simplicity, that is beyond the scope of our research. As for the rest, it may obviate some danger of idle discussions to say that the positive philosophy, subordinating all fancies to reality, excludes

logical controversies about the absolute value of this or that method, apart from its scientific application. The only ground of preference being the superior adaptation of any means to the proposed end, this philosophy may, without any inconsistency, change its order of proceeding when the one first tried is found to be inferior to its converse:—a discovery of which there is no fear in regard to the question we have now been examining.

Passing on from statical to dynamical sociology, we will contemplate the philosophical conception which should govern our study of the movement of society. Part of this subject is already despatched, from the explanations made in connection with statics having simplified the chief difficulties of the case. And social dynamics will be so prominent throughout the rest of this work, that I may reduce within very small compass what I have to say now under that head.

Though the statical view of society is the basis of sociology, the dynamical view is not only the more interesting of the two, but the more marked in its philosophical character, from its being more distinguished from biology by the master-thought of continuous progress, or rather, of the gradual development of humanity. If I were writing a methodical treatise on political philosophy, it would be necessary to offer a preliminary analysis of the individual impulses which make up the progressive force of the human race, by referring them to that instinct which results from the concurrence of all our natural tendencies, and which urges man to develop the whole of his life, physical, moral, and intellectual, as far as his circumstances allow. But this view is admitted by all enlightened philosophers; so that I may proceed at once to consider the continuous succession of human development, regarded in the whole race, as if humanity were one. For clearness, we may take advantage of Condorcet's device of supposing a single nation to which we may refer all the consecutive social modifications actually witnessed among distinct peoples. This rational fiction is nearer the reality than we are accustomed to suppose; for, in a political view, the true successors of such or such a people are certainly those who, taking up and carrying out their primitive endeavours, have prolonged their social progress, whatever may be the soil which they inhabit, or even the race from which they spring. In brief, it is political continuity which regulates sociological succession, though the having a common country must usually affect this continuity in a high degree. As a scientific artifice merely, however, I shall employ this hypothesis, and on the ground of its manifest utility.

The true general spirit of social dynamics then consists in conceiving of each of these consecutive social states as the necessary result of the preceding, and the indispensable mover of the following, according to the axiom of Leibnitz, —*the present is big with the future*. In this view, the object of



science is to discover the laws which govern this continuity, and the aggregate of which determines the course of human development. In short, social dynamics studies the laws of succession, while social statics inquires into those of coexistence; so that the use of the first is to furnish the true theory of progress to political practice, while the second performs the same service in regard to order; and this suitability to the needs of modern society is a strong confirmation of the philosophical character of such a combination.

If the existence of sociological laws has been established in the *Produced by* more difficult and uncertain case of the statical con-  
*natural laws.* dition, we may assume that they will not be questioned in the dynamical province. In all times and places, the ordinary course of even our brief individual life has disclosed certain remarkable modifications which have occurred, in various ways, in the social state; and all the most ancient representations of human life bear unconscious and most interesting testimony to this, apart from all systematic estimate of the fact. Now it is the slow, continuous accumulation of these successive changes which gradually constitutes the social movement, whose steps are ordinarily marked by generations, as the most appreciable elementary variations are wrought by the constant renewal of adults. At a time when the average rapidity of this progression seems to all eyes to be remarkably accelerated, the reality of the movement cannot be disputed, even by those who most abhor it. The only question is about the constant subjection of these great dynamical phenomena to invariable natural laws, a proposition about which there is no question to any one who takes his stand on positive philosophy. It is easy however to establish, from any point of view, that the successive modifications of society have always taken place in a determinate order, the rational explanation of which is already possible in so many cases that we may confidently hope to recognize it ultimately in all the rest. So remarkable is the steadiness of this order, moreover, that it exhibits an exact parallelism of development among distinct and independent populations, as we shall see when we come to the historical portion of this volume. Since, then, the existence of the social movement is unquestionable, on the one hand, and, on the other, the succession of social states is never arbitrary, we cannot but regard this continuous phenomenon as subject to natural laws as positive as those which govern all other phenomena, though more complex. There is in fact no intellectual alternative; and thus it is evident that it is on the ground of social science that the great conflict must soon terminate which has gone on for three centuries between the positive and the theologico-metaphysical spirit. Banished for ever from all other classes of speculation, in principle at least, the old philosophies now prevail in social science alone; and it is from this domain that they have to be excluded, by the conception of the social movement

being subject to invariable natural laws, instead of to any will whatever.

Though the fundamental laws of social interconnection are especially verified in this condition of movement, and though there is a necessary unity in this phenomenon, it may be usefully applied, for preparatory purposes, to the separate elementary aspects of human existence, physical, moral, intellectual, and, finally, political, —their mutual relation being kept in view. Now, in whichever of these ways we regard, as a whole, the movement of humanity, from the earliest periods till now, we shall find that the various steps are connected in a determinate order; as we shall hereafter see, when we investigate the laws of the succession. I need refer here only to the intellectual evolution, which is the most distinct and unquestionable of all, as it has been the least impeded and most advanced of any, and has therefore been usually taken for guidance. The chief part of this evolution, and that which has most influenced the general progression, is no doubt the development of the scientific spirit, from the primitive labours of such philosophers as Thales and Pythagoras to those of men like Lagrange and Bichat. Now, no enlightened man can doubt that, in this long succession of efforts and discoveries, the human mind has pursued a determinate course, the exact preparatory knowledge of which might have allowed a cultivated reason to foresee the progress proper to each period. Though the historical considerations cited in my former volume were only incidental, any one may recognize in them numerous and indisputable examples of this necessary succession, more complex perhaps, but not more arbitrary than any natural law, whether in regard to the development of each separate science, or to the mutual influence of the different branches of natural philosophy. In accordance with the principles laid down at the beginning of this work, we have already seen in various signal instances, that the chief progress of each period, and even of each generation, was a necessary result of the immediately preceding state; so that the men of genius, to whom such progression has been too exclusively attributed, are essentially only the proper organs of a predetermined movement, which would, in their absence, have found other issues. We find a verification of this in history, which shows that various eminent men were ready to make the same great discovery at the same time, while the discovery required only one organ. All the parts of the human evolution admit of analogous observations, as we shall presently see, though they are more complex and less obvious than that which I have just cited. The natural progression of the arts of life is abundantly evident; and in our direct study of social dynamics we shall find an explanation of the apparent exception of the fine arts, which will be found to oppose no contradiction to the general course of human progression. As to that part of the movement which appears at present to be least reducible to natural laws,

the political movement (still supposed to be governed by wills of adequate power), it is as clear as in any other case that political systems have exhibited an historical succession, according to a traceable filiation, in a determinate order, which I am prepared to show to be even more inevitable than that of the different states of human intelligence.

The interconnection which we have examined and established in a statical view may aid us in developing the conception of the existence of positive laws in social dynamics. Unless the movement was determined by those laws, it would occasion the entire destruction of the social system. Now, that interconnection simplifies and strengthens the preparatory indications of dynamic order; for, when it has once been shown in any relation, we are authorized to extend it to all others; and this unites all the partial proofs that we can successively obtain of the reality of this scientific conception. In the choice and the application of these verifications, we must remember that the laws of social dynamics are most recognizable when they relate to the largest societies, in which secondary disturbances have the smallest effect. Again, these fundamental laws become the more irresistible, and therefore the more appreciable, in proportion to the advancement of the civilization upon which they operate, because the social movement becomes more distinct and certain with every conquest over accidental influences. As for the philosophical co-ordination of these preparatory evidences, the combination of which is important to science, it is clear that the social evolution must be more inevitably subject to natural laws, the more compound are the phenomena, and the less perceptible therefore the irregularities which arise from individual influences. This shows how inconsistent it is, for instance, to suppose the scientific movement to be subject to positive laws, while the political movement is regarded as arbitrary; for the latter, being more composite, must overrule individual disturbances, and be therefore more evidently predetermined than the former, in which individual genius must have more power. Any paradoxical appearance which this statement may exhibit will disappear in the course of further examination.

If I confined myself strictly to a scientific view, I might satisfy myself with proving the fact of social progression, without taking any notice of the question of human perfectibility. But so much time and effort are wasted in groundless speculation on that interesting question, argued as it is on the supposition that political events are arbitrarily determined, that it may be as well to notice it in passing; and the more, because it may serve as a natural transition to the estimate of the limits of political action.

*Notion of Human perfectibility.* We have nothing to do here with the metaphysical controversy about the absolute happiness of Man at different stages of civilization. As the happiness of every man depends on the harmony between the develop-

ment of his various faculties and the entire system of the circumstances which govern his life; and as, on the other hand, this equilibrium always establishes itself spontaneously to a certain extent, it is impossible to compare in a positive way, either by sentiment or reasoning, the individual welfare which belongs to social situations that can never be brought into direct comparison: and therefore the question of the happiness of different animal organisms, or of their two sexes, is merely impracticable and unintelligible. The only question therefore is of the effect of the social evolution, which is so undeniable that there is no reasoning with any one who does not admit it as the basis of the inquiry. The only ground of discussion is whether development and improvement,—the theoretical and the practical aspect,—are one; whether the development is necessarily accompanied by a corresponding amelioration, or progress, properly so called. To me it appears that the amelioration is as unquestionable as the development from which it proceeds, provided we regard it as subject, like the development itself, to limits general and special, which science will be found to prescribe. The chimerical notion of unlimited perfectibility is thus at once excluded. Taking the human race as a whole, and not any one people, it appears that human development brings after it, in two ways, an ever-growing amelioration, first, in the radical condition of Man, which no one disputes; and next, in his corresponding faculties, which is a view much less attended to. There is no need to dwell upon the improvement in the conditions of human existence, both by the increasing action of Man on his environment through the advancement of the sciences and arts, and by the constant amelioration of his customs and manners; and again, by the gradual improvement in social organization. We shall presently see that in the Middle Ages, which are charged with political retrogression, the progress was more political than any other. One fact is enough to silence sophistical declamation on this subject; the continuous increase of population all over the globe, as a consequence of civilization, while the wants of individuals are, as a whole, better satisfied at the same time. The tendency to improvement must be highly spontaneous and irresistible to have persevered notwithstanding the enormous faults,—political faults especially,—which have at all times absorbed or neutralized the greater part of our social forces. Even throughout the revolutionary period, in spite of the marked discordance between the political system and the general state of civilization, the improvement has proceeded, not only in physical and intellectual, but also in moral respects, though the transient disorganization could not but disturb the natural evolution. As for the other aspect of the question, the gradual and slow improvement of human nature, within narrow limits, it seems to me impossible to reject altogether the principle proposed (with great exaggeration, however) by Lamarck, of the necessary influence

of a homogeneous and continuous exercise in producing, in every animal organism, and especially in Man, an organic improvement, susceptible of being established in the race, after a sufficient persistence. If we take the best marked case,—that of intellectual development, it seems to be unquestionable that there is a superior aptitude for mental combinations, independent of all culture, among highly civilized people; or, what comes to the same thing, an inferior aptitude among nations that are less advanced,—the average intellect of the members of those societies being taken for observation. The intellectual faculties are, it is true, more modified than the others by the social evolution: but then they have the smallest relative effect in the individual human constitution: so that we are authorized to infer from their amelioration a proportionate improvement in aptitudes that are more marked and equally exercised. In regard to morals, particularly, I think it indisputable that the gradual development of humanity favours a growing preponderance of the noblest tendencies of our nature,—as I hope to prove further on. The lower instincts continue to manifest themselves in modified action, but their less sustained and more repressed exercise must tend to debilitate them by degrees; and their increasing regulation certainly brings them into involuntary concurrence in the maintenance of a good social economy; and especially in the case of the least marked organisms, which constitute a vast majority. These two aspects of social evolution, then,—the *development* which brings after it the *improvement*,—we may consider to be admitted as facts.

Adhering to our relative, in opposition to the absolute view, we must conclude the social state, regarded as a whole, to have been as perfect, in each period, as the coexisting condition of humanity and of its environment would allow. Without this view, history would be incomprehensible; and the relative view is as indispensable in regard to progress, as, in considering social statics, we saw it to be in regard to order. If, in a statical view, the various social elements cannot but maintain a spontaneous harmony, which is the first principle of order; neither can any of them help being as advanced, at any period, as the whole system of influences permits. In either case, the harmony and the movement are the result of invariable natural laws, which produce all phenomena whatever, and are more obscure in social science merely on account of the greater complexity of the phenomena concerned.

And now occurs, as the last aspect of social dynamics, the question of the general limits of political action. No enlightened man can be blind to the necessary existence of such limits, which can be ignored only on the old theological supposition of the legislator being merely the organ of a direct and continuous Providence, which admits of no limits. We need not stop to confute that hypothesis, which has no existence but in virtue

of ancient habits of thought. In any case, human action is very limited, in spite of all aids from concurrence and ingenious methods; and it is difficult to perceive why social action should be exempt from this restriction, which is an inevitable consequence of the existence of natural laws. Through all the self-assertions of human pride, every statesman of experience knows well the reality of the bounds prescribed to political action by the aggregate of social influences, to which he must attribute the failure of the greater number of the projects which he had secretly cherished; and perhaps the conviction is most thorough, while most carefully hidden, in the mind of the most powerful of statesmen, because his inability to struggle against natural laws must be decisive in proportion to his implication with them. Seeing that social science would be impossible in the absence of this principle, we need not dwell further upon it, but may proceed to ascertain the fitness of the new political philosophy to determine, with all the precision that the subject admits, what is the nature of these limits, general or special, permanent or temporary.

Two questions are concerned here: first, in what way the course of human development may be affected by the aggregate of causes of variation which may be applied to it; and next, what share the voluntary and calculated action of our political combinations may have among these modifying influences. The first question is by far the most important, both because it is a general principle, which the second is not, and because it is fully accessible, which, again, the second is not.

We must observe, in the first place, that social phenomena may, from their complexity, be more easily modified than any others, according to the law which was established to that effect in my first volume. Thus, the limits of variation are wider in regard to sociological than any other laws. If, then, human intervention holds the same proportionate rank among modifying influences as it is natural at first to suppose, its influence must be more considerable in the first case than in any other, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. This is the first scientific foundation of all rational hopes of a systematic reformation of humanity; and on this ground illusions of this sort certainly appear more excusable than on any other subject. But though modifications, from all causes, are greater in the case of political than of simpler phenomena, still they can never be more than modifications: that is, they will always be in subjection to those fundamental laws, whether statical or dynamical, which regulate the harmony of the social elements, and the filiation of their successive variations. There is no disturbing influence, exterior or human, which can make incompatible elements coexist in the political system, nor change in any way the natural laws of the development of humanity. The inevitable gradual preponderance

*Social phenomena modifiable.*

of continuous influences, however imperceptible their power may be at first, is now admitted with regard to all natural phenomena; and it must be applied to social phenomena, whenever the same method of philosophizing is extended to them. What then are the modifications of which the social organism and social life are susceptible, if nothing can alter the laws either of harmony or of succession? The answer is that modifications act upon the intensity and secondary operation of phenomena, but without affecting their nature or their filiation. To suppose that they could, would be to exalt the disturbing above the fundamental cause, and would destroy the whole economy of laws. In the political system this principle of positive philosophy shows that, in a statical view, any possible variations can affect only the intensity of the different tendencies belonging to each social situation, without in any way hindering or producing, or, in a word, changing the nature of, those tendencies; and, in the same way, in a dynamical view, the progress of the race must be considered susceptible of modification only with regard to its speed, and without any reversal in the order of development, or any interval of any importance being overleaped. These variations are analogous to those of the animal organism, with the one difference that in sociology they are more complex; and, as we saw that the limits of variation remain to be established in biology, it is not to be expected that sociology should be more advanced. But all we want here is to obtain a notion of the general spirit of the law, in regard both to social statics and dynamics; and looking at it from both points of view, it seems to me impossible to question its truth. In the intellectual order of phenomena, for instance, there is no accidental influence, nor any individual superiority, which can transfer to one period the discoveries reserved for a subsequent age, in the natural course of the human mind; nor can there be the reverse case of postponement. The history of the sciences settles the question of the close dependence of even the most eminent individual genius on the contemporary state of the human mind; and this is above all remarkable in regard to the improvement of methods of investigation, either in the way of reasoning or experiment. The same thing happens in regard to the arts; and especially in whatever depends on mechanical means in substitution for human action. And there is not, in reality, any more room for doubt in the case of moral development, the character of which is certainly determined, in each period, by the corresponding state of the social evolution, whatever may be the modifications caused by education or individual organization. Each of the leading modes of social existence determines for itself a certain system of morals and manners, the common aspect of which is easily recognized in all individuals, in the midst of their characteristic differences; for instance, there is a state of human life in which the best individual natures contract a habit of ferocity, from which very inferior natures easily emancipate them-

selves, in a better state of society. The case is the same, in a political view, as our historical analysis will hereafter show. And in fact, if we were to review all the facts and reflections which establish the existence of the limits of variation, whose principle I have just laid down, we should find ourselves reproducing in succession all the proofs of the subjection of social phenomena to invariable laws; because the principle is neither more nor less than a strict application of the philosophical conception.

We cannot enlarge upon the second head: that is, the classification of modifying influences according to their respective importance. If such a classification is not yet established in biology, it would be premature *Order of modifying influences.* indeed to attempt it in social science. Thus, if the three chief causes of social variation appear to me to result from, first, race; secondly, climate; thirdly, political action in its whole scientific extent, it would answer none of our present purposes to inquire here whether this or some other is the real order of their importance. The political influences are the only ones really open to our intervention; and to that head general attention must be directed, though with great care to avoid the conclusion that that class of influences must be the most important because it is the most immediately interesting to us. It is owing to such an illusion as this that observers who believe themselves emancipated from old prejudices cannot obtain sociological knowledge, because they enormously exaggerate the power of political action. Because political operations, temporal or spiritual, can have no social efficacy but in as far as they are in accordance with the corresponding tendencies of the human mind, they are supposed to have produced what is in reality occasioned by a spontaneous evolution, which is less conspicuous, and easily overlooked. Such a mistake proceeds in neglect of numerous and marked cases in history, in which the most prodigious political authority has left no lasting traces of its well-sustained development, because it moved in a contrary direction to modern civilization; as in the instances of Julian, of Philip II., of Napoleon Bonaparte, etc. The inverse cases, unhappily too few, are still more decisive; those cases in which political action, sustained by an equally powerful authority, has nevertheless failed in the pursuit of ameliorations that were premature, though in accordance with the social movement of the time. Intellectual history, as well as political, furnishes examples of this kind in abundance. It has been sensibly remarked by Fergusson, that even the action of one nation upon another, whether by conquest or otherwise, though the most intense of all social forces, can effect merely such modifications as are in accordance with its existing tendencies; so that, in fact, the action merely accelerates or extends a development which would have taken place without it. In politics, as in science, *opportuneness* is always the main condition of all great and durable influence,



whatever may be the personal value of the superior man to whom the multitude attribute social action of which he is merely the fortunate organ. The power of the individual over the race is subject to these general limits, even when the effects, for good or for evil, are as easy as possible to produce. In revolutionary times, for instance, those who are proud of having aroused anarchical passions in their contemporaries do not see that their miserable triumph is due to a spontaneous disposition, determined by the aggregate of the corresponding social state, which has produced a provisional and partial relaxation of the general harmony. As for the rest, it being ascertained that there are limits of variation among social phenomena, and modifications dependent on systematic political action; and as the scientific principle which is to describe such modifications is now known; the influence and scope of that principle must be determined in each case by the direct development of social science, applied to the appreciation of the corresponding state of circumstances. It is by such estimates, empirically attempted, that men of genius have been guided in all great and profound action upon humanity in any way whatever; and it is only thus that they have been able to rectify, in a rough way, the illusory suggestions of the irrational doctrines in which they were educated. Everywhere, as I have so often said, foresight is the true source of action.

The inaccurate intellectual habits which as yet prevail in political philosophy may induce an apprehension that, according to such considerations as those just presented, the new science of Social Physics may reduce us to mere observation of human events, excluding all continuous intervention. It is, however, certain that, while dissipating all ambitious illusions about the indefinite action of Man on civilization, the principle of rational limits to political action establishes, in the most exact and unquestionable manner, the true point of contact between social theory and practice. It is by this principle only that political art can assume a systematic character, by its release from arbitrary principles mingled with empirical notions. It is thus only that political art can pass upwards as medical art has done; the two cases being strongly analogous. As political intervention can have no efficacy unless it rests on corresponding tendencies of the political organism or life, so as to aid its spontaneous development, it is absolutely necessary to understand the natural laws of harmony and succession which determine, in every period, and under every social aspect, what the human evolution is prepared to produce, pointing out, at the same time, the chief obstacles which may be got rid of. It would be exaggerating the scope of such an art to suppose it capable of obviating, in all cases, the violent disturbances which are occasioned by impediments to the natural evolution. In the highly complex social organism, maladies and crises are necessarily even more inevitable than in the individual organism. But, though science is powerless for the moment amidst

wild disorder and extravagance, it may palliate and abridge the crises, by understanding their character and foreseeing their issue, and by more or less intervention, where any is possible. Here, as in other cases, and more than in other cases, the office of science is, not to govern, but to modify phenomena; and to do this, it is necessary to understand their laws.

Thus, then, we see what is the function of social science. Without extolling or condemning political facts, science regards them as subjects of observation: it contemplates each phenomenon in its harmony with coexisting phenomena, and in its connection with the foregoing and the following state of human development: it endeavours to discover, from both points of view, the general relations which connect all social phenomena: and each of them is *explained*, in the scientific sense of the word, when it has been connected with the whole of the existing situation, and the whole of the preceding movement. Favouring the social sentiment in the highest degree, this science fulfils the famous suggestion of Pascal, by representing the whole human race, past, present, and future, as constituting a vast and eternal social unit, whose different organs, individual and national, concur, in their various modes and degrees, in the evolution of humanity. Leading us on, like every other science, with as much exactness as the extreme complexity of its phenomena allows, to a systematic prevision of the events which must result from either a given situation or a given aggregate of antecedents, political science enlightens political art, not only in regard to the tendencies which should be aided, but as to the chief means that should be employed, so as to avoid all useless or ephemeral and therefore dangerous action; in short, all waste of any kind of social force.

This examination of the general spirit of political philosophy has been much more difficult than the same process in *Means of* regard to any established science. The next step, *investigation.* now that this is accomplished, is to examine, according to my usual method, the means of investigation proper to Social science. In virtue of a law before recognized, we may expect to find in Sociology a more varied and developed system of resources than in any other, in proportion to the complexity of the phenomena, while yet, this extension of means does not compensate for the increased imperfection arising from the intricacy. The extension of the means is also more difficult to verify than in any prior case, from the novelty of the subject; and I can scarcely hope that such a sketch as I must present here will command such confidence as will arise when a complete survey of the science shall have confirmed what I now offer.

As Social Physics assumes a place in the hierarchy of sciences after all the rest, and therefore dependent on them, its means of investigation must be of two kinds: those which are peculiar to itself, and which may be called direct, and those which arise from

the connection of sociology with the other sciences; and these last, though indirect, are as indispensable as the first. I shall review, first, the direct resources of the science.

*Direct means.*

Here, as in all the other cases, there are three methods of proceeding:—by Observation, Experiment, and Comparison.

Very imperfect and even vicious notions prevail at present as to what Observation can be and can effect in social science.

*Observation.*

The chaotic state of doctrine of the last century has extended to Method; and amidst our intellectual disorganization, difficulties have been magnified; precautionary methods, experimental and rational, have been broken up; and even the possibility of obtaining social knowledge by observation has been dogmatically denied; but if the sophisms put forth on this subject were true, they would destroy the certainty, not only of social science, but of all the simpler and more perfect ones that have gone before. The ground of doubt assigned is the uncertainty of human testimony; but all the sciences, up to the most simple, require proofs of testimony: that is, in the elaboration of the most positive theories, we have to admit observations which could not be directly made, nor even repeated, by those who use them, and the reality of which rests only on the faithful testimony of the original investigators; there being nothing in this to prevent the use of such proofs, in concurrence with immediate observations. In astronomy, such a method is obviously necessary; it is equally, though less obviously necessary even in mathematics; and, of course, much more evidently in the case of the more complex sciences. How could any science emerge from the nascent state,—how could there be any organization of intellectual labour, even if research were restricted to the utmost, if every one rejected all observations but his own? The stoutest advocates of historical scepticism do not go so far as to advocate this. It is only in the case of social phenomena that the paradox is proposed; and it is made use of there because it is one of the weapons of the philosophical arsenal which the revolutionary metaphysical doctrine constructed for the intellectual overthrow of the ancient political system. The next great hindrance to the use of observation is the empiricism which is introduced into it by those who, in the name of impartiality, would interdict the use of any theory whatever. No logical dogma could be more thoroughly irreconcilable with the spirit of the positive philosophy, or with its special character in regard to the study of social phenomena, than this. No real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible, except in as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by some theory: and it was this logical need which, in the infancy of human reason, occasioned the rise of theological philosophy, as we shall see in the course of our historical survey. The positive philosophy does not dissolve this obligation, but, on the contrary, extends and fulfils it more and more; the

further the relations of phenomena are multiplied and perfected by it. Hence it is clear that, scientifically speaking, all isolated, empirical observation is idle, and even radically uncertain; that science can use only those observations which are connected, at least hypothetically, with some law; that it is such a connection which makes the chief difference between scientific and popular observation, embracing the same facts, but contemplating them from different points of view: and that observations empirically conducted can at most supply provisional materials, which must usually undergo an ulterior revision. The rational method of observation becomes more necessary in proportion to the complexity of the phenomena, amidst which the observer would not know what he ought to look at in the facts before his eyes, but for the guidance of a preparatory theory; and thus it is that by the connection of foregoing facts we learn to see the facts that follow. This is undisputed with regard to astronomical, physical, and chemical research, and in every branch of biological study, in which good observation of its highly complex phenomena is still very rare, precisely because its positive theories are very imperfect. Carrying on the analogy, it is evident that in the corresponding divisions, statical and dynamical, of social science, there is more need than anywhere else of theories which shall scientifically connect the facts that are happening with those that have happened: and the more we reflect, the more distinctly we shall see that in proportion as known facts are mutually connected, we shall be better able, not only to estimate, but to perceive, those which are yet unexplored. I am not blind to the vast difficulty which this requisition imposes on the institution of positive sociology,—obliging us to create at once, so to speak, observations and laws, on account of their indispensable connection, placing us in a sort of vicious circle, from which we can issue only by employing in the first instance materials which are badly elaborated, and doctrines which are ill-conceived. How I may succeed in a task so difficult and delicate, we shall see at its close; but, however that may be, it is clear that it is the absence of any positive theory which at present renders social observations so vague and incoherent. There can never be any lack of facts; for in this case even more than in others, it is the commonest sort of facts that are most important, whatever the collectors of secret anecdotes may think; but, though we are steeped to the lips in them, we can make no use of them, nor even be aware of them, for want of speculative guidance in examining them. The statical observation of a crowd of phenomena cannot take place without some notion, however elementary, of the laws of social interconnection: and dynamical facts could have no fixed direction if they were not attached, at least by a provisional hypothesis, to the laws of social development. The positive philosophy is very far from discouraging historical or any

other erudition ; but the precious night-watchings, now so lost in the laborious acquisition of a conscientious but barren learning, may be made available by it for the constitution of true social science, and the increased honour of the earnest minds that are devoted to it. The new philosophy will supply fresh and nobler subjects, un hoped-for insight, a loftier aim, and therefore a higher scientific dignity. It will discard none but aimless labours, without principle, and without character ; as in Physics, there is no room for compilations of empirical observations ; and at the same time, philosophy will render justice to the zeal of students of a past generation, who, destitute of the favourable guidance which we, of this day, enjoy, followed up their laborious historical researches with an instinctive perseverance, and in spite of the superficial disdain of the philosophers of the time. No doubt, the same danger attends research here as elsewhere : the danger that, from the continuous use of scientific theories, the observer may sometimes pervert facts, by erroneously supposing them to verify some ill-grounded speculative prejudices of his own. But we have the same guard here as elsewhere,—in the further extension of the science : and the case would not be improved by a recurrence to empirical methods, which would be merely leaving theories that may be misapplied but can always be rectified, for imaginary notions which cannot be substantiated at all. Our feeble reason may often fail in the application of positive theories ; but at least they transfer us from the domain of imagination to that of reality, and expose us infinitely less than any other kind of doctrine to the danger of seeing in facts that which is not.

It is now clear that social science requires, more than any other, the subordination of Observation to the statical and dynamical laws of phenomena. No social-fact can have any scientific meaning till it is connected with some other social fact ; without which connection it remains a mere anecdote, involving no rational utility. This condition so far increases the immediate difficulty that good observers will be rare at first, though more abundant than ever as the science expands : and here we meet with another confirmation of what I said at the outset of this volume,—that the formation of social theories should be confided only to the best organized minds, prepared by the most rational training. Explored by such minds, according to rational views of coexistence and succession, social phenomena no doubt admit of much more varied and extensive means of investigation than phenomena of less complexity. In this view, it is not only the immediate inspection or direct description of events that affords useful means of positive exploration ; but the consideration of apparently insignificant customs, the appreciation of various kinds of monuments, the analysis and comparison of languages, and a multitude of other resources. In short, a mind suitably trained becomes able by exercise to convert almost all impres-

sions from the events of life into sociological indications, when once the connection of all indications with the leading ideas of the science is understood. This is a facility afforded by the mutual relation of the various aspects of society, which may partly compensate for the difficulty caused by that mutual connection: if it renders observation more difficult, it affords more means for its prosecution.

It might be supposed beforehand that the second method of investigation, Experiment, must be wholly inapplicable in Social Science; but we shall find that the science *Experiment.* is not entirely deprived of this resource, though it must be one of inferior value. We must remember (what was before explained) that there are two kinds of experimentation,—the direct and the indirect: and that it is not necessary to the philosophical character of this method that the circumstances of the phenomenon in question should be, as is vulgarly supposed in the learned world, artificially instituted. Whether the case be natural or factitious, experimentation takes place whenever the regular course of the phenomenon is interfered with in any determinate manner. The spontaneous nature of the alteration has no effect on the scientific value of the case, if the elements are known. It is in this sense that experimentation is possible in Sociology. If direct experimentation had become too difficult amidst the complexities of biology, it may well be considered impossible in social science. Any artificial disturbance of any social element must affect all the rest, according to the laws both of coexistence and succession; and the experiment would therefore, if it could be instituted at all, be deprived of all scientific value, through the impossibility of isolating either the conditions or the results of the phenomenon. But we saw, in our survey of biology, that pathological cases are the true scientific equivalent of pure experimentation, and why. The same reasons apply, with even more force, to sociological researches. In them, pathological analysis consists in the examination of cases, unhappily too common, in which the natural laws, either of harmony or of succession, are disturbed by any causes, special or general, accidental or transient; as in revolutionary times especially; and above all, in our own. These disturbances are, in the social body, exactly analogous to diseases in the individual organism: and I have no doubt whatever that the analogy will be more evident (allowance being made for the unequal complexity of the organisms) the deeper the investigation goes. In both cases it is, as I said once before, a noble use to make of our reason, to disclose the real laws of our nature, individual or social, by the analysis of its sufferings. But if the method is imperfectly instituted in regard to biological questions, much more faulty must it be in regard to the phenomena of social science, for want even of the rational conceptions to which they are to be referred. We see the most disastrous political experiments for ever renewed, with only some insignificant and irrational modifications,

though their first operation should have fully satisfied us of the uselessness and danger of the expedients proposed. Without forgetting how much is ascribable to the influence of human passions, we must remember that the deficiency of an authoritative rational analysis is one of the main causes of the barrenness imputed to social experiments, the course of which would become much more instructive if it were better observed. The great natural laws exist and act in all conditions of the organism; for, as we saw in the case of biology, it is an error to suppose that they are violated or suspended in the case of disease: and we are therefore justified in drawing our conclusions, with due caution, from the scientific analysis of disturbance to the positive theory of normal existence. This is the nature and character of the indirect experimentation which discloses the real economy of the social body in a more marked manner than simple observation could do. It is applicable to all orders of sociological research, whether relating to existence or to movement, and regarded under any aspect whatever, physical, intellectual, moral, or political; and to all degrees of the social evolution, from which, unhappily, disturbances have never been absent. As for its present extension, no one can venture to offer any statement of it, because it has never been duly applied in any investigation in political philosophy; and it can become customary only by the institution of the new science which I am endeavouring to establish. But I could not omit this notice of it, as one of the means of investigation proper to social science.

As for the third of those methods, Comparison, the reader must bear in mind the explanations offered, in our survey of biological philosophy, of the reasons why the comparative method must prevail in all studies of which the living organism is the subject; and the more remarkably, in proportion to the rank of the organism. The same considerations apply in the present case, in a more conspicuous degree; and I may leave it to the reader to make the application, merely pointing out the chief differences which distinguish the use of the comparative method in sociological inquiries.

It is a very irrational disdain which makes us object to all comparison between human society and the social state of the lower animals. This unphilosophical pride arose out of the protracted influence of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy; and it will be corrected by the positive philosophy, when we better understand and can estimate the social state of the higher orders of mammals, for instance. We have seen how important is the study of individual life, in regard to intellectual and moral phenomena,—of which social phenomena are the natural result and complement. There was once the same blindness to the importance of the procedure in this case as now in the other; and, as it has given way in the one case, so it will in the

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other. The chief defect in the kind of sociological comparison that we want is that it is limited to statical considerations ; whereas the dynamical are, at the present time, the preponderant and direct subject of science. The restriction results from the social state of animals being, though not so stationary as we are apt to suppose, yet susceptible only of extremely small variations, in no way comparable to the continued progression of humanity in its feeblest days. But there is no doubt of the scientific utility of such a comparison, in the statical province, where it characterizes the elementary laws of social interconnection, by exhibiting their action in the most imperfect state of society, so as even to suggest useful inductions in regard to human society. There cannot be a stronger evidence of the natural character of the chief social relations, which some people fancy that they can transform at pleasure. Such sophists will cease to regard the great ties of the human family as factitious and arbitrary when they find them existing, with the same essential characteristics, among the animals, and more conspicuously, the nearer the organisms approach to the human type. In brief, in all that part of sociology which is almost one with intellectual and moral biology, or with the natural history of Man ; in all that relates to the first germs of the social relations, and the first institutions which were founded by the unity of the family or the tribe, there is not only great scientific advantage, but real philosophical necessity for employing the rational comparison of human with other animal societies. Perhaps it might even be desirable not to confine the comparison to societies which present a character of voluntary co-operation, in analogy to the human. They must always rank first in importance : but the scientific spirit, extending the process to its final logical term, might find some advantage in examining those strange associations, proper to the inferior animals, in which an involuntary co-operation results from an indissoluble organic union, either by simple adhesion or real continuity. If the science gained nothing by this extension, the method would. And there is nothing that can compare with such an habitual scientific comparison for the great service of casting out the absolute spirit which is the chief vice of political philosophy. It appears to me, moreover, that, in a practical view, the insolent pride which induces some ranks of society to suppose themselves as, in a manner, of another species than the rest of mankind, is in close affinity with the irrational disdain that repudiates all comparison between human and other animal nature. However all this may be, these considerations apply only to a methodical and special treatment of social philosophy. Here, where I can offer only the first conception of the science, in which dynamical considerations must prevail, it is evident that I can make little use of the kind of comparison ; and this makes it all the more necessary to point it out, lest its omission should occasion such scientific inconveniences as I have just indicated. The



commonest logical procedures are generally so characterized by their very application, that nothing more of a preliminary nature is needed than the simplest examination of their fundamental properties.

To indicate the order of importance of the forms of society which are to be studied by the Comparative Method, I begin with the chief method, which consists in a comparison of the different coexisting states of human society on the various parts of the earth's surface;—

*Comparison  
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society.*

those states being completely independent of each other. By this method, the different stages of evolution may all be observed at once. Though the progression is single and uniform, in regard to the whole race, some very considerable and very various populations have, from causes which are little understood, attained extremely unequal degrees of development, so that the former states of the most civilized nations are now to be seen, amidst some partial differences, among contemporary populations inhabiting different parts of the globe. In its relation to Observation, this kind of comparison offers the advantage of being applicable both to statical and dynamical inquiries, verifying the laws of both, and even furnishing occasionally valuable direct inductions in regard to both. In the second place, it exhibits all possible degrees of social evolution to our immediate observation. From the wretched inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego to the most advanced nations of western Europe, there is no social grade which is not extant in some points of the globe, and usually in localities which are clearly apart. In the historical part of this volume, we shall find that some interesting secondary phases of social development, of which the history of civilization leaves no perceptible traces, can be known only by this comparative method of study; and these are not, as might be supposed, the lowest degrees of evolution, which every one admits can be investigated in no other way. And between the great historical aspects, there are numerous intermediate states which must be observed thus, if at all. The second part of the comparative method verifies the indications afforded by historical analysis, and fills up the gaps it leaves: and nothing can be more rational than the method, as it rests upon the established principle that the development of the human mind is uniform in the midst of all diversities of climate, and even of race; such diversities having no effect upon anything more than the rate of progress.—But we must beware of the scientific dangers attending the process of comparison by this method. For instance, it can give us no idea of the order of succession, as it presents all the states of development as coexisting: so that if the order of development were not established by other methods, this one would infallibly mislead us. And again, if we were not misled as to the order, there is nothing in this method which discloses the filiation of the different systems of society; a

matter in which the most distinguished philosophers have been mistaken in various ways and degrees. Again, there is the danger of mistaking modifications for primary phases; as when social differences have been ascribed to the political influence of climate, instead of that inequality of evolution which is the real cause. Sometimes, but more rarely, the mistake is the other way. Indeed, there is nothing in the matter that can show which of two cases presents the diversity that is observed. We are in danger of the same mistake in regard to races; for, as the sociological comparison is instituted between peoples of different races, we are liable to confound the effects of race and of the social period. Again, climate comes in to offer a third source of interpretation of comparative phenomena, sometimes agreeing with, and sometimes contradicting the two others; thus multiplying the chances of error, and rendering the analysis which looked so promising almost impracticable. Here, again, we see the indispensable necessity of keeping in view the positive conception of human development as a whole. By this alone can we be preserved from such errors as I have referred to, and enriched by any genuine results of analysis. We see how absurd in theory and dangerous in practice are the notions and declamations of the empirical school, and of the enemies of all social speculation: for it is precisely in proportion to their elevation and generality that the ideas of positive social philosophy become real and effective,—all illusion and uselessness belonging to conceptions which are too narrow and too special, in the departments either of science or of reasoning. But it is a consequence from these last considerations that this first sketch of sociological science, with the means of investigation that belong to it, rests immediately upon the primary use of a new method of observation, which is so appropriate to the nature of the phenomena as to be exempt from the dangers inherent in the others. This last portion of the comparative method is the Historical Method, properly so called; and it is the only basis on which the system of political logic can rest.

The historical comparison of the consecutive states of humanity is not only the chief scientific device of the new political philosophy. Its rational development constitutes the substratum of the science, in whatever is essential to it. It is this which distinguishes it thoroughly from biological science, as we shall presently see. The positive principle of this separation results from the necessary influence of human generations upon the generations that follow, accumulating continuously till it constitutes the preponderating consideration in the direct study of social development. As long as this preponderance is not directly recognized, the positive study of humanity must appear a simple prolongation of the natural history of Man: but this scientific character, suitable enough to the earlier generations,

*Comparison of  
consecutive  
states.*

disappears in the course of the social evolution, and assumes at length a wholly new aspect, proper to sociological science, in which historical considerations are of immediate importance. And this preponderant use of the historical method gives its philosophical character to sociology in a logical, as well as a scientific sense. By the creation of this new department of the comparative method, sociology confers a benefit on the whole of natural philosophy; because the positive method is thus completed and perfected, in a manner which, for scientific importance, is almost beyond our estimate. What we can now comprehend is that the historical method verifies and applies in the largest way, that chief quality of sociological science,—its proceeding from the whole to the parts. Without this permanent condition of social study, all historical labour would degenerate into being a mere compilation of provisional materials. As it is in their development especially that the various social elements are interconnected and inseparable, it is clear that any partial filiation must be essentially untrue. Where, for instance, is the use of any exclusive history of any one science or art, unless meaning is given to it by first connecting it with the study of human progress generally? It is the same in every direction, and especially with regard to political history, as it is called,—as if any history could be other than political, more or less! The prevailing tendency to speciality in study would reduce history to a mere accumulation of unconnected delineations, in which all idea of the true filiation of events would be lost amidst the mass of confused descriptions. If the historical comparisons of the different periods of civilization are to have any scientific character, they must be referred to the general social evolution: and it is only thus that we can obtain the guiding ideas by which the special studies themselves must be directed.

In a practical view, it is evident that the preponderance of the historical method tends to develop the social sentiment, by giving us an immediate interest in even the earliest experiences of our race, through the influence that they exercised over the evolution of our own civilization. As Condorcet observed, no enlightened man can think of the battles of Marathon and Salamis without perceiving the importance of their consequences to the race at large. This kind of feeling should, when we are treating of science, be carefully distinguished from the sympathetic interest which is awakened by all delineations of human life,—in fiction as well as in history. The sentiment I refer to is deeper, because in some sort personal; and more reflective, because it results from scientific conviction. It cannot be excited by popular history, in a descriptive form; but only by positive history, regarded as a true science, and exhibiting the events of human experience in co-ordinated series which manifest their own graduated connection. This new form of the social sentiment must at first be the privilege of the

choice few ; but it will be extended, somewhat weakened in force, to the whole of society, in proportion as the general results of social physics become sufficiently popular. It will fulfil the most obvious and elementary idea of the habitual connection between individuals and contemporary nations by showing that the successive generations of men concur in a final end, which requires the determinate participation of each and all. This rational disposition to regard men of all times as fellow-workers is as yet visible in the case of only the most advanced sciences. By the philosophical preponderance of the historical method, it will be extended to all the aspects of human life, so as to sustain, in a reflective temper, that respect for our ancestors which is indispensable to a sound state of society, and so deeply disturbed at present by the metaphysical philosophy.

As for the course to be pursued by this method,—it appears to me that its spirit consists in the rational use of social series ; that is, in a successive estimate of the different states of humanity which shall show the growth of each disposition, physical, intellectual, moral, or political, combined with the decline of the opposite disposition, whence we may obtain a scientific prevision of the final ascendancy of the one and extinction of the other,—care being taken to frame our conclusions according to the laws of human development. A considerable accuracy of prevision may thus be obtained, for any determinate period, and with any particular view ; as historical analysis will indicate the direction of modifications, even in the most disturbed times. And it is worth noticing that the prevision will be nearest the truth in proportion as the phenomena in question are more important and more general ; because then continuous causes are predominant in the social movement ; and disturbances have less power. From these first general aspects, the same rational certainty may extend to secondary and special aspects, through their statical relations with the first ; and thus we may obtain conclusions sufficiently accurate for the application of principles.

If we desire to familiarize ourselves with this historical method, we must employ it first upon the past, by endeavouring to deduce every well-known historical situation from the whole series of its antecedents. In every science we must have learned to predict the past, so to speak, before we can predict the future ; because the first use of the observed relations among fulfilled facts is to teach us by the anterior succession what the future succession will be. No examination of facts can explain our existing state to us, if we have not ascertained, by historical study, the value of the elements at work ; and thus it is in vain that statesmen insist on the necessity of political observation, while they look no further than the present, or a very recent past. The present is, by itself, purely misleading, because it is impossible to avoid confounding principal

with secondary facts, exalting conspicuous transient manifestations over fundamental tendencies, which are generally very quiet; and above all, supposing those powers, institutions, and doctrines, to be in the ascendant, which are, in fact, in their decline. It is clear that the only adequate corrective of all this is a philosophical understanding of the past; that the comparison cannot be decisive unless it embraces the whole of the past; and that the sooner we stop, in travelling up the vista of time, the more serious will be the mistakes we fall into. Before our very eyes, we see statesmen going no further back than the last century, to obtain an explanation of the confusion in which we are living: the most abstract of politicians may take in the preceding century, but the philosophers themselves hardly venture beyond the sixteenth; so that those who are striving to find the issue of the revolutionary period have actually no conception of it as a whole, though that whole is itself only a transient phase of the general social movement.

The most perfect methods may, however, be rendered deceptive by misuse: and this we must bear in mind. We have seen that mathematical analysis itself may betray us into substituting signs for ideas, and that it conceals inanity of conception under an imposing verbiage. The difficulty in the case of the historical method in sociology is in applying it, on account of the extreme complexity of the materials we have to deal with. But for this, the method would be entirely safe. The chief danger is of our supposing a continuous decrease to indicate a final extinction, or the reverse; as in mathematics it is a common sophism to confound continuous variations, more or less, with unlimited variations. To take a strange and very marked example: if we consider that part of social development which relates to human food, we cannot but observe that men take less food as they advance in civilization. If we compare savage with more civilized peoples, in the Homeric poems or in the narratives of travellers, or compare country with town life, or any generation with the one that went before, we shall find this curious result,—the sociological law of which we shall examine hereafter. The laws of individual human nature aid in the result by making intellectual and moral action more preponderant as Man becomes more civilized. The fact is thus established, both by the experimental and the logical way. Yet nobody supposes that men will ultimately cease to eat. In this case, the absurdity saves us from a false conclusion; but in other cases, the complexity disguises much error in the experiment and the reasoning. In the above instance, we must resort to the laws of our nature for that verification which, taken altogether, they afford to our sociological analysis. As the social phenomenon, taken as a whole, is simply a development of humanity, without any real creation of faculties, all social manifestations must be to be found, if only in their germ, in the primitive type which biology constructed by anticipation for

sociology. Thus every law of social succession disclosed by the historical method must be unquestionably connected, directly or indirectly, with the positive theory of human nature; and all inductions which cannot stand this test will prove to be illusory, through some sort of insufficiency in the observations on which they are grounded. The main scientific strength of sociological demonstrations must ever lie in the accordance between the conclusions of historical analysis and the preparatory conceptions of the biological theory. And thus we find, look where we will, a confirmation of that chief intellectual character of the new science, —the philosophical preponderance of the spirit of the whole over the spirit of detail.

This method ranks, in sociological science, with that of zoological comparison in the study of individual life; and we shall see, as we proceed, that the succession of social states exactly corresponds, in a scientific sense, with the gradation of organisms in biology; and the social series, once clearly established, must be as real and as useful as the animal series. When the method has been used long enough to disclose its properties, I am disposed to think that it will be regarded as so very marked a *Promise of a fourth method.* modification of positive research as to deserve a separate place; so that, in addition to Observation, properly so called, Experiment, and Comparison, we shall have the Historical Method, as a fourth and final mode of the art of observing. It will be derived, according to the usual course, from the mode which immediately precedes it: and it will be applied to the analysis of the most complex phenomena.

I must be allowed to point out that the new political philosophy, sanctioning the old leadings of popular reason, restores to History all its scientific rights as a basis of wise social speculation, after the metaphysical philosophy had striven to induce us to discard all large consideration of the past. In the foregoing departments of natural philosophy we have seen that the positive spirit, instead of being disturbing in its tendencies, is remarkable for confirming, in the essential parts of every science, the inestimable intuitions of popular good sense; of which indeed science is merely a systematic prolongation, and which a barren metaphysical philosophy alone could despise. In this case, so far from restricting the influence which human reason has ever attributed to history in political combinations, the new social philosophy increases it, radically and eminently. It asks from history something more than counsel and instruction to perfect conceptions which are derived from another source: it seeks its own general direction, through the whole system of historical conclusions.

Having reviewed the general character of Sociology, and its means of investigation, we must next make out its relations to the other principal sciences.

## CHAPTER IV.

### RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

THE conditions of the positive philosophy with regard to this science are not fulfilled till its relations with the other sciences are ascertained. Its establishment in its proper place in the hierarchy is a principle of such importance that it may be seen to comprehend all the philosophical requisites for its institution as a science: and it is for want of this that all attempts in our time to treat social questions in a positive manner have failed. Whether we consider the indispensable data of various kinds supplied to sociology by the other sciences, or the yet more important requisite of the sound speculative habits formed by the preparatory study of them, the daily spectacle of abortive attempts to construct a social science leaves no doubt that this grand omission is the cause of the failure, and of the wrong direction always taken, sooner or later, by minds which seemed fitted to accomplish something better. We must, then, review the relation of this last of the sciences to all the rest; but our examination of each of them, and of biology especially, has so anticipated this part of my subject, that I may pass over it very briefly.

It is a new idea that the science of society is thus connected with the rest: yet in no case is the relation more unquestionable or more marked. Social phenomena exhibit, in even a higher degree, the complexity, speciality, and personality which distinguish the higher phenomena of the individual life. In order to see how this establishes the connection in question, we must remember that in the social, as in the biological case, there are two classes of considerations:—that of Man or Humanity, which constitutes the phenomenon, and that of the medium or environment, which influences this partial and secondary development of one of the animal races. Now, by the first term of this couple, sociology is subordinated to the whole of the organic philosophy, which discloses to us the laws of human nature: and by the second, it is connected with the whole system of inorganic philosophy, which reveals to us the exterior conditions of human existence. One of the two great divisions of philosophy, in short, determines the agent concerned in sociological phenomena, and

the other the medium in which it is developed. It is clear that we here take together, and treat as one, the three sections of inorganic philosophy,—chemistry, physics, and astronomy,—as they all relate equally to the social medium. It will be enough if we point out the participation of each, as the occasion arises. As to the Method, properly so called, it is, as we have seen, more and more necessary to subject studies to the graduated system of prior studies, in proportion to their increasing complexity. These are the two points we have to consider in surveying once more the encyclopedical scale, beginning, as before, with the relations which are the closest and most direct. We shall afterwards have to exhibit the reaction, scientific and logical, which sociology, once instituted, must exercise, in its turn, on the whole of the preceding sciences:—a reaction which is, as yet, even less suspected than the primary action itself.

The subordination of social science to biology is so evident that nobody denies it in statement; however it may be *Relation to Biology.* neglected in practice. This contrariety between the statement and the practice is due to something else, besides the faulty condition of social studies: it results also from the imperfection of biological science; and especially from its most conspicuous imperfection of all,—that of its highest part, relating to intellectual and moral phenomena. It is by this portion that biology and sociology are the most closely connected; and cerebral physiology is too recent, and its scientific state is too immature, to have admitted, as yet, of any proper organization of the relations of the two sciences. Whenever the time for that process arrives, the connection will be seen to bear two aspects. Under the first, biology will be seen to afford the starting-point of all social speculation, in accordance with the analysis of the social faculties of Man, and of the organic conditions which determine its character. But, moreover, as we can scarcely at all investigate the most elementary terms of the social series, we must construct them by applying the positive theory of human nature to the aggregate of corresponding circumstances,—regarding the small materials that we are able to obtain as rather adapted to facilitate and improve this rational determination than to show us what society really is at so early a period. When the social condition has advanced so far as to exclude this kind of deduction, the second aspect presents itself; and the biological theory of man is implicated with the sociological in a less direct and special manner. The whole social evolution of the race must proceed in entire accordance with biological laws; and social phenomena must always be founded on the necessary invariableness of the human organism, the characteristics of which, physical, intellectual, and moral, are always found to be essentially the same, and related in the same manner, at every degree of the social scale,—no development of them attendant upon the social



condition ever altering their nature in the least, nor, of course, creating or destroying any faculties whatever, or transposing their influence. No sociological view can therefore be admitted, at any stage of the science, or under any appearance of historical induction, that is contradictory to the known laws of human nature. No view can be admitted, for instance, which supposes a very marked character of goodness or wickedness to exist in the majority of men; or which represents the sympathetic affections as prevailing over the personal ones; or the intellectual over the affective faculties, etc. In cases like these, which are more common than the imperfection of the biological theory would lead us to expect, all sociological principles must be as carefully submitted to ulterior correction as if they supposed human life to be extravagantly long, or contravened, in any other way, the physical laws of humanity; because the intellectual and moral conditions of human existence are as real and as imperative as its material conditions, though more difficult to estimate, and therefore less known. Thus, in a biological view, all existing political doctrines are radically vicious, because, in their irrational estimate of political phenomena, they suppose qualities to exist among rulers and the ruled,—here an habitual perverseness or imbecility, and there a spirit of concert or calculation,—which are incompatible with positive ideas of human nature, and which would impute pathological monstrosity to whole classes; which is simply absurd. An example like this shows what valuable resources positive sociology must derive from its subordination to biology; and especially in regard to cerebral physiology, whenever it comes to be studied as it ought.

The students of biology have, however, the same tendency to exalt their own science at the expense of that which follows it, that physicists and chemists have shown in regard to biology. The biologists lose sight of historical observation altogether, and represent sociology as a mere corollary of the science of Man; in the same way that physicists and chemists treat biology as a mere derivative from the inorganic philosophy. The injury to science is great in both cases. If we neglect historical comparison, we can understand nothing of the social evolution; and the chief phenomenon in sociology,—the phenomenon which marks its scientific originality,—that is, the gradual and continuous influence of generations upon each other,—would be disguised or unnoticed, for want of the necessary key—historical analysis. From the time that the influence of former generations becomes the cause of any modification of the social movement, the mode of investigation must accord with the nature of the phenomena; and historical analysis therefore becomes preponderant, while biological considerations, which explained the earliest movements of society, cease to be more than a valuable auxiliary and means of control. It is the same thing as when, in the study of inorganic science, men quit deduction for

direct observation. It is the same thing as when, in biology, observers proceed from contemplating the organism and its medium, to analyse the ages of the individual being, as a principal means of investigation. The only difference is that the change in the instrument is the more necessary the more complex are the phenomena to be studied. This would have been seen at once, and political philosophy would have been admitted to depend on this condition for its advance, but for the prevalence of the vicious absolute spirit in social speculation, which, neglecting the facts of the case, for ever strives to subject social considerations to the absolute conception of an immutable political type, no less adverse to the relative spirit of positive philosophy than theological and metaphysical types, though less indefinite. The consequence of this error is that social modifications proper to certain periods, and passing away with them, are too often supposed to be inherent in human nature, and therefore indestructible. Even Gall, attending only to imperfect physiological considerations, and neglecting the social, wandered off into a sort of scientific declamation on the subject of war, declaring the military tendencies of mankind to be immutable, notwithstanding the mass of historical testimony which shows that the warlike disposition diminishes as human development proceeds. A multitude of examples of this kind of mistake might be presented; the most striking of which are perhaps in connection with theories of education, which are usually formed on absolute principles, to the neglect of the corresponding state of civilization.

The true nature of sociology is evident enough from what has been said. We see that it is not an appendix to biology, but a science by itself, founded upon a distinct basis, while closely connected, from first to last, with biology. Such is the scientific view of it. As to the method, the logical analogy of the two sciences is so clear as to leave no doubt that social philosophers must prepare their understandings for their work by due discipline in biological methods. This is necessary, not only to put them in possession of the general spirit of investigation proper to organic science, but yet more to familiarize them with the comparative method, which is the grand resource of investigation in both sciences. Moreover, there is a most valuable philosophical principle common to both sciences which remains to be fully developed before it can attain its final prevalence;—I mean the positive version of the dogma of final causes, discussed before in connection with the conditions of vital existence. This principle, being the necessary result of the distinction between the statical and the dynamical condition, belongs eminently to the study of living bodies, in which that distinction is especially marked, and where alone the general idea of it can properly be acquired. But, great as its direct use in the study of individual life, it is applicable in a much more extensive and essential way in social science. It is by means of this principle

that the new philosophy, uniting the two philosophical meanings of the word *necessary*, exhibits as inevitable that which first presents itself as indispensable; and the converse. There must be something in it peculiarly in harmony with social investigations, as we are led up to it by the most opposite methods of approach; one evidence of which is De Maistre's fine political aphorism, "Whatever is necessary exists."

*Relation to  
Inorganic  
philosophy.*

If sociology is thus subordinated to biology, it must be scientifically related to the whole system of inorganic philosophy, because biology is so. But it is also connected with that system by immediate relations of its own.

In the first place, it is only by the inorganic philosophy that we can duly analyse the entire system of exterior conditions, chemical, physical, and astronomical, amidst which the social evolution proceeds, and by which its rate of progress is determined. Social phenomena can no more be understood apart from their environment than those of individual life. All exterior disturbances which could affect the life of individual Man must change his social existence; and, conversely, his social existence could not be seriously disturbed by any modifications of the medium which should not derange his separate condition. I need therefore only refer to what I have said in regard to the influence of astronomical and other conditions on vital existence; for the same considerations bear on the case of social phenomena. It is plain that society, as well as individual beings, is affected by the circumstances of the earth's daily rotation and annual movement; and by states of heat, moisture, and electricity in the surrounding medium; and by the chemical conditions of the atmosphere, the waters, the soil, etc. I need only observe that the effect of these influences is even more marked in sociology than in biology, not only because the organism is more complex, and its phenomena of a higher order, but because the social organism is regarded as susceptible of indefinite duration, so as to render sensible many gradual modifications which would be disguised from our notice by the brevity of individual life. Astronomical conditions, above all others, manifest their importance to living beings only by passing from the individual to the social case. Much smaller disturbances would visibly affect a social condition than would disturb an individual life, which requires a smaller concurrence of favourable circumstances. For instance, the dimensions of the globe are scientifically more important in sociology than in biology, because they set bounds to the ultimate extension of population; a circumstance worthy of grave consideration in any positive system of political speculation. And this is only one case of very many. If we consider, in regard to dynamical conditions, what would be the effect of any change in the degree of obliquity of the ecliptic, in the stability of the poles of rotation, and yet more

in the eccentricity of the earth's orbit, we shall see that vast changes in social life must be produced by causes which could not endanger individual existence. One of the first reflections that presents itself is that positive sociology was not possible till the inorganic philosophy had reached a certain degree of precision. The very conception of stability in human association could not be positively established till the discovery of gravitation had assured us of the permanence of the conditions of life; and till physics and chemistry had taught us that the surface of our planet has attained a natural condition, apart from accidents too rare and too partial to affect our estimate; or, at least, that the crust of the globe admits of only variations so limited and so gradual as not to interfere with the natural course of social development,—a development which could not be hoped for under any liability to violent and frequent physico-chemical convulsions of any extent in the area of human life. There is thus more room to apprehend that inorganic philosophy is not advanced enough to supply the conditions of a positive polity, than to suppose that any real political philosophy can be framed in independence of inorganic science. We have seen before, however, that there is a perpetual accordance between the possible and the indispensable. What we must have, we are able to obtain; and if there are, as in the case of the mutual action of different starry systems, cosmical ideas which are inaccessible to us, we know, in regard to sociology now, as to biology before, that they are of no practical importance to us. Wherever we look, over the whole field of science, we shall find that, amidst the great imperfection of inorganic philosophy, it is sufficiently advanced, in all essential respects, to contribute to the constitution of true social science, if we only have the prudence to postpone to a future time investigations which would now be premature.

I observed in a former chapter that no disturbing causes, acting on social development, could do more than affect its rate of progress. This is true of the operation of influences from the inorganic world, as of all others. In our review of biology we saw that the human being cannot be modified indefinitely by exterior circumstances; that such modifications can affect only the degrees of phenomena, without at all changing their nature; and again, that when the disturbing influences exceed their general limits, the organism is no longer modified, but destroyed. All this, if possible, more eminently true of the social than of the individual organism, on account of its higher complexity and position. The course of its development must therefore be regarded as belonging to the essence of the phenomenon itself, and therefore essentially identical in all conceivable hypotheses about the corresponding medium. It is true we can easily imagine, as I said just now, that so delicate an evolution may be prevented by external disturbances, and particularly astronomical perturbations, which would not destroy the race; but as long as the

evolution does proceed, it must be supposed subject to the same essential laws, and varying only in its speed, as it traverses the stages of which it is composed, without their succession or their final tendency being ever changed. Such a change would be beyond the power of even biological causes. If, for instance, we admitted some marked alterations in the human organism, or, what comes to the same thing, conceived of the social development of another animal race, we must always suppose a common course of general development. Such is the philosophical condition imposed by the nature of the subject, which could not become positive, except in as far as it could be thus conceived of; and this is much more conspicuously true in regard to inorganic causes. As to the rest, this is only another illustration of what we have so often seen in the course of our survey of the scientific hierarchy,—that if the less general phenomena occur under the necessary preponderance of the more general, this subordination cannot in any way alter their proper laws, but only the extent and duration of their real manifestations.

One consideration remains, of the more importance because it applies especially to physico-chemical knowledge, which we seem to have rather neglected in this sketch for astronomical doctrine: I mean the consideration of Man's action on the external world, the gradual development of which affords one of the chief aspects of the social evolution, and without which the evolution could not have taken place as a whole, as it would have been stopped at once by the preponderance of the material obstacles proper to the human condition. In short, all human progress, political, moral, or intellectual, is inseparable from material progression, in virtue of the close interconnection which, as we have seen, characterizes the natural course of social phenomena. Now, it is clear that the action of Man upon nature depends chiefly on his knowledge of the laws of inorganic phenomena, though biological phenomena must also find a place in it. We must bear in mind, too, that physics, and yet more chemistry, form the basis of human power, since astronomy, notwithstanding its eminent participation in it, concurs not as an instrument for modifying the medium, but by prevision. Here we have another ground on which to exhibit the impossibility of any rational study of social development otherwise than by combining sociological speculations with the whole of the doctrines of inorganic philosophy.

It cannot be necessary to repeat here that which has been established as true with regard to the other sciences, and which is more conspicuously true as each science becomes more complex,—that an adequate general knowledge of all the preceding sciences in the hierarchy is requisite to the understanding of the one that follows. In the case of sociology the absence of this preparation is the obvious cause of the failure of all attempts to regenerate the science. We desire to recognize in it a

positive science, while we leave the conditions of positivity unfulfilled. We do not even form a just idea of the attributes of positivism, of what constitutes the explanation of a phenomenon, of the conditions of genuine investigation, or of the true intention in which hypotheses should be instituted and employed. We must thoroughly understand all these conditions, and use them in the natural order of the development of the sciences, venturing neither to select nor transpose, but following up the increasing complexity of the sciences, and recognizing the increase of resources which accompanies it, from astronomy with its simplicity of phenomena and of means of research, to sociology with its prodigious complexity and abundance of resources. Such discipline as this may be difficult; but it is indispensable. It is the only preparatory education which can introduce the positive spirit into the formation of social theories.

It is clear that this education must rest on a basis of mathematical philosophy, even apart from the necessity of *Mathematical* mathematics to the study of inorganic philosophy. *preparation.* It is only in the region of mathematics that sociologists, or anybody else, can obtain a true sense of scientific evidence, and form the habit of rational and decisive argumentation; can, in short, learn to fulfil the logical conditions of all positive speculation, by studying universal positivism at its source. This training, obtained and employed with the more care on account of the eminent difficulty of social science, is what sociologists have to seek in mathematics. As for any application of number and of a mathematical law to sociological problems, if such a method is inadmissible in biology, it must be yet more decisively so here, for reasons of which I have already said enough. The only error of this class which would have deserved express notice, if we had not condemned it by anticipation, is the pretension of some geometers to render social investigations positive by subjecting them to a fanciful *Pretended* mathematical theory of chances. This error is in *theory of* analogy with that of biologists who would make *chances.* sociology to be a corollary or appendix to their own science by suppressing the function of historical analysis. The error of the geometers is however by far the worst of the two, in itself, as well as because mathematicians are peculiarly tenacious of error, from the abstract character of their labours, which dispenses them from the close study of nature. Gross as is the illusion, we must remember its excusable origin. It was James Bernouilli who first conceived the notion; and the notion affords evidence of the nascent need to subject social theories to some kind of positivity. None but a high order of mind could have so early felt the need; and if the expedient was vicious, there was no better way discernible by any possibility at that time. The error was much less pardonable when the notion was reproduced by Condorcet, in a more direct and syste-

matic way; and his expectation from it, as manifested in his celebrated posthumous work, shows the fluctuating state of his mind in regard to the primary conception of social science. But there is no excuse for Laplace's repetition of such a philosophical mistake, at a time when the general human mind had begun to discern the true spirit of political philosophy, prepared as it was for the disclosure by the labours of Montesquieu and Condorcet himself, and powerfully stimulated besides by a new convulsion of society. From that time a succession of imitators has gone on repeating the fancy, in heavy algebraic language, without adding anything new, abusing the credit which justly belongs to the true mathematical spirit; so that, instead of being, as it was a century ago, a token of a premature instinct of scientific investigation, this error is now only an involuntary testimony to the absolute impotence of the political philosophy that would employ it. It is impossible to conceive of a more irrational conception than that which takes for its basis or for its operative method a supposed mathematical theory, in which, signs being taken for ideas, we subject numerical probability to calculation, which amounts to the same thing as offering our own ignorance as the natural measure of the degree of probability of our various opinions. While true mathematical theories have made great progress, for a century past, this absurd doctrine has undergone no improvement, except in some matters of abstract calculation which it has given rise to. It still abides in the midst of its circle of original errors, while mankind are learning, more and more, that the strongest proof of the reality of speculation in any science whatever is the fruitfulness of the conceptions belonging to it.

It is with a feeling of shame that I revert so often to the great maxims of philosophical pursuit, and dwell on them so long; that I should have to announce at this time of day that we must study simpler phenomena before proceeding to the more complex; and that we should acquaint ourselves with the agent of any phenomenon, and with the medium or circumstances, before we proceed to analyse it. But so different has been the course of political study pursued in the metaphysical school, that I rather apprehend that this high scientific connection will be exactly the part of my philosophical doctrine which will be least appreciated, and perhaps most contested, even after all the confirmation which I am about to offer. The reason of this apprehension is that the positive method is in direct opposition to our political habit of appealing to all sorts of minds on social questions, which they are expected to judge of, without any regular preparation, as if these problems were occasions for inspired decision. It is this consideration which makes me attach so special an importance to an explanation of the relation of Sociology to the other sciences.

To complete the account of these encyclopedic relations, we must look at the connection in an inverse way, estimating the philosophical reaction of social physics on all the foregoing sciences, in regard both to doctrine and method.—It must be at the end of the work that I must treat of Sociology as completing the whole body of philosophy, and showing that the various sciences are branches from a single trunk; and thereby giving a character of unity to the variety of special studies that are now scattered abroad in a fatal dispersion. In this place I can only point out, in a more special manner, the immediate reaction of Sociology on all the rest of natural philosophy in virtue of its own scientific and logical properties.

In regard to the doctrine, the essential principle of this reaction is found in the consideration that all scientific speculations whatever, in as far as they are human labours, must necessarily be subordinated to the true general theory of human evolution. If we could conceive of such a thing as this theory being so perfected as that no intellectual obstacle should limit the abundance of its most exact deductions, it is clear that the scientific hierarchy would be, as it were, inverted, and would present the different sciences, in an *à priori* way, as mere parts of this single science. We have no power to realize such a state of things; but the mere supposition may enable us to comprehend the legitimate general intervention of true social science in all possible classes of human speculation. At first sight, it appears as if this high intervention must belong to the biological theory of our nature; and it was by that avenue that philosophers first caught a glimpse of the conception: and it is perfectly true that the knowledge of the individual man must exert a secret, but inevitable influence over all the sciences, because our labours bear the ineffaceable impress of the faculties which produce them. But a close examination will convince us that this universal influence must belong more to the theory of social evolution than to that of individual Man, for the reason that the development of the human mind can take place only through the social state, the direct consideration of which must therefore prevail whenever we are treating of any results of that development. This is, then, in the briefest form, the first philosophical ground of the intellectual intervention of social physics in the cultivation of all the parts of natural philosophy. There will be more to say about it hereafter.

It is evident that Sociology must perfect the study of the essential relations which unite the different sciences, as this inquiry constitutes an essential part of social statics, directly intended to disclose the laws of such a connection, in the same way as in all cases of connection between any of the elements of our civilization. The most marked instance of this operation of social science is in the direct study of social dynamics, in virtue of the principle, so familiar



to us by this time, that true co-ordination must be disclosed by the natural course of the common development. All scientific men who have viewed their own particular subject in a large way have felt what important benefit might be afforded by corresponding historical information, by regulating the spontaneous expansion of scientific discoveries, and warning away from deceptive or premature attempts. I need not set forth the value that there would be in a history of the sciences, which is keenly felt by all who have made any important discovery in any science whatever: but, as my last chapter proves, no real scientific history,—no theory of the true filiation of eminent discoveries, at present exists, in any form or degree. We have only compilations of materials more or less rational, which may be of some provisional use, but which cannot be afterwards employed in the construction of any historical doctrine without strict revision, and which are certainly in their present state unfit to yield any happy scientific suggestions. When a true social science shall have been founded, such labours will assume the philosophical direction of which they are at present destitute, and will aid that development of human genius which now, in the form of unorganized erudition, they merely impede. If we remember that no science can be thoroughly comprehended till its history is understood, we shall see what special improvements this new science must introduce into each of the rest, as well as into the co-ordination of them all.

This leads us to consider the reaction of sociology on the other sciences in regard to Method. Without entering at present upon the great subject of a general theory of the positive method, I must just point out the established truth that each of the fundamental sciences specially manifests one of the chief attributes of the universal positive method, though all are present, in more or less force, in each science. The special resource of sociology is that it participates directly in the elementary composition of the common ground of our intellectual resources. It is plain that this logical co-operation of the new science is as important as that of any of the anterior sciences. We have seen that sociology adds to our other means of research that which I have called the *historical method*, and which will hereafter, when we are sufficiently habituated to it, constitute a fourth fundamental means of observation. But, though sociology has given us this resource, it is more or less applicable to all orders of scientific speculation. We have only to regard every discovery, at the moment it is effected, as a true social phenomenon, forming a part of the general series of human development, and, on that ground, subject to the laws of succession, and the methods of investigation which characterize that great evolution. From this starting-point, indisputable in its rationality, we comprehend immediately the whole necessary universality of the historical method, thenceforth disclosed in all its

eminent intellectual dignity. We can even see that, by this method, scientific discoveries become in a certain degree susceptible of rational prevision, by means of an exact estimate of the anterior movement of the science, interpreted by the laws of the course of the human mind. The historical prevision can hardly become very precise ; but it may furnish preparatory indications of the general direction of the contemporary progress, so as to save the vast waste of intellectual forces which is occasioned by conjectural attempts, usually doomed to failure. By this process of comparison of the present with the past, in regard to each science, it must become possible to subject the art of discovery to a kind of rational theory which may guide the instinctive efforts of individual genius, which cannot hold its course apart from the general mind, however persuaded it may be of its separation. The historical method will thus, by governing the systematic use of all other scientific methods, impart to them an amplitude of rationality in which they are now deficient, by transferring to the whole that regulated progression which at present belongs only to the details : and the choice of subjects for investigation, till now almost arbitrary, or at least thoroughly empirical, will acquire, in a certain degree, that scientific character which now belongs only to the partial investigation of each of them.—The method itself must, if it is to accomplish these purposes, be subject to the philosophical conditions imposed by the positive spirit of sociology. It must never consider the development of each complete science separately from the total progression of the human mind, or even from the fundamental evolution of humanity. Thus social physics, which supplies this method, must superintend its gradual application,—at least, in so far as the general conception of human development is concerned. Every partial or isolated use of this method of investigation, such as suits the desultory character of research in our day, would be either wholly ineffectual, or would realize but little good. There are some traces in existing science of this superior means of speculation, the positive method being uniform, and therefore to be found everywhere if anywhere ; but its complexity and its recent origin prevent our being able to point to examples at once marked and varied enough to afford a decisive manifestation. Throughout the whole range of our positive knowledge, I know of only one unquestionable example ; and that will be found, where we should naturally look for it, in mathematical science. We find it in the sublime prefatory chapters of the different sections of the ‘*Analytical Mechanics*,’ so little appreciated by ordinary geometers because they do not contain a single formula, but, in my opinion, proving the eminent philosophical superiority of Lagrange to all mathematicians since Descartes and Leibnitz. By his exposition of the filiation of the chief conceptions of the human mind in regard to rational mechanics, from the origin of the science to our own time, Lagrange certainly

anticipated the general spirit of the historical method; because he made this estimate the basis of the whole of his own scientific speculations. These remarkable writings are admirable food for meditation not only to geometers, but to all philosophical minds, which may find here the only example of what may properly be called History, though their author made no pretension to the common title of historian.

Thus we see that the reaction of Sociology on the other sciences is as important in a logical as in a scientific view. On the one hand, positive sociology mutually connects all the sciences, and on the other hand, it adds to all resources for investigation, a new and a higher method. While, from its nature, dependent on all that went before, Social Physics repays as much as it receives by its two kinds of service towards all other knowledge. We can already perceive that such a science must form the principal band of the scientific sheaf, from its various relations, both of subordination and of direction, to all the rest. It is in this way that the homogeneous co-ordination of real sciences proceeds from their positive development, instead of being derived from any anti-scientific conceptions of a fanciful unity of different phenomena, such as have hitherto been almost exclusively resorted to.

Social science must always remain inferior in all important speculative respects to all the other fundamental sciences. Yet we cannot but feel, after this review of its spirit, its function, and its resources, that the abundance of its means of investigation may establish it in a higher position of rationality than the present state of the human mind might seem to promise. The unity of the subject, notwithstanding its prodigious extent, the conspicuous interconnection of its various aspects, its characteristic advance from the most general to more and more special researches, and finally the more frequent and important use of *à priori* considerations through suggestions furnished by the anterior sciences, and especially by the biological theory of human nature, may authorize the highest hopes of the speculative dignity of the science,—higher hopes than can be excited by such an imperfect realization as I propose to sketch out, the purpose of which is to embody, in a direct manner, and by sensible manifestations, the more abstract view which I have now taken of the general nature of this new political philosophy, and of the scientific spirit which should regulate its ulterior construction.

## CHAPTER V.

SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THEORY OF THE SPONTANEOUS ORDER  
OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

THOUGH the dynamical part of Social Science is the most interesting, the most easily intelligible, and the fittest to disclose the laws of interconnection, still the Statical part must not be entirely passed over. We must briefly review in this place the conditions and laws of harmony of human society, and complete our statical conceptions, as far as the nascent state of the science allows, when we afterwards survey the historical development of humanity.

Every sociological analysis supposes three classes of considerations, each more complex than the preceding: viz., the conditions of social existence of the individual, the family, and society; the last comprehending, in a scientific sense, the whole of the human species, and chiefly, the whole of the white race. *Three aspects.*

Gall's cerebral theory has destroyed for ever the metaphysical fancies of the last century about the origin of Man's social tendencies, which are now proved to be inherent in his nature, and not the result of utilitarian considerations. The true theory has exploded the mistakes through which the false doctrine arose,—the fanciful supposition that intellectual combinations govern the general conduct of human life, and the exaggerated notion of the degree in which wants can create faculties. Independently of the guidance afforded by Gall's theory, there is a conclusive evidence against the utilitarian origin of society in the fact that the utility did not, and could not, manifest itself till after a long preparatory development of the society which it was supposed to have created. We shall the better see how the supposition involves us in a vicious circle if we attend to the character of the early ages of humanity, in which the individual advantages of association are very doubtful, if indeed we may not safely say that, in many cases, the burdens are greater than the resources, as we see only too plainly in the lowest ranks of the most advanced societies. It is thus evident that the social state would never have existed if its rise had depended on a conviction of its individual utility, because the benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself

1. *The Individual.*

after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain point. There are even sophists who at this day deny the utility, without being pronounced mad; and the spontaneous sociability of human nature, independent of all personal calculation, and often in opposition to the strongest individual interests, is admitted, as of course, by those who have paid no great attention to the true biological theory of our intellectual and moral nature.

Passing over some elementary considerations which belong rather to a special treatise on the physiological conditions,—such as the natural nakedness of the human being, and his helpless and protracted infancy,—which have been much exaggerated as social influences, since they exist in some animal races without producing the same social consequences,—I proceed to estimate the influence of the most important attributes of our nature in giving to society the fundamental character which belongs to it, and which remains permanent through all degrees of its development. In this view, the first consideration is of the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual faculties, which, though less remarkable in Man than in other animals, yet fixes the first essential idea of our true nature.—Though continuous action is, in all cases, an indispensable condition of success, Man, like every other animal, has a natural dislike to such perseverance, and at first finds pleasure only in a varied exercise of his activity,—the variety being of more importance to him than moderation in degree,—especially in the commonest cases, in which no strongly-marked instinct is concerned. The intellectual faculties being naturally the least energetic, their activity, if ever so little protracted beyond a certain degree, occasions in most men a fatigue which soon becomes utterly insupportable; and it is in regard to them chiefly that men of all ages of civilization relish that state of which the *dolce far niente* is the most perfect expression. Nevertheless, it is on the persevering use of these high faculties that the modifications of human life, general and individual, depend during the course of our social development, so that we are met at once by the melancholy coincidence that Man is most in need of precisely the kind of activity for which he is the least fit. His physical imperfections and moral necessities compel him, more than any other animal, to employ his reason in amending his primitive condition; while his reason is so far from being adequate to its work that it is subject to an irresistible fatigue which can be moderated only by strong and constant stimulus. Instead of lamenting over this discordance, we must receive it as a first authentic information supplied to social science by biology, and one which must radically affect the general character of human society first, and afterwards the rate of the social evolution. The consequence which immediately concerns us here is, that almost all men are naturally unfit for intellectual labour, and devoted to material activity; so that the speculative state cannot well be produced, much less

sustained, in them but by some impulse of another kind, kept up by lower but stronger propensities. However important individual differences in this respect may be, the differences are of degree only, so that the most eminent natures hold their place in the comparison; and men must be classed, in a scientific sense, by the nobleness or increasing speciality of the affective faculties by which the intellectual incitement is produced. If we observe the ascending scale of these faculties, upon Gall's theory, we see that, among the generality of men, the intellectual tension is (with some exceptions of that speculative impulse to which all human beings are liable) habitually supported only by the strong stimulus derived from the needs of the organic life, and the commonest instincts of the animal life, the organs of which lie at the back of the brain. The individual nature of man becomes lofty in proportion as the incitement proceeds from propensities which are of a higher order, more peculiar to our species, and placed, anatomically, further forward in the brain, while yet the activity of the intellectual region can never, in the noblest cases, be independent of such stimulus, unless the habit of meditation has actually become preponderant,—a case too rare to be considered in a general view.—Lest we should form a false philosophical estimate of our case, I may observe that, however we may regret the degree in which our intellectual faculties are less active than the lower, we must beware of wishing that the case was reversed. If our affective faculties were subordinated to the intellectual, all idea of improving the social organism would be merely senseless. It would be like polishing our roads, instead of merely diminishing their friction, which would not improve the accustomed locomotion, but render its mechanism contradictory to the fundamental laws of motion. For our affective faculties must preponderate, not only to rouse our reason from its natural lethargy, but to give a permanent aim and direction to its activity, without which it would be for ever lost in vague abstract speculation. Even under our actual conditions, which subject the wildest reveries to more or less control of reality, we see how the most mystical efforts of pious ecstasy to conceive of an ideal state, exempt from organic wants and from all human passions, have issued, even in the highest minds, in conceptions of a sort of transcendental idiotcy, eternally absorbed in a foolish and almost stupid contemplation of the divine majesty. Our social organism is, then, what it ought to be, except as to degree; and we must observe and remember that it is in our power, within certain narrow limits, to rectify this degree of difference; or rather, that the rectification takes place in proportion to the steady development of civilization, which tends to subordinate our propensities to our reason, more and more, without giving us any cause to apprehend a reversal of the order at any future time.

The second consideration is that, besides the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual life, the lowest and most personal

propensities have, in regard to social relations, an unquestionable preponderance over the nobler. According to the sound biological theory of man, our social affections are inferior in strength and steadiness to the personal, though the common welfare must depend especially on the regular satisfaction of the former, which first originate the social state for us, and then maintain it against the divergencies of individual instincts. To understand the sociological value of this biological datum, we must observe, as in the former case, that the condition is necessary, and that it is only its degree that we have to deplore. In analogy with the former case, personal instincts must give an aim and direction to our social action. All notions of public good must be based upon those of private advantage, because the former can be nothing else than that which is common to all cases of the latter: and, under no ideal refinement of our nature, could we ever habitually desire for others anything else but what we wish for ourselves,—unless in those infinitely rare and very secondary cases in which an excessive refinement of moral delicacy, fostered by intellectual meditation, may enable a man to appreciate for another means of happiness which are of little or no value to himself. Our moral nature would then be destroyed, and not improved, if it were possible to repress our personal instincts, since our social affections, deprived of necessary direction, would degenerate into a vague and useless charity, destitute of all practical efficacy. When the morality of an advanced society bids us love our neighbours as ourselves, it embodies in the best way the deepest truth, with only such exaggeration as is required in the formation of a type, which is always fallen short of in practice. In this sublime precept, the personal instinct is the guide and measure of the social; and in no other way could the principle be presented; for in what respect and how could any one love another who did not love himself? Thus, again, we may be satisfied with the nature of Man, though not with the degree of his self-regards. We must regret that even in the best natures, the social affections are so overborne by the personal, as rarely to command conduct, in a direct way. In this sense, we may conceive, after a comparison of the two cases I have presented, that the sympathetic instinct and the intellectual activity are especially destined to compensate mutually their common social insufficiency. We may say, indeed, that if Man became more benevolent, that would be equivalent in social practice to his being more intelligent, not only because he would put his actual intelligence to better use, but because it would not be so much absorbed by the discipline which it must be constantly imposing on the strong preponderance of the personal propensities. But the converse supposition is not less exact, though it is less appreciable; for all real intellectual development is finally equivalent, in regard to the conduct of life, to a direct augmentation of natural benevolence, both by strengthening Man's empire

over his passions, and by refining the habitual sense of the reactions occasioned by various social contact. If we admit, in the first case, that no great intellect can duly expand without a certain amount of universal benevolence, by which alone it can have free impulse, a lofty aim; and large exercise; so, inversely, we cannot doubt that all noble intellectual expansion fortifies general sympathy, not only by casting out selfish instigations, but by inspiring a wise predilection in favour of social order, which may, notwithstanding its ordinary coldness, concur as fortunately in the maintenance of social harmony as dispositions which are more lively and less steady. The reciprocal connection of those two chief moderators of human life, intellectual activity and the social instinct, seems thus to be unquestionable: and the first function of universal morals, in regard to the individual, consists in increasing this double influence, the gradual extension of which constitutes the first spontaneous result of the general development of humanity. And the double opposition between Man's moral and material need of intellectual toil and his dislike of it, and again, between Man's need, for his own happiness, of the social affections, and the necessary subjection of these to his personal instincts, discloses the scientific germ of the struggle which we shall have to review, between the conservative and the reforming spirit; the first of which is animated by purely personal instincts, and the other by the spontaneous combination of intellectual activity with the various social instincts.

So much for the first statical division,—the Individual. Next, we must consider the Family.

As every system must be composed of elements of the same nature with itself, the scientific spirit forbids us to regard society as composed of individuals. The true 2. *The Family.* social unit is certainly the family,—reduced, if necessary, to the elementary couple which forms its basis. This consideration implies more than the physiological truth that families become tribes, and tribes become nations: so that the whole human race might be conceived of as the gradual development of a single family, if local diversities did not forbid such a supposition. There is a political point of view from which also we must consider this elementary idea, inasmuch as the family presents the true germ of the various characteristics of the social organism. Such a conception is intermediate between the idea of the individual and that of the species, or society. There would be as many scientific inconveniencies in passing it over in a speculative sense as there are dangers in practice in pretending to treat of social life without the inevitable preparation of the domestic life. Whichever way we look at it, this necessary transition always presents itself, whether in regard to elementary notions of fundamental harmony, or for the spontaneous rise of social sentiment. It is by this avenue that



Man comes forth from his mere personality, and learns to live in another, while obeying his most powerful instincts. No other association can be so intimate as this primary combination, which causes a complete fusion of two natures in one. Owing to the radical imperfection of the human character, individual divergences are too marked to admit of so close an association in any other case. The common experience of human life teaches us only too well that men must not live too familiarly together, if they are to bear, in mutual peace, the infirmities of our nature,—whether of the intellect or the affections. Even religious communities, united as they are by a special bond, were, as we know, perpetually tormented by internal dissensions, such as it is impossible to avoid if we attempt to reconcile qualities so incompatible as the intimacy and the extension of human relations. Even in the family, the intimacy is owing to the strong spontaneousness of the common end, combined with the equally natural institution of an indispensable subordination. Whatever talk there may be, in modern times, of social equality, even the most restricted society supposes, not only diversities, but inequalities; for there can be no association without a permanent concurrence in a general operation, pursued by distinct means, mutually subordinated. Now, the most entire realization possible of these elementary conditions is inherent in the family alone, where nature has supplied all the requisites of the institution. Thus, notwithstanding the temporary abuse of the family spirit in the way of excess, which has occasionally brought reproach on the institution, it is, and will ever be, the basis of the social spirit, through all the gradual modifications which it may have to undergo in the course of the human evolution. The serious assaults upon this institution which we witness in our day must, therefore, be regarded as the most alarming symptoms of our temporary tendency to social disorganization. But such a direction of the revolutionary spirit is a dangerous symptom only on account of the decrepitude of the belief on which the idea of the Family, like every other social idea, is made to rest. As long as the family relation has no other intellectual basis than religious doctrine, it will share whatever discredit belongs to that doctrine in the present state of human development. The Positive philosophy, which reorganizes whatever it touches, can alone re-establish the conception on an immutable foundation, by transferring all social speculation from the region of vague ideality to the ground of indisputable reality.

The constitution of the human family has undergone modifications of a progressive kind which appear to me to disclose, at each epoch of development, the exact importance of the change wrought in the corresponding social state. Thus, the polygamy of less advanced nations must give a character to the family wholly different from that which it has among nations which are capable of

that monogamy to which our nature tends. In the same way, the ancient family, which consisted partly of slaves, must be very unlike the modern, which is mainly reduced to the kindred of the couple, and in which the authority of the head is comparatively small. But the estimate of these modifications will find its right place in my historical review. Our object now is to consider the elementary scientific aspect of the family; that aspect which is made common to all social cases by regarding the domestic as the basis of all social life. In this view, the sociological theory of the family is reducible to the investigation of two orders of relations, viz., the subordination of the sexes, which institutes the family, and that of ages, which maintains it. A certain amount of voluntary association takes place from that degree of the biological scale at which sex begins; and it is always occasioned by the sexual union first, and then by the rearing of progeny. If the sociological comparison must stop at the two great classes of superior animals, birds and mammifers, it is because none below them present a sufficiently complete realization of this double elementary character.

We cannot too reverently admire that universal natural disposition, on which all association is grounded, by which, *The sexual relation.* the state of marriage, however imperfect, the strongest instinct of our animal nature, at once satisfied and disciplined, occasions harmony instead of the disorder which would arise from its license. It was not to be expected that, when the revolutionary spirit was attacking everything else, it should allow marriage to escape,—connected as it has hitherto been with the theological philosophy. When the positive philosophy shall have established the subordination of the sexes, and in that, the principle of marriage and of the family, it will take its stand on an exact knowledge of human nature, followed by an appreciation of social development as a whole, and of the general phase which it now presents; and in doing this it will extinguish the fancies by which the institution is at present discredited and betrayed. No doubt Marriage, like every other human concern, undergoes modifications as human development proceeds. Modern marriage, as constituted by Catholicism, is radically different, in various respects, from Roman marriage, as that differed from the Greek, and both, in a much greater degree, from the Egyptian or Oriental, even after the establishment of monogamy. It is undisputed that these modifications have not come to any end, and that the great social reconstitution for which we are looking will establish the general character of the association, which all preceding modifications have progressively developed. Meantime, the absolute spirit of the existing political philosophy mistakes such modifications for an overthrow of the institution; a state of things very analogous to that of the ancient times, when the Greek philosophy was

about to make way for the Christian regeneration of the family and of society, and when fantastical errors, caused by the long intellectual interregnum, gave occasion to the famous satire of Aristophanes, which we may accept as a rude rebuke of our own licentiousness.

What the ultimate conditions of marriage will be, we cannot know as yet; and if we could, this is not the place to treat of them. It is enough for our purposes to be assured that they will be consonant with the fundamental principle of the institution,—the natural subordination of the woman, which has reappeared under all forms of marriage, in all ages, and which the new philosophy will place on its right basis,—a knowledge of the individual organism first, and then of the social organism. Biological philosophy teaches us that, through the whole animal scale, and while the specific type is preserved, radical differences, physical and moral, distinguish the sexes. Comparing sex with age, biological analysis presents the female sex, in the human species especially, as constitutionally in a state of perpetual infancy, in comparison with the other; and therefore more remote, in all important respects, from the ideal type of the race. Sociology will prove that the equality of the sexes, of which so much is said, is incompatible with all social existence, by showing that each sex has special and permanent functions which it must fulfil in the natural economy of the human family, and which concur in a common end by different ways, the welfare which results being in no degree injured by the necessary subordination, since the happiness of every being depends on the wise development of its proper nature.

We have seen that the preponderance of the affective faculties is less marked in Man than in the lower animals, and that a certain degree of spontaneous speculative activity is the chief cerebral attribute of humanity, as well as the prime source of the marked character of our social organism. Now, the relative inferiority of Woman in this view is incontestable, unfit as she is, in comparison, for the requisite continuousness and intensity of mental labour, either from the intrinsic weakness of her reason or from her more lively moral and physical sensibility, which are hostile to scientific abstraction and concentration. This indubitable organic inferiority of feminine genius has been confirmed by decisive experiment, even in the fine arts, and amidst the concurrence of the most favourable circumstances. As for any functions of government, the radical inaptitude of the female sex is there yet more marked, even in regard to the most elementary state, and limited to the guidance of the mere family, the nature of the task requiring, above everything, an indefatigable attention to an aggregate of complex relations, none of which must be neglected, while the mind must be independent of the passions; in short, reasonable. Thus, the

economy of the human family could never be inverted without an entire change in our cerebral organism, and the only possible result of a resistance to natural laws would be to deprive Woman of the enjoyment of her proper welfare by disturbing the family and society. Again, we have seen that, in the affective life of Man, the personal instincts overrule the sympathetic or social, which last can, and do, only modify the direction decided by the first, without becoming the habitual moving powers of practical existence. Here again, by a comparative examination, we can estimate the happy social position appropriated to the female sex. It is indisputable that women are, in general, as superior to men in a spontaneous expansion of sympathy and sociality, as they are inferior to men in understanding and reason. Their function in the economy of the family, and consequently of society, must therefore be to modify by the excitement of the social instinct the general direction necessarily originated by the cold and rough reason which is distinctive of Man. Apart from all consideration of material differences, and contemplating exclusively the noblest properties of our cerebral nature, we see that, of the two attributes which separate the human race from the brutes, the primary one indicates the necessary and invariable preponderance of the male sex, while the other points out the moderating function which is appropriate to Woman, even independently of maternal cares, which evidently constitute her most important special destination, but which are usually too exclusively insisted on, so as to disguise the direct social and personal vocation of the female sex.

The other great element of the human family is the relation between parents and children, which, spread abroad *The Parental relation.* through the whole of society, produces the natural subordination of ages. The discipline prescribed by nature in this relation is too unquestionable to admit of the same attacks of the revolutionary spirit which have been directed towards the preceding relation. The ardent champions of the political rights of women have not yet offered an analogous doctrine in regard to children, who are less able to stimulate the zeal of their special champions. Wild as are the eccentricities of our social anarchy, popular good sense, however imperfect it may still be, imposes some restraint on individual absurdities when they go so far as to shock a primary instinct.

There is certainly no natural economy more worthy of admiration than that spontaneous subordination which, first constituting the human family, then becomes the type of all wise social co-ordination. The testimony of ages has done honour to this type; and when Man has formed his conception of providential government on the most perfect direction of events that he could conceive, he has taken this institution for his model. There is no other case which offers,

in the same degree, the most respectful spontaneous obedience, on the part of the inferior, without the least degradation; an obedience imposed by necessity first, and then by gratitude; and nowhere else do we see in the superior party the most absolute authority united to entire devotedness, too natural and too genial to be regarded as duty. These characteristics must become weakened in the case of wider and less intimate relations; the submission cannot be so complete and spontaneous, nor the protection so affectionate and devoted. But family life will, nevertheless, be eternally the school of social life, both for obedience and for command, which will be excellent in proportion to their approach to this model; and in the future, as in the past, the modifications of society will correspond with those which human progression must occasion in the domestic constitution. In all critical periods, however, there have been false reasoners who have argued from the inconveniences which attend this institution, like every other, against the organization itself, and who would mend it by means of a total inversion,—proposing to make society the model of the family; at a time, too, when society is in no condition to serve as a type for any kind of orderly arrangement. All domestic discipline would be impossible under a system which would take from parents the guidance and almost the acquaintance of their children, through a monstrous exaggeration of the influence of society on the education of youth; and children, of the hereditary transmission of their parents' property, accumulated on their behalf,—obedience and authority being thus successively destroyed. This work is not the place in which to examine such extravagances; but it was necessary to refer to this particular delusion in order to show the fitness of the positive polity to consolidate all the primary ideas of social order, amidst the confusion attending the decline of the theological philosophy. Here, as everywhere else, we shall find the positive philosophy subordinating all schemes of artificial order to the observation of natural order: and we shall perceive that the modifications wrought out by the social evolution are superior to any that the most eminent reformers would have ventured to conceived of beforehand,—a fact which should teach us not to interfere with the succession of different portions of the reorganization by attempting to renovate everything at once, down to the smallest details, according to the routine of modern constitutions.

We must not omit the striking property of domestic organization,—that it establishes the elementary idea of social perpetuity, by directly and irresistibly connecting the future with the past. When duly generalized, the idea and the feeling pass on from the immediate parents to ancestors, and issue in that universal respect for our predecessors which is an indispensable condition of all social economy. There is no social state which does not present evidences of it. The diminishing influence of traditions as human develop-

ment proceeds, and the growing preference of written to oral transmission, must modify the expression of the sentiment among the moderns, if not the sentiment itself; but whatever point social progression may attain, it will always be supremely important that Man should not regard himself as a being of yesterday, and that the whole of his institutions and customs should connect, by a system of intellectual and material tokens, his remembrances of the entire past with his hopes for the future. The tendency of the revolutionary philosophy is to foster a disdain of the past, on account of its politics; and I need not add that the positive philosophy, which takes history for its scientific basis, which represents all the men of all times as co-operating in the same evolution, and which perseveringly connects all existing progress with the whole of antecedent human action, is thoroughly adapted to confirm the idea and sentiment of social continuity. In fact, we see that the region of the positive sciences is the only one in which this reverent co-ordination of the present with the past, has withstood the encroachments of the revolutionary philosophy, which, in every other connection, would almost have us believe that reason and justice are creations of our own day.

It is not necessary to enlarge here on the fraternal relation, though it would obtain its share of attention if we were engaged in forming a constitution of society. For our purposes here, the brotherly relation offers little subject of remark, interesting as it is from the sweetness or the bitterness which it sheds over private life. If the brothers are nearly of the same age, there is little subordination in the case: and if the difference in age is sufficient to admit of that subordination, the relation becomes, for analytical purposes, like that of parent and child. All that it is in our way to remark here is that true social science will never fail, either in studying the past, or speculating on the future, to assign the rank of absolute requisites to all elements which have, through all time, constituted an essential part of the domestic hierarchy. Discarding all Utopian fancies, and proposing to observe the economy of real society, we must bring into our scientific analysis all the arrangements which, by their steady permanence, indicate their grave importance.

The third head of our statical analysis brings us to the consideration of society, as composed of families and not of individuals, and from a point of view which commands all times and places.

The main cause of the superiority of the social to the individual organism is, according to an established law, the more marked speciality of the various functions fulfilled by organs more and more distinct, but interconnected; so that unity of aim is more and more combined with diversity of means. We cannot, of course, fully appreciate a phenomenon which is for ever proceeding before our eyes, and in which we bear a part; but

if we withdraw ourselves in thought from the social system, and contemplate it as from afar, can we conceive of a more marvellous spectacle, in the whole range of natural phenomena, than the regular and constant convergence of an innumerable multitude of human beings, each possessing a distinct and, in a certain degree, independent existence, and yet incessantly disposed, amidst all their discordance of talent and character, to concur in many ways in the same general development, without concert, and even consciousness on the part of most of them, who believe that they are merely following their personal impulses? This is the scientific picture of the phenomenon: and no temporary disturbances can prevent its being, under all circumstances, essentially true. This reconciliation of the individuality of labour with co-operation of endeavours, which becomes more remarkable as society grows more complex and extended, constitutes the radical character of human operations when we rise from the domestic to the social point of view. The degree of association that we observe among the superior animals has something voluntary in it, but there is no organization which can make it resemble the human: and the first individual specializing of common functions is seen in our simple domestic life, which is thus a type of the social organization. The division of labour can never, however, be very marked in the family, because the members are few; and yet more because such a division would soon show itself to be hostile to the spirit of the institution; for domestic training, being founded on imitation, must dispose the children to follow parental employments, instead of undertaking new ones: and again, any very marked separation in the employments of the members must impair the domestic unity which is the aim of the association. The more we look into the subject, the more we shall see that the appropriation of employments, which is the elementary principle of general society, cannot hold anything like so important a place in the family. In fact, the domestic relations do not constitute an association, but a *union*, in the full force of the term; and, on account of this close intimacy, the domestic connection is of a totally different nature from the social. Its character is essentially moral, and only incidentally intellectual; or, in anatomical language, it corresponds more to the middle than to the anterior part of the brain. Founded chiefly upon attachment and gratitude, the domestic union satisfies, by its mere existence, all our sympathetic instincts, quite apart from all idea of active and continuous co-operation towards any end, unless it be that of its own institution. Though more or less co-ordination of different employments must exist, it is so secondary an affair that when, unhappily, it remains the only principle of connection, the domestic union degenerates into mere association, and is even too likely to dissolve altogether. In society the elementary economy presents an inverse character, the sentiment of co-operation becoming preponderant,

and the sympathetic instinct, without losing its steadiness, becoming secondary. No doubt there are a multitude of men well enough organized to love their fellow-labourers, however numerous or remote they may be, and however indirect may be their co-operation; but such a sentiment, arising from the reaction of the reason upon the social feelings, could never be strong enough to guide social life. Even under the best circumstances the intellectual mediocrity of the majority of men does not allow them to form any distinct idea of relations which are too extensive, too indirect, and too foreign to their own occupations to impart any sympathetic stimulus which could be of permanent use. It is only in domestic life that Man can habitually seek the full and free expansion of his social affections; and perhaps this is the chief reason why it is the last indispensable preparation for social life; for concentration is as necessary to the feelings as generalization to the thoughts. Even the most eminent men, who direct their sympathetic instincts upon their race at large or the society in which they live, are usually impelled to this by the moral disappointments of a domestic life which has failed in some of its conditions; and however genial the imperfect compensation may be to them, this abstract love of their species admits of nothing like that satisfaction of the affections which arises from a very limited, and especially an individual attachment. However this may be, such cases are besides too evidently exceptional to affect any inquiry into the social economy. Thus, though the sympathetic instinct exists wherever there is association, more or less, the principle of co-operation is that which must prevail, when we pass on from the consideration of the family to the general co-ordination of families. To attribute to it the formation of the social state, as it was the fashion of the last century to do, is a capital error; but, when the association has once begun, there is nothing like this principle of co-operation for giving consistency and character to the combination. In the lower stages of savage life we see families combining for a temporary purpose, and then returning, almost like the brutes, to their isolated independence, as soon as the expedition, which is usually one of war or the chase, is ended, though already some common opinions, expressed in a certain uniform language, are preparing them for permanent union in tribes, more or less numerous. It is upon the principle of co-operation, then, spontaneous or concerted, that we must found our analysis of the last division of social statics.

We must include in our view of the division of employments something much more extensive than the material arrangements which the expression is usually understood to convey. We must include under it all human operations whatever, regarding not only individuals and classes, but also, in many ways, different nations, as participating, in a special mode and degree, in a vast common work, the gradual

*Distribution of  
employments.*



development of which connects the fellow-labourers with the whole series of their predecessors, and even with their successors. This is what is meant when we speak of the race being bound up together by the very distribution of their occupations; and it is this distribution which causes the extent and growing complexity of the social organism, which thus appears as comprising the whole of the human race. Man can hardly exist in a solitary state: the family can exist in isolation, because it can divide its employments and provide for its wants in a rough kind of way: a spontaneous approximation of families is incessantly exposed to temporary rupture, occasioned by the most trifling incidents. But when a regular division of employments has spread through any society, the social state begins to acquire a consistency and stability which place it out of danger from particular divergences. The habit of partial co-operation convinces each family of its close dependence on the rest, and, at the same time, of its own importance, each one being then justified in regarding itself as fulfilling a real public function, more or less indispensable to the general economy, but inseparable from the system as a whole. In this view the social organization tends more and more to rest on an exact estimate of individual diversities, by so distributing employments as to appoint each one to the destination he is most fit for, from his own nature (which however is seldom very distinctly marked), from his education and his position, and, in short, from all his qualifications; so that all individual organizations, even the most vicious and imperfect (short of monstrosity), may be finally made use of for the general good. Such is, at least, the social type which we conceive of as the limit of the existing social order, and to which we may be for ever approximating, though without the hope of ever attaining it; and it is, in fact, a reproduction, with a large extension, of the domestic organism, with less power, in proportion to its extent, of appointing a due destination to every member; so that the social discipline must always be more artificial, and therefore more imperfect, than the domestic, which nature herself ordains and administers.

The necessities of this co-operation and distribution, of special offices cause inconveniences which I am compelled to advert to; for it is in the investigation of these that we find the scientific germ of the relation between the idea of society and that of government.

Some economists have pointed out, but in a very inadequate way, the evils of an exaggerated division of material labour; *Inconveniences.* and I have indicated, in regard to the more important field of scientific labour, the mischievous intellectual consequences of the spirit of speciality which at present prevails. It is necessary to estimate directly the principle of such an influence, in order to understand the object of the spontaneous system of

requisites for the continuous preservation of society. In decomposing, we always disperse ; and the distribution of human labours must occasion individual divergences, both intellectual and moral, which require a permanent discipline to keep them within bounds. If the separation of social functions develops a useful spirit of detail, on the one hand, it tends, on the other, to extinguish or to restrict what we may call the aggregate or general spirit. In the same way, in moral relations, while each individual is in close dependence on the mass, he is drawn away from it by the expansion of his special activity, constantly recalling him to his private interest, which he but very dimly perceives to be related to the public. On both grounds the inconveniences of the division of functions increase with its characteristic advantages without their being in the same relation, throughout the spontaneous course of the social evolution. The growing speciality of habitual ideas and familiar relations must tend to restrict the understanding more and more, while sharpening it in a certain direction, and to sever more and more the private interest from a public interest which is for ever becoming more vague and indirect ; while, at the same time, the social affections, gradually concentrated among individuals of the same profession, become more and more alienated from all other classes, for want of a sufficient analogy of ways and ideas. Thus it is that the principle by which alone general society could be developed and extended, threatens, in another view, to decompose it into a multitude of unconnected corporations, which almost seem not to belong to the same species ; and hence it is that the gradual expansion of human ability seems destined to produce such minds as are very common among civilized peoples, and prodigiously admired by them,—minds which are very able in some one respect and monstrously incapable in all others. If we have been accustomed to deplore the spectacle among the artisan class, of a workman occupied during his whole life in nothing else but making knife-handles or pins' heads, we may find something quite as lamentable in the intellectual class, in the exclusive employment of a human brain in resolving some equations, or in classifying insects. The moral effect is, unhappily, analogous in the two cases. It occasions a miserable indifference about the general course of human affairs, as long as there are equations to resolve and pins to manufacture. This is an extreme case of human automatism ; but the frequency, and the growing frequency of the evil gives a real scientific importance to the case, as indicating the general tendency, and warning us to restrain it. Thus it appears to me that the social destination of government is to guard against and restrain the fundamental dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests, which is the inevitable result of the very principle of human development, and which, if left to itself, would put a stop to social progression in all important respects.

Here we have, in my opinion, the basis of the elementary and abstract theory of government, regarded in its complete scientific extension; that is, as characterized by the universal necessary reaction,—first spontaneous and then regulated,—of the whole upon the parts. It is clear that the only way of preventing such a dispersion is by setting up this reaction as a new special function, which shall intervene in the performance of all the various functions of the social economy, to keep up the idea of the whole, and the feeling of the common interconnection: and the more energetically, the more individual activity tends to dissolve them. Not itself effecting any determinate social progress, it contributes to all that society can achieve, in any direction whatever, and which society could not achieve without its concentrating and protective care. The very nature of its action indicates that it cannot be merely material, but also, and much more, intellectual and moral; so as to show the double necessity of what has been called the temporal and spiritual government, the rational subordination of which was the best feature of the social organization that was happily effected in its day, under the influence of the prevalent Catholicism. Moreover, this ruling function must become more instead of less necessary, as human development proceeds, because its essential principle is inseparable from that of the development itself.—Thus, it is the habitual predominance of the spirit of the whole which constitutes government, in whatever way it is regarded. The next consideration is, how such an action arises, independently of all systematic combination, in the natural course of the social economy.

If the dispersive tendency arising from the distribution of functions naturally propagates itself, it is clear that any influence capable of neutralizing it must also be constantly expanding. In fact, an elementary subordination must always be growing out of the distribution of human operations, which gives birth to government, in the bosom of society itself, as we could easily discover by analysing any marked subdivision which has just taken place in any employment whatever. This subordination is not only material, but yet more intellectual and moral; that is, it requires, besides practical submission, a corresponding degree of real confidence in both the capacity and the probity of the special organs to whom a function, hitherto universal, is confided. Every one of us relies, even for life itself, on the aptitude and the morality of a multitude of almost unknown agents, whose folly or wickedness might affect the welfare of vast numbers of human beings. Such a condition belongs to all modes of social existence. If it is especially attributed to industrial societies, it is only because it must be most conspicuous where the division of labour goes furthest; and it is as certainly to be found in purely military societies; as the statical

analysis of an army, a man-of-war, or any other active corporation shows in a moment.

This elementary subordination discloses its own law; which is, that the various operations in which individuals are engaged fall naturally under the direction of those which are next above them in generality. We may easily convince ourselves of this by analysing any special occupation at the moment when it assumes a separate character: because the task thus separated is necessarily more special than the function from which it proceeds, and to which its own fulfilment must be subordinated. This is not the occasion on which to expatiate on this law; but its political bearing concerns us here,—indicating as it does the germ of a true classification of social functions. We shall hereafter meet with a full verification of this law in regard to the industrial life of modern societies: the eminent regularity of military associations renders the law obvious at once; and when the law is once admitted, it discloses the spontaneous connection of this elementary social subordination with that political subordination, properly so called, which is the basis of government, and which presents itself as the last degree in the hierarchy formed by the subjection of the more special to the more general classes of phenomena. For, as the various particular functions of the social economy are naturally implicated in relations of greater generality, all must at length be subject to the direction of the most general function of all, which is characterized, as we have seen, by the constant action of the whole upon the parts. On the other hand, the organs of this direction must be much strengthened by the encouragement afforded to intellectual and moral inequality under a system of division of employments. It is clear that while men were obliged to do everything for themselves, they must have been confined to domestic life, devoting all their activity to supply the wants of the family; and there could be little expansion of individual ability and character. Though marked individuality must always have made itself felt, in every state of society, the division of labour, and the leisure which it brings, have been needful to the conspicuous development of that intellectual superiority on which all political ascendancy must mainly rest. We must observe, moreover, that there can be no such division of intellectual as of material labour; so that the intellectual functions must be less affected than the industrial by the dispersive tendencies of such a division. We are familiar with the effect of civilization in developing moral, and yet more, intellectual inequalities; but we must bear in mind that moral and intellectual forces do not admit, like the physical, of being accumulated and compounded: so that, eminently as they can concur, and clearly as they are the creators of social concurrence, they are much less adapted for direct co-operation. A sufficient coalition of the most insignificant individuals can easily carry any point of physical conflict, or of acquisition of wealth, against

the highest superiority in an individual or a family; so that, for example, the most enormous private fortune cannot sustain any competition with the financial power of a nation, whose treasury is filled by a multitude of the smallest contributions. But, on the contrary, if the enterprise depends on a high intellectual power, as in the case of a great scientific or poetical conception, there can be no association of ordinary minds, however extensive, which can compete with a Descartes or a Shakspeare. It is the same in the moral case; as, for instance, if society is in need of any great resource of devotedness, the want cannot be supplied by accumulating any amount of moderate zeal furnished by individuals. The only use of a multitude in such a case is that it improves the chance of finding the *unique* organ of the proposed function; and when that singular agent is once found, there is no degree of multitude which can weigh down its preponderance. It is through this privilege that intellectual and moral forces tend to an ever-increasing social authority, from the time when a due division of employments admits of their proper development.

Such is, then, the elementary tendency of all human society to a spontaneous government. This tendency accords with a corresponding system, inherent in us as individuals, of special dispositions towards command in some, and towards obedience in others. We must not, with regard to the first, confound the desire to rule with the fitness to do so; though the desire is one element of the fitness: and, on the other hand, there is a much stronger inclination to obedience in the generality of men than it is customary in our day to suppose. If men were as rebellious as they are at present represented, it would be difficult to understand how they could ever have been disciplined: and it is certain that we are all more or less disposed to respect any superiority, especially any intellectual or moral elevation, in our neighbours, independently of any view to our own advantage: and this instinct of submission is, in truth, only too often lavished on deceptive appearances. However excessive the desire of command may be in our revolutionary day, there can be no one who, in his secret mind, has not often felt, more or less vividly, how sweet it is to obey when he can have the rare privilege of consigning the burdensome responsibility of his general self-conduct to wise and trustworthy guidance: and probably the sense of this is strongest in those who are best fitted for command. In the midst of political convulsion, when the spirit of revolutionary destruction is abroad, the mass of the people manifest a scrupulous obedience towards the intellectual and moral guides from whom they accept direction, and upon whom they may even press a temporary dictatorship, in their primary and urgent need of a preponderant authority. Thus do individual dispositions show themselves to be in harmony with the course of social relations as a whole, in teaching us that political

subordination is as inevitable, generally speaking, as it is indispensable. And this completes the elementary delineation of Social Statics.

My sketch has perhaps been so abstract and condensed that the conceptions of this chapter may appear obscure at present ; but light will fall upon them as we proceed. We may already see, however, the practical advantage which arises from the scientific evolution of human relations. The individual life, ruled by personal instincts ; the domestic, by sympathetic instincts ; and the social, by the special development of intellectual influences, prepare for the states of human existence which are to follow : and that which ensues is, first, personal morality, which subjects the preservation of the individual to a wise discipline ; next, domestic morality, which subordinates selfishness to sympathy ; and lastly, social morality, which directs all individual tendencies by enlightened reason, always having the general economy in view, so as to bring into concurrence all the faculties of human nature, according to their appropriate laws.

## CHAPTER VI.

SOCIAL DYNAMICS; OR, THEORY OF THE NATURAL PROGRESS  
OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

IF we regard the course of human development from the highest scientific point of view, we shall perceive that it consists in educing, more and more, the characteristic faculties of humanity, in comparison with those of animality; and especially with those which Man has in common with the whole organic kingdom. It is in this philosophical sense that the most eminent civilization must be pronounced to be fully accordant with nature, since it is, in fact, only a more marked manifestation of the chief properties of our species; properties which, latent at first, can come into play only in that advanced state of social life for which they are exclusively destined. The whole system of biological philosophy indicates the natural progression. We have seen how, in the brute kingdom, the superiority of each race is determined by the degree of preponderance of the animal life over the organic. In like manner, we see that our social evolution is only the final term of a progression which has continued from the simplest vegetables and most insignificant animals, up through the higher reptiles, to the birds and the mammals, and still on to the carnivorous animals and monkeys, the organic characteristics retiring, and the animal prevailing more and more, till the intellectual and moral tend towards the ascendancy which can never be fully obtained, even in the highest state of human perfection that we can conceive of. This comparative estimate affords us the scientific view of human progression, connected, as we see it is, with the whole course of animal advancement, of which it is itself the highest degree. The analysis of our social progress proves indeed that, while the radical dispositions of our nature are necessarily invariable, the highest of them are in a continuous state of relative development, by which they rise to be preponderant powers of human existence, though the inversion of the primitive economy can never be absolutely complete. We have seen that this is the essential character of the social organism in a statical view: but it becomes much more marked when we study its variations in their gradual succession.

Civilization develops, to an enormous degree, the action of Man upon his environment: and thus, it may seem, at first, to concentrate our attention upon the cares of material existence, the support and improvement of which appear to be the chief object of most social occupations. A closer examination will show, however, that this development gives the advantage to the highest human faculties, both by the security which sets free our attention from physical wants, and by the direct and steady excitement which it administers to the intellectual functions, and even the social feelings. In Man's social infancy, the instincts of subsistence are so preponderant, that the sexual instinct itself, notwithstanding its primitive strength, is at first controlled by them: the domestic affections are then much less pronounced; and the social affections are restricted to an almost imperceptible fraction of humanity, beyond which everything is foreign, and even hostile: and the malignant passions are certainly, next to the animal appetites, the mainspring of human existence. It is unquestionable that civilization leads us on to a further and further development of our noblest dispositions and our most generous feelings, which are the only possible basis of human association, and which receive, by means of that association, a more and more special culture. As for the intellectual faculties,—we see, by the habitual improvidence which characterizes savage life, how little influence reason has over men in that stage of existence. Those faculties are then undeveloped, or show some activity only in the lowest order, which relate to the exercise of the senses: the faculties of abstraction and combination are almost wholly inert, except under some transient stimulus: the rude curiosity which the spectacle of nature involuntary inspires is quite satisfied with the weakest attempts at theological explanation; and amusements, chiefly distinguished by violent muscular activity, rising at best to a manifestation of merely physical address, are as little favourable to the development of intelligence as of social qualities. The influence of civilization in perpetually improving the intellectual faculties is even more unquestionable than its effect on moral relations. The development of the individual exhibits to us in little, both as to time and degree, the chief phases of social development. In both cases, the end is to subordinate the satisfaction of the personal instincts to the habitual exercise of the social faculties, subjecting, at the same time, all our passions to rules imposed by an ever-strengthening intelligence, with the view of identifying the individual more and more with the species. In the anatomical view, we should say that the process is to give an influence by exercise to the organs of the cerebral systems, increasing in proportion to their distance from the vertebral column, and their nearness to the frontal region. Such is the ideal type which exhibits the course of human development, in the individual, and, in a higher degree, in the



species. This view enables us to discriminate the natural from the artificial part of the process of development; that part being natural which raises the human to a superiority over the animal attributes; and that part being artificial by which any faculty is made to preponderate in proportion to its original weakness: and here we find the scientific explanation of that eternal struggle between our humanity and our animality which has been recognized by all who have made Man their study, from the earliest days of civilization till now, and embodied in many forms before its true character was fixed by the positive philosophy.

This, then, is the direction of the human evolution. The next consideration is the rate at which it proceeds, apart from any differences which may result from climate, race, or other modifying causes. Taking into the account only universal causes, it is clear that the speed must be in proportion to the combined influence of the chief natural conditions relating to the human organism first, and next to its medium. The invariableness,—the evident impossibility of suspending these fundamental conditions must ever prevent our estimating their respective importance, though we may have a general conviction that our spontaneous development must be hastened or retarded by any change in these elementary influences, organic or inorganic; supposing, for instance, our cerebral system to be slightly inferior, in the frontal region; or our planet to become larger or more habitable. Sociological analysis can, by its nature, reach only to accessory conditions, which are rendered susceptible of estimate by their variations.

Among these secondary but permanent influences, which affect the rate of human development, *ennui* is the first which presents itself. Man, like other animals, cannot be happy without a sufficient exercise of all his faculties, intense and persistent in proportion to the intrinsic activity of each faculty. The greater difficulty experienced by man in obtaining a development compatible with the special superiority of his nature renders him more subject than the other animals to that remarkable state of irksome languor which indicates at once the existence of the faculties and their insufficient activity, and which would become equally irreconcilable with a radical debility incapable of any urgent tendency, and with an ideal vigour, spontaneously susceptible of indefatigable exercise. A disposition at once intellectual and moral, which we daily see at work in natures endowed with any energy, must have powerfully accelerated the human expansion, in the infancy of humanity, by the uneasy excitement it occasioned either in the eager search for new sources of emotion, or in the more intense development of direct human activity. This secondary influence is not very marked till the social state is sufficiently advanced to make men feel a growing need to exercise the highest faculties, which are, as we have seen, the least energetic. The strongest faculties, which

are the lowest, are so easily exercised that in ordinary circumstances they can hardly generate the *ennui* which would produce a favourable cerebral reaction. Savages, like children, are not subject to much *ennui* while their physical activity, which alone is of any importance to them, is not interfered with. An easy and protracted sleep prevents them, as if they were mere animals, from feeling their intellectual torpor in any irksome way. This brief notice of the influence of *ennui* was necessary, to show what its operation really amounts to in accelerating the speed of our social evolution. But perhaps the most important of all 'accelerating influences is the ordinary duration of human life, which I mention in the second place. There is no denying that our social progression rests upon death. I mean the successive steps suppose the steady renewal of the agents of the general movement, which is almost imperceptible in the course of any single life, and becomes marked only on the succession of a new generation. Here again the social resembles the individual organism,—being under the same necessity to throw off its constituent parts as they become, by the vital action itself, unfit for further use, and must be replaced by new elements. To illustrate this, we need not go so far as to suppose an indefinite duration of human life, which would presently put a stop to all progression whatever. It is enough to imagine it lengthened tenfold only, its respective periods preserving their present proportions. If the general constitution of the brain remained the same as now, there must be a retardation, though we know not how great, in our social development: for the perpetual conflict which goes on between the conservative instinct that belongs to age and the innovating instinct which distinguishes youth would be much more favourable than now to the former. From the extreme imperfection of the higher parts of our nature, even those who, in their prime, have contributed most to human progress cannot preserve their due social eminence very long without becoming more or less hostile to the further progress which they cannot assist. But an ephemeral life would be quite as mischievous as a too protracted one, by giving too much power to the instinct of innovation. The resistance which this instinct now meets with from the conservatism of age compels it to accommodate its efforts to the whole of what has been already done. Without this check, our feeble nature, which has a strong repugnance to irksome and continuous labour, would be for ever proposing incomplete views and crude attempts, that could never ripen into mature projects and feasible acts: and this would be the inevitable state of things, if human life were reduced to a quarter, or even to half its present length. Such would be the consequences, in either case, if we suppose the constitution of the human brain to be much what it is now: and to suppose it essentially changed, would be to carry us over into the region of hypothesis.

No justification is however afforded by these considerations to the

optimism of the advocates of final causes: for if, in this as in every other case, the actual order is necessarily more or less accordant with the course of the phenomena, it is very far from being true that the arrangement of the natural economy is as good for its purposes as we can easily conceive. The slowness of our social development is no doubt partly owing to the extreme imperfection of our organism; but it is owing nearly as much to the brevity of human life: and there would be no risk to any other great arrangement if the duration of our life, while still limited by the conditions just specified, were doubled or trebled. We have hardly thirty years (and those beset with impediments) to devote to other purposes than preparation for life or for death; and this is a very insufficient balance between what Man can devise and what he can execute. Probably no one has ever nobly devoted himself to the direct advancement of the human mind without bitterly feeling how time, employed to the utmost, failed him for the working out of more than an insignificant part of his conceptions. It will not do to say that the rapid succession of coadjutors compensates for this restriction of individual activity. Important as this compensation is, it is very imperfect, both on account of the loss of time in preparing each successor, and because the precise continuance of the work by different persons, occupying different points of view, is impossible, and the more out of the question exactly in proportion to the value of the new coadjutors. In the simplest material operations, no man's work has ever been carried on by others precisely as he would have done it himself; and the more difficult and lofty labours, which require intellectual and moral forces to complete them, are much more in need of a persistent unity in their management. These intellectual and moral forces no more admit of partition and addition by successors than by contemporaries; and, whatever the advocates of the indefinite distribution of individual efforts may say, a certain degree of concentration is necessary to the accomplishment of human progress.

Another cause which affects the rate of progress is the natural increase of population, which contributes more than any other influence to accelerate the speed. This increase has always been regarded as the clearest symptom of the gradual amelioration of the human condition; and nothing can be more unquestionable when we take the whole race into the account; or at least, all the nations which have any mutual interest: but this is not the view with which my argument is concerned. I have to consider only the progressive condensation of our species as a last general element concurring in the regulation of our rate of social progress. It is clear that by this condensation, and especially in its early stages, such a division of employments is favoured as could not take place among smaller numbers: and again, that the faculties of individuals are stimulated to find subsistence by more refined methods;

and again, that society is obliged to react with a firmer and better concerted energy against the expansion of individual divergences. In view of these considerations, I speak, not of the increase of the numbers of mankind, but of their concentration upon a given space, according to the special expression which I have made use of, and which is particularly applicable to the great centres of population, whence, in all ages, human progression has started. By creating new wants and new difficulties, this gradual concentration develops new means, not only of progress but of order, by neutralizing physical inequalities, and affording a growing ascendancy to those intellectual and moral forces which are suppressed among a scanty population. If we go on to inquire into the effect of a quicker or slower concentration, we shall perceive that the social movement is further accelerated by the disturbance given to the old antagonism between the conservative and the innovating instincts,—the last being strongly reinforced. In this sense the sociological influence of a more rapid increase of population is in analogy with that which we have just been considering in regard to the duration of life; for it is of little consequence whether the more frequent renewal of individuals is caused by the short life of some, or the speedier multiplication of others; and what was said in the former case will suffice for the latter. It must be observed, however, that if the condensation and rapidity were to pass beyond a certain degree, they would not favour, but impede this acceleration. The condensation, if carried too far, would render the support of human life too difficult; and the rapidity, if extreme, would so affect the stability of social enterprises as to be equivalent to a considerable shortening of our life. As yet, however, the increase of population has never nearly reached the natural limits at which such inconveniences will begin; and we have really no experience of them, unless in a few exceptional cases of disturbance caused by migrations, ill-managed as to their extent of numbers and of time. In an extremely distant future, our posterity will have to consider the question, and with much anxiety; because, from the smallness of the globe, and the necessary limitation of human resources, the tendency to increase will become extremely important, when the human race will be ten times as numerous as at present, and as much condensed everywhere as it is now in the west of Europe. Whenever that time comes, the more complete development of human nature, and the more exact knowledge of the laws of human evolution, will no doubt supply new means of resistance to the danger; means of which we can form no clear conception, and about which it is not for us to decide whether they will, on the whole, afford a sufficient compensation.

These are not all the accelerating influences which could be mentioned; but they are the chief; and they are enough for us, in our abstract view of our subject. I have now only to exhibit the main

subordination which the different aspects of human development must mutually present.

Though the elements of our social evolution are connected, and *The order of evolution.* always acting on each other, one must be preponderant, in order to give an impulse to the rest, though they may, in their turn, so act upon it as to cause its further expansion. We must find out this superior element, leaving the lower degrees of subordination to disclose themselves as we proceed : and we have not to search far for this element, as we cannot err in taking that which can be best conceived of apart from the rest, notwithstanding their necessary connection, while the consideration of it would enter into the study of the others. This double characteristic points out the intellectual evolution as the preponderant principle. If the intellectual point of view was the chief in our statical study of the organism, much more must it be so in the dynamical case. If our reason required at the outset the awakening and stimulating influence of the appetites, the passions, and the sentiments, not the less has human progression gone forward under its direction. It is only through the more and more marked influence of the reason over the general conduct of Man and of society, that the gradual march of our race has attained that regularity and persevering continuity which distinguish it so radically from the desultory and barren expansion of even the highest of the animal orders, which share, and with enhanced strength, the appetites, the passions, and even the primary sentiments of Man. If the statical analysis of our social organism shows it resting at length upon a certain system of fundamental opinions, the gradual changes of that system must affect the successive modifications of the life of humanity : and this is why, since the birth of philosophy, the history of society has been regarded as governed by the history of the human mind. As it is necessary, in a scientific sense, to refer our historical analysis to the preponderant evolution, whatever it may be, we must in this case choose, or rather preserve, the general history of the human mind as the natural guide to all historical study of humanity. One consequence of the same principle,—a consequence as rigorous but less understood,—is that we must choose for consideration in this intellectual history, the most general and abstract conceptions, which require the exercise of our highest faculties. Thus it is the study of the fundamental system of human opinions with regard to the whole of phenomena,—in short, the history of Philosophy, whatever may be its character, theological, metaphysical, or positive,—which must regulate our historical analysis. No other department of intellectual history, not even the history of the fine arts, including poetry, could, however important in itself, be employed for this object ; because the faculties of expression, which lie nearer to the affective faculties, have always, in their palmy days, been subordinated, in the eco-

nomy of social progress, to the faculties of direct conception. The danger (which is inherent in every choice, and which is least in the choice that I have made) of losing sight of the interconnection of all the parts of human development, may be partly guarded against by frequently comparing them, to see if the variations in any one corresponds with equivalent variations in the others. I believe we shall find that this confirmation is eminently obtainable by my method of historical analysis. This will be proved at once if we find that the development of the highest part of human interests is in accordance with that of the lowest,—the intellectual with the material. If there is an accordance between the two extremes, there must be also between all the intermediate terms.

We have indicated the general direction of the human evolution, its rate of progress, and its necessary order. We may now proceed at once to investigate the natural laws by which the advance of the human mind proceeds. The scientific principle of the theory appears to me to consist in the great philosophical law of the succession of the three states:—the primitive theological state, the transient metaphysical, and the final positive state,—through which the human mind has to pass, in every kind of speculation. This seems to be the place in which we should attempt the direct estimate of this fundamental law taking it as the basis of my historical analysis, which must itself have for its chief object to explain and expand the general notion of this law by a more and more extended and exact application of it in the review of the entire past of human history. I hope that the frequent statement and application of this law throughout the preceding part of my work will enable me to condense my demonstration of it here, without impairing its distinctness, or injuring its efficacy in such ulterior use as we shall have to make of it.

The reader is by this time abundantly familiar with the interpretation and destination of the law. All thoughtful persons can verify for themselves its operation in *Law of the Three Periods.* individual development, from infancy to manhood, as I pointed out at the beginning of this work. We can test it, as we have tested other laws, by observation, experiment, and comparison. I have done so through many years of meditation; and I do not hesitate to say that all these methods of investigation will be found to concur in the complete establishment of this historical proposition, which I maintain to be as fully demonstrated as any other law admitted into any other department of natural philosophy. Since the discovery of this law of the three periods, all positive philosophers have agreed on its special adaptation to the particular science in which each was interested, though all have not made the avowal with equal openness. The only objections that I have encountered have related merely to the universality of its application. I hold it to be now implicitly recognized with regard to all the sciences which are positive: that is, the triple evolution is admitted in regard to all

cases in which it is accomplished. It is only in regard to social science that its application is supposed to be impossible : and I believe the objection to signify nothing more than that the evolution is in this case incomplete. Social science has, with all its complexity, passed through the theological state, and has almost everywhere fully attained the metaphysical ; while it has nowhere yet risen to the positive, except in this book. I shall leave the assertion of the law in regard to sociology to the demonstration which my analysis will afford : for those who cannot perceive in this volume, as a whole, the nascent realization of this last philosophical process could not be convinced by argument. Leaving the historical verification of the law therefore to the reader, I invite attention to its philosophical explanation. It is not enough that the succession of the three states is a general fact. Such generality would go for more in any other science than in sociology, because, as we have seen, our biological philosophy enables us to conceive of all the main relations of social phenomena *à priori*, independently of their direct investigation, and we need confirmation of our conceptions by direct knowledge of human nature and experience. An *à priori* conception of a law so important as this is of the deepest interest in the study of social dynamics ; and, to confirm it, we must carefully mark the general grounds, derived from an exact knowledge, which have rendered indispensable on the one hand, and inevitable on the other, that succession of social phenomena which take their course under the operation of this law. The logical grounds have already been assigned, at the outset of the work, and repeatedly since : and it is with the moral and social that we now have to do, and we can review them without subjecting ourselves to the reproach of severing the parts of a philosophical demonstration which are in their nature bound up together.

The necessity of the intellectual evolution I assert lies in the primary tendency of Man to transfer the sense of his own nature into the radical explanation of all phenomena whatever. Philosophers tell us of the fundamental difficulty of knowing ourselves ; but this is a remark which could not have been made till human reason had achieved a considerable advance. The mind must have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could be astonished at its own acts,—reflecting upon itself a speculative activity which must be at first incited by the external world. If, on the one hand, Man must begin by supposing himself the centre of all things, he must, on the other hand, next set himself up as a universal type. The only way that he can explain any phenomena is by likening them, as much as possible, to his own acts,—the only ones whose mode of production he can suppose himself, by the accompanying sensations, to understand. We may therefore set up a converse statement, and say that Man knows nothing but himself ; and thus, his philosophy, in his earliest

stage, consists principally in transferring this spontaneous unity, more or less fortunately, into all subjects which may present themselves to his nascent attention. It is the highest proof of his philosophical maturity when he can, at length, apply the study of external nature to his own. When I laid this down as the basis of biological philosophy, I intimated the extreme rarity of such an attainment. At the outset, under the inverse process, the universe is always subordinated to Man, in speculative as well as in active respects. We shall not have attained a truly rational position till we can reconcile these two great philosophical views, at present antagonistic, but admitting of being made mutually complementary, and, in my opinion, prepared for being so, from this time forward. Such a harmony is even now barely conceivable in the brightest insight of philosophical genius, and there could have been no choice between the two courses in the earliest days of human development. The starting-point must have been that which alone was naturally possible. This was the spontaneous origin of the theological philosophy, the elementary spirit of which consists in explaining the intimate nature of phenomena, and their mode of production, and in likening them, as much as possible, to the acts of human will, through our primary tendency to regard all beings as living a life analogous to our own, and often superior, from their greater habitual energy. This procedure is so eminently exclusive, that men are unable to emancipate themselves from it, even in the most advanced stages of evolution, except by abandoning altogether these inaccessible researches, and restricting themselves to the study of the laws of phenomena, apart from their causes. Whenever, at this day, the human mind attempts to pass these inevitable limits, it involuntarily falls again into the primary errors, even in regard to the simplest phenomena, because it recurs to an aim and point of view essentially analogous, in attributing the production of phenomena to special volitions, internal, or more or less external. One case presents itself as an example, of the simplest scientific character,—that of the memorable philosophical error of the illustrious Malebranche in regard to the explanation of the mathematical laws of the elementary collision of solid bodies. If such a mind, in such an age, could explain such a theory in no other way than by an express recurrence to the continuous activity of a direct and special providence, we cannot doubt the tendency of our reason towards a radically theological philosophy whenever we attempt to penetrate, on any ground whatever, the intimate nature of phenomena.

This inevitableness of the theological philosophy is its most radical property, and the first cause of its long ascendancy. We have seen before that it was necessary, as the only possible beginning of our intellectual evolution; for the facts which must form the basis of a positive theory could not be collected to any purpose with-

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out some preliminary theory which should guide their collection. Our understanding cannot act without some doctrine, false or true, vague or precise, which may concentrate and stimulate its efforts, and afford ground for enough speculative continuity to sustain our mental activity. Our meteorological *observations*, as we call them, show us how useless may be vast compilations of facts, and how really unmeaning, while we are destitute of any theory whatever. Those who expect that the theory will be suggested by the facts, do not understand what is the course necessarily pursued by the human mind, which has achieved all real results by the only effectual method,—of anticipating scientific observations by some conception (hypothetical in the first instance) of the corresponding phenomena. Such a necessity has already been shown to be especially marked in the case of social speculations, not only from their complexity, but from the peculiarity that a long preparatory development of the human mind and of society constitutes the phenomena of the case, independently of all preparation of observers, and all accumulation of observations. It may be worth observing, that all the partial verifications of this fundamental proposition that we meet with in the different sciences confirm each other, on account of our tendency to unity of method and homogeneousness of doctrine, which would incline us to extend the theological philosophy from one class of speculations to another, even if we should not so treat each one of them separately.

The original and indispensable office of the theological philosophy is then to lead forth the human mind from the vicious circle in which it was confined by the two necessities of observing first, in order to form conceptions, and of forming theories first, in order to observe. The theological philosophy afforded an issue by likening all phenomena whatever to human acts; directly, in the first instance, by supposing all bodies to have a life more or less like our own, and indirectly afterwards, by means of the more durable and suggestive hypothesis which adds to the visible system of things an invisible world, peopled by superhuman agents, who occasion all phenomena by their action on matter, otherwise inert. The second stage is especially suitable to the human mind which begins to feel its difficulties and its needs; for every new phenomenon is accounted for by the supposition of a fresh volition in the ideal agent concerned, or, at most, by the easy creation of a new agent. However futile these speculations may now appear, we must remember that, in all times and everywhere, they have awakened human thought by offering to it the only material which it could at first accept. Besides that there was no choice, the infant reason can be interested by nothing but sublime solutions, obtained without any deep and sustained conflict of thought. We, at this day, find ourselves able, after suitable training, to devote ourselves to the study of the laws of phenomena, without heed to

their first and final causes: but still we detect ourselves occasionally yielding to the infantine curiosity which pretends to a power of knowing the origin and the end of all things. But such severity of reason as we are capable of has become attainable only since the accumulation of our knowledge has yielded us a rational hope of finally discovering the natural laws that were altogether out of reach, in the early states of the human mind; and the only alternative from total inactivity was, in those days, in the pursuit of the inaccessible subjects which are represented by the theological philosophy.—The moral and social grounds of this philosophy were as necessary as the intellectual. Its moral influence was to inspire Man with confidence enough for action, by animating him with a sense of a position of supremacy. There is something astonishing in the contrast between the actual powers of Man in an infant state and the indefinite control which he aspires to exercise over external nature; just as there is in his expectation of understanding matters which are inaccessible to reason. The practical and the speculative expectation alike belong to the theological philosophy. Supposing all phenomena to be regulated by superhuman will, Man may hope to modify the universe by his desires; not by his personal resources, but by the access which he believes himself to have to the imaginary beings whose power is unlimited: whereas, if he was aware from the beginning that the universe is subject to invariable laws, the certainty that he could no more influence than understand them would so discourage him that he would remain for ever in his original apathy, intellectual and moral. We find ourselves able to dispense with supernatural aid in our difficulties and sufferings, in proportion as we obtain a gradual control over nature by a knowledge of her laws: but the early races of men were in an opposite condition. They could obtain confidence, and therefore courage, only from above, and through the illusion of an illimitable power residing there, which could, on any occasion, afford them irresistible aid. I am not referring now to any hope of a future life. We shall see presently that it was not till a much later period that that hope exercised any important social influence: and even in more recent times, we shall find that the effect of the religious spirit on the conduct of human life proceeds much more from belief in actual and special immediate aid than from the uniform perspective of a remote future existence. This seems to me the leading aspect of the remarkable state which is produced in the human brain by the important intellectual and moral phenomenon of prayer; the admirable properties of which, when it has attained its full physiological efficacy, are very manifest in the earliest stage of progress. After a long decline of the religious spirit, the notion of *miracle* was naturally formed, to characterize the events which had become exceptional, and were attributed to divine intervention: but the very conception shows that the general

principle of natural laws had become familiar, and even preponderant, because the only sense of *miracle* was a transient suspension of natural laws. While the theological philosophy was all in all, there were no miracles, because everything was equally marvellous, as we see by the artless descriptions of ancient poetry, in which the commonest incidents are mixed up with the most monstrous prodigies, and undergo analogous explanations. Minerva intervenes to pick up the whip of a warrior in military games, as well as to protect him against a whole army: and in our own time, the devotee is as importunate in praying for his smallest personal convenience as for the largest human interests. In all ages, the priest has been more occupied with the solicitations of his flock about immediate favours of Providence than with their care for their eternal state. However this may be, we see that it is a radical property of the theological philosophy to be the sole support and stimulus of Man's moral courage, as well as the awakener and director of his intellectual activity.—To this we must add, as another attraction of Man to this philosophy, that the affective influence comes in to fortify the speculative. Feeble as are the intellectual organs, relatively considered, the attractive moral perspective of an unbounded power of modifying the universe, by the aid of supernatural protectors, must have been most important in exciting mental action. In our advanced state of scientific progress, we can conceive of the perpetual pursuit of knowledge for the sake of the satisfaction of intellectual activity, joined to the tranquil pleasure which arises from the discovery of truth: yet it is doubtful whether such natural stimulus as this would always suffice without collateral instigations of glory, of ambition, or of lower and stronger passions, except in the case of a very few lofty minds; and with them, only after training in the requisite habits. And nothing of this kind can be supposed possible in the early days, when the intellect is torpid and feeble, and scarcely accessible to the strongest stimulus; nor yet afterwards, when science is so far advanced as to have attained some speculative success. In the working out of such speculation, the mental activity can be sustained by nothing short of the fictions of the theological philosophy about the supremacy of man and his unbounded empire over external nature; as we have seen in regard to astrology and alchemy. In our own time, when there are enlightened men who hold such delusions in regard to social speculations alone, we see how irrationally they expect to modify at will the whole course of political phenomena, in which they could not take any adequate scientific interest without such an expectation. What we see of the influence of this view in maintaining the old politics may give us some faint idea of its power when it pervaded every part of the intellectual system, and illusion beset the reason of Man, whichever way he turned. Such then was

the moral operation of the theological philosophy,—stimulating Man's active energy by the offer, in the midst of the troubles of his infantine state, of absolute empire over the external world, as the prize of his speculative efforts.

The social evidences under this head will be fully treated in the following chapters, so that we may dismiss them now with a very short notice, important as they are ; and the more easily, because this class of evidences is the most indisputable of the three. There are two views which must be considered, in relation to the high social office of the theological philosophy : first, its function in organizing society ; and next, its provision for the permanent existence of a speculative class.—As to the first, we must perceive that the formation of any society, worthy to be so called, supposes a system of common opinions, such as may restrain individual eccentricity ; and such an influence, if needful now, when men are connected together by such a concurrence of obligations as high civilization introduces, must be absolutely indispensable in the infancy of society, when families adhere to each other so feebly, by means of relations as precarious as they are defective. No concurrence of interests, nor even sympathy in sentiment, can give durability to the smallest society, if there be not intellectual unanimity enough to obviate or correct such discordance as must inevitably arise. It has been shown that, indolent as our intellectual faculties are in comparison with the others, reason must rule, not domestic but social, and yet more political life : for through it alone can there be any organization of that reaction of society on the individual which appoints the function of government, and absolutely requires a system of common opinions about nature and Man. Such a system, then, is a political necessity ; and especially in the infancy of society. But, on the other hand, we must admit that the human mind, having thus furnished a basis for social organization, must depend for its further development on society itself, whose expansion is really inseparable from that of human intelligence. Here we see that society is in a vicious circle in a political, as well as, a logical view, through the opposition of two equal necessities ; and here, again, the only possible issue is afforded by the theological philosophy. It directs the first social organization, as it first forms a system of common opinions, and by forming such a system. Because we see it now in such a state of decomposition that its advocates lose sight of the unity of opinions that it once secured, and are themselves involved in intellectual discordance, we must not forget how, in those days of vigour by which it must be judged, it established an intellectual communion which constituted its most remarkable political function. The police consideration of a future life is wrongly attributed to this period of human society. It arose long after, and was of very inferior importance to the

*Social influences of the Theological philosophy.*

intellectual agreement which preceded it: and its operation would not be so erroneously exaggerated, but that religion has so far faded out of men's minds as to leave no other strong habitual remembrance than of its grossest impressions.

Another way in which the theological philosophy was politically indispensable to human progress was by instituting, in the midst of society, a special class regularly devoted to speculative activity. In this view, the social supremacy of the theological philosophy has lasted to our own time. It is scarcely possible for us to form any but an indirect idea of the difficulty of establishing, in the earliest period of society, any permanent division between theory and practice, such as is effected by the existence of a class regularly occupied with speculation. Even now, amidst all the refinement of our mental habits, we find extreme difficulty in duly estimating any new operation which has no immediate practical bearing: and by this we may imperfectly understand how impossible it was, in the remotest ages, to institute among populations of warriors and slaves a corporation that should be disengaged from military and industrial employments, and whose activity should be mainly of an intellectual kind. Such a class could, in those times, have been neither established nor tolerated if it had not been introduced in the natural course of social movement, and invested with authority beforehand by the influence of the theological philosophy. The political function of that philosophy thus was to establish a speculative body whose social existence not only admitted of no preparatory discussion, but was itself an indispensable preparation for the regular organization of all other classes. Whatever might have been the confusion of intellectual labour, and the inanity of the leading investigations of the sacerdotal orders, it is not the less true that the human mind owes to them the first effectual separation between theory and practice, which could take place in no other manner. Mental progress, by which all other progress is directed, would certainly have been destroyed at its birth, if society had continued to be composed of families engaged in the cares of material existence, or, as the only alternative, in the excitement of a brutal military activity. Any spiritual expansion supposes the existence of a privileged class, enjoying the leisure indispensable to intellectual culture, and at the same time urged, by its social position, to develop to the utmost the kind of speculative activity compatible with the primitive state of humanity; and this description is answered by the sacerdotal institution established by the theological philosophy. Though, in the decrepitude of the old philosophy, we see the theological class sunk in mental lethargy, we must not forget that but for their activity in the days of its prime, human society would have remained in a condition much like that of a company of superior monkeys. By forming this speculative class,

then, the theological philosophy fulfilled the political conditions of a further progression of the human mind.

Such are the qualities, intellectual, moral, and social, which secured the supremacy of the theological philosophy, at the outset of human progress. This is the only part of my sociological demonstration which is at all open to dispute; and this is one reason why I have dwelt so long upon it: but it is not the only reason. Another and a greater is that this view contains the radical principle of the whole demonstration, the remainder of which will not detain us long.

If this starting-point of human development has been placed beyond dispute, the final, or positive stage, does not admit of it. We have seen enough of the establishment of the positive philosophy in other departments to be satisfied of its destined prevalence in sociology. For the same reasons which explain and justify the early supremacy of the theological philosophy, we see that it must be a provisional state, for its supremacy was owing to its aptitude to meet the needs of a primitive state of humanity; and those needs are not the same, nor requiring the same philosophy to satisfy them, as those which arise in a more advanced stage of the human evolution. After having awakened human reason, and superintended its progress, in the absence of a more real philosophy, theology began to repress the human mind from the first moment of its coming into direct antagonism with the positive philosophy. And in the same way, in its moral relations, it imparted at first a consolatory confidence and active energy, which have become transmuted, by too long a duration, into oppressive terror and a faint apathy which have been too common a spectacle since it has been driven to struggle to retain its hold, instead of extending its dominion. There is no more question of the moral than of the intellectual superiority and final supremacy of the positive philosophy, capable as it is of developing in us an unshaken vigour and a deliberate steadfastness, directly derived from our own nature, without any external assistance, or any imaginary hindrance. And again, in regard to its social bearings, though the ascendancy of the theological philosophy lasted longer on this ground than on the other two, it is evident enough at present that, instead of uniting men, which was its proper function at first, it now divides them, so that after having created speculative activity, it has ended with radically hindering it. The function of reuniting, as of stimulating and directing, belongs more and more, as religious belief declines, to the conceptions of positive philosophy, which alone can establish that intellectual community all over the world on which the great future political organization is to be grounded. The intellectual destination of the two philosophies has been sufficiently established in our review of all the departments of natural philosophy. Their moral and social destination will be illustrated in succeeding chap-

ters of this volume. My historical analysis will explain to us the continuous decline of the one and the corresponding rise of the other, from the earliest period of human progression. It may appear paradoxical to regard the theological philosophy as in a steadily declining state intellectually, at the very time that it was fulfilling its most exalted political mission; but we shall find satisfactory scientific evidence that Catholicism, its noblest social work, must necessarily be its last effort, on account of the germs of disorganization which must thenceforth grow more and more rapidly. We need here therefore only assign the general principle of the inevitable tendency of the human mind towards an exclusive positive philosophy, throughout the whole range of the intellectual system.

The general, like the individual human mind, is governed by imagination first, and then, after a sufficient exercise of the faculties at large, more and more by reason. The same grounds on which the process takes place in the individual case determine that of the whole

*Attempted  
union of the  
two philoso-  
phies.*

species; and with the more certainty and power on account of the greater complexity and perpetuity of the social organism. Supreme as the theological philosophy once was, it is certain that such a method of philosophizing was resorted to only because no other was possible. Wherever there has been a choice, in regard to any subject whatever, Man has always preferred the study of the laws of phenomena to that of their primary causes, though prior training, which there has been no rational education adapted to counteract, has often occasioned lapse into his old illusions. Theological philosophy has, however, never been absolutely universal. That is, the simplest and commonest facts in all classes of phenomena have always been supposed subject to natural laws, and not to the arbitrary will of supernatural agents. Adam Smith made the remark that there never was, in any age or country, a god of Weight. In more complex cases, if only the relations of phenomena are seen to be invariable, the most superficial observer recognizes the presence of law. Even among moral and social phenomena, where the entrance of positive philosophy has been interdicted, we are all obliged to act daily on the supposition of natural laws, in order to conduct the common affairs of life, for all forecast would be impossible if we supposed every incident to be ascribable to supernatural agency, and no other resource therefore possible than prayer, for influencing the course of human actions. It is even noticeable that the principle of the theological philosophy itself lies in the transference to the phenomena of external nature of the first beginnings of the laws of human action; and thus the germ of the positive philosophy is at least as primitive as that of the theological philosophy itself, though it could not expand till a much later time. This idea is very important to the perfect rationality of our sociological theory; because, as human life can never present any real

creation, but only a gradual evolution, the final spread of the positive spirit would be scientifically incomprehensible, if we could not trace its rudiments from the very beginning. From that scarcely appreciable presence at the beginning, the rise of the positive spirit has been recognizable, in proportion to the extension and generalization of our observations, and the theological philosophy has been slowly but steadily driven back within the narrowing limits of phenomena whose natural laws were still unknown. Thus was the function of the old philosophy clearly a provisional one,—to maintain our mental activity by the only exercise open to it, till the positive philosophy should usher it into the wide field of universal knowledge, made accessible to the whole race. This destination has only recently exhibited itself in an unquestionable way since the disclosure of natural laws in phenomena so numerous and so various as to suggest the necessary existence of analogous laws in all other departments, however remote their actual discovery may be.

It does not follow, from anything that I have said, that the two philosophies were always visibly opposed to each other. On the contrary, the physical study must have succumbed to the theological spirit if they had seemed at the outset to be incompatible. In fact, the study of the laws of phenomena appeared, for a long course of time, to agree very well with the investigation into their causes. It was only when observations became more connected, and disclosed important relations, that the radical opposition of the two doctrines began to be felt. Before the antagonism was avowed, the positive spirit manifested its repugnance to the futile absolute explanations of the theological philosophy; and the theological spirit lavished its disdain on the circumspect march and modest investigations of the new school; while still there was no idea that the study of real laws was irreconcilable with that of essential causes. When natural laws of considerable scope were at length discovered, the incompatibility became clear between the preponderance of imagination and that of reason, between the absolute spirit and the relative; and, above all, between the ancient hypothesis of the sovereign direction of events by any arbitrary will, and the growing certainty that we can foresee and modify them by the rational access of human wisdom. It is only in our own time that the antagonism has been extended to all parts of the intellectual field: and even up to the last moment, the students of special subjects have believed that by confining themselves to the investigation of natural laws, and paying no attention to the nature of beings and mode of production of phenomena, they might find physical researches compatible with the explanations of theology; while theology made its own concessions in the form of a provisional notion of a universal providence, combined with special laws which it had imposed on itself. The conduct of Catholicism, in interdicting the habitual use of miracle and prophecy, which prevailed so largely in ancient times,



seems to me to present, in religious affairs, a transient situation analogous to that which is exhibited by what is called the institution of constitutional monarchy in the political world; each being in its own way an indisputable symptom of decline. However this may be, the insufficiency of the theological philosophy manifests itself to popular observation in that form of popular evidence which can alone reach the majority of mankind,—in its comparison with its opponent in the application of means. The positive philosophy enables us to foresee and to modify natural events, and thus satisfies, more and more, as it advances, the most urgent intellectual needs of humanity, while the ancient philosophy remains barren; so that its fanciful explanations are more and more neglected, while the new philosophy obtains a perpetually firmer hold on the public reason. Those who have remained faithful in their attachment to the theological philosophy make no practical use of it in their daily life, and ground their predilection for it on its characteristic generality: so that when its antagonist shall have become systematized as fully as it is destined to be, the ancient philosophy will have lost the last attribute which has ever entitled it to social supremacy.

We have now only to take a cursory survey of the intermediate state. I have pointed out more than once before, *The Metaphysical Period.* that any intermediate state can be judged of only after a precise analysis of the two extremes. The present case is a remarkable illustration of this necessity; for, if it is once admitted that the human mind must set out from the theological state, and arrive certainly at the positive, we may easily understand how it must pass through the metaphysical, which has no other destination than to afford a transition from the one to the other. The bastard and mobile character of the metaphysical philosophy fits it for this office, as it reconciles, for a time, the radical opposition of the other two, adapting itself to the gradual decline of the one and the preparatory rise of the other, so as to spare our dislike of abrupt change, and to afford us a transition almost imperceptible. The metaphysical philosophy takes possession of the speculative field after the theological has relinquished it, and before the positive is ready for it: so that in each particular case, the dispute about the supremacy of any of the three philosophies is reduced to the mere question of opportuneness, judged by a rational examination of the development of the human mind. The method of modification consists in substituting gradually the entity for a deity when religious conceptions become so generalized as to diminish perpetually the number of supernatural agents, as well as their active intervention, and at length arrive, professedly if not really, at rigorous unity. When supernatural action loses its original speciality, it consigns the immediate direction of the phenomenon to a mysterious entity, at first emanating from itself,

but to which daily custom trains the human mind to refer more and more exclusively the production of each event. This strange process has favoured the withdrawal of supernatural causes, and the exclusive consideration of phenomena; that is, the decline of the theological and the rise of the positive spirit. Beyond this, the general character of this philosophy is that of the theological, of which it is only a modification, though the chief. It has an inferior intellectual consistency, and a much less intense social power; so that it is much better adapted for a critical function than for any real organization: and it is those very qualities which disable it for resistance to the growth of the positive spirit. On the one hand, the increasing subtlety of metaphysical speculations is for ever reducing their characteristic entities to mere abstract denominations of the corresponding phenomena, so as to render their own impotence ridiculous when they attempt explanations: a thing which would not have been possible, in an equal degree, with purely theological forms. On the other hand, its deficiency of organizing power, in consequence of its radical inconsistency, must prevent its maintaining any such political struggle as theology maintained against the spread of positive social philosophy. However, it obtains a respite by its own equivocal and mobile nature, which enables it to escape from rational discussion even more than the theological philosophy itself, while the positive spirit is as yet too imperfectly generalized to be able to attack the only substantial ground of their common authority,—the universality which they can boast, but which it has not. However this may be, we must admit the aptitude of metaphysics to sustain, provisionally, our speculative activity on all subjects till it can receive more substantial aliment; at the same time carrying us over from the theological *régime* further and further in the direction of the positive. The same aptitude appears in its political action. Without overlooking the serious intellectual and moral dangers which distinguish the metaphysical philosophy, its transitional quality accounts to us for the universal ascendancy which it has provisionally obtained among the most advanced societies, which cannot but have an instinctive sense of some indispensable office to be fulfilled by such a philosophy in the evolution of humanity. The irresistible necessity of this temporary phase is thus, on all grounds, as unquestionable as it could be prior to the direct analysis to which it will be subjected in the course of our historical review.

During the whole of our survey of the sciences, I have endeavoured to keep in view the great fact that all the three states, theological, metaphysical, and positive, may and do exist at the same time in the same mind in regard to different sciences. I must once more recall this consideration, and insist upon it; because in the forgetfulness of it lies the only real objection that can be brought against the grand law of the

*Coeistence  
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three states. It must be steadily kept in view that the same mind may be in the positive state with regard to the most simple and general sciences; in the metaphysical with regard to the more complex and special; and in the theological with regard to social science, which is so complex and special as to have hitherto taken no scientific form at all. Any apparent contradiction must certainly arise, even if it could be shown to exist, from the imperfection of our hierarchical arrangement, and not from the law of evolution itself. This once fully understood, the law itself becomes our guide in further investigation, as every proved theory does, by showing us by anticipation, what phenomena to look for, and how to use those which arise: and it supplies the place of direct exploration, when we have not the necessary means of investigation. We shall find that by this law alone can the history of the human mind be rendered intelligible. Having convinced ourselves of its efficacy in regard to all other sciences, and in interpreting all that has yet come to pass in human history, we must adhere to it steadily in analysing the present, and in forming such anticipation of the future as sociology, being a real science, enables us to rely upon.

To complete my long and difficult demonstration, I have only now to show that material development, as a whole, must follow a course, not only analogous, but perfectly correspondent with that of intellectual development, which, as we have seen, governs every other.

All political investigation of a rational kind proves the primitive  
*Corresponding* tendency of mankind, in a general way, to a military  
*material de-* life; and to its final issue in an industrial life. No  
*velopment.* enlightened mind disputes the continuous decline of  
 the military spirit, and the gradual ascendency of the industrial. We see now, under various forms, and more and more indisputably, even in the very heart of armies, the repugnance of modern society to a military life. We see that compulsory recruiting becomes more and more necessary, and that there is less and less voluntary persistence in that mode of life. Notwithstanding the immense exceptional development of military activity which was occasioned by anomalous circumstances at the beginning of the present century, our industrial and pacific instincts have returned to their regular course of expansion, so as to render us secure of the radical tranquillity of the civilized world, though the peace of Europe must often appear to be endangered through the provisional deficiency of any systematic organization of international relations; a cause which, though insufficient to produce war, keeps us in a state of frequent uneasiness. We need not then go over again the proof of the first and last terms of the evolution; which will be abundantly illustrated by the historical analysis that I shall offer. We have only to refer the facts of human experience to the essential laws of human nature, and the necessary conditions of social development:—a scientific procedure which has never yet been attempted.

As long as primitive Man was averse from all regular toil, the military life alone furnished a field for his sustained activity. Apart from cannibalism, it offered the simplest means of subsistence. However deplorable the necessity, its universal prevalence and continuous development, even after subsistence might have been obtained by other means, proves that the military *régime* must have had some indispensable, though provisional office to fulfil in the progression of the race. It was indeed the only one under which human industry could make a beginning; in the same way that the scientific spirit could not have arisen without the protection of the religious. The industrial spirit supposed the existence of a considerable social development, such as could not have taken place till isolated families had been connected by the pursuits of war. The social, and yet more the political properties of military activity are, in their early stages, perfectly clear and decisive, and, in short, fully appropriate to the high civilizing function which they had to fulfil. It was thus that habits of regularity and discipline were instituted, and the families of men were brought into association for warlike expeditions or for their common defence. The objects of association could not possibly be more obvious or urgent, nor the elementary conditions of concurrence more irresistible. In no other school could a primitive society learn order; as we may see at this day in the case of those types of ancient humanity,—the exceptional individuals who cannot now be made amenable to industrial discipline. This ascendancy of the military spirit was indispensable, not only to the original consolidation of political society, but yet more to its continuous extension, which could not otherwise have taken place but with excessive slowness; and such extension was, to a certain degree, indispensable to the final development of human industry. Thus, then, we find humanity involved in the same kind of vicious circle with regard to its temporal as we saw it to be with its spiritual progress; and in both cases an issue was afforded by the fortunate expansion of a preliminary tendency. In fact, the necessary basis of the military *régime* has everywhere been the individual slavery of the producing class, by which warriors were allowed the full and free development of their activity. We shall see hereafter that the great social operation which was to be accomplished, in due time, by the continuous progression of a military system, powerfully instituted and wisely carried out, must have failed in its earliest stages. We shall also see how this ancient slavery was the necessary preparation for the final prevalence of the industrial life, by imposing on the majority of the race, irresistibly and exclusively, that toil to which man is constitutionally averse, though an ultimate condition of laborious perseverance was in store for all. To view the case without prejudice, we must transport ourselves to those primitive times, and not regard the slavery of that age with the just horror

with which we view that of modern times,—the colonial slavery of our day, which is truly a social monstrosity, existing as it does in the heart of an industrial period, subjecting the labourer to the capitalist in a manner equally degrading to both. The ancient slavery was of the producer to the warrior; and it tended to develop their respective energies, so as to occasion their final concurrence in the same social progression.

Necessary as this military *régime* was, it was not the less merely provisional. While industrial activity has the fine quality of bearing the most energetic extension among all individuals and nations without making the rise of the one irreconcilable with that of the other, it is evident that the exaltation of the military life among any considerable portion of the race must occasion the restriction of all the rest; this being, in fact, the proper function of the *régime* in regard to the whole field of civilization. Thus, while the industrial period comprehends the whole term of human progress under natural laws,—that is, the whole future that we can conceive of,—the military period could last no longer than the formation of those preparatory conditions which it was its function to create. This end was attained when the chief part of the civilized world was at length united under the same rule; that is, in regard to Europe, when Rome had completed its conquests. From that time forward, military activity had neither object nor aliment; and from that time forward, therefore, it declined, so as no longer to disguise that gradual rise of the industrial spirit, which had been preparing during the interval. But, notwithstanding this connection, the industrial state was so radically different from the military as to require an intermediate term; and in the same way that, in the spiritual evolution, an intermediate term was required between the theological and the positive spirit. In both cases, the middle phase was fluctuating and equivocal. We shall see hereafter that, in the temporal case, it consisted, first, in a substitution of a defensive for an offensive military organization, and afterwards in an involuntary general subordination, more and more marked, of the military spirit to the instinct of production. This transitory phase being the one in which we live, its proper nature, vague as it is, can be estimated by direct intuition.

Such is the temporal evolution, briefly surveyed in its three periods. No philosophical mind can help being struck by the analogy between this indisputable progression and our primary law of succession of the three states of the human mind. But our sociological demonstration requires that we should establish the connection between them by exhibiting the natural affinity which has always existed, first between the theological and the military spirit, and afterwards between the scientific and industrial; and, consequently, between the two transient functions of the metaphysicians and the

legists. This elucidation will impart the last degree of precision and consistency to my demonstration, and will thus establish it as the rational basis of the entire historical analysis which will follow.

The occasional rivalry between the theological power and the military, which history presents, has sometimes disguised their radical affinity, even in the eyes of philosophers. But, if we consider, there can be no real rivalry but among the different elements of the same political system, in consequence of that spontaneous emulation which, in all cases of human concurrence, must become more earnest and extensive as the end is more important and indirect, and therefore the means more distinct and independent, without the participation, voluntary or instinctive, being thereby prevented. When two powers, equally energetic, rise, increase, and decline together, notwithstanding the difference of their natures, we may be assured that they belong to the same *régime*, whatever may be their habitual conflicts. Conflict indicates radical incompatibility only when it takes place between two elements employed in analogous functions, and when the gradual growth of the one coincides with the continuous decline of the other. As to the present case, it is evident that, in any political system, there must be an incessant rivalry between the speculative and the active powers, which, through the imperfection of our nature, must often be inclined to ignore their necessary co-ordination, and to disdain the general limits of their reciprocal attributes. Notwithstanding the social affinity between science and industry, we must look for similar conflict between them hereafter, in proportion to the political ascendancy which they will obtain together. We see signs of it already in the intellectual and moral antipathy of Science to the natural inferiority of these labours of Industry which yet are the means of wealth, and in the instinctive repugnance of Industry to the abstraction which characterizes Science, and to the just pride by which it is animated.

*Affinity between the theological and military régime.*

Having despatched these objections, we may now contemplate the strong bond which unites the theological and military powers, and which has in all ages been felt and honoured by all enlightened men who have borne a part in either, notwithstanding the passions of political rivalry. It is plain that no military system could arise and endure without the countenance of the theological spirit, which must secure for it the complete and permanent subordination essential to its existence. Each period imposes equal exigencies of this sort in its special manner. At the outset, when the narrowness and nearness of the aim required a less absolute submission of mind, social ties were so weak that nothing could have been done but for the religious authority with which military chiefs were naturally invested. In more advanced times the end became so vast and remote, and the participation so indirect, that even long

habits of discipline would not have secured the necessary co-operation without the aid of theological convictions occasioning blind and involuntary confidence in military superiors. It was in very ancient times that the military spirit had its great social function to fulfil; and it was in those ancient times that the two powers were usually found concentrated in the same chiefs. We must observe also that it was not every spiritual authority whatever that would have sufficiently suited the foundation and consolidation of military government, which, from its nature, required the concurrence of the theological philosophy, and no other: for instance, though natural philosophy has rendered eminent service in modern times to the art of war, the scientific spirit, which encourages habits of rational discussion, is radically incompatible with the military spirit; and we know that the subjection of their art to the principles of science has always been bitterly deplored by the most distinguished soldiers, on the introduction of every change, as a token of the decline of the military system. On this ground, then, the affinity of temporal military powers for spiritual theological powers is sufficiently accounted for. At the first glance we might suppose the converse relation to be less indispensable, since purely theocratic societies have existed, while an exclusively military one has never been known. But a closer examination will always show the necessity of the military system to consolidate, and yet more to extend, the theological authority, developed in this way by a continual political application, as the sacerdotal instinct has always been well aware. We shall see again that the theological spirit is as hostile to the expansion of industry as the military. Thus the two elements of the primitive political system have not only a radical affinity, but common antipathies and sympathies, as well as general interests; and it must be needless to enlarge further in this place on the sociological principle of the concurrence of these powers, which my historical analysis will present as constantly engaged in consolidating and correcting each other.

*Affinity between the Positive and Industrial spirit.*

The latest case of political dualism is even more unquestionable than the earliest, and we are favourably circumstanced for observing it,—the two elements not having yet attained their definite ascendancy, though their social development is sufficiently marked. When the time arrives for their political rivalry, it may be more difficult than now to exhibit that resemblance in origin and destination, and that conformity of principles and interests, which could not be seriously disputed as long as their common struggle against the old political system acts as a restraint upon their divergences. The most remarkable feature that we have to contemplate in their case is the aid which each renders to the political triumph of the other, by seconding its own efforts against its chief antagonist. I have already noticed, in another connection, the secret

incompatibility between the scientific spirit and the military. There is the same hostility between the industrial spirit, when sufficiently developed, and the theological. The most zealous advocates of the old *régime* are very far removed from the old religious point of view; but we can transport ourselves to it for a moment, and see how the voluntary modification of phenomena by the rules of human wisdom must thence appear as impious as the rational prevision of them, as both suppose invariable laws, finally irreconcilable with all arbitrary will. According to the rigorous though barbarous logic of the least civilized nations, all human intervention to improve the economy of nature is an injurious attack upon providential government. There is no doubt, in fact, that a strong preponderance of the religious spirit benumbs the industrial, by the exaggerated feelings of a stupid optimism, as has been abundantly clear on many decisive occasions. That this disastrous effect has not been more fatal is owing to priestly sagacity, which has so managed this dangerous power as to educe its civilizing influence, while neutralizing its injurious action by constant and vigilant effort, in a way which I shall presently exhibit. We cannot then overlook the political influence by which the gradual expansion of human industry must aid the progressive ascendancy of the scientific spirit, in its antagonism to the religious; to say nothing of the daily stimulus which industry and science impart to each other, when once strong enough for mutual action. Thus far their office has chiefly been to substitute themselves for the ancient political powers which are yielding up their social influence; and our attention is necessarily drawn chiefly to the aid they have afforded to each other in this operation. But it is easy to perceive what force and what efficacy must reside in their connection, when it shall have assumed the organic character, in which it is at present deficient, and shall proceed to the final reorganization of modern society.

Now that we have examined the two extreme states, the intermediate dualism requires little notice. The inter-connection of the convergent powers, spiritual and temporal, which constitutes the transitory *régime*, is a necessary consequence of all that we have been observing. Indeed, we need but look at the labours of metaphysicians and legists to see what their affinity is, amidst their rivalries; an affinity which stakes the philosophical ascendancy of the one class on the political preponderance of the other. We may, then, regard as now complete the necessary explanation required by our fundamental law of human evolution, in order to its direct application to the study of this great phenomenon. That study will be guided by the consideration of the three dualisms which I have established as the only basis of sound historical philosophy. It is worth noticing the conformity of this law of succession, at once intellectual and material,

*Intermediate  
régime.*



social and political, with the historical order which popular reason has instinctively established, by distinguishing the ancient and the modern world, separated and reunited by the Middle Ages. The sociological law which I have propounded may be found to have for its destination to take up a vague empirical notion, hitherto barren, and render it rational and prolific. I hail this spontaneous coincidence, as giving a sanction to my speculative labours; and I claim this confirmation, in virtue of that great aphorism of positive philosophy which I have quoted so often, which enjoins upon all sound scientific theories to start from a point sufficiently accordant with the spontaneous indications of popular reason, of which true science is simply a special prolongation.

The series of views of social dynamics sketched out in this chapter has established the fundamental law of human development, and therefore the bases of historical philosophy. We had before ascertained the spirit and method of that philosophy; and we may now therefore proceed to apply this great sociological conception to the analysis of the history of mankind.

## CHAPTER VII.

PREPARATION OF THE HISTORICAL QUESTION.—FIRST THEOLOGICAL PHASE: FETICHISM.—BEGINNING OF THE THEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY SYSTEM.

THE best way of proving that my principle of social development will ultimately regenerate social science, is to show that it affords a perfect interpretation of the past of human society,—at least in its principal phases. If, by this method, any conception of its scope and proper application can be obtained, future philosophers can extend the theory to new analyses, and more and more special aspects of human progression. The application which I propose now to enter upon must, however, in order to be brief, be restricted; and the first part of my task is to show what the restrictions must be.

The most important of these restrictions, and the one which comprehends all the rest, is, that we must confine our analysis to a single social series; that is, we must study exclusively the development of the most advanced nations, not allowing our attention to be drawn off to other centres of any independent civilization which has, from any cause whatever, been arrested, and left in an imperfect state. It is the selectest part, the vanguard of the human race, that we have to study; the greater part of the white race, or the European nations,—even restricting ourselves, at least in regard to modern times, to the nations of Western Europe. When we ascend into the remoter past, it will be in search of the political ancestors of these peoples, whatever their country may be. In short, we are here concerned only with social phenomena which have influenced, more or less, the gradual disclosure of the connected phases that have brought up mankind to its existing state. If Bossuet was guided by literary principle in restricting his historical estimate to one homogeneous and continuous series, it appears to me that he fulfilled not less successfully the philosophical conditions of the inquiry. Those who would produce their whole stock of erudition, and mix up with the review such populations as those of India and China and others that have not aided the process of development, may reproach Bossuet with his limitations: but not the less is his

exposition, in philosophical eyes, truly universal. Unless we proceed in this way, we lose sight of all the political relations arising from the action of the more advanced on the progress of inferior nations. The metaphysical, and even the theological polity seeks to realize its absolute conceptions everywhere, and under all circumstances, by the same empiricism, which disposes civilized men everywhere to transplant into all soils their ideas, customs, and institutions. The consequences are such that practice requires as imperatively as theory that we should concentrate our view upon the most advanced social progression. When we have learned what to look for from the *élite* of humanity, we shall know how the superior portion should intervene for the advantage of the inferior; and we cannot understand the fact, or the consequent function, in any other way: for the view of coexisting states of inequality could not help us. Our first limit then is that we are to concentrate our sociological analysis on the historical estimate of the most advanced social development.

For this object we want only the best-known facts; and they are so perfectly co-ordinated by the law of the three periods, that the largest phases of social life form a ready and complete elucidation of the law; and when we have to contemplate the more special aspects of society, we have only to apply in a secondary way the corresponding subdivisions of the law to the intermediate social states. Social physiology being thus directly founded, its leading conception will be more and more precisely wrought out by our successors by its application to shorter and shorter intervals, the last perfection of which would be, if it could be reached, that the true filiation of every kind of progress should be traced from generation to generation.

In this department of science, as in every other, the commonest facts are the most important. In our search for the laws of society, we shall find that exceptional events and minute details must be discarded as essentially insignificant, while science lays hold of the most general phenomena which everybody is familiar with, as constituting the basis of ordinary social life. It is true, popular prejudice is against this method of study; in the same way that physics were till lately studied in thunder and volcanoes, and biology in monstrosities: and there is no doubt that a reformation in our ignorant intellectual habits is even more necessary in Sociology than in regard to any of the other sciences.

The restrictions that I have proposed are not new, or peculiar to the latest department of study. They appear in all the rest under the form of the distinction between abstract and concrete science. We find it in the division which is made between physics and natural history, the first of which is the appropriate field of positive philosophy. The division does not become less indispensable as phenomena become

*Abstract treatment of History.*

more complex : and it in fact decides, in the clearest and most precise manner, the true office of historical observation in the rational study of social dynamics. Though, as Bacon observed, the abstract determination of the general laws of individual life rests on facts derived from the history of various living beings, we do not the less carefully separate physiological or anatomical conceptions from their concrete application to the total mode of existence proper to each organism. In the same way we must avoid confounding the abstract research into the laws of social existence with the concrete histories of human societies, the explanation of which can result only from a very advanced knowledge of the whole of these laws. Our employment of history in this inquiry, then, must be essentially abstract. It would, in fact, be history without the names of men, or even of nations, if it were not necessary to avoid all such puerile affectation as there would be in depriving ourselves of the use of names which may elucidate our exposition, or consolidate our thought. The further we look into this branch of science, as well as others, the more we shall find that natural history, essentially synthetic, requires, to become rational, that all elementary orders of phenomena should be considered at once : whereas, natural philosophy must be analytical, in order to discover the laws which correspond to each of the general categories. Thus the natural history of humanity involves the history of the globe and all its conditions, physical, chemical, and everything else : while the philosophy of society cannot even exist till the entire system of preceding sciences is formed, and the whole mass of historical information offered as material for its analysis. The function of Sociology is to derive, from this mass of unconnected material, information which, by the principles of the biological theory of Man, may yield the laws of social life ; each portion of this material being carefully prepared by stripping off from it whatever is peculiar or irrelevant,—all circumstances, for instance, of climate, locality, etc.,—in order to transfer it from the concrete to the abstract. This is merely what is done by astronomers, physicists, chemists, and biologists, in regard to the phenomena they have to treat ; but the complexity of social phenomena will always render the process more delicate and difficult in their case, even when the positivity of the science shall be universally admitted. As for the reaction of this scientific treatment on History itself, I hope that the following chapters will show that it sets up a series of immutable landmarks throughout the whole past of human experience ; but these landmarks afford direction and a rallying-point to all subsequent observations ; and that they become more frequent as we descend to modern times, and social progression is accelerated.

As the abstract history of humanity must be separated from the concrete, so must the abstract inquiry into the laws of society be

separated from questions of concrete Sociology. Science is not yet advanced enough for this last. For instance, geological considerations must enter into such concrete inquiry, and we have but little positive knowledge of geology: and the same is true of questions of climate, race, etc., which never can become positively understood till we can apply to them the sociological laws which we must attain through the abstract part of the study. The institution of social dynamics would be in fact impossible, if we did not defer to a future time the formation of concrete sociology; and ready as we are to pursue this course in regard to other sciences, there can be no reason why we should resist it here.—As an instance of this necessity, let us take the most important sociological inquiry that presents itself,—the question of the scene and agent of the chief progression of the race. Why is Europe the scene, and why is the white race the agent, of the highest civilization? This question must have often excited the curiosity of philosophers and statesmen; yet it must remain premature, and incapable of settlement by any ingenuity, till the fundamental laws of social development are ascertained by the abstract research. No doubt, we are beginning to see, in the organization of the whites, and especially in their cerebral constitution, some positive germs of superiority; though even on this naturalists are not agreed: and again, we observe certain physical, chemical, and biological conditions which must have contributed to render European countries peculiarly fit to be the scene of high civilization: but if a trained philosophical mind were to collect and arrange all the material for a judgment that we possess, its insufficiency would be immediately apparent. It is not that the material is scanty or imperfect. The deficiency is of a sociological theory which may reveal the scope and bearing of every view, and direct all reasoning to which it may give rise: and in the absence of such a theory, we can never know that we have assembled all the requisites essential to a rational decision. In every other case is the postponement of the concrete study as necessary as in this: and if the novelty and difficulty of my creative task should compel me occasionally to desert my own logical precept, the warning I have now given will enable the reader to rectify any errors into which I may lapse.

One more preliminary consideration remains. We must determine more precisely than I have yet done the regular mode of definition of the successive periods which we are about to examine. The law of evolution, no doubt, connects the chief historical phases with the corresponding one of the three periods: but there is an uncertainty of a secondary kind for which I must provide a solution. It arises out of the unequal progression of the different orders of ideas, which occasions the coexistence, for instance, of the metaphysical state of some intellectual category, with the theological state of a later category, less general and less advanced,—or with the positive

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state of a former category, less complex and more advanced. The apparent confusion thus produced must occasion perplexing doubts in minds which are not in possession of the explanation about the true philosophical character of the corresponding times: but the hesitation may be obviated or relieved by its being settled what intellectual category is to decide the speculative state of any period. On all accounts, the decision must be grounded on the most complex and special; that is, the category of moral and social ideas,—not only on account of their eminent importance, but from their position at the extremity of the encyclopedical scale. The intellectual character of each period is governed by that order of speculations; and it is not till any new mental *régime* has reached that category that the corresponding evolution can be regarded as realized, beyond all danger of a return to the prior state. Till then, the more rapid advance of the more general categories can only establish in each phase the germs of the next, without its own character being much affected; or can, at most, introduce subdivisions into the period. For instance, the theological period must be regarded as still subsisting, as long as moral and political ideas retain a theological character, though other intellectual categories may have passed into the metaphysical state, and some few of the simplest into the positive. Under this method of proceeding, the essential aspect of each period will remain as marked as possible, while freely admitting of the preparation of the following. We may now proceed to a direct examination of the successive periods, estimating the rational character of each, on the one hand; and, on the other, exhibiting its filiation to the preceding, and its tendency to prepare for the following; so as to realize by degrees the positive concatenation whose principle has been already established.

The theological period of humanity could begin no otherwise than by a complete and usually very durable state of pure Fétichism, which allowed free exercise to that *Fétichism.* tendency of our nature by which Man conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity. This primitive character of human speculation is established by the biological theory of Man in the *à priori* way; and in the opposite way, by all the precise information that we can obtain of the earliest social period; and again, the study of individual development confirms the analysis of the collective. Some philosophers set out in the inquiry, as a matter of course, with the supposition that polytheism was the first stage; and some have been so perverse as to place monotheism furthest back, and fétichism as a corruption of polytheism: but such inversions are inconsistent with both the laws and the facts of human history. The real starting-point is, in fact, much humbler than is commonly supposed, Man having everywhere begun by being a fétich-worshipper and a cannibal. Instead of indulging our horror and disgust of such a state of things by deny-

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ing it, we should admit a collective pride in that human progressiveness which has brought us into our present state of comparative exaltation, while a being less nobly endowed than Man would have vegetated to this hour in his original wretched condition. Another supposition involves an error less grave, but still requiring notice. Some philosophers suppose a state prior even to fetichism; a state in which the human species was altogether material, and incapable of any speculation whatever;—in that lowest condition in which they now conclude the natives of *Tierra del Fuego* and some of the *Pacific Islanders* to be. If this were true, there must have been a time when intellectual wants did not exist in Man: and we must suppose a moment when they began to exist, without any prior manifestation;—a notion which is in direct contradiction to biological principles, which show that the human organism, in all times and places, has manifested the same essential needs, differing only in their degree of development and corresponding mode of satisfaction. This is proof enough of the error of the supposition: and all our observation of the lowest idiocy and madness, in which Man appears to be debased below the higher brutes, assures us that a certain degree of speculative activity exists, which obtains satisfaction in a gross fetichism. The error arises from the want of knowing what to look for; and hence, the absence of all theological ideas is hastily concluded wherever there is no organized worship or distinct priesthood. Now, we shall see presently that fetichism may obtain a considerable development, even to the point of star-worship, before it demands a real priesthood; and when arrived at star-worship, it is on the threshold of polytheism. The error is natural enough, and excusable in inquirers who are unfurnished with a positive theory which may obviate or correct any vicious interpretation of facts.

On the ground of this hypothesis, it is said that Man must have begun like the lower animals. The fact is so,—allowing for superiority of organization; but perhaps we may find in the defects of the inference a misapprehension of the mental state of the lower animals themselves. Several species of animals afford clear evidence of speculative activity: and those which are endowed with it certainly attain a kind of gross fetichism, as Man does,—supposing external bodies, even the most inert, to be animated by passion and will, more or less analogous to the personal impressions of the spectator. The difference in the case is that Man has ability to raise himself out of his primitive darkness, and that the brutes have not,—except some few select animals, in which a beginning to polytheism may be observed,—obtained, no doubt, by association with Man. If, for instance, we exhibit a watch to a child or a savage, on the one hand, and a dog or a monkey, on the other, there will be no great difference in their way of regarding the new object, further than their form of expression:—each will suppose it a sort of animal,

exercising its own tastes and inclinations : and in this they will hold a common fetichism,—out of which the one may rise, while the other cannot. And thus the allegation about the starting-point of the human species turns out to be a confirmation of our proposition, instead of being in any way inconsistent with it.

It is so difficult to us to conceive of any but a metaphysical theology, that we are apt to fall into perpetual mistakes in contemplating this, its gross origin. Fetichism has even been usually confounded with polytheism, when the latter has been called Idolatry,—a term which applies only to the former; and the priests of Jupiter and Minerva would doubtless have repelled the trite reproach of the adoration of images as justly as Catholic priests do now, when subject to the same charge from Protestants. But, though we are too distant from fetichism to form a just conception of it, each one of us may find in his own earliest experience a more or less faithful representation of it. The celebrated phrase of Bossuet, applied to the starting-point of the human mind, describes the elementary simplicity of theology :—*Everything was God, except God himself*; and from that moment forward, the number of gods steadily decreased. We may recognize some features of that state in our own condition of mind when we are betrayed into searching after the mode of production of phenomena, of whose natural laws we are ignorant. We then instinctively conceive of the production of unknown effects according to the passions and affections of the corresponding being regarded as alive; and this is the philosophical principle of fetichism. A man who smiles at the folly of the savage in taking the watch for an animal, may, if wholly ignorant of watch-making, find himself surprised into a state not so far superior, if any unforeseen and inexplicable effects should arise from some unperceived derangement of the mechanism. But for a widely analogous experience, preparing him for such accidents and their interpretation, he could hardly resist the impression that the changes were tokens of the affections or caprices of an imaginary being.

Thus is Fetichism the basis of the theological philosophy,—deifying every substance or phenomenon which attracts the attention of nascent humanity, and remaining traceable through all its transformations to the very last. The Egyptian theocracy, whence that of the Jews was evidently derived, exhibited, in its best days, the regular and protracted coexistence of the three religious periods in the different castes of its sacerdotal hierarchy,—the lowest remaining in mere fetichism, while those above them were in full possession of a marked polytheism, and the highest rank had probably attained an incipient monotheism. Moreover, a direct analysis will disclose to us very marked traces, at all times, of the original fetichism, however it may be involved in metaphysical forms in subtle understandings. The conception among the ancients of the Soul of the universe, the modern notion that the



earth is a vast living animal, and, in our own time, the obscure pantheism which is so rife among German metaphysicians, is only fetichism generalized and made systematic, and throwing a cloud of learned words as dust into the eyes of the vulgar. These evidences show that fetichism is no theological aberration, but the source of theology itself,—of that primitive theology which exhibits a complete spontaneousness, and which required from Man in his apathetic state no trouble in creating supernatural agents, but permitted him passively to yield to his propensity to transfer to outward objects the sense of existence which served him for an explanation of his own phenomena, and therefore for an absolute explanation of all out of himself. At first it was only inanimate nature that was the object in its more conspicuous phenomena,—even the negative ones, such as shadows, which no doubt terrified the nascent race as they now alarm individual children and some animals: but the spontaneous theology soon extended to embrace the animal kingdom, producing the express adoration of brutes, when they presented any aspect of mystery: that is, when Man did not find the corresponding equivalent of their qualities in himself,—whether it were the exquisite superiority of the sense of smell, or any other sense in animals, or that their organic susceptibility made them aware, sooner than himself, of atmospheric changes, etc. etc.

That philosophy was as suitable to the moral as to the intellectual state of the infant human race. The preponderance of the affective over the intellectual life, always conspicuous, was in its full strength in the earliest stages of the human mind. The empire of the passions over the reason, favourable to theology at all times, is yet more favourable to fetich theology than to any other. All substances being immediately personified, and endowed with passions, powerful in proportion to the energy of the phenomena, the external world presented to the observer a spectacle of such perfect harmony as has never been seen since: of a harmony which yielded him a satisfaction to which we cannot even give a name, from our inability to feel it, however strenuously we may endeavour to carry our minds back into that cradle of humanity. It is easy to see how this exact correspondence between the universe and Man must attach us to fetichism, which, in return, specially protracts the appropriate moral state. In more advanced periods, evidence of this appears when organizations or situations show us any overwhelming action of the affective part of Man's nature. Men who may be said to think naturally with the hinder part of the head, or who find themselves so disposed for the moment, are not preserved even by high intellectual culture from the danger of being plunged by some passion of hope or fear, into the radical fetichism,—personifying, and then deifying, even the most inert objects that can interest

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their roused sensibilities. From such tendencies in our own day, we may form some idea of the primitive force of such a moral condition, which, being at once complete and normal, was also permanent and universal.

The metaphorical constitution of human language is, in my eyes, a remarkable and eternal testimony to the primitive condition of Man. There can be no doubt that the main body of human language has descended from that remotest period, which must probably have endured much longer than any other, from the special slowness of such progress as it could admit of. The common opinion which attributes the use of figurative expressions to a dearth of direct signs is too rational to be admissible with regard to any but a very advanced period. Up to that time, and during the ages which must have mainly influenced the formation, or rather the development, of language, the excessive abundance of figures belonged naturally to the prevalent philosophy, which, likening all phenomena to human acts, must introduce as faithful description expressions which must seem metaphorical when that state had passed away in which they were literal. It is an old observation that the tendency diminishes as the human mind expands: and we may remark that the nature of metaphors is gradually transformed with the lapse of time:—in the early ages men transferred to the external world the expressions proper to human acts; whereas now we apply to the phenomena of life terms originally appropriated to inert nature, thus showing that the scientific spirit, which looks from without inward, is more and more influencing human language.

Looking now to the influence of the primitive theological philosophy on human progression, we observe that fetichism is the most intense form of theology,—at least, as regards the individual; that is, the fetich form of that order of ideas is the one which most powerfully influences the mental system. If we are surprised at the number of pagan gods that we are continually meeting with in ancient books, there is no saying how we might be impressed if we could for a moment see the multitude of deities that the pure fetich-worshipper must live in the midst of. And again, the primitive man could see and know nothing but through his theological conceptions, except some very few practical notions of natural phenomena, furnished by experience, and little superior to the knowledge obtained by the higher animals by the same means. In no other religious period could theological ideas be so completely adherent to the sensations, which were incessantly presenting those ideas; so that it was almost impossible for the reason to abstract them in any degree, or for a single moment. It does not follow that the social influence of this form of theology was at all in proportion to its effect on individuals. On the contrary, the political influence of the theo-

logical philosophy will be seen, as we proceed, to strengthen as it becomes more abstract in the human mind.

It is not difficult to perceive why fetichism was a feeble instrument of civilization, notwithstanding its wide intellectual dominion; and this will disclose to us what its social influence really was.

In the first place, sacerdotal authority is indispensable to render available the civilizing quality of the theological philosophy. All doctrine must have special organs, to direct its social application; and the necessity is strongest in the case of religious doctrine, on account of its indefinite character, which compels a permanent exercise of active discipline, to keep the vagueness and indefiniteness within bounds. The experience of the last three centuries shows us how, when sacerdotal authority is broken up, religious ideas become a source of discord instead of union: and this may give us some notion of the small social influence of a theology which anticipated all priesthoods, though it might be the first concern of every member of that infant society. Why fetichism admitted of no priesthood, properly so called, is obvious. Its gods were individual; and each resided fixedly in a particular object; whereas, the gods of polytheism are more general by their nature, and have a more extended dominion and residence. The fetich gods had little power to unite men, or to govern them. Though there were certainly fetiches of the tribe, and even of the nation, the greater number were domestic, or even personal; and such deities could afford little assistance to the development of common ideas. And again, the residence of each deity, in a material object left nothing for a priesthood to do, and therefore gave no occasion for the rise of a distinct speculative class. The worship, incessant and pervading as it was, when every act of a man's life had its religious aspect, was of a kind that required every man to be his own priest, free from intervention between himself and gods that were constantly accessible. It was the subsequent polytheistic belief in gods that were invisible, more or less general, and distinct from the substances which they ruled, that originated and developed a real priesthood, enjoying high social influence, in its character of mediator between the worshipper and his deity. In the most triumphant periods of Greek and Roman polytheism, we meet with evidences of the contrasted character of the two theological phases, in the Lares and Penates, the domestic gods which had survived the fetich multitude, and which were served, not by any priest, but by each believer; or, at most, by the head of the family, as their spontaneous priest.

The beginning of a priesthood may, however, be discerned in the professions of soothsayers, conjurers, etc., which exist among the fetich tribes of Africa: but a close inquiry into their state, as into that of the first societies of men, will show that, in such cases,

fetichism has reached its highest elevation, and become star-worship. This astrolatry is the introduction to polytheism; and it has qualities which instigate the development of a genuine priesthood. There is a character of generality about the stars which fits them to be common fetiches: and sociological analysis shows us that this was in fact their destination among populations of any extent. And again, when their inaccessible position was understood (which was not so soon as is commonly thought) the need of special intermediaries began to be felt. These two circumstances, the superior generality and the inaccessible position of the stars, are the reasons why the adoration of them, without changing the character of the universal fetichism, determined the formation of an organized worship and a distinct priesthood: and thus, the advent of astrolatry was not only a symptom, but a powerful means of social progress in its day, though, from its extreme and mischievous protraction, we are apt to condemn it as universally a principle of human degradation. It must have been long, however, before star-worship obtained a marked ascendancy over other branches of fetichism, so as to impart a character of real astrolatry to the whole religion. The human mind was long engrossed with what lay nearest; and the stars held no prominent place in comparison with many terrestrial objects, as, for instance, meteorological effects, which indeed furnished the attributes of supernatural power through nearly the whole of the theological period. While magicians could control the moon and stars, no one supposed they could have anything to do with the government of the thunder. A long series of gradual modifications in human conceptions was therefore necessary to invert the primitive order, and place the stars at the head of natural bodies, while still subordinated to the earth and Man, according to the spirit of theological philosophy at its highest perfection. But, it was only when fetichism rose to the elevation of astrolatry that it could exercise any great social influence, for the reasons thus given. And this is the rational explanation of the singular characteristic of the theological spirit,—that its greater intellectual extension is coincident with its smaller social influence. Thus, not only does fetichism share the common condition of all philosophies, that of not extending to moral and social considerations till it has embraced all simpler speculations, but there are special reasons for the retardation of the time when it can acquire any political consistency, notwithstanding its vast preparatory intellectual extension. The further we proceed in our review of the social operation of the theological spirit, the more we shall perceive how great is the mistake of supposing that religious belief is the only basis of human association, to the exclusion of all other orders of common conceptions. We have now seen that the political attribute did

not disclose itself in the period of the greatest mental prevalence of the religious system: and we shall presently find that polytheism, and yet more monotheism, exhibits the necessary connection between the intellectual decline of the theological spirit and the perfect realization of its civilizing faculty: and this will confirm our conclusion that this social destination could be attributed to it only provisionally, while awaiting the advent of more direct and more permanent principles.—If, however, fetichism is not adapted to the development of the theological polity, its social-influence has nevertheless been very extensive, as may be easily shown.

In a purely philosophical view,—that is, in regard to its function of directing human speculation,—this earliest form of religious belief manifests in the smallest possible degree the theological quality of attacking the original torpor of the human faculties by furnishing some aliment to our conceptions, and some bond between them. Having done this, fetichism obstructs all advance in genuine knowledge. It is in this form, above all others, that the religious spirit is most directly opposed to the scientific, with regard to the simplest phenomena; and all idea of natural laws is out of the question when every object is a divinity with a will of its own. At this period of intellectual infancy, imaginary facts wholly overwhelm real ones; or rather, there is no phenomenon which can be distinctly seen in its genuine aspect. The mind is in a state of vague pre-occupation with regard to the external world, which, universal and natural as it is, is not the less a kind of permanent hallucination, proceeding from such a preponderance of the affective over the intellectual life, that the most absurd beliefs impair all direct observation of natural phenomena. We are too apt to treat as imposture exceptional sensations which we have long ceased to be able to understand, but which have always been well known to magicians and fortunetellers in the stage of fetichism; but, if we try, we may picture to ourselves how it is that, in the absence of all conception of natural laws, nothing can appear monstrous, and Man is pretty sure to see what he is disposed to see, by illusions which appear to me strongly analogous to those which are experienced by brutes, through their gross fetichism. However familiar we may now be with the conception of the regularity of natural events, and however this conception may be now the basis of our whole mental system, it is certainly not an innate idea, as each of us can almost assign the very date of its formation in his own mind. Setting ourselves back to a time before its existence among men, we cannot wonder at the hallucinations produced by an intellectual activity so at the mercy of the passions, or of natural stimulants affecting the human frame; and our surprise is rather that the radical integrity of the mind of Man should have restrained as far as it did the tendency to illusion which was encouraged by the only theories then possible.

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The influence of fetichism was less oppressive in regard to the fine arts. It is evident that a philosophy which endowed the whole universe with life must favour the expansion of imagination, which was then supreme among the faculties. Thus, it is certain that the origin of all the fine arts, not excepting poetry, is to be referred to the fetich period. When I treat of the relation of polytheism to the fine arts, I shall have occasion to glance at that of fetichism also; and I therefore leave it now; observing only that the fact to be shown is that, in social as in individual life, the rise and expansion of human faculties begin with the faculties of expression, so as gradually to lead on the evolution of the superior and less marked faculties, in accordance with the connection established among them by our organization.

As to the industrial development of the race, it is certain that Man began his conquests over external nature in the fetich period. We do not give their due to those primitive times when we forget that it was then that men learned to associate with tamed animals, and to use fire, and to employ mechanical forces, and even to effect some kind of commerce by the nascent institution of a currency. In short, the germs of almost all the arts of life are found in that period. Moreover, Man's activity prepared the ground for the whole subsequent evolution of the race by the exercise of his destructive propensities, then in their utmost strength. The chase not only brought separate families into association when nothing else could have done it, but it cleared the scene of social operations from the encumbrance of an inconvenient multitude of brutes. So great was the destruction, that it is now believed to have concurred with some geological causes in obliterating certain races of animals, and especially some of the largest: in the same way that the superfluous vegetation is believed to have been got rid of by the devastation attending a pastoral mode of life. It is not easy however to settle how much of the industrial advance of the period is to be attributed to its fetichism. At the first glance, it might seem that the direct consecration of external objects must forbid Man to modify the world around him: and it is certain that too long a protraction of fetichism could not but have that effect, if the human mind were always or ever thoroughly consistent, and if there were no conflict between beliefs and instincts, in which the first must give way. But there is to be considered, besides, the theological quality which is so favourable to the incitement of human activity in the absence of all knowledge of natural laws,—the assurance given to Man that he is supreme in Nature. Though his supremacy is unavailing without the intervention of divine agents, the constant sense of this supreme protection cannot but be the best support to human energy at a period when Man is surrounded by immense obstacles, which he would not otherwise venture to attack. Up to a very recent date in

human history, when the knowledge of natural laws had become a sufficient groundwork for wise and bold action, the imperfect and precarious theological stimulus continued to act. Its function was all the more appropriate to fetichism, that it offered the hope of almost unlimited empire by an active use of religious resources. The more we contemplate those primitive ages, the more clearly we shall see that the great move was rousing the human mind from animal torpor; and it would have been supremely difficult, physically and morally, if the theological philosophy, in the form of fetichism, had not opened the only possible issue. When we examine, from the right point of view, the characteristic illusions of that age about controlling the courses of the stars, lulling or exciting storms, etc., we are less disposed to an unphilosophical contempt than to mark in these facts the first symptoms of the awakening of human intelligence and activity.

As to its social influence, fetichism effected great things for the *Political* race, though less than the subsequent forms of the *influence.* theological spirit. We are apt to underrate these services, because the most religious persons of our own time are unable to do justice to the effects of a belief which is extinct. It is only the positive philosophy which enables us to estimate the share borne by the religious spirit in the social, as well as the intellectual progression of the human race. Now, it is plain that moral efforts must, from our organization, be almost always in conflict, more or less, with the strongest impulses of our nature; and what but the theological spirit could afford a ground for social discipline at a time when foresight, collective and individual, was far too restricted to sustain any influences of rationality? Even at more advanced periods, institutions which are justified by reason, remain long under theological tutelage before they can be freely committed to their true sanctions; as, for instance, when sanitary precepts are diffused and established by religious prescription. An irresistible induction shows us the necessity of a similar consecration of social changes in which we are at present least disposed to look for it. We should not, for instance, suspect any religious influence to be concerned in the institution of property: yet there are some aspects of society in which we find it; as, for instance, in the famous *Taboo* of the Pacific Islands, which I regard as a valuable trace of the participation of theology in that first consolidation of territorial property which takes place when hunting or pastoral tribes pass into the agricultural stage. It seems probable, too, that religious influences contributed to establish, and yet more to regulate, the permanent use of clothing, which is regarded as one of the chief marks of nascent civilization, both because it stimulates industrial aptitudes and because its moral operation is good in encouraging Man to improve his own nature by giving reason control over the propensities.

It is a great and injurious mistake to conceive of this theological

influence as an artifice applied by the more enlightened men to the government of the less. We are strangely apt to ascribe eminent political ability to dissimulation and hypocrisy ; but it is happily rendered incontestable, by all experience and all study, that no man of superior endowments has ever exercised any great influence over his fellows without being first, for his own part, thoroughly convinced. It is not only that there must be a sufficient harmony of feeling and inclinations between himself and them, but his faculties would be paralysed by the effort to guide his thoughts in the two opposite ways,—the real and the affected,—either of which would separately be as much as he could manage. If theological theories entered into the simplest speculations of men, in the age of fetichism, they must have governed social and political meditations, the complexity of which rendered religious resources peculiarly necessary. The legislators of that age must have been as sincere in their theological conceptions of society as of everything else ; and the dreadful practical extravagances into which they too often fell under that guidance are unquestionable evidence of their general sincerity. We must consider, too, that the earliest theological polity naturally afforded suggestions which were coincident with corresponding social needs. The coincidence arose partly from that general property of all religious phases,—the vagueness of all faiths, which adapts them to be modified by all political exigencies, and thus to appear to sanction a suggestion when they merely respond to a want ; and partly from the fact, special in each case, that the beliefs of any society must be mainly determined by the existing modifications of that society ; so that opinions must necessarily present certain attributes in special harmony with corresponding social circumstances ; and without this they could not retain their influence. By the first property an organization under a priesthood was rendered necessary, to prevent opinions so capable of abuse from being committed to the vulgar ; and by the second, theological theories could not only consecrate all valuable suggestions, but could frequently produce some which were suitable to the contemporary social state. The first corresponds to what is vague and uncontrollable in each religious system ; and the other to what is definite and susceptible of regulation ; and the two supply each other's deficiencies. As belief becomes simplified and organized, its social influence diminishes under the first aspect, on account of the restriction on speculation ; but it is ever increasing under the second aspect, as we shall presently see, permitting superior men to make the utmost use of the civilizing virtue of this primitive philosophy. It is clear that the first of these modes of social action of any theology must prevail eminently in fetichism ; and this agrees with our observation of the absence or imperfection of any religious organization ; but this fact renders all analysis inextricable, from the difficulty of discerning how much of the religious element was incorporated with the intricate web of a life which our familiar



conceptions are so little adapted to unravel. We can only verify by some decisive examples the necessary reality of our theory; a thing which is easily done. As to the second mode, though it operated little during the fetich period, its precise nature enables us to obtain a better hold of it. An example or two will show its effect on the social progress of the race.

All philosophers are agreed about the supreme importance of the *Institution of Agriculture.* institution of agricultural life, without which no further human progress would have been possible; but all do not see how religion was concerned in the transition. War, which is the chief temporal instrument of early civilization, has no important social influence till the nomade condition is left behind. The fierce conflicts of hunting, and even of pastoral tribes, are like those of carnivorous animals, and only exercise activity and prepare for progress without producing immediate political results. The importance of subjecting Man to a fixed residence is thus obvious enough, on the one hand, and, on the other, the difficulty attending a change so little compatible in many ways with the character of infant humanity. There can be no doubt that a wandering life was natural to primitive Man, as we see it to be now to individuals below the reach of culture. This shows us how the intervention of spiritual influences may have been necessary to so great a change. It is usual to suppose that the condensation of numbers, as the race increased, would compel the tillage of the soil, as it had before compelled the keeping of flocks. But the explanation, though true as far as it goes, is insufficient; for, as we have seen before, want does not produce faculty. No social exigency will find its satisfaction if Man is not already disposed to provide it; and all experience shows that men will, in the most urgent cases, rather palliate each suffering as it arises, than resolve on a total change of condition which is repugnant to their nature. We know by observation what dreadful expedients men would adopt to reduce the excess of population, rather than exchange a nomade for an agricultural life, before their intellectual and moral nature was duly prepared for it. The progression of the human being therefore caused the change, though the precise date of its accomplishment must depend on external requirements; and above all, on the numbers needing food. Now, as agricultural life was certainly instituted before fetichism passed away, it is clear that there must be in fetichism something favourable to the change, though we may not know precisely what it was. But I have no doubt about the essential principle. The worship of the external world must be especially directed to the objects which are nearest and commonest; and this must tend to develop the originally feeble affection of men for their native soil. The moving lamentations of vanquished warriors for their tutelary gods were not about Jupiter, Minerva, or other abstract and general deities, whom they could find everywhere, but for their domestic

gods; that is, pure fetiches. These were the special divinities whom the captives wept to leave behind, almost as bitterly as the tombs of their fathers, which were also involved in the universal fetichism. Among nations which had reached polytheism before becoming agricultural, the religious influence necessary to the change was chiefly due, no doubt, to the remains of fetichism, which held a conspicuous place in polytheism up to a very advanced period. Such an influence then is an essential property of the first theological phase; and it would not have been strong enough in the subsequent religions if the great material change had not by that time been so well established on other grounds as to be able to relinquish the original one which was passing away. The reaction of the change upon theology is, at the same time, worthy of notice. It was then that fetichism assumed that highest form,—that of star-worship,—which was the transition stage to polytheism. It is plain that the settled abode of agricultural peoples must fix their speculative attention upon the heavenly bodies, while their labours remarkably disclosed the influences of the sky: whereas, the only astronomical observations to be expected of a wandering tribe are of the polar star, which guides their nocturnal course. Thus there is a double relation between the development of fetichism and the final establishment of agricultural life.

Another instance of the influence of fetichism on social progress is its occasioning the systematic preservation of serviceable animals, and also of vegetables. It has been shown that the first action of Man on the external world must be in the form of devastation; and his destructive propensities do their work in clearing the field for future operations. A propensity so marked among men as rude as they were vehement threatened the safety of all races, before the utility of any was known. The most valuable organic species were the most exposed; and they must almost inevitably have perished if the first intellectual and moral advance of the human race had not intervened to restrain the tendency to indiscriminate destruction. Fetichism performed this office, not only by introducing agricultural life, but directly; and if it was done by a method which afterwards became excessively debased—the express worship of animals—it may be asked how else the thing could have been done. Whatever evils belonged afterwards to fetichism, it should be remembered how admirably it was adapted to preserve the most valuable animals and vegetables, and indeed all material objects requiring special protection. Polytheism rendered the same service, by placing everything under the care of some deity or other; but this was a less direct method than that of fetichism, and would not have sufficed in the first instance. No provision of the kind is to be found in monotheism; but neither is it so necessary in the more advanced stage of human progress to which it is adapted: yet the want of regular discipline in this order

*Protection to  
products.*

of relations is found to be a defect to this day, and one which is only imperfectly repaired by purely temporal measures. There can be no doubt that the moral effect of Man's care of animals contributed largely to humanize him. His carnivorous constitution is one of the chief limitations of his pacific capabilities, favourable as is the growing subdivision of employments to the milder inclinations of the majority of society; and, honourable as is the Utopia of Pythagoras, imagined in an age when the destructive tendency prevailed in the highest portion of society, it is not the less opposed to Man's nature and destiny, which oblige him to increase in all directions his natural ascendancy over the whole of the animal kingdom. On this account, and for the regulation of this power, laws are essential, as in every other case of power possessed: and fetichism must be regarded as having first indicated, in the only way then possible, an exalted kind of human institution, for the regulation of the most general political relations of all,—those of Man towards the external world, and especially the animal part of it. The selfishness of kind could not prevail among these relations without serious danger; and it must become moderate in proportion as the organisms rise to an increasing resemblance to our own. When the positive philosophy shall regulate these relations, it will be by constituting a special department of external nature, in regard to which a familiar knowledge of our interest in the zoological scale will have trained us in our duty to all living beings.

Such were, as nearly as we can estimate, the social influences of fetichism. We must now observe how it passed into polytheism.

There can be no doubt of the direct derivation of polytheism from fetichism, at all times and in all places. The *Transition to Polytheism.* analysis of individual development, and the investigation of the corresponding degrees of the social scale, alike disclose this constant succession. The study of the highest antiquity, when illustrated by sound sociological theories, verifies the same fact. In most theogonies the prior existence of fetichism is necessary to the formation of the gods of polytheism. The Greek gods that issued from the Ocean and the Earth, issued from the two principal fetiches; and we have seen how, in its maturity, polytheism incorporates strong remains of fetichism. Speculatively regarded, this transformation of the religious spirit is perhaps the most radical that it has ever undergone, though we are unable, through its remoteness, to appreciate with any steadiness its extent and difficulty. From the comparative nearness and social importance of the transition to monotheism, we naturally exaggerate its relative importance; but in truth the interval to be passed was much narrower in the later case than in the earlier. If we reflect that fetichism supposed matter to be, in all forms, actually alive, while polytheism declared it to be nearly inert, and passively subject to the arbitrary will of a divine agent, it seems hardly imagin-

able how such a transition of views could be gradually made. Both are equally remote from the positive view,—that of the operation of natural laws; but they are no less opposed to each other, except in the one point of some express will being the cause of every incident: and thus it is a matter of the highest philosophical interest to ascertain the spontaneous mode of this memorable transition.

The intervention of the scientific spirit has only recently been direct and explicit; but not the less has it been concerned in all the successive modifications of the religious spirit. If Man had been no more capable than monkeys and carnivorous animals of comparing, abstracting, and generalizing, he would have remained for ever in the rude fetichism which their imperfect organization forbids their surmounting. Man however can perceive likeness between phenomena, and observe their succession: and when these characteristic faculties had once found aliment and guidance under the first theological instigation, they gathered strength perpetually, and by their exercise reduced, more and more rapidly, the influence of the religious philosophy by which they had been cherished. The first general result of the rise of this spirit of observation and induction seems to me to have been the passage from fetichism to polytheism, beginning, as all such changes do, with the highest order of minds, and reaching the multitude at last. To understand this, we must bear in mind that, as all fetich faith relates to some single and determinate object, the belief is of an individual and concrete nature. This quality suits well with the particular and unconnected character of the rudely material observations proper to an infant state of the human mind: so that the exact accordance between the conception and the investigation that is found wherever our understandings are at work, is evident in the present case. The expansion of the spirit of observation caused by the first theory, imperfect as it was, must destroy the balance which, at length, cannot be maintained at all but by some modification of the original philosophy. Thus the great revolution which carried men on from fetichism to polytheism is due to the same mental causes, though they may not be so conspicuous, that now produce all scientific revolutions,—which always arise out of a discordance between facts and principles. Thus did the growing generalization of human observations necessitate the same process in regard to the corresponding theological conceptions, and occasion the transformation of fetichism into simple polytheism; for the difference between the divinities of the two systems is the essential one that the gods, properly so called, have, from their indeterminate residence, a more general and abstract character. Each undertakes a special order of phenomena, but in a great number of bodies at the same time; so that each rules a department of some extent; whereas the fetich is inseparable from the one object in which it resides. When certain phenomena appeared alike in various substances, the cor-

responding fetiches must have formed a group, and at length coalesced into one principal one, which thus became a god; that is, an ideal and usually invisible agent, whose residence is no longer rigorously fixed. Thus, when the oaks of a forest, in their likeness to each other, suggested certain general phenomena, the abstract being in whom so many fetiches coalesced was no fetich, but the god of the forest. Thus, the intellectual transition from fetichism to polytheism is neither more nor less than the ascendancy of specific over individual ideas, in the second stage of human childhood, social as well as personal. As every essential disposition is, on our principles, inherent in humanity from the beginning, this process must have already taken place, in certain cases; and the transition was thus, no doubt, much facilitated; as it was only necessary to extend and imitate what had already been done. Polytheism itself may have been primitive in certain cases, where the individual had a strong natural tendency to abstraction, while his contemporaries, being more impressible than reasonable, were more struck by differences than resemblances. As this exceptional condition does not indicate any general superiority, and the cases must have been few and restricted, my theory is not affected by them. They are interesting to us only as showing how the human mind was subjected to its first great philosophical transition, and carried through it.

Thus it is that the purely theological nature of the primitive philosophy was preserved, in the conception that phenomena were governed by Will and not by laws; while, again, it was profoundly modified by the view of matter being no longer alive but inert, and obtaining all its activity from an imaginary external being. The intellectual and social consequences of the change will appear hereafter. The remark that occurs in this place is that the decline of the mental influence of the religious spirit, while its political influence is rising, may be distinctly perceived at this stage. When each individual thing lost its character of essential life and divineness, it became accessible to the scientific spirit, which might be humble enough in its operation, but was no longer excluded by theological intervention. The change is evidenced by the corresponding steady diminution of the number of divinities, while their nature was becoming more abstract and their dominion more extended. Each god took the place of a troop of fetiches, which were thenceforth permitted, or reduced, to serve as his escort. We shall hereafter recognize the same process, in the succession of monotheism to polytheism.

The particular issue by which the transition was effected is easily found, when we consider that it must be through the phenomenon which appears the most general and abstract, and the most universal in its influence. The stars answer to this description, when once their isolated and inaccessible position had fixed men's attention, in preference to the nearer objects which had at first engrossed it.

The difference in conception between a fetich and a god must be smaller in the case of a star than of any other body; and it was this which made astrolatry, as I observed before, the natural intermediary state between the two first theological phases. Each sidereal fetich, powerful and remote, was scarcely distinguishable from a god; and especially in an age when men did not trouble themselves with nice distinctions. The only thing necessary to get rid of the individual and concrete character altogether, was to liberate the divinity from his imprisonment in one place and function, and to connect him by some real or apparent analogy with more general functions; thus making him a god, with a star for his preferred abode. This last transformation was so little necessary that, throughout nearly the whole polytheistic period, it was only the planets that, on account of their special variations, were subjected to it. The fixed stars remained true fetiches till they were included with everything in the universal monotheism.

In order to complete our estimate of this part of the human evolution, in which all the principles of subsequent progress must be implicated, I must point out the manifestations of the metaphysical spirit which here present themselves. If the theological philosophy is modified by the scientific spirit, this is done only through the metaphysical spirit, which rises with the decline of the theological, till the positive prevails over them both. The more recent dominion of the metaphysical spirit may be the most engrossing to us; but perhaps its operation when it was a mere gradation of the theological philosophy might appear to be of higher importance, if we could estimate the change wrought by it, and were in possession of any precise evidence. When bodies ceased to be divinely alive by their own nature, they must have some abstract property which rendered them fit to receive the action of the supernatural agent;—an action which could not be immediate when the agent had a wider influence and an unfixed abode. Again, when a group of fetiches yield up their common attributes to a single god, and that god is regarded as living, in spite of his abstract origin, the conception is metaphysical in its whole character,—recognizing, as it does, personified abstractions. For the universal characteristic of the metaphysical state, as a transitional condition of the understanding, is a radical confusion between the abstract and the concrete point of view, alternately assumed to modify theological conceptions; now to render abstract what was before concrete, when each generalization is accomplished, and now to prepare for a new concentration the conception of more general existences, which were hitherto only abstract. Such is the operation of the metaphysical spirit on the theological philosophy, whose fictions had offered the only intelligible ground to human understanding while all that it could do was to transfer to everything out of itself its own sense of active existence. Distinct

*The metaphysical spirit traceable.*

from every substance, though inseparable from it, the metaphysical entity is more subtle and less definite than the corresponding supernatural action from which it emanates; and hence its aptitude to effect transitions which are invariably a decline, in an intellectual sense, of the theological philosophy. The action is always critical, as it preserves theology while undermining its intellectual basis; and it can appear organic, only when it is not too preponderant, and in as far as it contributes to the gradual modification of the theological philosophy, to which, especially in a social view, must be referred whatever may appear to be organic in the metaphysical philosophy. These explanations must at first appear obscure; but the applications we shall have to make of them will render them unquestionable as we proceed. Meantime, it was impossible to defer them, and to neglect the true origin of the metaphysical influence, concerned as it is in the great transition from fetichism to polytheism. Besides the immediate scientific necessity, it is certainly desirable to trace, from the cradle of humanity upwards, that spontaneous and constant rivalry, first intellectual and then political, between the theological and the metaphysical spirit, which, protracted to the present moment, and necessary till the preparatory revolution is accomplished, is the main cause of our disturbed and conflicting condition.

For the length and complexity of these discussions, their importance must be my excuse. Any irrationality at our starting-point would have vitiated the whole of my historical investigation, while the first stage of human development is little known and confusedly apprehended. The second period will be comparatively easy to present, as it has been better explored, and is less remote in character from our own experience. We learn already, however, the efficacy of the positive philosophy in transferring us to the successive points of view from which the phases of human development may be understood, without losing any of the homogeneousness and independence of its own rational decisions. The value of this property, which is owing to the relative spirit of the new philosophy, will appear more and more as we proceed, and will enable us to comprehend the whole of human history without supposing Man to have ever been in his organization intellectually or morally different from what he is now. If I have inspired any kind of intellectual sympathy in favour of fetichism, which is the lowest aspect of the theological philosophy, it will be easy to show henceforth that the spirit of each period has been not only the most suitable to the corresponding situation, but accordant with the special accomplishment of a determinate process, essential to the development of human nature.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## SECOND PHASE: POLYTHEISM.—DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY SYSTEM.

MONOTHEISM occupies so large a space in the view of modern minds, that it is scarcely possible to form a just estimate of the preceding phases of the theological philosophy; but thinkers who can attain to anything like impartiality in their review of religious periods may satisfy themselves by analysis, and in spite of appearances, that polytheism, regarded in its entire course, is the principal form of the theological system. Noble as we shall find the office of monotheism to have been, we shall remain convinced that polytheism was even more completely and specially adapted to satisfy the social needs of the corresponding period. Moreover, we shall feel that, while every state of the theological philosophy is provisional, polytheism has been the most durable of any; while monotheism, being the nearest to the entire cessation of the theological *régime*, was best fitted to guide civilized humanity through its transition from the ancient to the modern philosophy.

Our method must be to take an abstract view of each of the essential properties of polytheism; and then to *True sense of Polytheism.* examine the various forms of the corresponding *régime*. In doing this, I shall regard Polytheism in the broad popular sense, as it was understood by the multitude and expressed by Homer, and not under any allegorical aspect that erudite and imaginative minds may find in it. It is only under a monotheistic view that the ancient gods can be symbolically regarded. In the infant state of human reason, a great number of gods was required for a great variety of objects, their special attributes being correspondent to the infinite diversity of phenomena; and they were perfectly distinct and independent of each other. This view, prescribed by analysis, is confirmed by all contemporary records, in which I suppose our scholars will hardly look for the hazy symbolism which they themselves propose.

We have seen that, intellectually speaking, fetichism was more closely incorporated with human thought than any other religion; so that the conversion into polytheism *Its operation on the human Mind.* was in fact a decline. But the effect of polytheism upon human imagination, and its social efficacy, rendered the



second period that of the utmost development of the religious spirit, though its elementary force was already impaired. The religious spirit has indeed never since found so vast a field, and so free a scope, as under the *régime* of a direct and artless theology, scarcely modified, as yet, by metaphysics, and in no way restrained by positive conceptions, which are traceable at that period only in some unconnected and empirical observations on the simplest cases of natural phenomena. As all incidents were attributed to the arbitrary will of a multitude of supernatural beings, theological ideas must have governed minds in a more varied, determinate, and uncontested way than under any subsequent system. If we compare the daily course of active life as it must have been with the sincere polytheist, with what it is now to the devoutest of monotheists, we cannot but admit, in opposition to popular prejudice, that the religious spirit must have flourished most in the first case,—the understanding of the polytheist being beset, on all occasions and under the most varied forms, by a multitude of express theological explanations; so that his commonest operations were spontaneous acts of special worship, perpetually kept alive by a constant renewal of form and object. The imaginary world then filled a much larger space in men's minds than under the monotheistic system, as we may know by the constant complaints of Christian teachers about the difficulty of keeping the disciples of their faith up to the true religious point of view: a difficulty which could scarcely have existed under the more familiar and less abstract influence of a polytheistic faith. Judged by the proper criterion of all philosophy, its degree of contrast with the doctrine of the invariableness of natural laws, polytheism is much more imperfect than monotheism, as we shall see when we have to consider the diminution of miracles and oracles wherever even the Mohammedan form of monotheism has prevailed. Visions and apparitions, for instance, are exceptional things in modern theology, reserved for a few privileged persons here and there, and for important purposes; whereas every pagan of any mark had personal intercourse with various deities, on the most trifling subjects, some of his divinities being probably his relations, more or less remote.—The only specious objection to this estimate, as far as I know, is that monotheism is superior to polytheism in inspiring devotion. But this objection (besides that it leaves other arguments unaffected) rests upon a confusion between the intellectual and the social power of religious beliefs; and then upon a vicious estimate of the latter, from bringing the ancient and modern habits of thought too near together. Because polytheism pervaded all human action, it is difficult to determine its share in each social act; whereas under monotheism its co-operation may be much less, while it is more marked, under the clearer separation of the active from the speculative life. It would also be absurd to look to polytheism for the particular kind of proselytism, and there-

fore of fanaticism, which is proper to monotheism, whose spirit of exclusiveness inspires a repugnance towards all other faiths, which could not be felt in the same degree by men who, admitting a multitude of gods, could not much object to recognize a few more, whenever their admission became possible. The only way of estimating the moral and social efficacy of polytheism is by comparing it with its assigned function, in promoting human progress,—that function being very unlike the one appointed to monotheism. In this view, we shall find that the political influence of the one was certainly not less extensive or indispensable than that of the other: so that this consideration leaves untouched the various concurring proofs of polytheism being the greatest possible development of the religious spirit, which began to decline, directly and rapidly, on assuming the form of monotheism.

In our examination of polytheism, I shall take first the scientific point of view; then the poetic or artistic; and finally the industrial.

It is easily seen how unfavourable to science must be that theological philosophy which represses all scientific expansion under the weight of detailed religious explanations of all phenomena; thereby affixing the stigma of impiety to every idea of invariable physical laws. The superiority of monotheism in this view will be apparent hereafter; but, however great that superiority may be, it is not the less true that scientific education began under polytheism, and cannot therefore be incompatible with it, nor without some encouragement from it.

The first consideration is of the importance of the step taken by human reason in rising from fetichism into polytheism,—the first effort of speculative activity, and the greatest. In this, the distinct intellectual life of our race began; and this was the indispensable preparation, without which the conception of invariable natural laws could never have been formed. When all bodies were no longer supposed to be divine in their nature, the secondary details of phenomena were set free for observation, without theological intermixture; and the religious conception related to beings distinct from the body, and residing elsewhere. The general conception of destiny or fate, introduced by polytheism, was also a substantial primitive ground for the principle of the invariableness of natural laws. While phenomena must then have appeared more irregular than we can conceive, polytheism exceeded its aim by presenting such a crowd of heterogeneous and unruly divinities as could not be reconciled with so much of regularity in the external world as must be admitted; and hence the creation of a particular god of immutability, whose supremacy must be acknowledged by all the rest, amidst their proper independence. Thus was the notion of Fate the necessary corrective of polytheism, from which it is naturally inseparable;—to say nothing of the aid it afforded

in the final transition to monotheism. Thus polytheism disclosed an access to the ulterior principle of the invariableness of natural laws by subordinating the innumerable wills of its deities to some steady rules, however obscure those rules might be : and it sanctioned this nascent regularity, in certain respects, in relation to the moral world, which was, in that instance as in every other within the range of theology, the starting-point of all explanations of the physical world : for we always find each divinity preserving his own characteristics, in the midst of the wildest caprices, and throughout the freest excursions of ancient poetry, which indeed could not otherwise inspire any sustained interest.—Again, polytheism engaged the awakened scientific spirit in philosophical meditation, by establishing a primitive connection among human ideas, which was not the less infinitely valuable for being chimerical in its nature. Human conceptions then exhibited that great character of unity of method and homogeneousness of doctrine which is the natural condition of our reason, and which has never been paralleled since, nor can be till the positive philosophy shall exercise that full and uniform supremacy which the theological philosophy exercised, in an inferior manner, in its best days. Under monotheism, this particular quality could not flourish, because some human conceptions had passed out of the theological philosophy, so as to change its primitive character very sensibly : and thus it is obvious that the spirit of the whole, or of uniformity, now so rare, might abound at a time when not only were conceptions so few that a single mind could easily embrace them all, but all were subordinated to a theological philosophy which admitted of the mutual comparison of them all. Mistaken as most of the conclusions necessarily were, the state of mind in which they were formed was more natural than the philosophical anarchy which marks the modern transition state ; and it is no wonder that eminent thinkers, especially if they belong to the Catholic school, should expressly deplore, at this day, as a radical degradation of our reason, the irrevocable decline of that ancient philosophy which, taking its stand at the source of all things, left nothing unconnected and unexplained, by the uniform application of its theological conceptions. It is certainly impossible not to admire the fitness of the theological philosophy to occasion first, and then encourage, the first expansion of our reason, by administering material and guidance to its activity, till the progress of knowledge allowed a higher system to supersede its provisional protection. And if we consider the determination of the future to be the end of all philosophical speculation, we shall see how theological divination opened the way for scientific prevision, notwithstanding the antagonism in which they must finally stand, and by which the superiority of the positive philosophy is established, on condition of that complete generalization which remains at present unaccomplished.

In a more special and direct way we can see how the polytheistic system aided, in the midst of its fictions and inspirations, the development of a certain capacity of observation and induction, so far, at least, as affording it a vast field and an attractive aim, by connecting all phenomena with the destiny of Man, as the chief object of divine government. The superstitions which now appear the most absurd,—such as divination by the flight of birds, the entrails of victims, etc.,—had a really progressive philosophical character, as keeping alive the stimulus to steady observation of phenomena, which could not otherwise have offered any permanent interest. However fanciful the objects of all kinds of observation, they were thereby collected for a better use at a future time, and would not have been collected at all in any other way. As Kepler observed, astrological chimeras long sustained the taste for astronomical observations, after having created it; and anatomy may have gained as much by the pretensions of soothsayers to ascertain the future by the study of the liver, the heart, the lungs, etc., of sacrificial animals. There are phenomena even now which, by their want of subjection to any scientific theory, make us almost sorry that this primitive institution of observations, with all its dangers, should have been destroyed before it could be properly replaced, or the mere preservation of its results be guaranteed. Such, for instance, are, in concrete physics, the greater number of meteorological phenomena, and particularly those of thunder, which, for the sake of augury, were the subject of scrupulous and continuous observation in ancient times. An unprejudiced mind may lament the total loss of the observations which the Etruscan augurs, for instance, were collecting through a long course of ages, and which our philosophy could make use of at this day, to far better purpose than our meteorological materials compiled without rational guidance. The registers of the augurs could hardly have been worse kept than ours; and a determinate end being indispensable to all true observation, any theory is better than none. The same course of remark may extend to all orders of facts, without excepting even intellectual and moral phenomena, which had been delicately observed in all their connections, with a view to the interpretation of dreams. Such incessant perseverance as the ancients devoted to this study is to be looked for nowhere else but under the future prevalence of positive philosophy.

Such is the scientific aspect of polytheism,—the least favourable of its aspects. Its influence upon the fine arts is more easily appreciable and less disputed. Our concern is however more with the source of the influence than with the results.

Through a confusion of philosophy with poetry, it is a common mistake to attribute too much to the fine arts in an infant state of society, supposing them to be the intellectual basis of its economy. But philosophy and poetry have at

all times been distinct, even before they had obtained their proper denominations, and during the long period when they were cultivated by the same individual minds,—if we except what no one means by poetry—the mnemonic expedient by which religious, moral, and scientific formulas were versified, to aid their transmission. Through all gradations of savage life, the social influence of poetry and the other fine arts was secondary to the theological, to which it lent aid, and by which it was protected, but which it could never supersede. Homer was, after all that has been said, no philosopher or sage, and much less a priest or a legislator; but his lofty intelligence was imbued with the best that human thought had produced in all departments, as has been the case since with all men of poetic or artistic genius, of whom he will ever be the most eminent type. Plato, who must have understood the spirit of antiquity, would certainly not have excluded the most general of the fine arts from his Utopia if its influence had been so fundamental in the economy of ancient societies as is commonly supposed. Then, as in every other age, the rise and action of the various fine arts were occasioned by a pre-existing and universally-admitted philosophy, which was only more especially favourable to them in the earliest times. The faculties of expression have never directly overruled those of conception; and any inversion of this elementary relation would directly tend to the disorganization of the human economy, individual and social, by abandoning the conduct of our life to faculties which can do no more than soften and adorn it. The guiding philosophy of that day was very different from ours; but not the less were the men of that day guided by their philosophy; and what is accessory now was, in like manner, accessory then. Many eminent persons in antiquity were almost insensible to the charms of poetry and art, while representing to us very powerfully the corresponding social state; and, conversely, modern peoples are very far from resembling the ancient, though the taste for poetry, music, painting, etc., is purified and extended more and more; far indeed beyond what it could have been in any early society, considering the slaves, who always formed the bulk of the population. This being explained, we may understand how admirable was the influence of polytheism in raising the fine arts to a degree of social power which has never been equalled since, for want of sufficiently favourable conditions. Fetichism favoured the poetic and artistic development of humanity, by transferring the human sense of existence to all external objects; and to apprehend the full meaning of this, we must consider that the æsthetic faculties relate more to the affective than to the intellectual life, the latter not admitting of any expression or imitation which can be strongly felt or fairly judged by interpreter or spectator. Having seen how decided was the preponderance of the affective life under fetichism, we perceive how genial the period must have been to the arts of poetry and

music, which were the earliest of the class. The external world can never since have been in such familiar accordance with the soul of Man as when all that he saw was alive with his life, and subordinated to his destiny. The too rare fragments of fetich poetry which have come down to us, or over from distant tribes, show this superiority with regard to inanimate beings, which have, in all succeeding states, been much less adapted for poetic, and less still for musical use. Polytheism compensated in part for this kind of æsthetic inferiority by the ingenious expedient of metamorphoses, which at least preserved the intervention of sentiment and passion in inorganic life; inferior in poetic energy as was this indirect vestige of affective life to the primitive conception of a direct, personal, and continuous vitality. But, as the moral world must be the main object of the fine arts, the one respect in which fetichism favoured them was of small importance in comparison with the vast advantages they obtained under polytheism: and this it is which, having established the starting-point of art in an earlier period, we are now to consider.

The advancement of the fine arts is favoured by that peculiar attribute of polytheism,—its encouragement of the imagination, which it exalts over the reason; giving to the race a second age analogous to the corresponding period of the individual mind; as the stage of fetichism corresponded with the first period of individual experience,—that of sentiment. This fostering of the æsthetic faculties by polytheism is no doubt the chief cause of the error which supposes polytheism to be altogether a poetical creation: whereas the theological system existed first, and then produced the fine arts, though the intellectual and social function of poetry and the other arts must be more conspicuous and considerable under that *régime* than under those which succeeded. Under polytheism, the æsthetic faculties had a direct, though accessory participation in theological operations of the first consequence; whereas, under monotheism they had no higher office than being concerned in worship, or, at most, in the propagation of religion, without any share in the dogmatic part of the system. Under polytheism, when philosophy had introduced any new divinity, to explain physical or moral phenomena, poetry took up the work, by conferring on the abstract and indeterminate being a costume, manners, and a history, suitable to his function; thus giving to the conception the concrete character which was indispensable to its social and even mental efficacy. In fetichism, all the divinities were concrete, and nothing else; and it was only when the fine arts had attained a kind of dogmatic function under polytheism that they could realize their full expansion; and when they did, they enjoyed an authority and consideration which they could not retain under monotheism.—Again, fetichism could not extend, without great delay and difficulty, to the explanation of the moral world: on the contrary, its moral

intuition served as the basis of its conception of the physical world ; whereas we see in polytheism the great progressive quality of applicability to moral and even social phenomena. Thus, it was in its second stage that theological philosophy became universal, by being extended to that province which became more and more important to it, and which is now all that is left of it. There is no need to point out the æsthetic importance of the extension of the polytheistic philosophy to moral and social phenomena, which must ever be the chief domain of the fine arts.—Once more, polytheism is favourable to those arts, popular as is their character, by giving them so popular a basis as a system of familiar and universal opinions, by which the arts were made an expression of what was in every mind, and the active interpreter and the passive spectator were brought into moral harmony. The want of such harmony is the main cause of the feeble effect produced by the greatest modern works of art, conceived, as they are, without faith, and judged without conviction, and therefore exciting in us no impressions less abstract and more popular than those general ones which are a consequence of our human nature. Now, no succeeding religion was ever so popular as polytheism at its best period ;—certainly not monotheism, in its utmost splendour ; for polytheism had the advantage of great moral imperfections, which extended and sustained its popular power only too well :—and it is only from positive philosophy, with its system of settled and unanimous opinions, that we can hope for any great expansion of the fine arts, in congeniality with the spirit of modern civilization.

This, then, is one of the services rendered to humanity by polytheism ; and a great service it is, as æsthetic advancement is one of the chief elements of human progression. The æsthetic faculties are, in a manner, intermediate between the moral and intellectual faculties ; their end connecting them with the one, and their means with the other. By acting at once on the mind and the heart, their development must become one of the most important agents of education, intellectual and moral, that we can conceive. In the rare cases in which the intellectual life of the individual has been too absorbing, the fine arts can revive the moral life, long neglected or disdained : and, with the great majority of men, the converse effect may be no less salutary. In them the intellectual life is benumbed by their affective activity ; and the æsthetic development, besides its own permanent importance, serves as an indispensable preparation for its mental progress. This is the special phase which humanity must assume under the direction of polytheism ; and thus is attained the first degree of intellectual life, through a gentle and irresistible influence, fraught with delight, independently of its mental action, properly so called. Our daily observation of individual development shows the value of this service, by making it clear that there is scarcely any other way of

awakening and sustaining any speculative activity but such as arises under the immediate stimulus that our human necessities afford to our feeble intelligence; and the manifestation of some interest in the fine arts will ever be the commonest symptom of the birth of the spiritual life. It is true this is but an early stage in human education, which must be imperfect till the reason gains the ascendancy over the imagination; but if, under fetichism, it was an advance that sentiment should prevail over the animal life; and again, that imagination should obtain an ascendancy over sentiment, it is clear that polytheism is a great step forward towards the settled and normal state of that prevalence of reason in the human mind which is aided by monotheism, and will be perfected by the complete establishment of positive philosophy. While the æsthetic and the scientific spirit differ widely from each other, they each employ, in their own way, the same original faculties of the brain; so that the first kind of intellectual activity serves as an introduction to the second, without dispensing with a special intervention which we shall consider when we come to review the operation of monotheism. No doubt, the analytical and abstract spirit of scientific observation of the external world is radically distinct from the synthetic and concrete spirit of æsthetic observation, which seizes the human aspect only of all phenomena, by contemplating their actual influence on Man, in his moral relations; but not the less have they an all-important interest in common, in the disposition to observe accurately, and therefore to institute intellectual precautions of an analogous kind against error in either case. The analogy is yet more complete in whatever concerns the study of Man himself, in which the philosopher and the artist have equal need of some identical ideas, of which they make different uses. The hidden affinity which unites the one and the other spirit, through all their characteristic differences, cannot therefore be denied; nor that the more rapid development of the first is an indispensable preparation for the slower growth of the last: and if this relation becomes manifest, in the first instance, among the leaders of intellectual culture, it cannot but extend in time to the passive multitude. What I have said would be confirmed at every step, if the nature of this work admitted of a close comparison of the stages of progression of the two orders of ideas,—the æsthetic and the scientific; and also if I could speak separately of each art, and show the order of their rise and expansion. My limits forbid me to do this; and I can only assert what every student can verify for himself, that each art has preceded others in proportion to its more general nature; that is, in proportion to the variety and completeness of its power of expression,—apart from its distinctness and force. According to this test, the æsthetic series begins with poetry, and proceeds through music, painting, sculpture, and, finally, architecture.



We now see that the excellence of the fine arts in ancient times presents no such paradox as is usually supposed; and that it would be a mistake to imagine that the æsthetic faculties of Man have declined, merely because their exercise is not so prominent, nor so favoured by circumstances, as in the age of polytheism. Without renewing the controversy about the ancients and moderns, we may point to unquestionable evidences that human faculties have not declined, even in regard to the fine arts, by passing through the darkness of the Middle Ages. In the first of them, Poetry, our progress is incontestable. Even in the epic form, which is least congenial with modern civilization, we can hardly find nobler poetic genius in any age than that of Dante or Milton, nor an imagination so powerful as that of Ariosto. In dramatic poetry, where shall we find a parallel to Shakspeare and the dramatists of his age in England, and Corneille, Racine, and Molière in France? Though Music does not fill such a space in human life now as in ancient times, there can be no question of the superiority of modern Italian and German music to that of the ancients, which comprehended no harmony, and consisted of only simple and uniform melodies, in which measure was the chief means of expression. In Painting, not only is there a prodigious advance in technical methods, but in the loftiest moral expression; and all antiquity produced nothing comparable to the works of Raffaele, or of many other modern painters. If there is a real exception in the case of Sculpture, it is easily explained by a reference to the manners and habits of the ancients, which familiarized them more with the study of the human form. As to Architecture, besides the improvement of the industrial part of it in modern times, there can be no doubt of its æsthetic superiority, as shown in the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, in which the moral power of the art attains a sublime perfection which is nowhere to be found among the temples of antiquity, notwithstanding the charm of their regularity. And all this progress has taken place amidst a civilization in which æsthetic excitements have hitherto been much less inherent than in that of earlier times. As it is the function of the fine arts to represent our moral and social life, it is clear that, while they are adapted to all phases of human existence, they must be most conspicuous where the character of society is most homogeneous and settled, and therefore best fitted for clear and definite representation; a condition which was afforded, in a pre-eminent degree, by ancient societies, under the empire of polytheism. Modern society, on the contrary, has been, from the beginning of the Middle Ages, one long stage of transition, directed by monotheism,—the social state presenting no stable and marked aspect, and the philosophy favouring scientific more than æsthetic development. All influences have thus concurred to retard the course of the fine arts; and yet, all evidence proves that there has not only been no deterioration, but that genius

of this order has attained and surpassed the elevation of the noblest productions of antiquity, while it has opened new provinces of art, and declined in no other respect than in social influence. To all who judge by a higher criterion than the effect produced it must be evident that, in spite of unfavourable circumstances, the æsthetic, like all the other faculties of Man, are under a condition of continuous development. When a stable and homogeneous, and at the same time progressive state of society shall have become established under the positive philosophy, the fine arts will flourish more than they ever did under polytheism, finding new scope and new prerogatives under the new intellectual *régime*. Then will be seen the advantage of the educational discipline of Man's irrepressible æsthetic faculties which is now going on; and then will be evident to all eyes that radical affinity which, under the laws of the human organization, unites the perception of the beautiful with the relish for truth, on the one hand, and the love of goodness on the other.

The influence of polytheism on the industrial aptitudes of the human race will appear hereafter, when we have *Polytheistic Industry* to consider which of the three forms of polytheism best regulates that province. I need only say here that polytheism provides a great extension and more direct application of the influence by which fetichism first excited and sustained human activity in its conquest of external nature. By withdrawing divinities from their former inseparable connection with particular bodies, polytheism rendered lawful such modifications of matter as would have been profane before; while it imparted a belief in supernatural aid in all enterprises whatever, in a more special and familiar way than we can now conceive. At the same time, it instituted a priesthood, to interpret among conflicting claims and appearances: and the multiplicity of gods supplied a valuable special resource to neutralize, by their mutual rivalry, the anti-industrial disposition which we have seen to belong to the religious spirit. Without such a resource, wisely applied by sacerdotal authority, it is evident that the dogma of fatalism, inseparable from polytheism, must have put a stop to the expansion of human activity. There is no disputing the special fitness of polytheism to encourage the development of Man's industrial activity, till, by the progress of the study of nature, it begins to assume its rational character, under the corresponding influence of the positive spirit, which must give it a wiser and bolder direction as it enters upon its great new field.

We must remember that in those early days war was the chief occupation of man, and that we should entirely misjudge ancient industry if we left out of view the arts of military life. Those arts must have been the most important of all, while they were the easiest to improve. Man's first utensils have always been arms, to employ against beasts or his rivals. His skill and sagacity were

engaged through many centuries, in instituting and improving military apparatus, offensive or defensive; and such efforts, besides fulfilling their immediate purpose, aided the progress of subsequent industry, to which it afforded many happy suggestions. In this connection, we must always regard the social state of antiquity as inverse to our own, in which war has become a merely accessory affair. In antiquity, as now among savages, the greatest efforts of human industry related to war; in regard to which it accomplished prodigies, especially in the management of sieges. Among us, though the vast improvements in mechanical and chemical arts have introduced important military changes, the system of military implements is far less advanced, in comparison with our resources as a whole, than it was, under the same comparison, among the Greeks and Romans. Thus, we cannot form a judgment of the influence of polytheism upon the industrial development of the human race unless we give its due place to the military branch of the arts of life.

The social aptitude of polytheism remains to be considered, under its two points of view,—the political and the moral,—the first of which was necessarily preponderant; and the second of which shows more than any other aspect the radical imperfection of this phase of the theological philosophy.

The polytheistic priesthood was the first social corporation which could obtain sufficient leisure and dignity to devote itself to the study of science, art, and industry, which polytheism encouraged, and to which ambition urged the priesthood, no less than their vocation called them. The political consequences of such an establishment, in influencing the economy of ancient society, are what we must next ascertain. In its earliest age, the human race

*Social attributes of Polytheism.* always discloses the germs of the chief political powers, temporal and practical, spiritual and theoretical. Of the first class, military qualities, strength and courage first, prudence and cunning afterwards, are the immediate basis of active authority, even if it be temporary. Of the second class is the wisdom of the aged, which performs the office of transmitting the experience and the traditions of the tribe, and which soon acquires a consultative power, even among populations whose means of subsistence are so precarious and insufficient as to require the mournful sacrifice of decrepit relatives. With this natural authority is connected another elementary influence,—that of women,—which has always been an important domestic auxiliary, bringing sentiment to the aid of reason, to modify the direct exercise of material supremacy. These rudiments of all succeeding establishments of authority would not have passed beyond their incipient stage, if polytheism had not attached them to the double institution of regular worship and a distinct priesthood, which

afford the only means of admitting anything like a social organization among scattered families. This is the chief political destination of the theological philosophy; and it is in this, its second stage, that we see how its social prerogative results from the rise of common opinions on subjects the most interesting to Man, and of a speculative class which must be the organ of those opinions. It is in this way, and not so much from fears or hopes of a future life, that religious doctrines have been efficacious in a social sense. The political influence of religious doctrine has never been great: its operation is essentially moral; though even under this aspect, we are too apt to confound with it the repressive or guiding power inherent in the existence of any system of common opinions. Moreover, it is unquestionable that the religious doctrine acquired social importance only at a late period of polytheism; and it was under monotheism that that importance reached its height; as we shall presently see. It is true, there has been no age in which Man did not yield to the natural desire and supposition of his own eternal existence, past and future; a tendency which it is perfectly easy to explain; but this natural belief exists long before it admits of any social or even moral application,—first, because theological theories are very slowly extended to human and social phenomena; and again, because, when this is effected, and the guidance of human affairs has become the chief function of the gods, it is on the present, and not on a future life that the strongest emotions of hope and fear are concentrated. The poems of Homer show how new were the moral theories of polytheism relating to future reward and punishment, by the eagerness of the wisest minds to propagate a belief so useful, and so little known among the most advanced peoples: and the books of Moses show that, even in a state of premature monotheism, the rude Hebrew nation, not yet susceptible of the idea of eternal justice, feared only the direct and temporal wrath of its formidable deity.

In the social phase presented by polytheism, after the establishment of common opinions, and a speculative class as their organ, the nature of the worship was well *Worship.* adapted to the mind of the time, consisting of numerous and varied festivals, favourable to the advancement of the fine arts, and supplying a sufficient ground for assemblages of a population of some extent, connected by a common language. The festivals of Greece preserved their high social importance, as a bond and reconciliation of conflicting nations, till absorbed by the power of Rome. If no power but that of the theological philosophy could organize even the games of the ancients, it is not surprising that all natural authorities should repair for sanction to this source, which alone could give any extension and durability to their social influence; and hence the theocratic character which invests all modes of primitive government.

Passing from the passive establishment of a social organization to its active existence,—the first consideration is that *Civilization by War.* life was then military by necessity, not only from the conformity of war with the propensities of the age, but from its being the only means of rendering the political organism durable and progressive. It had a higher and more general function in extending human associations, and devoting the most numerous classes to an industrial life. When we speak of the civilizing qualities of modern war, we commit the great mistake of estimating absolutely what can be only relative, and supposing that to be true of our own time which was true only of a totally different age : but if restricted to the social state of the ancients, or to that of any population at the same stage of progress, it is emphatically true that war was a means of civilization. By the annexation of secondary populations to a preponderant one, human society was enlarged in the only way then possible ; while the dominion of the conquering nation could not be established or maintained but by the repression of the military activity of each annexed population ; and thus was peace preserved among the subordinates, and opportunity was afforded for their induction into an industrial mode of life. Such is the process by which human societies were disciplined, extended, reconstituted, and led on to their subsequent mode of existence. There cannot be a happier instance of the power of intellectual and moral superiority than this, which shows us how propensities which, in every other carnivorous being, lead only to the brutal development of the destructive instincts, become the natural means of civilization. We need no further proof of the aptitude of polytheism to sustain and direct the rise of military activity. We, who make a broad division between the spiritual and the temporal, are apt to say that the ancients had no religious wars : but if this is in any sense true, it is because all their wars had more or less of a religious character ; their gods being then national deities, mingling their conflicts with those of their peoples, and sharing their triumphs and reverses. There was something of this in the fierce wars of fetichism, though the family character of the divinities precluded them from any considerable political efficacy ; but the gods of polytheism had precisely that degree of generality which allowed them to call entire peoples to their standards, while they were national enough to stimulate the growth of the warrior spirit. In a system which admitted of an almost indefinite addition of new gods, the only possible proselytism was in subjecting the gods of the vanquished to those of the victor ; but it certainly always existed, under that characteristic form, in ancient wars, in which it must have largely contributed to excite mutual ardour, even among combatants who practised an analogous worship, but each of whom yet had their national god familiarly incorporated with the whole of their special history. The social operation of polytheism was, while

stimulating the spirit of conquest, to incorporate subject nations with the victorious one, permitting each to preserve its own faith and worship, on condition of acknowledging the superiority of the victorious deities; a procedure which, under that *régime*, required no subversion of any religious economy. Under this military aspect, polytheism is superior, not only to fetichism, but even to monotheism. Monotheism is adapted to the more pacific existence of more advanced societies, and does not urge to war, in their case, but rather discourages it: while, with regard to less advanced nations, it does not, because it cannot, seek the annexation of other faiths, but is instigated by its own exclusive character to annihilate or degrade conquered idolaters, unless they redeem themselves by immediate conversion. The Jews, the Mohammedans, and others who passed over prematurely into an abortive monotheism before they were socially prepared for the change, are remarkable instances of this. It is unquestionable that these are the qualities which specially adapt polytheism to direct the military development of ancient society.

Among the accessory resources of the polytheistic system, we may note the quality by which it secured the establish-  
ment and maintenance of a strict military discipline, *Sacerdotal  
sanctions.*  
whose prescriptions were easily placed under the guardianship of a suitable divine protection, by means of oracles, augury, etc., always applicable under a regular system of supernatural communication, organized by polytheism, and repressed by monotheism. We must bear in mind the spontaneous sincerity which regulated the use of those means which we are too apt to regard as jugglery, for want of carrying ourselves back to an intellectual condition in which theological conceptions were blended with all human acts, and the simplest movements of human reason were adorned by a religious consecration. If ancient history offers some rare instances of deliberately false oracles having been published for political purposes, it never fails to exhibit also the small success of such miserable expedients, through the radical connection of minds, which must prevent some from firmly believing what others have forged. There is, again, the power of apotheosis, much underrated by us: a power peculiar to this second religious period, and which tended to foster in the highest degree, among superior minds, every kind of active enthusiasm, and especially military fervour. The immortal beatification proposed by monotheism was a poor substitute, because apotheosis under polytheism gratified the universal idea of unlimited life, and added to it the special privilege of promising to vigorous spirits the eternal activity of those instincts of pride and ambition which were the great charm of life in their eyes. When we judge of this resource by the degradation it exhibited in the decrepitude of polytheism, when it was applied to the worst rulers, and had become a sort of mortuary formality, we lose all conception of its power in

the days of faith and energy, when eminent persons might hope, by a worthy fulfilment of their social destination, to rise to the rank of gods or demigods, after the example of Bacchus, Hercules, and others. This consideration may show how all the political energies of the religious spirit were applied by polytheism as far as their nature admitted, so that nothing remained but for their intensity to decline. This decline, so mourned at the time as depriving mankind of one of its most powerful actuating forces, but in no way hindering social development, may teach us the value of analogous apprehensions in our own day, when men anticipate social degeneracy from the extinction of the theological *régime* which mankind is discovering to be unnecessary.

Our next consideration must be of the radical conditions of the corresponding *régime*, whose aim and spirit we have been reviewing: in other words, we must examine the chief characteristics which, common to all the forms of such a *régime*, are evidently indispensable to its practical organization. These are the institution of Slavery, and the cor-  
Two characteristics of the polity.  
Slavery. founding of the spiritual and temporal powers, which together constitute the main difference between the polytheistic organism of ancient, and the monotheistic organism of modern societies.

We are all aware how indispensable Slavery was to the social economy of antiquity; but we are apt to overlook the principle of that relation. We have only to extend to the individual case the explanation hitherto applied to nations, of the warlike destination of ancient society, as a necessary means of progression. It is easily seen how slavery was engendered by war, which was its chief source and its first general corrective. The righteous horror with which we regard existing slavery naturally blinds us to the immense progression which it constituted and caused when it everywhere succeeded to cannibalism or the sacrifice of captives, and the conqueror, curbing his vindictive passions, could become sensible of the advantages he might derive from the services of his captive by annexing him, as an inferior auxiliary, to the family he ruled. Such an advance implies an industrial and moral progression much more considerable than is commonly supposed. It was a sagacious remark of Bossuet's that the etymology of the term reminds us that the slave was originally a prisoner of war who was spared instead of being devoured or sacrificed, according to prior custom. It is probable that without such a resource the blind military passion of the first ages of society would have destroyed nearly the whole race and thus the immediate benefits of such an institution require no more vindication than its naturalness. Its service to the ulterior development of humanity is no less indisputable, though it is less appreciated. There could have been no sufficient expansion of the military *régime* if all pacific labours had not been assigned to slaves.

so that slavery, resulting from war, served afterwards to sustain it, not only as a main recompense of victory, but as a permanent condition of the conflict. And again, slavery was no less important to the vanquished, who were thus constrained to an industrial life, notwithstanding their constitutional repugnance to it. Slavery was thus to the individual what we have seen that conquest was to nations. The more we consider the original aversion of our defective nature to regular and sustained toil, the more we shall be convinced that slavery opened the only general issue for the industrial development of humanity; and the better we shall see how labour, accepted at first as a ransom of life, became afterwards the principle of emancipation. Thus it was that ancient slavery grew to be, in relation to human progress, an indispensable means of general education, which could not have been otherwise supplied, while it was, at the same time, a merely necessary condition of special development.

Among the many differences which distinguish the ancient from our dreadful modern slavery, the conspicuous fact that the one was in harmony with the spirit of the age, while the other is opposed to it, is enough to condemn the latter. The existing slaveholder enjoys repose at the expense of the toil of his victim; whereas, the ancient conqueror and his captive worked in virtual concert, the activity of each promoting that of the other. Though slaves were, in those days, much more numerous than their masters, slavery existed through a long course of ages without any but extremely rare crises of danger; whereas modern slavery has maintained only an irksome existence for three centuries past, in the midst of frightful and always imminent dangers, notwithstanding the material preponderance of the owners, powerfully assisted by metropolitan civilization. The difference is that the ancient slavery was a normal state, originated by war, and sustained by a multitude of accessory tendencies; whereas modern slavery is simply a factitious anomaly.

The relation of slavery to polytheism, may not be evident at first sight, certain as it is made by historical analysis. If we consider, however, that the encouragement of slavery is a mere prolongation of the encouragement afforded to the spirit of conquest, we shall see that this theological state is in harmony with both. Polytheism, in fact, corresponds to slavery, as fetichism does to the extermination of captives, and monotheism, as we shall see, to the emancipation of serfs. Fetichism and monotheism are adverse to slavery,—the one because it is a religion too individual and local to establish any bond between the conqueror and the conquered strong enough to restrain natural ferocity; and the other, because it is universal enough to preclude so profound an inequality between the worshippers of the same true God. Both are adverse to slavery for the same reasons which make conquest an exceptional pursuit for them. The intermediate theological state was therefore the one



appropriate to slavery,—being general enough to afford the necessary bond, and special enough to maintain social distance. The victor and the vanquished preserved their respective gods, whilst there was a common property in their religion which sufficed for a certain agreement; their relation being moreover consecrated by the subordination of the inferior to the superior gods. Thus it was that polytheism precluded the slaughter of captives on the one hand, and their regular emancipation on the other; and thus it consolidated and sanctioned their habitual bondage.

The next prominent feature of the ancient social economy is the confusion between the spiritual and the temporal powers, united in the same chiefs; whereas their systematic separation is one of the chief political attributes of modern civilization. Speculative authority, which was then purely sacerdotal, and active power which was essentially military, were always incorporated under the polytheistic *régime*; and such a combination was a requisite to the action of this *régime* on human development. This is the point which we have next to examine.

There could be no recognition, in ancient times, of the separation that was established in the Middle Ages, under the happy prevalence of Catholicism, between the moral power which regulates the thoughts and inclinations, and the political power which is concerned with actions and results. Such a separation supposes a development of the social organism far greater than that of the period when the simplicity and confusion of political ideas precluded any systematic distinction between the establishment of general principles of society and their special and daily use. Nor could such a division take place till each of the two powers had asserted its proper existence, derived from an independent origin; whereas in ancient times, they were derived from each other,—whether the military command was simply an accessory of sacerdotal authority or sacerdotal authority was merely an instrument of military domination. Nor, again, could such a separation take place at a time when the existing polity was confined to a chief city, however it might be destined to spread till it comprehended large populations: whereas, in the Middle Ages, the chief ground of the division was the necessity of attaching to a common spiritual power nations too remote and diverse to be brought into any resemblance in their temporal governments.

Thus the political spirit of antiquity had no more marked characteristic than the pervading confusion between morals and laws, opinions and acts; the same authority presiding over them all whatever the form of government might otherwise be. Even in contingencies most favourable to the establishment of a distinct spiritual power,—as when a citizen was made dictator without executive office,—even this possession of supreme legislative power

never suggested any permanent separation between the moral and the political authority. The schemes of philosophers are always a reflection of the genius of their time; and we find in the boldest proposals of ancient philosophers no hint of a distinction between the regulation of opinions and that of acts; and yet the recognized existence of this class of speculative men among the principal Greek nations must be regarded as the first step towards this very separation. Those of them who went furthest in prescribing a government of philosophers had no other idea than of those philosophers being temporal as well as moral rulers; an arrangement which would have been a greater curse to them than any imperfection of social order under which they were living. This commingling of authority was no less indispensable to the function of the polytheistic *régime* than it was in itself inevitable. Military activity could not have done its work if the same class had not been at once pontiffs and military chiefs, sustaining the rigorous interior discipline required by the nature and duration of the wars of the time; and again, those wars could not have produced their necessary effect if there had not been a collective action in each armed nation upon exterior societies, such as can arise only from a concentration of authority. The continuous development of the spirit of conquest required, in ancient times, a fulness of obedience and a unity of conception altogether incompatible with our modern notions of two coexisting social authorities: and we shall have occasion to observe how closely the division of authority was connected with the decline of the aggressive military system into one purely defensive. If we observe apparent exceptions, as in the case of Mohammedanism, we shall always find, on close observation, that with the monotheism has coexisted the ancient commingling of authority as well as the spirit of conquest.

It is easy to see how irreconcilable polytheism is with the separation of powers which we shall find to be characteristic of monotheism. Without homogeneousness and consistency, the priesthood could not be securely independent of the temporal power; and the multiplicity of deities rendered such conditions impossible, through the dispersion of theological action which they must cause. At this distance of time, it is difficult for us to conceive of the rivalries which must have existed among different orders of ancient priests, through the inevitable competition of their numerous divinities, whose respective prerogatives, however carefully regulated, could not but frequently conflict; and this must have so far overruled the common instinct of the priesthood as to have precluded or dissolved any considerable sacerdotal coalition, if the temporal power had ever so little desire to hinder it. Whatever were the alliances, avowed or secret, of the various priesthoods, among the best-known polytheistic nations, those priesthoods had a proper and isolated existence till they were all reduced to subjection by the

temporal authority, which laid hold of the chief religious functions. Any apparent exception may be considered hereafter: it is enough to say here that it is contrary to the nature of polytheism to allow the existence of a spiritual power, independent of a corresponding temporal power, unless the one is reduced to be the mere appendage or instrument of the other.

Thus we see how the chief political wants of antiquity were met by polytheism, inasmuch as it aided the development of the spirit of conquest, and then established that concentration of social authority which was indispensable to that development. If it be objected that this concentration became the principle of the most degrading despotism, in the hands of infamous rulers; the reply is, that we must judge of the *régime* by its period of highest perfection, and not by any effects belonging to its season of decline. The declining period of all provisional influences exhibits the mischiefs of a too long protraction of any institution: and the case of the military *régime*, with its confusion of social powers, is no exception. When the uses of the system were obtained, dangers which had before been restrained or concealed manifested themselves, in proof that its provisional office was now fulfilled. It only remains for me to observe, under this view of the subject, that there is a close affinity between the two great conditions of the ancient polity. The abolition of slavery has always, as we shall presently find, been coincident with the separation of spiritual and temporal power: a natural consequence of that conjunction of the two authorities which conferred a religious sanction on the dominion of the master, and at the same time exempted this domestic subordination from all such sacerdotal interposition as might restrain that absolute dominion.

Next to the political analysis comes the moral. I may dismiss it very briefly, so small are its difficulties and its importance, in comparison with those of the political analysis of this *régime*. The institution of slavery and the concentration of the spiritual and temporal powers indicate the necessary moral inferiority of the polytheistic to the monotheistic stage of human development.

Morality is profoundly vitiated throughout its relations, personal, domestic, and social, by the mere existence of slavery. There is no occasion to say much of its injurious influence on the servile class; for it cannot be necessary to prove that there must be degradation where there is no sense of human dignity, and where the moral nature is wholly neglected, and the evils of servility neutralize all the benefits of labour. Important as such considerations must be, since the bulk of modern population has issued from this unhappy class, and bears only too evident marks of such an origin, the case may be left as it stands before the observation of us all, on account of its being unquestionable. We have therefore only to comment on the effect of

slavery on the free,—on the masters,—whose proper development it is more necessary to follow, because it afterwards afforded the type of universal evolution. Under this aspect it is evident that this institution, however indispensable to human advancement in a political sense, must seriously impede moral progression. In personal morals, which the ancients knew most about, the effect of a power of absolute command over slaves who were bound to bear whatever caprice might inflict, was of course to impair that power of self-rule which is the first principle of moral development;—to say nothing of the dangers from flattery which beset every free man. As to domestic morals, De Maistre was no doubt right in the remark that slavery must have corrupted the primary family relations through the fatal facility it offered to licentiousness; so that even the establishment of monogamy was little more than a profession. As for social morality,—which consists mainly in the love of mankind,—it is sufficiently evident that the universal habits of cruelty often gratuitous and arbitrary, exercised towards the unprotected slaves, must foster those propensities of hardness and even ferocity which were ordinary features of ancient manners, blighting even the best natures with moral injury. No less fatal were the consequences of the other political feature of the *régime*. It was through the confusion of the spiritual and temporal power that the morality of those times was subordinated to the polity; whereas, in modern days, and especially under the reign of Catholicism, morality, in its independence of polity, has more and more assumed its direction, as I will presently explain. So vicious a subjection of the general and permanent in morality to the special and unstable in politics must impair the consistency of moral ordinances, and corrupt their purity by postponing the estimate of the means to that of the immediate personal end, and inducing a contempt of the fundamental attributes of humanity in comparison with those required by the existing needs of a variable policy. Inevitable as such an imperfection must be, it is not the less real, nor the less deplorable. The morality of the ancients was, in fact, like their polity, essentially military. When nations were adapted for a warlike destination, that aim became the supreme rule in the estimate of moral dispositions, which were esteemed in proportion to their aptitude to aid the great design, whether in the way of command or of obedience. Again, there was an absence of all moral education, which monotheism alone could institute. There was no compensation for this great elementary function in the arbitrary intervention of the Greek or Roman magistrate, when he imposed minute, capricious, and fallacious regulations upon private conduct. The only resource for supplying in any degree this enormous omission was to insinuate a kind of moral instruction into the popular mind by means of festivals and shows, such as

*Subordination  
of morality  
to polity.*

have lost their chief importance to society by having deputed their moral function to a better instrumentality. The social action of philosophers, among the Greeks first, and then the Romans, had no other destination; and this mode of abandoning such a function to private agency, without any legitimate organization, could only disclose the imperfection, in regard to morality, of the *régime* without adequately repairing it; for influence of that nature could amount to little more than declamation, always impotent and often dangerous, whatever may have been its provisional utility in preparing a future regeneration.

The causes of the moral inferiority of the polytheistic organism are now clear enough. If we take the point of view of the ancient regarding their morality in its relation to their polity, we cannot but admire its aptitude as an aid to their military activity: and in this direction, it has shared the general human progression, which could not have taken place in any other way. But it is no less strikingly imperfect, if regarded as a necessary phase of the moral education of mankind. It is not that the sanction of human passions was fatally authorized or facilitated by polytheism. Though there was something of this, the mischief is greatly overrated by Christian philosophers, who seem to think that no morality could resist such a solvent: yet polytheism destroyed neither the moral instinct of the race, nor the gradual influence of the spontaneous observations on the qualities of our nature and their consequences which good sense presently amassed. On the other hand, monotheism, with all its superiority in this respect, has not realized its intrinsic morality any better in those exceptional cases in which it has coexisted with slavery and the confusion of the two social powers. It is observable, too, that this tendency, with which polytheism is so harshly reproached, and which was a necessary consequence of the extension of theological explanations to moral subjects, afforded a free and natural scope to various human feelings, which had been too much repressed before to have indicated in any other way how far they should be encouraged or neutralized, when morality had become possible. The eminent superiority of monotheism should not therefore induce us to disallow the participation of polytheism in the office of theological philosophy, whether as an organ of the advancing race in establishing certain moral opinions, which must be rendered almost irresistible by such universality; or by sanctioning those rules by the perspective of a future life, in which the theological, aided by the æsthetic spirit, set up its ideal type of justice and perfection, so as to convert into a powerful moral auxiliary a spontaneous infantile belief in the eternal prolongation of its favourite enjoyments. A rapid survey in truth convinces us that polytheism instigated the moral development of mankind, in all important aspects, independently of its special encouragement of qualities most suitable to the purposes of the first age of society.

Its efficacy is above all conspicuous in relation to the two extreme terms of morality,—the personal and the social. The *Personal morality.* military application of the first was evident enough to secure especial attention to it; and the active and passive energy which is the prime virtue of savage life was carefully developed. Begun under fetichism, this development was carried forward to perfection under polytheism. The simplest precepts relating to this elementary class of virtues required the intervention of the religious spirit; and there is no doubt that its sanction was given to habits of physical purification, in which we find the first example of that superintendence of himself which Man must institute, for any purposes of action or resistance. As to social morality, it is clear that polytheism encouraged in the highest degree *Social morality.* that love of country which took its rise under fetichism. Beginning in the fetich attachment to the native soil, it was stimulated by the national character of polytheism, till it attained the dignity of a rooted and invincible patriotism, often exalted into a conspicuous fanaticism, and constituting the great and almost the only aim of moral education. We see at once its bearing upon social progress, and how it must have been fostered by the small extent of nationality of that age, and also by the character of its wars, which rendered death or slavery always imminent, and devotion to country the only salvation. A certain degree of ferocity attended this virtue, as it bound up a hatred of foreigners with an attachment to a small number of compatriots; but it was a stage in the progress towards that love of the whole human race which was introduced by Christianity, and which would have been wholly incompatible with the military tendencies of antiquity. To polytheism we must also refer the first regular organization of morality in regard to old age and ancestry, a veneration for which was indispensable to that sense of social perpetuity which becomes more and more important as theological hopes of a future life lose their power, and till the positive philosophy establishes it for ever by exhibiting the connection of the individual with the whole human race, past, present, and future.

The most imperfect part of morality under polytheism was the domestic. It was, as it were, dropped between the *Domestic morality.* personal and the social morality, at a time when they were too directly connected, in consequence of the supremacy of political considerations. We shall see presently how it is the immortal honour of Catholicism that it instituted a sound organization of morality by connecting it chiefly with the life of the Family, and making the social virtues depend on the domestic. Polytheism, however, effected a beginning of domestic morality; and it was under its reign that mankind rose to a settled monogamy. Though polygamy is still erroneously attributed to climate, any one may satisfy himself that it has been, in the North as much

as the South, an attribute of the first age of human development, immediately following that in which the difficulty of subsistence controlled the reproductive instinct. Necessary as polygamy was in its own season, there is no doubt that the state of monogamy is the most favourable to the development of the best qualities of human nature, in both sexes; and the dawning conception of this social condition led, in the early days of polytheism, to the first establishment of monogamy, followed by necessary prohibitions of incest. Successive improvements of the conjugal relation accompanied the chief phases of the polytheistic *régime*; but the social character of Woman was far from being duly ascertained, while her unavoidable dependence on Man encouraged too much of his primitive rudeness. This first imperfect rise of the distinctive feminine character is exhibited in the constant though secondary participation of women in sacerdotal authority, which was expressly granted to them under polytheism, and taken from them by monotheism. As civilization develops all intellectual and moral differences, and therefore, among others, those of the sexes, we can no more derive a favourable presumption of the corresponding condition of women because they shared the priesthood, than because they shared war and the chase,—which there is no reasonable doubt that they did. There is, in fact, abundant proof that the social state of Woman was radically inferior under the polytheistic *régime* to what it became in the reign of Christianity. In times when men were hunters and herdsmen, and then when they were warriors, the sexes were too much separated, and their affections were bestowed otherwise than on each other: and then came the institution of slavery, which tended to impair the conjugal relation very seriously. But, in spite of these evils, polytheism certainly did imitate domestic morality, though less effectually than personal and social morals.

Our examination of polytheism must, I think, convince us that *Three phases of Polytheism.* notwithstanding vast deficiencies and imperfections, this homogeneous and well-connected system could not but produce men of greater consistency and completeness than the world has since seen under a condition of humanity less purely theological, while not as yet fully positive. However this may be, one more task remains, to complete our estimate. We must review the different forms assumed by the system, according to the office it had to fulfil, in aiding human progress. We must distinguish between theocratic and military polytheism, according to the more spiritual or more temporal character assumed by the concentration of the two powers. Then again, in the military system, we must consider the rising stage of the spirit of conquest, and that of its completion: and thus, the polytheistic *régime* will naturally divide itself into three parts, which we may call, in an historical way, the Egyptian method, the Greek, and the Roman. We will now consider the proper prerogative and invariable succession of the three.

The intellectual and social elements of a primitive civilization can expand only under the almost absolute rule of a sacerdotal class. Prepared by fetichism in its advanced state of star-worship, and perhaps before the entire transition from the pastoral to the agricultural life, the system could be developed only under the ascendancy of polytheism. Its general spirit consists in the hereditary transmission of functions or professions which is embodied in the institution of Caste, ruled by the supreme caste of the priesthood, which, being the depository of all knowledge, established a connection among all the heterogeneous corporations which took their rise from families. This ancient organization, not framed for purposes of war, though largely extended by it, did not assign the lowest and most numerous caste to a state of individual slavery, but to one of collective servitude, which is even more unfavourable than that of slavery to ultimate emancipation. The inevitable tendency of nascent civilization to such a system appears to me to be a law of social dynamics. We see it now in the Asiatic races so exemplified that we are apt to regard it as proper to the yellow races, though the white races were in their season equally subject to it, with the difference that, from their inherent superiority, or through the influence of more favourable circumstances, they disengaged themselves more rapidly from it. But the system could become thoroughly characteristic only under conditions which repressed warlike propensities, and favoured the sacerdotal spirit. The local causes were a combination of a fine climate with a fertile soil, favouring intellectual development by making subsistence easy; a territory admitting naturally of internal communication; and a country so isolated as to be secure from invasion, while offering no strong inducements to a life of war. These conditions are best found in the valley of a great river, separated from the rest of the world by the sea on the one hand, and inaccessible deserts or mountains on the other. Thus, the great system of castes flourished first in Egypt, Chaldæa, and Persia; and it abides in our day in those parts of the East which are least exposed to contact with the white nations, as in China, Japan, Tibet, Hindostan, etc.; and from analogous causes it was found in Mexico and Peru at the time of their conquest. Traces of these causes may be recognized in all instances of indigenous civilization, as in Western Europe, among the Gauls, the Etruscans, etc. The primitive influence may be perceived among nations whose progress has been accelerated by fortunate colonization. The general impress is recognized in their various ulterior institutions, and is not entirely effaced in the most advanced societies. In short, this system is the universal basis of ancient civilization.

The universality and tenacity of the system of Caste are a sufficient proof of its suitability to human needs, in its season, notwith-



standing the inconveniences it involved. Nothing, indeed, could be more natural, at the outset, than that, by domestic imitation, the easiest and most powerful means of education, employments should descend from fathers to sons : and it was the only possible training in an age when oral transmission was the sole means of communicating conceptions. In fact, there is, and always will be, a tendency, though ever diminishing to the hereditary adoption of employments, however different the modern method may be from the ancient, in which the succession was tyrannically decreed by law. When men have no special impulse to a particular occupation, they naturally adopt that of the family ; and the only way of diminishing the tendency is by improving general education, so as to provide by abstract and systematic instruction the training which formerly required a concrete and empirical domestic apprenticeship. It was in this way that Catholicism put an end to the hereditary practice of the priesthood, which was once as universal as that of any other functions whatever, public or private.

The distinguishing properties of the system are not less evident than its natural origin. We owe to it the first permanent division between theory and practice, by the institution of a speculative class, invested with grand prerogatives of dignity and leisure : and to this period we must refer the primitive elements of genuine knowledge,—it being that in which the human mind began to regulate its general course. The same may be said of the fine arts, then carefully cultivated, not only for the sake of their charm, but as tributary to dogma and worship on the one hand, and information and religious propagation on the other. The industrial development was the most remarkable of all, requiring no rare intellectual qualifications, inspiring no fear in the ruling class, and furnishing, under the reign of peace, forces adequate to the most colossal undertakings. The loss of many useful inventions before the preservative institution of caste arose must have suggested the need of it, and have proved its advantages afterwards in securing the division of labour which was here and there attained. No institution has ever shown itself more adapted to honour ability of various kinds than this polytheistic organization, which often exalted into apotheosis its commemoration of eminent inventors, who were offered to the adoration of their respective castes. In a social view, the virtues of the system are not less conspicuous. Politically, its chief attribute was stability. All precautions against attack from within and from without were most energetically instituted. Within, all the castes were united by the single bond of their common subordination to the sacerdotal caste, from which each derived all that it had of special knowledge and perpetual instigation. There never was elsewhere such a concentration, for intensity, regularity, and permanence of human power,

as that possessed by the supreme caste, each member of which (at least, in the higher ranks of the priesthood) was not only priest and magistrate, but also philosopher, artist, engineer, and physician. The statesmen of Greece and Rome, superior as they were in accomplishment and generality to any examples that modern times can show, appear but incomplete personages in comparison with the fine theocratic natures of early antiquity, of whom Moses is the most familiar, if not the most accurate type. The only pressing external danger was from the growth of military activity, for which, however, the sacerdotal policy found employment, when necessary, in distant expeditions and irrevocable colonization. As to its influence on morals, this system was favourable to personal morality, and yet more to domestic, till the military phase of polytheism became preponderant; for the spirit of caste was a mere extension of the family spirit. The condition of Women was improved, notwithstanding the prevalence of polygamy; for they were rescued from the subjection to rude toil which had been their lot in a barbaric age; and their seclusion, according to the customs of polygamy, was the first token of homage, and of their assignment to a position more conformable to their true nature. As to social morals,—the system was evidently favourable to respect for age, and homage to ancestors. The sentiment of patriotism did not as yet transcend love of caste, which, narrow as it appears to us, was a necessary preparation for the higher attachment. The superstitious aversion to foreigners which exists under a system of caste must not be confounded with the active contempt maintained at a later period by military polytheism.

Notwithstanding all these qualities, the theocratic system could not but be hostile to progress, through its excessive stability which stiffened into an obstinate immovableness when new expansions required a change of social classification. The supreme class appropriated all its immense resources of every kind to the preservation of its almost absolute dominion, after it had lost, by long enjoyment of power, the chief stimulus to its own progression. At first sight, the political system looks well, in its aspect of a reign of mind; though it was rather a reign of fear, resting as it did on the use of superstitious terrors, and the spells offered by the possession of the earliest physical knowledge; but we must frankly admit, on consideration, that the political rule of intelligence is hostile to human progression. Mind must tend more and more to the supreme direction of human affairs; but it can never attain it, owing to the imperfection of our organism, in which the intellectual life is the feeblest part; and thus it appears that the real office of mind is deliberative; that is, to modify the material preponderance, and not to impart its habitual impulsion. The same comparative feebleness which precludes the dominion of intelligence would render such dominion dangerous, and hostile to progress; for it

would lose its chief stimulus, and, being adapted to modify and not to command, it would be occupied in maintaining its monstrous ascendancy, instead of advancing towards perfection. I shall have to enlarge further on this consideration in another chapter. I advert to it here because it discloses the principle of the stationary character imputed to the theocratic system by the very persons who profoundly admire its apparent rationality. It is clear, from this point of view, that the extreme concentration of powers which gives its consistency to the theocratic system must retard human advancement, because no separate portion could make any progress without involving the great whole so bound up together. In regard to science, for instance, which ought to be the glory of the system, we know that scarcely any progress was made, not only from want of stimulus, but because any considerable development of science would have been fatal to the whole social economy. We all know that, after the first mental revolution, the sciences can flourish only by being cultivated for their own sakes, and not as instruments of political rule; and analogous considerations hold good of every other department of the social system. Thus, we must admit that the theocratic *régime* institutes a general human progression: and that it afterwards retards that progression. In any nation in which the military caste has failed to subordinate the sacerdotal, no immediate triumph of the military caste has saved it from submission, sooner or later, to the sacerdotal. The vanquished have absorbed the victors: the conquering foreigner has ended by being chief among the native priests, and everything goes on much as before. The case is the same when, by internal revolution, military chiefs have triumphed over the priests; they soon involuntarily acquire the theocratic character, and all that has happened has been a change of persons or of dynasties. The transition from theocratic to military polytheism was effected by means of populations whose external circumstances were unfavourable to theocracy and favourable to war; and by means of that colonization, which, issuing from a society of castes, could not plant down the political qualities of the institution on a new soil, though they might retain its intellectual and moral advantages. While the hereditary principle continued to settle almost everything, the grand new power of choice for personal qualities was introduced,—remaining subordinate to the old principle for awhile, but ever gaining in extent and independence. The political equilibrium of the two principles, which might at length be obtained, depended mainly on the contemporary degree of military activity, which was an admirable test of the merits of corresponding vocations. Thus, the balance was maintained among the Romans for a course of centuries, as an indirect but necessary consequence of the expansion of the system of conquest; whereas, among the Greeks, for an opposite reason, legislators and philosophers had always been laboriously striving to

reconcile what they called oligarchy and democracy, and always pretty much in vain.

When we turn from theocratic to military polytheism, we find a distinction arising between intellectual and social progression, which were hitherto inseparable. *The Greek or intellectual.* The intellectual is represented by the Greek *régime*, which was intermediate between the Egyptian and the Roman, being more intellectual than the one and less social than the other. In Greek society there was abundance of military activity; but it was, in relation to human progression, merely desultory, leaving to the Romans the political function of permanent conquest. Greece was the scene of perpetual conflicts of small states, till Roman dominion spread over all. The peculiarity is explained partly by geographical causes,—the singular partition of territory by gulfs, isthmus, and mountain chains, favouring divisions into states; and partly by the social cause of these states having populations almost identical in language, and the origin and degree of civilization of their colonies. From these causes arose the inability of the Greek states to employ a warlike activity equal to that of the Romans in subjugating their nearest neighbours, and the necessity of pushing it to a distance; thus pursuing a course inverse to that of Rome, and radically incompatible with the progressive establishment of such an extended and durable dominion as might furnish a solid basis for the ulterior development of humanity. Thus it was that the Athenian people, triumphant in the Archipelago, in Asia, in Thrace, etc., was confined to a central territory no larger than our modern provinces, camped about with numerous rivals who could not be subdued; so that Athens might more reasonably propose the conquest of Egypt or Asia Minor than of Sparta, Thebes, or Corinth, or even of the little adjacent republic of Megara. Thus while there was military activity enough to preserve the Greeks from the intellectual and moral torpor induced by theocracy, their military life was not preponderant enough to engross the faculties of the most eminent men, who could not feel an exclusive interest in the futile struggles of which Greek wars mainly consisted. Their cerebral energy, finding no adequate political occupation, was thrown back upon the intellectual life; and the masses, under the same influences, were disposed towards the same culture, especially in the direction of the fine arts. Still, the germs of this intellectual and moral development were derived from theocratic societies, by means of colonization. Through the concurrence of these conditions there arose in Greece an entirely new class, destined to be the organ of mental progression, as being eminently speculative without being sacerdotal, and active without being engrossed by war. By a slight change of this antagonism, in both directions, the philosophers, men of science, and artists, continued to be simply pontiffs more or less elevated in the sacerdotal hierarchy, or became humble servitors, charged with

the instruction of great military families. Thus, though military activity was politically barren among the Greeks, it wrought in favour of human progression, independently of its special importance in rescuing from theocratic influences that little nucleus of free-thinkers who were in some sort charged with the intellectual destinies of our race, and who would probably have been overwhelmed in theocratic degradation, but for the sublime achievements of Thermopylæ, Marathon, Salamis, and of Alexander in his immortal career of conquest.

Of the operation of the Greek *régime* on the fine arts enough has been said for my purpose here. As to the scientific aspect, as a manifestation of a new intellectual element, largely affecting the rise of philosophy, we must fix our attention on the formation, nearly thirty centuries ago, of a contemplative class, composed of free men, intelligent and at leisure, with no determinate social function, and therefore more purely speculative than theocratic dignitaries, who were occupied in preserving or applying their predominant power. In imitation of their sacerdotal precursors, these sages or philosophers at first cultivated all the parts of the intellectual domain at once,—with the one exception that poetry was early separated from the other fine arts, in virtue of its more rapid expansion: but soon that great division arose which furnished the basis of our scientific development, when the positive spirit began to manifest itself, amidst the philosophy, first theological and then metaphysical, which governed all ancient speculation. The first appearance of the true scientific spirit was naturally in the form of mathematical ideas,—the necessary origin from their simplicity, generality, and abstract character, of rational positivism. It was by these qualities that mathematical ideas were the first to be withdrawn from the theological jurisdiction under which they had been only implicitly comprehended; and it was through them that purely arithmetical ideas were a subject of study before geometry was disengaged from the art of measurement, with which it was incorporated in theocratic speculation. The very name of the science, however, indicates a culture almost as ancient: and geometry, properly so called, could alone offer an adequate field for arithmetical, and yet more for algebraic pursuit; which could not at first be separated. Thence Thales derived the first true geometry, which he presented in his fundamental theory of rectilinear figures, soon extended by the immortal discovery of Pythagoras, which might indeed have been derived from the theorems of Thales on proportional lines, if the power of abstract deduction had been sufficiently advanced, but which proceeded from the distinct principle of the direct study of areas. The well-known fact of Thales teaching the Egyptian priests to measure the height of their pyramids by the length of their shadows is, to the thoughtful, a symptom of vast significance, disclosing the true state of science,

still absurdly exaggerated in favour of ancient theocracy, while it exhibits the intellectual progress already made when human reason began to deal, for purposes of scientific utility, with an order of phenomena which had hitherto been merely a subject of superstitious terror. From that date geometry rose, by the aid of the invention of conic sections, to the perfection which it exhibited in the genius of Archimedes, in whom we recognize the eternal type of the true geometer, and the originator of the fundamental methods to which we owe all subsequent progress. After him, I need specify (except perhaps Apollonius) only Hipparchus, the founder of trigonometry (after the preparation made by Archimedes), the inventor of the chief methods of celestial geometry, and the indicator of its practical relations, in regard to the ascertainment of time and place. Mathematical speculation then offered the only field for scientific activity, for reasons exhibited in the whole course of this work, and illustrated by the very name of the science indicating its exclusive positivity at that period. The study of life by the physician Hippocrates, and the works of Aristotle on animals, meritorious as they are, could not so affect the human mind as to render it adequate to sciences of such complexity as to require a systematic creation in a remote future.

With this advent of rational positivity came in that spirit of special research which at once distinguished the new order of speculations from the indeterminate contemplations of the ancient philosophy. Our modern need is of new generalities; but the case of the ancients was very different. The pursuit of specialities then involved no political disadvantages; and it was the only means by which, independently of the common need of division of employments, the human mind could learn to penetrate the depths of any subject whatever. In short, the scientific spirit was not, under the theological *régime*, the chief ulterior element of the positive *régime*, but only destined for its remote preparation; and it must therefore be special in its character, or fail altogether: and there is, in fact, no doubt that men of science, properly so called, began to appear as a separate class from the philosophers, at the memorable epoch distinguished under this point of view by the foundation of the museum of Alexandria, directly adapted to satisfy this new intellectual need, when progressive polytheism had achieved its final triumph over the stationary.

As for the purely philosophical development, it had for some time before its separation from the scientific, been *Philosophy.* influenced by the nascent positivity. This is shown by the marked intervention of metaphysics. Before astronomical study had begun to disclose the existence of natural laws, the human mind, eager to escape from the exclusively theological *régime*, was searching among rudimentary mathematical conceptions for universal ideas of order and fitness, which, confused and

illusory as they were, were a genuine first presentiment of the subjection of all phenomena to natural laws. This original loan of science to philosophy was the basis of the whole Greek metaphysics; and the metaphysical spirit followed upon mathematical discovery, passing from the mysteries of numbers to those of forms as science proceeded from arithmetic to geometry, and at length comprehended both classes of ideas. Aristotle's mighty work will always be the most admirable monument of this philosophy, an immortal testimony to the intrinsic power of human reason in a period of extreme speculative imperfection, passing sagacious judgment on the sciences and fine arts, and omitting from his range of conceptions only the industrial arts, which were then thought beneath the notice of free citizens. When the Alexandrian establishment had separated philosophy into natural and moral, it obtained a more and more active social existence, and strove for ever-increasing influence upon the government of mankind. Notwithstanding the strange extravagances of this new phase, it was as necessary as the first in preparation for the monotheistic *régime*, not only as precipitating the decline of polytheism but as unconsciously supplying, as we shall see, a germ of spiritual re-organization. If we made a thorough examination into the series of speculations on the supreme good, we should discover a tendency to conceive of social economy in complete independence of all theological philosophy. But such a hope could have none but a critical influence, like all that sprang from this philosophy which was the active organ of an intellectual and moral anarchy very like our own. Its radical unfitness to be a basis of even mental, and much more social organization, is unquestionable, at the time of its chief spiritual activity, as we see by the continuous progress of universal and systematic doubt, leading every school from Socrates to Pyrrho and Epicurus to a denial of all external existence. This strange issue, directly incompatible with any idea of natural law, discloses the radical antipathy between the metaphysical spirit and the positive, from the time of the separation of philosophy from science; a separation which the good sense of Socrates saw to be impending, but without suspecting either the limits or the dangers involved. Its distinctive social action throughout its whole course, reprobated as it will ever be by posterity, was well represented by the noble Fabricius, when, speaking of Epicureanism, he regretted that such a moral philosophy as that did not prevail among the Samnites and the other enemies of Rome, because it would then be so easy to conquer them. Its intellectual action was scarcely more favourable; as we may judge by the fact that when the separation between philosophy and science had gone sufficiently far, the most eminent philosophers were ignorant of knowledge which was popularized in the school of Alexandria; as when the philosophy of Epicurus put forth those

strange astronomical absurdities which the poet Lucretius <sup>ridiculously</sup> repeated, half a century after the time of Hipparchus. In short, metaphysics desired to be so independent and absolute as to be emancipated from the only two powers that can organize,—theology and science.

The Roman civilization will not detain us so long as the Greek. It is more simple and marked; and its influence on modern society is more complete and evident. I *The Roman or Military.* may point out here, that in assigning the names Greek and Roman to certain phases of civilization, I am not deserting my abstract method of research, but rendering those names abstract, by making them the representatives of certain collective conditions. Antiquity presents many populations animated by military activity, but prevented by circumstances from fulfilling a career of conquest; and, on the other hand, inverse influences have favoured an opposite state. Each case must, in its extreme, furnish an instance of preponderant political or intellectual superiority. The system of conquest could not be completely carried out by more than one power: and the spiritual action which was compatible with the age, must operate from a single centre first, whatever the ulterior propagation might amount to. The further we examine, the more we shall see that there has been nothing fortuitous about this double process of human advancement, even in the places and times indicated by these representative names. As to the places, it is obvious that the two movements, political and intellectual, go forward in scenes sufficiently but not too remote, so that at the outset the one should not be absorbed or perverted by the other, while yet they should be able, after a certain progress had been made, to penetrate each other, so as to conduce and converge equally to the monotheistic *régime* of the Middle Ages, which we shall soon see to have issued from this memorable combination. As to the time, it is obvious that the mental progression of Greece must precede by some centuries the extension of the Roman dominion, the premature establishment of which would have radically impeded it by crushing the independent activity from which it arose: and if the interval had, on the other hand, been too great, the universal propagation and social use would have failed, because the original movement, which could not be of any great duration, would have become too much weakened at the time of contact. On the other hand, when the first Cato insisted on the expulsion of the philosophers, the political danger from metaphysical contagion was pretty nearly gone by, since the Roman impulsion was by that time too decided to be really liable to such adulteration: but if a permanent contact had been possible two or three centuries earlier, it would certainly have been incompatible with the free and unmixed course of the spirit of conquest.

The more we study the Roman people, the more we see that it



was indeed destined to universal empire, as its own poet said, and as every citizen perseveringly and exclusively desired. The nation freed itself from its theocratic beginning by the expulsion of its kings, but securing its own organization by means of the senatorial caste, in which the sacerdotal was subordinated to the military power. When this wise and energetic corporation of hereditary captains failed to yield to the people or the army such influence as might attach them to the system of conquest, the natural march of events had the needed effect. Generally speaking, the formation and improvement of the internal constitution, and the gradual extension of external dominion, depended on each other much more than on any mysterious superiority of design and conduct in the chiefs, whatever may have been the influence of individual political genius, to which a vast career was thus opened. The first cause of success was the convergence of all the means of education, direction, and execution towards one homogeneous and permanent end, more accessible than any other to all minds, and even to all hearts. The next cause was the gradual course of the progression. When we see this noble republic devoting three or four centuries to the solid establishment of its power in a radius of under a hundred miles, about the same time that Alexander was spreading out his marvellous empire in the course of a few years, it is not difficult to foresee the fate of the two empires, though the one usefully prepared the East for the succession of the other. Another cause of success

*Conquest.*

was the course of conduct steadily pursued towards the conquered nations; the principle being that of progressive incorporation, instead of the instinctive aversion to foreigners which elsewhere attended the military spirit. If the world, which resisted every other power, rather welcomed than withstood the Roman rule, it was owing to the new spirit of large and complete aggregation which distinguished it. When we compare the conduct of Rome towards vanquished, or rather incorporated peoples, with the dreadful vexations and insulting caprices that the Athenians (who were otherwise very attractive) heaped upon their tributaries, and even at times on their allies, we see that the Greeks aimed at making the most of a precarious sway, while the Romans were securely advancing towards universal supremacy. Never since that period has the political evolution been manifested in such ful-

*Morality.*

ness and unity, in the people and their leaders,—the end being kept in view. The moral development was in harmony with the same end,—the individual man being disciplined for military life, and domestic morality being unquestionably higher than in Greece. The most eminent Greeks wasted much of their leisure among courtesans; whereas among the Romans the social consideration and legitimate influence of women were largely increased, while their moral existence was more strictly confined to the purposes of their destination. The introduction of family names,

unknown in Greece, is a sufficient testimony to the growth of the domestic spirit.—Social morals also were in a rising state, notwithstanding the hardness and cruelty to slaves, customary in that period, and the ferocity encouraged by the horrible nature of popular amusements, which shock the feeling of a modern time. The sentiment of patriotism was modified and ennobled by the best disposition towards the vanquished, and had something of the character of the universal charity soon to be proposed by monotheism. This remarkable nation presents the supreme case of the political government of morality; so that the morality may be divined by a direct consideration of the polity. Born to command in order to assimilate; destined to extinguish by its own ascendancy the barren military activity which threatened to disintegrate humanity; accepting only to discard the common tendencies of original civilization, this noble nation manifested, amidst its prodigious imperfections, an assemblage of qualities adapted to its mission; a mission which, being fulfilled and incapable of reproduction, will immortalize the name of Rome to the remotest ages of political existence. The intellectual development *Intellectual development.* could be no more than accessory; consisting in extending the mental action induced by Greek civilization; and this it accomplished with an earnestness that contrasts well with the puerile jealousies which still further divided the Greek mind. The Roman imitations were necessarily inferior to the Greek originals; but there were some exceptions to this inferiority, especially in the historical department, as was natural. The decline of Rome testifies to the justice of our estimate of its mission. When its dominion could be extended no further, this vast organism, having lost its moving principle, fell into dissolution, exhibiting a moral corruption without parallel in the history of society; for nowhere else has there existed such a concentration of means, in the form of power and wealth, in the absence of any end. The passage of the republic to imperial government, though evidently compelled by the circumstances which converted extension into preservation, was no re-organization, but only a mode of chronic destruction of a system which must perish because it did not admit of regeneration. The emperors were mere popular chiefs, and, introducing no fresh principles of order, only accelerated the decline of the senatorial caste, on which everything depended, but whose function was now exhausted. When Cæsar, one of the greatest of men, sank under the alliance of metaphysical fanaticism with aristocratic rage, this foolish and odious murder had no other issue than raising to the leadership of the people against the senate men much less fit for the government of the world; and none of the changes which ensued ever admitted of any return, however temporary, to the genuine Roman organization, because its existence was inseparably connected with the gradual extension of conquest.

Having thus reviewed the three essential phases of ancient polytheism, we have only to indicate the tendency of the whole *régime* to produce the monotheistic order of the Middle Ages, by which the relative character of polytheism will be indisputably established.

In an intellectual view, the filiation is perfectly clear; the necessary and continuous destination of the Greek philosophy being to serve as the organ of the irrevocable decline of polytheism, in preparation for the advent of monotheism. The only essential rectification of modern opinion required in this matter is to recognize, in this great speculative revolution, the latent influence of the nascent positive spirit in giving an intermediary character to this philosophy, which, ceasing to be wholly theological, and unable as yet to be scientific, constitutes that temporary chronic malady, the metaphysical state. The confused sense of the necessary existence of natural laws, awakened by the introduction of geometrical and astronomical truths, was the only means of giving any philosophical consistence to that universal disposition to monotheism which arose from the steady progress of the spirit of observation, circumscribing supernatural intervention till it was condensed into a monotheistic centre. If no theological unity was possible amidst the instability, isolation, and discordance of primitive observations of nature, neither could reason be satisfied amidst the contradictions of a multitude of capricious divinities when the regularity of the external world was becoming more apparent as observation extended. I remarked before that the transition was facilitated by the belief in fate, as the god of immutability, to whom the other gods were subordinated more and more as the permanence of natural relations was revealed by accumulated experience. The irresistible conviction of such supremacy was the original and undisputed basis of a new mental *régime*, which has, at this day, become complete for the highest order of minds. The mode of transition cannot be questioned if we consider that the Providence of the monotheists is nothing else than the Fate of the polytheists, gradually inheriting and absorbing the prerogatives of all the other deities, and only assuming a more determinate and concrete character as a more active extension succeeded to the vague and abstract earlier conception. Absolute monotheism, as presented by metaphysical deists,—that is, the doctrine of one supernatural being, without mediators between him and Man,—is a mere abstraction, which can furnish no basis for any religious system of real efficacy, intellectual, moral, or, above all, social. The popular idea of monotheism closely resembles the latest polytheistic conception of a multitude of supernatural beings, subjected directly, regularly, and permanently to the sway of a single will, by which their respective offices are appointed: and the popular

instinct justly rejects as barren the notion of a god destitute of ministers. Thus regarded, the transition, through the idea of Fate, to the conception of Providence, is clear enough, as effected by the metaphysical spirit in its growth.

Besides the reasons already assigned for the Greek philosophy having taken the lead, when the rest of the world was ready, we must bear in mind the accordance of the spirit of doubt and intellectual indecision with the tendencies of the contemporary social state. The military education of the Greeks, unprovided with an adequate object; the fluctuating state of their polity; and the perpetual contentions among peoples at once alike and mutually repugnant,—were all predisposing causes of the reception of the metaphysical philosophy, which in due time disclosed a congenial career to the Greek mind. It could never have obtained a footing in Rome while a single clear aim absorbed all the powers of the nation; nor did it, when that aim was accomplished. When Rome was mistress of the world, the conflicts of Greek rhetoricians and sophists never excited more than a factitious kind of interest.

From the outset, as I observed before, the metaphysical philosophy contemplated some sort of government of society by mind, under the direction of some metaphysical system or other. This is shown by the convergence of all manner of discordant Utopias towards the same end. But the radical incapacity of metaphysics was so apparent when moral philosophy came to be applied to the conduct of society, that it became necessary to draw towards monotheism, which was the centre of all important speculation, the only basis of the needed union, and the only fulcrum of genuine spiritual authority. Thus we see that in the grandest period of Roman empire, the various philosophical sects were more theologically inclined than for two or three centuries before, busily propagating monotheistic doctrine, as the only intellectual basis of universal association. As science was then only nascent, and metaphysics could organize nothing but doubt, it was necessary to recur to theology, for the sake of its social properties, which were to be cultivated on the monotheistic principle. The Roman sway was favourable to this process, both because it had organized wide intellectual communication, and because it exhibited within its bounds the whole collection of religions in all their barrenness, and thus called for a homogeneous religion such as monotheism; the only one which offered such dogmatic generality as would suit all the elements of this vast agglomeration of nations.

The social aspect of this revolution (the greatest the world has ever seen, except the one in progress) also shows it to be a necessary result of that combination of Greek and Roman influence, at the period of their interpenetration, which Cato so unavailingly opposed. The fact of this combination throws much light on the

division of the spiritual and the temporal power, which appears paradoxical till its causes are understood. The speculative ambition of the metaphysical sects impelled them to aim at absolute dominion,—at guiding not only the opinions and morals of men, but their acts and practical affairs, by philosophers, who should have become supreme in authority. It was yet too early for the conception of a regular division between moral and political government: neither philosophers nor emperors dreamed of it. Thus, philosophy was in perpetual, though latent insurrection against a political system under which all social power was concentrated in the hands of military chiefs. Its professors, the independent thinkers who, without any regular mission, proposed themselves to the astonished but acquiescent public and magistracy as intellectual and moral guides in all the affairs of life, were, in their very existence, a germ of future spiritual power, apart from the temporal: and this is, in a social view, the mode in which Greek civilization participated in bringing about the new state of things. On the other hand, when Rome gradually conquered the world, nothing was further from her thoughts than ever giving up the system which was the basis of her greatness, and under which all sacerdotal power was in the hands of military chiefs: and yet, she contributed her share towards the formation of an independent spiritual power. It happened through her finding the impossibility of keeping together portions of her empire so various and remote by any temporal centralization, however stringent; and, again, by her military activity passing from the offensive to the defensive state, and parting off, for want of central aim, into independent principalities, requiring the advent of the spiritual power to unite them in a common bond. We shall see that this was the real origin of the feudality of the Middle Ages. A third way was that a universal morality became necessary, to unite the nations which were brought forcibly together while urged to mutual hatred by their respective forms of polytheism; and the need was met and satisfied by the communication of those higher and more general views and feelings which the conquering nobles had acquired by exercise and proof. In this way it appears that the political movement had as much share as the philosophical in causing that spiritual organization which distinguished the Middle Ages, and which owed its attribute of generality to the one movement, and that of morality to the other.

As nothing was fortuitous in this great revolution, but, on the contrary, every leading feature might be anticipated

*The Jews.*

after due consideration of the conditions I have indicated, it may be interesting to observe what Roman province must be the scene of the great result of the dualism just described. It must be a portion of the empire which was especially prepared for monotheism, and for the habitual existence of an independent

spiritual power. It must have an intense and obstinate nationality, which would make it suffer under isolation, and find a way out of it, without surrendering its peculiar faith, and indeed being disposed to propagate it. These conditions point to the little Jewish theocracy, derived in an accessory way from the Egyptian, and perhaps also the Chaldean theocracy, whence it probably emanated by a kind of exceptional colonization of the sacerdotal caste, the superior orders of which, become monotheists by their own intellectual progress, were led to institute, as a refuge or an experiment, a monotheistic colony, in which monotheism preserved a difficult but avowed existence,—at least, after the separation of the ten tribes. Before the annexation to Rome, this anomalous people was only the more isolated by its faith, through the pride of superiority which enhanced, in their case, the superstition of exclusive nationality proper to all theocracies. This peculiarity was beneficial to the great movement, by furnishing the first direct instruments of the universal regeneration.

This view seems to present itself naturally; but it is not essential to our analysis. If the Jews had not made a beginning, some other nation would have offered the requisite organs; and those organs would have guided the advance in precisely the same direction, only transferring to some books, now probably lost, the sacred character which is still attributed to others.

The slowness of this immense revolution is easily accounted for, if we only consider how all the social powers of the polytheistic *régime* were concentrated, so that it was necessary to change everything almost at once. The theocratic elements of the Roman system were once more in the first rank; for the five or six centuries which intervened between the emperors and the kings may be considered as a vast military episode in the long period proper to ancient theocracies; and the sacerdotal character, which had, for that interval, been effaced by the military, re-appeared when conquest ceased. With the re-establishment of the theocratic *régime*, now much weakened, the conservative instinct proper to it revived, notwithstanding the instability of the rulers after the humiliation of the senatorial caste. This confusion between the temporal and spiritual power, which was the very spirit of the system, explains why even the wisest and most generous of the Roman emperors could no more understand than a Chinese emperor could now, the voluntary renunciation of polytheism, which they regarded, and feared to sanction, as a demolition of their whole government, till the gradual conversion of the population to Christian monotheism introduced a new political influence, permitting first, and then requiring, the conversion of the leaders. That conversion terminated the preparatory progression, and opened the new system by a decisive symptom of the real, indepen-

dent power of the new spiritual authority which was to be its great moving force.

Such is my view of ancient polytheism as a whole, contemplated in its intellectual and social aspects, and examined as to its tendency to produce the new theological phase of the Middle Ages; which, again, after performing higher social functions than its predecessor, is making way for the advent of the positive philosophy. In the examination of monotheism to which I shall now proceed, I shall be obliged, as hitherto, to content myself with proposing my series of historical views, in illustration of my theory of human development; leaving it to the reader to supply the mass of historical proof which it would be incompatible with the nature and limits of my work for me to set before him.

## CHAPTER IX.

## AGE OF MONOTHEISM.—MODIFICATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY SYSTEM.

WHEN Rome had united the civilized world under her sway, the time was come for Monotheism to assume and complete the work of preparation for a new and higher social life. The intellectual decline of the theological philosophy was about to begin: but it had not yet attained its full social value: and this action, inverse to that of the polytheistic *régime*, is the reason why we should consider its social qualities,—beginning with the political,—before examining its mental attributes. I begin with the political, because, though the predominant action of monotheism is moral, its moral efficacy itself has always depended on its political existence. My task will be shortened by a new facility, which will attend us from this point onwards,—that of attending to one form only of the theological *régime*. Hitherto, we have had to separate the abstract qualities of the system examined from the various modes in which they were realized. Now, we have *Catholicism, the form.* to attend only to the Roman Catholic form of monotheism, because, while Mohammedanism, the Greek faith, and every other form of monotheism, presents a remarkable general conformity with all the rest, it is the Roman Catholic form which has fulfilled the functions of the *régime* in Western Europe: and it must therefore be the single object of our examination. I prefer the term Catholicism to that of Christianity, not only because it is more distinctive, but because it is more universal, from involving no name of any individual founder, but comprehending the monotheistic principle without sectarian limitation. Every one knows what a Catholic is; but the wisest man will not undertake to say what a Christian is, now that the title belongs to all the thousand varieties which separate the primitive Lutheran from the pure deist.

As the chief attribute of the political system of monotheism is the introduction of a spiritual power independent of the temporal, we must first examine this great social creation, passing on afterwards to the temporal organization.



The uniformity of belief proper to monotheism, and enforced by it, admits of the establishment of a single theological system among peoples too important and too diverse to be long kept together under one temporal government: whence such a consistence and dignity must accrue to the sacerdotal class as affords a ground for political independence. The preparation of the conditions, beginning from the concurrence of the Roman power with the Greek philosophy, was very slow. The Greek philosophy, it is true, contemplated the establishment of a spiritual power; but it did not contemplate the separation of the temporal power from it: hence it merely indicated, as every Utopia does, the social need of the age, and prophesied its satisfaction: and it remained for Catholicism to take to itself whatever was true and practicable in all other schemes, dismissing what was foolish or hurtful. How this was done we shall see as we proceed.

Though intelligence must always exert a powerful influence in human affairs, and though a certain convergence of *Principle of political rule.* opinion is necessary to all association, and therefore to all government, such supremacy of intellect in political government as the Greek philosophers desired can never be more than a dream. The intellectual life is feeble than the affective in our organism, as I have repeatedly said; and mental superiority is too little understood and appreciated by the majority of society to obtain an immediate and practical ascendancy. The mass of mankind, being destined to action, sympathize most with organizations of moderate intelligence and eminent activity. The general gratitude also waits upon services which satisfy the sum of human wants, among which those of the intellect are very far from holding the most conspicuous place. The most vivid interest and the most unqualified gratitude are excited by practical success, military or industrial, though such achievement requires far less intellectual power than almost any theoretical labours, even of a kind very inferior to the highest speculations in art, science, and philosophy. Though these speculative services are the loftiest of benefits, and the very means of progress, they cannot awaken the rapid and ready enthusiasm excited by far inferior operations: for mental participation in them is too remote and too abstract to be obtained otherwise than through a more or less difficult analysis, which is not favourable to sudden fervour, even among enlightened men. Even in the regions of science and philosophy, the most general conceptions bring less honour to their illustrious creators than discoveries of an inferior order, as an Aristotle, a Descartes, and a Leibnitz had only too much reason to know. The value of such men is not recognized till their mission has closed; and they are sustained in their labours, not by an immediate supremacy (which would be sure, under a reign of mind, to be seized by the boldest pretenders), but by their secret consciousness of their intellectual rank, and their

instinctive assurance of their ulterior influence on human destiny. And then, again, there is the shortness of our life, on which I remarked before as injurious to our political organism. A greater longevity might allow a better social classification of intellect, by affording more time for the recognition of choice minds; but at present the cases are extremely rare of thinkers of the first order being appreciated till their life, or their genius, has passed away. The sacerdotal sway under the old theocracies may seem to be a contradiction to what I have now said; but, besides that the case was an anomalous one which can never recur, as the beginning of a new system can happen but once, we must remember that the intellectual superiority of the governing power showed itself in a practical form. From the singular concentration of functions in the priestly caste, their speculative labours, which were seldom greater than occasion required, were professedly and complacently subordinated to practical use, whether medical, administrative, industrial, or any other. Thus it was not intellectual superiority that was raised to supremacy: and it could not be so in a society organized by the hereditary principle. It was among the Greek philosophers that the speculative character first became distinctly marked; and we know how far it was, amidst all its strenuous efforts, from ever obtaining political sway. It is plain, on every ground, that the real social office of mind is not to engross the conduct of life, but to modify, by its consultative or preparatory influence, the rule of material or practical power, whether military or industrial: and no complaints on the part of philosophers will affect an order of things which, being natural, must be most in harmony with social conditions. The direct consideration of utility is so narrow that it would be oppressive and dangerous in action if unmodified; but not the less is it the basis of all sound social classification. In social as in individual life, judgment is more necessary than genius, except on the rare occasions when a new elaboration or special animation of the mass of social thought is required. Then some few eminent thinkers interpose to conduct the crisis, and set forward the ordinary movement again for another long period. It will be seen, if we inquire, that in every instance of the appearance of any great new social phase, simple good sense, after having given place for a time, quietly resumes its social sway; and the more fit abstract speculation is to conduct such crises, the less adapted is it for the daily direction of common affairs. Intellectually, contemplative minds are unprepared for special and pressing calls on their activity; and morally, they cannot take a sufficient interest in the obtrusive and detailed reality with which it is the business of government to deal. Again, they are led away by their interest in some special study from that consideration of the whole which is the first attribute of good government; and when a decision is required which cannot be sound unless it rests upon a balance of

social views, the philosopher will be found remotely pursuing his abstract study of one single social aspect. The very few who are able to keep the whole in view while pursuing their own order of speculation are precisely those who are furthest from desiring to rule society, because they best know how mischievous the aim would be if it were not impracticable. Mankind cannot therefore too eminently honour those noblest minds which devote themselves to think for the whole race; mankind cannot too carefully cherish these, its chief treasures and adornments, nor too eagerly support their functions by administering all possible facilities, and laying society open to their vivifying influence; but it should, at the same time, carefully avoid committing the ordinary direction of society to men whose characteristic qualities render them essentially unfit for the task. We must remember, too, how indispensable constant stimulus is to this least active part of human nature, which needs opposition to rouse it to work. Mind is made for conflict, and not for rule, and it would sink into fatal atrophy from the moment when, instead of having to modify an order independent of itself, it should indulge in admiration of an order of its own creation and appointment. From that moment it would follow the conservative course of theocratic government: and we have seen what that is. It is needless to point out that by this time it would not be the first-rate minds that would be in the seats of power, but inferior thinkers, who, with the lower morality which belongs to their combined intellectual and social rank, would use their power to maintain their position. Envy and hating the superiors whose honours they usurped, and repressing the mental development of the mass of the people, these pretended intellectual princes would, if their reign were possible, teach us how incompatible with order and progress is a nominal reign of Mind. If the ruling powers of the civilized world have not, in fact, systematically hindered the expansion of the human mind, it is (for one reason among others) because they did not suppose mental superiority to be any qualification for political rule, and were therefore not afraid to encourage its spread.

This seems to be a long digression; but I have pursued it designedly, not only because it seems to me to be called for by some circumstances of our times, but because we shall find it a valuable preparation for our dynamic studies, saving the necessity of various elucidations which would otherwise be called for. I may add that it may obviate some natural though baseless fears of a sort of theocratic despotism, such as might otherwise be entertained when we propose the idea of an intellectual re-organization of the political system of modern society. It enables us, on our return to our proper historical ground, to estimate the difficulty which the monotheistic system had to surmount, in the Middle Ages, in forming the new social constitution of the most advanced portion of the

human race. The great political problem was to discard the dreams of Greek philosophy about the sovereignty of intellect, while satisfying the irresistible desire for social ascendancy entertained by the speculative activity of a long course of generations. The new power had been in a state of latent insurrection under the Greek, and also the Roman *régime*; and it was now necessary, under pain of an eternal and fatal conflict between the men of action and the men of thought, to organize some permanent reconciliation, which should convert this vicious antagonism into a useful emulation, assigning to each great force a share in the political system,—a participation independent while convergent, and enjoyed in virtue of prerogatives naturally inherent in each. This was the vast difficulty encountered by Catholicism in the Middle Ages, and admirably surmounted by means of that fundamental division between the spiritual and the temporal authority which will be more and more recognized as the greatest advance ever made in the general theory of the social organism, and as the main cause of the superiority of the modern to the ancient polity. No doubt the solution was empirical at first; and it was not till long afterwards that its true philosophical conception was wrought out of the experience of the facts; but such has been the process with all great political issues, because a rational political science, qualified to guide and enlighten the gradual course of active operations, has never yet existed. The character and efficacy of this great act of progress were also impaired by its connection with the provisional destiny of the theological philosophy, even then, on the decline: and this connection is, in fact, the main cause of the repugnance which modern minds are apt to feel, in a temporary way, towards the distribution of power which, once effected under any form, will remain,—whatever may become of its first philosophical basis,—and prevail even in the minds to which it was once most unacceptable, till, philosophically reconstructed, it becomes the grand foundation of modern re-organization. It is clear, moreover, that the theological aim of the speculative class must have seriously injured their social function; because their intellectual and even their moral functions must have been insignificant in comparison with their charge of the faith, and all social direction of minds and hearts uninteresting in comparison with the salvation of souls. Again, the almost indefinite authority possessed by the exclusive interpreters of the divine will and judgments were favourable to abuse, and even vicious usurpation, such as was only too congenial to ecclesiastical power, through its natural ambition, and the vague and absolute character of its essential doctrines, which proposed no rational limitation of the various kinds of human authority. These evils hastened the decline of the constitution to which they belonged, and they troubled the process of the true distribution of power; but

*The great problem.*

*Separation of spiritual and temporal power.*

they did not ruin it. They did not prevent its aiding the contemporary progression of the race, nor its establishment as a precedent for the future improvement of the social organism; these being the two aspects in which we have now to examine it. It is incompatible with the limits of this Work to give such an account of the economy of the Catholic system of the Middle Ages as could convey any idea of the profound admiration I entertain for it; but it is the positive philosophy which will first render justice to this greatest political achievement of human wisdom. Hitherto it has been examined by panegyrists, who were necessarily under a sort of fanaticism on the subject, or by blind detractors, who saw nothing of its social destination. The positive philosophy, as free from monotheistic as from polytheistic or fetich belief, can be equally impartial in all the cases, and, being provided with a theory, can judge of the participation of Catholicism in human progress, in the way that institutions, like men, can alone be truly judged: that is, after the full accomplishment of their principal mission.

We have seen that hitherto morals had always been subordinated to political considerations. The grand social characteristic of Catholicism was that by constituting a moral power, wholly independent of the political, it

*Transposition  
of morals and  
politics.*

infused morality into political government; and this was done so naturally in the course of human progress, that it has survived the decay of the system which was its first organ; and with such vigour, that it marks, amidst all fluctuations, and more than any other characteristic whatever, the radical superiority of modern civilization over that of antiquity. From the outset, this new power took up a position equally remote from the foolish political pretensions of the Greek philosophy, and the degrading servility of the theocratic spirit, prescribing submission to established governments, while subjecting these governments to a universal morality of growing strictness. Whether, as at first, under Roman sway, or, as afterwards, under that of the forces of the North, it certainly aimed at nothing more than modifying by moral influence a pre-existing and independent political power. If the conflicts between the two powers which abounded so much in the Middle Ages are duly examined, it will be found that they were almost defensive on the part of the spiritual power, which had to contend, and did contend nobly, though often with only partial success, for the independence which was necessary to the discharge of its mission. The tragical story of Thomas à Becket, with a multitude more, less famous in history, proves that the aim of the clergy in such conflicts was to guard their choice of their own functionaries from temporal usurpation; a pretension which must be admitted to be legitimate and modest enough. Any rational theory about the boundaries of the two powers must, it seems to me, rest on the general principle that, as the spiritual power relates

*Function  
of each.*

to *education*, and the temporal one to *action*, the influence of each must be sovereign in its own department, and only consultative in that of the other. Thus, the function of the spiritual power is, in the first place, to educate, according to the ordinary sense of the word, and then to keep up and apply, in the social practice of individuals and classes, the principles which education had prepared for the guidance of their life. As to still wider, even international relations, by which this power was chiefly characterized in the Middle Ages, they were simply an extension of the same operation to peoples so remote and so various as to require distinct and independent temporal government; and which would therefore have been without any regular political connection if the spiritual power, equally at home among all nations, had not employed its universal privilege in arbitrating in all their disputes, and, on occasion, promoting their collective activity. When once we have summed up all its prerogatives under the principle of Education, which enables us to take a single comprehensive view of the whole vast organism, we shall be so far from imputing to the Catholic power any serious usurpation of temporal authority, that we shall admit that it rarely obtained such freedom of action as was essential to the proper accomplishment of its mission, even in the days of its greatest splendour,—from about the middle of the eleventh to the end of the thirteenth century. Through all obstacles, however, Catholicism fulfilled its great provisional office, giving to the world, by its mere existence, an example which will never be lost of the inestimable influence on the improvement of society of a genuine spiritual authority, such as we have need of now, and shall obtain, when we have ascertained an intellectual basis for it, more direct, broader, and more durable than that of Catholicism.

It was under Catholicism that the speculative class began to assume the character assigned to it by the immutable laws of human nature, neither engrossing political sway, as in theocracies, nor remaining outside of the social organization, as under the Greek *régime*. Henceforth its post was one of calm and enlightened, but not indifferent observation of practical life, in which it could interpose only in an indirect manner, by its moral influence. Thus placed at the true point of view of the general economy, being the spontaneous, faithful organ, and the natural adviser of its needs, it was eminently adapted, by speaking to each in the name of all, to introduce into the active life of individuals, classes, and nations, the abstract consideration of the common good, which would otherwise have been effaced amidst the divergences and discordance of the activity of the age. From this memorable period, a regular division between theory and its application began to be established, in the case of social ideas, as it had already been, with more or less success, in the case of simpler conceptions: political principles were no longer empirically constructed

*The speculative class.*

as required by practical urgency: social necessities came to be wisely considered in advance; and a legitimate expansion was afforded to the spirit of social, and even of political improvement: in short, political action began to assume, in its intellectual relations, a character of wisdom, extent, and even rationality which had never existed before, and which would have been more marked already, but for the misfortune that the philosophy involved in the operation was the theological. Morally regarded, there can be no doubt that this modification of the social organism developed among even the lowest ranks of the nations concerned in it a sense of dignity and elevation before almost unknown: for the universal morality, thus established by general conviction outside of and above the political sphere of action, authorized the meanest Christian to adduce, on occasion, to the most powerful noble, the inflexible prescriptions of that common doctrine which was the basis of obedience and respect; an obedience and respect which were now due to the function, and no longer to the person; so that submission might henceforth cease to be servile, and remonstrance to

*The Catholic system.* be hostile. In a purely political view, this happy regeneration realized the great Utopia of the Greek philosophers, in all that was useful and reasonable, while excluding its follies and extravagances; since it constituted, in the midst of an order founded upon birth, fortune, or military valour, an immense and powerful class in which intellectual and moral superiority was openly entitled to ascendancy, and often led to the most eminent positions in the hierarchy; so that the same capacity which would have been disturbing or oppressive according to Greek notions, thenceforth became the ordained guide of the general progress: a settlement so satisfactory that we have only to follow its lead in reconstructing the same system on a better foundation.—In the international view, we cannot but perceive the aptitude of the spiritual organization for an almost indefinite territorial extension, wherever there was an analogous civilization admitting of a system of continuous relations, while the temporal could not, from its very nature, transcend its much narrower limits, without such intolerable tyranny as induced its own destruction. The papal hierarchy, in fact, constituted, in the Middle Ages, the main bond among the various European nations, after the decline of the Roman sway: and, in this view, the Catholic influence ought to be judged, as De Maistre truly remarked, not only by the ostensible good which it produced, but yet more by the imminent evil which it silently eviated, and which, on that account, we can only inadequately appreciate. If we measure the value of such an organization by the Catholicity from which it derives its title, we shall find that it allows us, better than any other, to estimate both the superiority and the imperfection of Catholicism in comparison with the system which preceded and with that which must follow it. For, on the one

hand, the Catholic organization, extending to India and America, embraced an extent of territory and population far exceeding that of the Roman dominion, which became unmanageable by the disjunction and remoteness of its extremities from its active centre: and, on the other hand, Catholicism could incorporate with itself, in the days of its greatest splendour, only a small portion of the civilized world; since, before it was matured, the Mohammedan monotheism had taken possession of a large portion of the white race; and, some centuries afterwards, the Byzantine monotheism, which was almost as unlike it, had alienated from it for ever the half of the Roman world. These restrictions, so far from being accidental, must be philosophically regarded as an inevitable consequence of the vague and arbitrary character of theological belief, which, while laboriously organizing a dangerous, but temporary intellectual depression, could never occasion a satisfactory mental convergence among numerous and remote peoples, which can enter into durable communion only through a purely positive philosophy, amidst any possible elevation of the human race.

Having thus ascertained the social destination of the Catholic power, we must next briefly review the conditions of that action by which it achieved the moral results that remain imperishable after the decay of its intellectual basis.

These conditions naturally divide themselves into the two classes of statical and dynamical conditions; the first class *Ecclesiastical organization.* relating to the proper organization of the Catholic hierarchy; and the other to the accomplishment of its destination. Taking the statical conditions first,—we cannot be surprised at the universal political ascendancy of the ecclesiastical organization in the Middle Ages, superior as it was to all that surrounded it, and to all that had preceded it. Directly based upon intellectual and moral desert, at once flexible and stable, connected in all its chief parts, without repressing the proper activity of any, this admirable hierarchy could not but inspire in the humblest of its worthy members a sense of superiority, just, though sometimes too haughty, towards the ruder organisms with which it was at first connected, and which rested chiefly on birth, modified by fortune or military ability. When it took its true form, the Catholic organization, on the one hand, extended the elective principle by *Elective principle.* admitting to choice of office the whole of society, the lowest ranks of which have supplied cardinals, and even popes; and, on the other hand, it advanced the nature of this political principle by reversing the order of election, by causing the superiors to be chosen by the inferiors. The characteristic method of election to the supreme spiritual dignity must ever, it seems to me, be regarded as a masterpiece of political wisdom, in which the guarantees of stability and due preparation must be more secure than they could be by the empirical expedient of hereditary succession,



while the soundness of the choice must be favoured both by the superior wisdom of the well-adapted electors, and by the careful encouragement given to the capacity, wherever found, for ecclesiastical rule, proved by an active noviciate; these collective precautions being in full accordance with the extreme importance of the eminent function which Catholic philosophers have ever justly regarded as the nucleus of their ecclesiastical system.

We must also recognize the political bearing of the monastic institutions, which, apart from their intellectual services, certainly were one of the most indispensable elements of the vast organism. Arising out of the urgent need which, in the early days of Catholicism, was felt by contemplative minds to disengage themselves from the excessive dissipation and corruption of contemporary society, these special institutions, which we now know chiefly through the abuses of their declining period, were the cradle whence issued by anticipation the chief Christian conceptions, dogmatic and practical. Their discipline became afterwards the permanent apprenticeship of the speculative class, and the foundation whence issued the reformation of orders; a provision for the beneficial exercise of political genius which it has been impossible to appreciate, since the inevitable decay of this vast provisional system of spiritual organization. It is clear that the Catholic system could not have preserved, among its European relations, the attribute of generality, secure from absorption by the spirit of nationality inherent in its local clergy, if these contemplative train-bands, who were placed by their very nature at the universal point of view, had not been for ever reproducing direct thought, while exhibiting an example of independence which thereby became more generally practicable.

The chief condition of efficacy common to all the political qualities of the Catholic constitution was the powerful special education of the Clergy, which rendered the ecclesiastical genius habitually superior to every other, not only in knowledge of all kinds, but in political aptitude. The modern defenders of Catholicism, while proving that this education was always kept up to the most advanced point of general philosophy, have overlooked the importance of the introduction into that education of the new element of History, which, at least in the form of the history of the Church, became a part of ecclesiastical study. If we consider the filiation which connected Catholicism on the one hand with the Roman, and on the other with the Greek régime, and even, through Judaism, with the most ancient theocracies; and again, if we remember its continuous intervention in all great human affairs, we shall see that, from the time of its full maturity under the great Hildebrand, the history of the Church was a kind of fundamental history of humanity, in its social aspect. Whatever was narrow in this view was com-

pensated for by the unity of conception and composition which belonged to it, and which could not have been otherwise obtained: so that it should be no surprise that the philosophical origin of universal historical speculation is due to the genius of modern Catholicism. Taking for granted the political superiority which must have belonged to disciplined and meditative thinkers in the midst of an ignorant temporal aristocracy, who cared for nothing else in history than the genealogy of their houses, or some provincial or national chronicles, we may further admit that the prerogative still rests where it did, for want of being claimed by any other body. Amidst the intellectual and social decay of Catholicism, we shall probably find, in the higher ranks of its hierarchy, more minds than we can find elsewhere which are capable of assuming the true point of view of human affairs as a whole, though the political destruction of their corporation prevents their manifesting, or perhaps cultivating the quality.

One more quality of their political philosophy, hitherto unnoticed, remains to be pointed out;—I mean the discipline *Restriction of inspiration.* by which Catholicism, in the days of its greatness, diminished the political dangers of the religious spirit by restricting more and more that right of supernatural inspiration which no theological system can dispense with entirely, but which the Catholic organization reduced, and shackled by wise and powerful ordinances, the importance of which can be understood only by a comparison with the preceding, and in some sort, with the following state. Polytheism was never at a loss for a deity to protect some inspiration or other; and though monotheism reduced its extent, and modified its exercise, it still allowed a dangerous scope to inspiration, as we see by the case of the Jews, among whom prophets and seers abounded, and had even a certain recognized though irregular function. Catholicism, as the organ of a more advanced state, represented the privilege of inspiration as eminently exceptional, limiting it to instances more and more serious, to fewer and fewer chosen persons, at more and more distant intervals, and subjecting it to tests of growing severity; and it reached its last degree of possible restriction when divine communications were generally reserved for the supreme ecclesiastical authority exclusively. This papal infallibility, which has been regarded as such a reproach to Catholicism, was thus, in fact, a great intellectual and social advance. As De Maistre observed, it was simply the religious condition of the final jurisdiction, without which society would have been for ever troubled by the inexhaustible disputes generated by such vague doctrines. It will at once occur to the thoughtful observer that we find here a striking confirmation of the great proposition of historical philosophy before laid down, that, in the passage from polytheism to monotheism, the religious spirit underwent an intellectual decline; for we find Catholicism constantly

employed in actual life in extending the domain of human wisdom at the expense of that, once so vast, of divine inspiration.

I cannot afford space to dwell on the special institutions of Catholicism, however great their importance in the working of the organism; such, for instance, as the employment of a kind of sacred language, by the preservation of Latin in the sacerdotal corporation, when it was no longer the popular language; a means of facilitating communication and concentration, within and without, and also of putting off the inevitable day when the spirit of individual criticism should attack the noble social edifice, whose intellectual bases were so precarious. But there are still two eminent conditions, the one moral and the other political, which, without being so essential as those I have just noticed, are yet indispensably connected with Catholicism. Both were ordained by the special nature of the period and the system, rather than by the general nature of the spiritual organization: a distinction which is important to their clearness and relevancy in this place. They are, the institution of ecclesiastical celibacy, and the annexation of a temporal principality to the centre of spiritual authority, in order to secure its European independence.

The institution of ecclesiastical celibacy, long repressed, but at length established by the powerful Hildebrand, has *Ecclesiastical* ever been justly regarded as one of the essential bases *celibacy.* of sacerdotal discipline. Its favourable influence on the performance of spiritual and social functions, in a general way, is well understood; and, with regard to Catholicism in particular, it is seen to be necessary to the common discharge of the chief moral offices of the clergy, especially confession. In a political view, we have only to imagine a state of society in which, without celibacy, the Catholic hierarchy could certainly never have acquired or maintained either the social independence or the freedom of mind necessary to the accomplishment of their great provisional mission. The hereditary principle was still prevalent and in vigour, everywhere but in the ecclesiastical organization; and the clergy would have been drawn away by it, but for the institution of celibacy. Whatever nepotism there was, was exceptional; but there was enough to show what would have been the consequences if the division of the two social powers had been put to risk by such a transmutation as the popes found it so difficult to restrain, of bishops into barons, and priests into knights. We have never done justice to the bold and radical innovation wrought by Catholicism in the social organism, when it superseded the hereditary principle in the priesthood, which was incorporated with the social economy, not only of theocracies, but of the Greeks and Romans, among whom pontifical offices of importance were the exclusive patrimony of some privileged families, or at least of a caste. The great political service of Catholicism in aiming this fatal blow at

the system of caste is a sufficient evidence how far it was in advance of the society on which it had to operate. Yet the blind opponents of Catholicism may be seen to confound the Catholic *régime* with the ancient theocracies, while reproaching it with that ecclesiastical celibacy which renders pure theocracy impossible by guaranteeing a legitimate access to sacerdotal dignities for all ranks of society.

As for the temporal sovereignty of the Head of the Church,—it must not be forgotten that the Catholic system arose at a time when the two powers were confounded, and that it would have been absorbed or politically annulled by the temporal power, if the seat of its authority had been included in any particular jurisdiction, whose lord would presently, after the manner of his time, have humbled the pope into a sort of chaplain: unless, indeed, we resort to the artless supposition of a miraculous succession of Charlemagnes, sagacious, like him, to discern the true spirit of European organization in the Middle Ages, and therefore disposed to respect and guard the independence of the pope. Though monotheism favoured the separation of the two powers, it could not be with such energy and precision as would enable it to dispense with the aid of political conditions: and of these the most evident and important was the possession of a territorial sovereignty, containing a population which might be provisionally sufficient to itself, and which might thus offer a secure refuge to all members of the vast hierarchy, in case of collision with the temporal powers which, but for such a resource, would have held them in close local dependence. The seat of this exceptional principality was hardly a matter of choice. The centre of the authority that was henceforth to rule the civilized world must be in that one city in which alone the ancient order merged without interruption into the modern, by means of the rooted habits which for long ages had directed thither the social ideas and hopes of the human race. De Maistre has shown us how, in the famous removal to Byzantium, Constantine fled morally before the Church, no less than politically before the barbarians. The necessity of this temporal appendage to the supreme spiritual dignity must not, however, make us forget the serious evils arising from it, both towards the sacerdotal authority itself, and for the portion of Europe set apart to be this political anomaly. The purity, and even the dignity of the pontifical character were compromised by the permanent incorporation of the lofty prerogatives of the papacy with the secondary operations of provincial government. Through this very discordance, the popes have ruled so little in Rome, even in the most splendid period of Catholicism, as to have been unable to repress the factions of great families, whose disgraceful conflicts so often defied and injured the temporal authority of the papacy. Italian ambition had at first favoured the

*Temporal  
Sovereignty  
of the Popes.*

papal system; but in this way it helped to disorganize it; and the spiritual head of Europe is now seen transformed into a petty Italian prince, elective while his neighbours are hereditary, but occupied, just as they are, and even more than they, with the precarious maintenance of his local dominion.\* As for Italy at large, her intellectual and even moral development was accelerated by such a settlement: but she lost her political nationality by it: for the popes could neither pervert their function by including all Italy under their temporal rule, in defiance of Europe; nor, from a regard to their own independence, permit any other great Italian sovereignty to border upon their territory. There was no more deplorable consequence of the condition of existence that we have just reviewed than the political sacrifice of so valuable and so interesting a part of the European community, which has been fruitlessly struggling, for ten centuries, to establish a national unity incompatible with the political system founded upon Catholicism.

These statical conditions of the political existence of Catholicism have been noticed with so much distinctness, because they are open to misconception when the philosophical principle of interpretation is not laid hold of. The dynamical conditions may be more briefly dismissed. We have little more to consider than the great elementary prerogative of Education,—using the word in the large sense before assigned to it.

If we were philosophical enough to judge of the Catholic system of universal ministration, not by the backward character of Catholic education in the present day, but by what it was in comparison with the preceding state of things, we should better estimate its importance. The polytheistic régime doomed the mass of society to brutish stupidity: not only slaves but the majority of free men being deprived of all regular instruction, unless we may so call the popular interest in the fine arts and observance of festivals, finished off with scenic sports. Military education, in which free men alone could share, was in fact the only one in ancient times that could be appropriately organized. Vast, then, was the elementary progress when Catholicism imposed on every disciple the strict duty of receiving, and as far as possible, of procuring that religious instruction which, taking possession of the individual from his earliest days, and preparing him for his social duties, followed him through life, keeping him up to his principles by an admirable combination of exhortations, of exercises, and of material signs, all converging towards unity of impression. In an intellectual view, the philosophy which formed the basis of popular catechisms was all that it could be in those times,—all that existed except the metaphysical teachings, which were radically unfit, from their anti-organic nature, to enter into

\* Published in 1841.

general circulation, and which could only have engendered a prevalent scepticism. The rudiments of science, discovered in the school of Alexandria, were too weak, disconnected, and abstract to enter into popular education, even if they had not been repelled by the spirit of the system. So far from the Catholic system having always been repressive of popular intelligence, as is now most unjustly said, it was for a long period the most efficacious promoter of it. The prohibition of the indiscreet and popular use of the Scriptures was a logical necessity imposed by the view of giving an indefinite continuity to monotheism; and, injurious as are the intellectual and social consequences of such a prohibition, it cannot be philosophically regarded as a step backwards towards theocracy: for, so far from favouring the monopoly of knowledge and power which distinguished theocracy, the Catholic clergy were for ever labouring to imbue the whole of society with whatever knowledge they had themselves obtained. This was indeed a necessary consequence of the division of powers, which left no other sufficient support for the spiritual authority than the intellectual development of society. Our estimate of the mental and moral operation of the Catholic educational system will come in better hereafter; and our present business is with its political operation only. The political influence of the priesthood arose out of the natural ascendancy which accrues to the original directors of all education that is not confined to mere instruction; an immediate and general ascendancy, inherent in that great social office, quite apart from the sacred character of spiritual authority in the Middle Ages, and the superstitious terrors which were connected with it. Furnished from the beginning with the empirical wisdom of the Eastern theocracies and the ingenious speculations of the Greek philosophy, the Catholic clergy had to apply themselves to the steady and accurate investigation of human nature; individual and social; and they made as much progress in it as was possible by means of irrational observations, directed or interpreted by theological or metaphysical conceptions. Such knowledge, possessed in the highest existing degree, was eminently favourable to political ascendancy, because it naturally and at all times constitutes the chief intellectual basis of spiritual authority; all other sciences operating merely, in this relation, through their influence on speculation that regards Man and society. The institution of Confession is an all-important function of the prerogative of Education. It is at once a consequence and a complement of it. For it is impossible, on the one hand, that the directors of youth should not be the counsellors of active manhood; and, on the other, that the social efficacy of their early influence should be secure without such a protraction of moral influence as would enable them to watch over the daily application of the principles of conduct which they had instilled. There can be no stronger proof of the decay of the old spiritual organization than our present inability to

see the necessity of such a function, and to feel its adaptation to those primary needs of our moral nature, effusion and direction, which, in the first instance, could not be better satisfied than by the voluntary submission of every believer to a spiritual guide, freely chosen from a vast and eminent corporation, all whose members were usually fit to give useful advice, and incapable, from their disinterested position, of abusing a confidence on which their personal authority was founded. If such a consultative influence over human life were denied to the spiritual power, what social prerogative would remain that might not be more justly contested? The moral effects of this noble institution, which purified men by confession and rectified them by repentance, have been so effectually vindicated by those who understand them best, that we may spare ourselves any elaborate comparison of it with the rough and ineffectual discipline, equally precarious and vexatious, by which the magistrate, under the polytheistic system, strove to regulate morals by arbitrary precepts, in virtue of the confusion of powers which then prevailed. We have to regard it now only as an indispensable condition of spiritual government, furnishing the information and the moral means without which it could not perform its social office. The evils which it produced, even in its best days, are attributable less to the institution itself than to the vague and absolute nature of the theological philosophy on which the spiritual organization was founded. The right of absolution, almost arbitrary under the best securities, arose necessarily out of this position of circumstances; and no remonstrances could avail against the practical need of it; for without it, a single serious fault must have perpetually occasioned despair, the consequence of which, to the individual and to society, must have converted this salutary discipline into a source of incalculable disturbance.

From the political estimate of Catholicism, we must next pass *Dogmatic conditions.* on to a brief review of its dogmatic conditions, in order to see how secondary theological doctrines, which appear to us socially indifferent, were yet necessary to the political efficacy of a system so complex and factitious that when its unity, laboriously maintained, was once infringed by the destruction of any one of its component influences, the disorganization of the whole was, however gradual, absolutely inevitable.

The amount of polytheism involved in Catholicism was as small as the needs of the theological spirit would at all admit. But there were accessory dogmas which, derived more or less spontaneously from the characteristic theological conception, have expanded into means more or less necessary to the fulfilment of its destination in regard to social progress. We must notice the most important of these.

The vague and variable tendency of theological conceptions impairs their social efficacy by exposing the precepts they supply to

perpetual modification by human passions: and this difficulty can be met only by an incessant vigilance on the part of the corresponding spiritual authority. Catholicism had no choice, if the unity of its social function was to be preserved, but to repress the irreconcilable outbreaks of the religious spirit in individual minds by setting up absolute faith as the first duty of the Christian, because there was no other basis for moral obligation of other kinds. This was a real advance of the moral interests of society; for the great practical utility of religion in that age was that it permitted the provisional elevation of a noble speculative body, eminently adapted during its ascending period to direct the opinions and morals of mankind. It is from this point of view that the dogmatic, as well as the directly political character of Catholicism ought to be judged; for in no other way can we seize the true character of some doctrines, dangerous no doubt, but imposed by the nature or the needs of the system: and in no other way can we understand the importance formerly attributed by so many superior minds to special dogmas which might at first appear useless to the final destination, but which had a real bearing both upon the ecclesiastical unity and social efficacy of Catholicism. Some of these dogmas were the very means of the destruction of the system, by the mental and moral insurrection which they provoked. For instance, the dogma that the reception of the Catholic faith is the sole means of salvation was the only instrument for the control of theological divergence; but this fatal declaration, which involves the damnation of all heretics, involuntary as well as wilful, excited more deep and unanimous indignation than any other, when the day of emancipation arrived; for nothing is more confirmatory of the provisional destination of all religious doctrines than their gradually leading on to the conversion of an old principle of love into a final ground of insurmountable hatred; as we should see more and more henceforth amidst the dissolution of creeds, if their social action did not tend finally towards a total and common extinction. The dogma of the condemnation of mankind through Adam, which is, morally, more revolting than the other, was also a necessary element of the Catholic philosophy, not only for the theological explanation it supplied of human suffering, but, more specially, because it afforded ground for the scheme of redemption, on the necessity of which the whole economy of the Catholic faith is based. The institution of purgatory was happily introduced into the social practice of Catholicism, as a necessary corrective of the eternity of future punishment; for without it, there must have been either fatal relaxation or uncontrollable despair,—both alike dangerous to the individual and to society: whereas, by this intermediate issue both were avoided, and the religious procedure could be exactly adapted to each case. This was a case of political

*Dogma of  
exclusive  
salvation.*

*Of the Fall.*

*Of purgatory.*



necessity; and another, yet more special, is that of the assignment of an absolutely divine character to the real or ideal founder of this great system, through the relation of such a conception to the radical independence of the spiritual power, which is thus at once placed under an inviolable authority of its own, direct though invisible: whereas, under the Arian hypothesis, the temporal power, addressing itself immediately to a general Providence, must be less disposed to respect the intervention of the sacerdotal body, whose mystic head has been much lowered in rank. We cannot imagine, at this day, the immense difficulty of every kind that Catholicism had to encounter in organizing the separation of the two authorities; and therefore we can form no judgment of the various resources required by the struggle; among which resources this apotheosis is conspicuous, tending as it did to raise the Church in the eyes of monarchs; while, on the other hand, a rigorous divine unity would have favoured, in an inverse way, too great a concentration of the social ascendancy. We accordingly find in history a varied and decisive manifestation of the obstinate predilection among the kings in general for the heresy of Arius, in which their class instinct confusedly discerned a way to humble the papal independence and to favour the social sway of temporal authority. The same political efficacy attached to the doctrine of

*Of the Real  
Presence.*

the Real Presence, which, intellectually strange as it is, is merely a prolongation of the preceding dogma. By it, the humblest priest is invested with a perpetual power of miraculous consecration, which must give him dignity in the eyes of rulers who, whatever might be their material greatness, could never aspire to such sublime operations. Besides the perpetual stimulus thus administered to faith, such a belief made the minister more absolutely indispensable: whereas, amidst simpler conceptions and a less special worship, temporal rulers might then, as since, have found means to dispense with sacerdotal intervention, on condition of an empty orthodoxy. If we proceeded from

*Worship.*

the dogma to consider the Catholic worship in the same way, we should find that (apart from the moral instrumentality in regard to individual and social action which it afforded) it had the same political bearing. The sacraments, in their graduated and well-combined succession, roused in each believer, at the most important periods of his life, and through its regular course, the spirit of the universal system, by signs specially adapted to the character of each position. In an intellectual view, the mass offers a most unsatisfactory spectacle, appearing to human reason to be merely a sort of magical operation, terminated by the fulfilment of a pure act of spirit-raising, real though mystical: but in a social view, we see in it a happy invention of the theological spirit, suppressing universally and irrevocably the bloody sacrifices of polytheism, by diverting the instinctive need of sacrifice which is

inherent in every religious *régime*, and which was in this case daily gratified by the voluntary immolation of the most precious of imaginable victims.

What I have said may suggest some conception of the importance of attending to the dogma and worship of the Catholic church in considering its operation on the destiny of society. The more closely we study Catholicism in the Middle Ages, the better we shall understand the interest of the controversies amidst which minds of a high order built up the wonderful organization of their church. The indefatigable labours of so many scholars and pontiffs in opposition to Arianism, which would have destroyed their sacerdotal independence; their struggles against Manicheism, which threatened the very basis of their economy, by substituting dualism for unity; and many other well-known controversies, had as serious and profound a purpose, even of a political kind, as the fiercest contests of our time, which may perhaps appear hereafter quite as strange to philosophers who will overlook the serious social interests involved in the ill-conceived questions that at present abound. The slightest knowledge of ecclesiastical history will confirm the suggestion of philosophy that there must have been some grave meaning in controversies pursued through many centuries by the best minds of the time, amidst the vivid interest of all civilized nations: and there is truth in the remark of Catholic historians, that all heresies of any great importance were accompanied by serious moral or political error,—the logical filiation of which it would generally be easy to establish by considerations analogous to those that I have applied in a few leading cases.

This brief sketch is all that my objects allow me to give of the spiritual organism which was gradually wrought out through a course of ten centuries, by methods, various but united in aim, from St Paul, who first conceived the general spirit of it, to Hildebrand, who systematized its social constitution; the intermediate period having been well occupied by the concurrence of all the noblest men of whom their race could then boast,—Augustine, Ambrosius, Jerome, Gregory, etc. etc.,—whose unanimous tendency to the establishment of a general unity, however impeded by the mediocrity of the common order of kings, was usually supported by sovereigns of high political ability,—such as Charlemagne and Alfred. From the spiritual organism we may now pass to the temporal; and having done with the political, we shall then be prepared for an analysis of the moral and mental character of the monotheistic *régime*.

Historical interpreters of the temporal condition of the Middle Ages are apt to assign a far too accidental character to it, by exaggerating the influence of the Germanic invasions. It would be easy to show, first, in answer to this, that the condition of society had so little of the fortuitous

*Significance of controversies.*

*Temporal organization of the régime.*

about it that it might have been actually anticipated (if the necessary knowledge had been obtainable) from the *The Germanic invasions.* Roman system, modified by the Catholic; and that the feudal system would have arisen without any invasions: and, again, it may be shown that the invasions themselves were a necessary result of the final extension of the Roman dominion. After our late study of the progressive greatness of that dominion, and of its limitations, we easily perceive that the Roman empire must be bounded on one side by the great Oriental theocracies, which were too remote and too uncongenial for incorporation; and on another side, and especially westwards, by nations, hunters or shepherds, who, not being settled down, could not be effectually conquered: so that about the time of Trajan and the Antonines, the system had acquired all the extension it could bear, and might soon expect a reaction. As to the reaction,—it is evident that there can be no real conquest where the agricultural and sedentary mode of life does not exist among the vanquished, as well as the conquerors; for a nomade tribe, driven to seek refuge by removal, will be for ever passing to and fro between its refuge and its old haunts, and the return will be vigorous in proportion to the gradualism of the process of dislodging them from successive territories. In this way, the invasions were no more accidental than the conquests which provoked them; for the gradual driving back, by rendering the conditions of nomade existence more and more irksome, ended by greatly quickening the transition from nomade to agricultural life. The readiest method was to seize on the nearest favourable and prepared territory, whose owners, weakened in proportion to the extension of the empire, became more and more incapable of resistance. The process was as gradual as that of conquest, though we are apt to suppose otherwise from taking into the account none but the successful final invasions: but the truth is, that invasion had begun, on a large scale, several centuries before Rome attained the summit of its greatness; though its success could not be of a permanent nature till the vigour of the empire, at its heart, began to be exhausted. So natural was this progressive result of the situation of the political world, that it occasioned large concessions, long before the fifth century; such as the incorporation of barbarians in the Roman armies, and the abandonment of certain provinces, on condition that new rivals should be kept in check. Pledged as I am to treat only of the advanced rank of humanity, it was yet necessary to say thus much of the reacting power, because from it mainly the military activity of the Middle Ages took its rise.

Though the military system was carried on through the Middle Ages, it then essentially changed its character, as *Rise of Defensive system.* the civilized world found itself in a new position. Military activity lost its offensive character, and assumed that defensive office which all judicious historians point out as the char-

acteristic quality of the feudal system. This change, powerfully facilitated by Catholicism, was, however, a necessary result of antecedent circumstances, like Catholicism itself. When the Roman extension was complete, it became a primary care to preserve its dominions; and the increasing pressure of the nations which had resisted conquest made such defence continually more urgent in importance. The military *régime* must thenceforward undergo that transformation into what is called *Of territorial independence.* the feudal system, by making political dispersion prevail over a concentration which was becoming continually more difficult as its aim was disappearing: for the dispersion agreed with a system of defence which required the direct and special participation of individuals; whereas, conquest had supposed the thorough subordination of all partial movements to the directing authority. Then was the time when the military chief, always holding himself in readiness for a territorial defence which yet did not require perpetual activity, found himself in possession of independent power in a portion of territory which he was able to protect, with the aid of his military followers, whom it was his daily business to govern, unless his power enabled him to reward them with inferior concessions of the same kind, which, again, might in time become susceptible of further division, according to the spirit of the system. Thus, without any Germanic invasion, there was, in the Roman system, a tendency to dismemberment through the disposition of the governors in general to preserve their territorial office, and to secure for it that hereditary succession which was the natural prolongation and the most certain pledge of their independence. The tendency was evident even in the East, which was comparatively untouched by invasion. The memorable concentration wrought by Charlemagne was the natural, though temporary result of the general prevalence of feudal methods, achieving the political separation of the West from the empire, which was thenceforth remanded to the East, and preparing for the future propagation of the feudal system, without being able to restrain the dispersive tendency which constituted its spirit. The one remaining attribute of the feudal condition, that which relates to the modification of the lot of slaves, was another result of the change in the military system, which could not but occasion the transmutation of the ancient slavery into serfage, which was *Slavery become serfage.* consolidated and perfected by the influence of Catholicism, as we shall presently see. As the importation of slaves declined with the decline of conquest, and finally came to an end, the internal traffic in slaves relaxed,—their owners being disposed to make an hereditary property of them in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining new supplies. When slaves became thus attached to families and their lands, they became, in fact, serfs. Thus, whichever way we look at it, it appears that the feudal system would have arisen without

any aid from barbaric invasion, which could do no more than accelerate its establishment; and thus we get rid of that appearance of fortuity which has disguised, even to the most sagacious minds, the true character of this great social change.

Before I proceed to consider the temporal characteristics of the feudal system, I must just point out the effect of the spiritual institution in preparing for it, and moderating the difficulties of the transition. From its station at the most general point of view,

*Intervention of the Church.* the Catholic authority saw the impending certainty of the Germanic invasions, and had nobly prepared to soften the shock by means of courageous missions to the expected invaders: and when they came, the northern nations found awaiting them a powerful clergy ready to restrain their violence towards those whom they vanquished, and from among whom the ranks of that clergy had been recruited. The moral energy and the intellectual rectitude of the conquerors were more favourable to the action of the Church than the sophistical spirit and corrupt manners of the enervated Romans; while, on the other hand, their comparative remoteness from the monotheistic state of mind, and their contempt for the conquered race, were difficulties in the way of the civilizing influence of Catholicism. It was the function of the spiritual body to fuse the respective favourable qualities of the conflicting races, and to aid their subsidence into the system which was to ensue.

The influence of Catholicism on each of the three phases under which the great temporal change to the feudal system presents itself is evident enough. It aided the transformation of offensive into defensive war by its own predominant desire to unite all Christian nations into one great political family, guided by the Church. By its intervention, it obviated many wars,—actuated, no doubt, by a desire to prevent all diminution of its authority over the military chiefs, as well as by the principles and spirit proper to itself. All great expeditions common to the Catholic nations were in fact of a defensive character, and destined to put an end to successive invasions which might become habitual: such, for instance, as the wars of Charlemagne against the Saxons and the Saracens, and, at a later time, the Crusades, which were intended as a barrier against the invasion of Mohammedanism.—Again: Catholicism aided the breaking up of the temporal power into small territorial sovereignties, favouring the transmutation of life-interests into hereditary fiefs, and organizing the relation of the principles of obedience and protection, as the basis of the new social discipline. Excluding the hereditary principle in its own structure, it countenanced it here, not under the form of custom or caste, but from a deep sense, however indistinct, of the true social needs of the age. Capacity was the title to power in the Church. On the land, capacity was best secured by that permanent attachment to the soil and to local traditions which secured stability at the same time, and involved

the admission of the hereditary principle. The training of the local ruler must be in his home, where he could be specially prepared for his future office, form his ideas and manners, and become interested in the welfare of his vassals and serfs; and all this could not be done without the hereditary principle, the great advantage of which consists in the moral preparation of the individual for his social function. In regulating the reciprocal obligations of the feudal tenure, the beneficent influence of Catholicism is unquestionable. It wrought by that admirable combination, unknown to antiquity, of the instinct of independence and the sentiment of devotedness which established the social superiority of the Middle Ages, when it exhibited a new spectacle of the dignity of human nature among privileged families who were few at first, but who served as a type to all classes, as they successively emerged into freedom.—Again: Catholicism influenced the transmutation of slavery into serfage. The tendency of monotheism to modify slavery is visible even in Mohammedanism, notwithstanding the confusion between the temporal and the spiritual power which it still involves. It is therefore eminently conspicuous in the Catholic system, which interposes a salutary spiritual authority between the master and his slave, or the lord and his serf, an authority which is equally respected by both, and which is continually disposed to keep them up to their mutual duty. Traces of this influence may be observed even now, through a comparison of negro slavery in Protestant and Catholic America; the superiority of the lot of the negro in the latter case being a matter of constant remark by impartial investigators, though unhappily the Romish clergy are not clear of participation in this great modern error, so repugnant to its whole doctrine and constitution. From the earliest days, the Catholic power has tended, everywhere and always, to the abolition of slavery, which, when the system of conquest had closed, was no longer a necessary condition of political existence, and became a mere hindrance to social development; and not the less because this tendency has been disguised and almost annulled, on occasion, through certain obstacles peculiar to a few Catholic nations.

These three characteristics of the temporal organization of the Middle Ages seemed to be summed up in the institution of Chivalry. *Institution of Chivalry.* Whatever were the abuses attendant upon it, it is impossible to deny its eminent social utility during an interval when the central power was as yet inadequate to the direct regulation of internal order in so new a state of society. Though Mohammedanism had, even before the Crusades, originated something like the noble associations by which Chivalry affords a natural corrective of insufficient individual protection, it is certain that their free rise is attributable to the Middle Age spirit; and we discern in it the wisdom of Catholicism converting a mere means of military education into a powerful social instrumentality. The superiority

of merit to birth, and even to the highest authority, which was a principle of these affiliations, is quite in the Catholic spirit. We must however bear in mind the dangers involved in this institution, and especially the peril to the fundamental principle of the *régime* when the exigencies of the Crusades created those exceptional orders of European chivalry which united the monastic to the military character, for the purposes of their enterprise. As a natural consequence, this union of qualities bred a monstrous ambition, which dreamed of that very concentration of spiritual and temporal power that the spirit of the age had been occupied in dissolving. The Templars, for instance, were instinctively formed into a kind of conspiracy against royalty and the papacy at once; and kings and popes had to lay aside their disputes and unite for the destruction of their common foe. This was, it seems to me, the only serious political danger that social order had to encounter in the Middle Ages. That social order was, in fact, so remarkably correspondent with the contemporary civilization, that it sustained itself by its own weight as long as the correspondence lasted.

Here then we see the feudal system to be, in a temporal sense, the cradle of modern society. It set society forward towards the great aim of the whole European polity,—the gradual transformation of the military into the industrial life. Military activity was then employed as a barrier to the spirit of invasion, which, if not so checked, would have stopped the social progress; and the result was obtained when, at length, the peoples of the North and East were compelled, by their inability to find settlements elsewhere, to undergo at home their final transition to agricultural and stationary life, morally guaranteed by their conversion to Catholicism. Thus the progression which the Roman system had started was carried on by the feudal system. The Roman assimilated civilized nations; and the feudal consolidated that union by urging barbarous peoples to civilize themselves also. The feudal system, regarded as a whole, took up war at its defensive stage, and having sufficiently developed it, left it to perish for want of material and object. Within national limits its influence had the same tendency, both by restricting military activity to a diminishing caste, whose protective authority became compatible with the industrial progress of the nascent working class, and by modifying the warlike character of the chiefs themselves, which gradually changed from that of defender to that of proprietor of territory, in preparation for becoming by-and-by the mere dictator of vast agricultural enterprise, unless indeed it should degenerate into that of Courtier. The great universal tendency, in short, of the economy was to the final abolition of slavery and serfage, and afterwards, the civil emancipation of the industrial class, when the time of fitness should arrive.

*Operation of  
the Feudal  
system.*

From the political, I next proceed to the moral aspect of the monotheistic régime.

As the social establishment of universal morality was the chief destination of Catholicism, some may wonder that I did not take up my present topic at the close of my account of the Catholic organization, without waiting till I had exhibited the temporal order. But I think I am placing the subject in the truest historical light by showing that it belongs to the whole system of political organization proper to the Middle Ages, and not to one of its elements alone. If Catholicism first secured to morality the social ascendancy which is its due, feudalism, as a result of the new social situation, introduced precocious germs of a lofty morality peculiar to itself, which Catholicism expanded and improved, but without which it could have had no complete success. Both issuing from antecedent circumstances, Catholicism was the active and rational organ of a progression naturally occasioned by the new phase which human development had assumed. The military and national morality of antiquity, subordinate to polity, had given place to a more pacific and universal morality, predominant over polity, in proportion as the system of conquest became changed into one of defence. Now, the social glory of Catholicism,—a glory which mankind will gratefully commemorate when all theological faiths shall have become matters of mere historical remembrance,—is that it developed and regulated to the utmost a tendency which it could not have created. It would be to exaggerate most mischievously the influence, unhappily only too feeble, of any doctrines on human life, to attribute to them the power of so changing the essential mode of human existence. If Catholicism had been transplanted untimely among nations which had not achieved the preparatory progress, its social influence would not have been sustained by the moral efficacy which distinguished it in the Middle Ages. Mohammedanism is an illustration of this. Its morality, derived from Christianity, and no less pure, is far from having produced the same results, because its subjects were insufficiently prepared for a monotheism which was, in their case, far from spontaneous, and altogether premature. We must not then judge of Middle Age morality from the spiritual point of view, without the temporal; and we must moreover avoid any attempt to give precedence to either element, each being indispensable, and the two therefore inseparable.

A great error of the metaphysical school is that of attributing the moral efficacy of Catholicism to its doctrine alone, apart from its organization, which is indeed supposed to have an opposite tendency. It is enough, in answer to this, to refer to what I have already said of the action of the Catholic organization, and to the moral inefficacy of Mohammedanism, and of Greek or Byzantine Catholicism, which, with abundance of doctrinal power, have



socially failed for want of a spiritual organization. Like them, Catholicism would have produced its morality in feeble formulas and superstitious practices, suitable to the vague and unconnected character of theological doctrine, if it had not provided for the constant active intervention of an independent and organized spiritual power, which constituted the social value of the religious system. In order to estimate what this operation was, I will briefly consider first how the doctrines of Catholicism wrought in a moral view, apart from their corresponding organization.

The most important question, in this connection, is whether the moral influence of Catholicism in the Middle Ages was owing to its doctrines being the organs for the constitution of certain common opinions, which, when once established, must have permanent moral power from their universality; or whether, according to the popular view, the results are ascribable to personal hope, and yet more, fear, with regard to a future life, which Catholicism applied itself to co-ordinate and fortify more completely than any other religion has ever attempted to do, precisely by avoiding all dogma on the subject, and leaving every one's imagination to create the rewards and punishments which would be most effectual in his case. The question can, it is obvious, be decided only by observation of exceptional cases, in which general opinion and religious precepts are in opposition; for, when they co-operate, it is impossible to know how much influence to assign to the one or the other. Rare as are these exceptional cases, there are enough in every age of Catholicism to satisfy us in regard to the great axiom of social statics,—that public prejudices are habitually more active than religious precepts, when any antagonism arises between these two moral forces, which are usually found convergent. The instance adduced by Condorcet—that of the duel—appears to me sufficiently decisive. This custom, imposed by military morals, induced pious knights to brave the strongest religious condemnation in the most brilliant ages of the Church; whereas, at this day, we see the duel spontaneously disappearing by degrees under the strengthening sway of industrial morals, notwithstanding the entire practical decay of religious prohibition. This one instance will guide the reader in his search for analogous cases, all of which will be found more or less illustrative of the tendency in human nature to brave a remote danger, however fearful, rather than immediate discredit in a fixed and unanimous public opinion. It seems, at first sight, as if nothing could counterbalance the power of religious terror directed upon an eternal future; but it is certain that, by the very element of eternity, the threat loses its force; and there have always been strong minds which have inured themselves to it by familiarity, as not to be trammelled by it in the indulgence of their natural impulses. Every continued sensation becomes, by our nature, con-

verted into indifference; and when Milton introduces alternation in the punishment of the damned, doomed "from beds of burning fire to starve in ice," the idea of the Russian bath raises a smile, and reminds us that the power of habit extends to alternation, however abrupt, if it be but sufficiently repeated. The same energy which urges to grave crimes fortifies minds against such a future doom, which may also be considered very uncertain, and is always becoming familiarized by lapse of time; and, in the case of ordinary people, while there was absolution in the distance, as there always was, it was easier to violate religious precepts to the moderate extent their character of mind required, than to confront public prejudice. Without going further into this kind of analysis, we are warranted in saying that the moral power of Catholicism was due to its suitability as an organ of general opinions, which must become the more powerfully universal from their active reproduction by an independent and venerated clergy; and that personal interest in a future life has had, comparatively, very little influence at any time upon practical conduct.

The moral regeneration wrought by Catholicism was begun by the elevation of Morals to that social supremacy before accorded to polity. This was done by subordinating the private and variable to the most general and permanent needs, through the consideration of the elementary conditions of human nature common to all social states and individual conditions. It was these great necessities which determined the special mission of the spiritual power, whose function it was to express them in a form of universal doctrine, and to invest them with sanctity in real life, individual and social; a function which supposed an entire independence of the temporal power. No doubt, this beneficent social action was much impaired by its connection with the theological philosophy,—by the vagueness with which that philosophy infected its moral prescriptions,—by the too arbitrary moral authority possessed by the directing body, whose absolute precepts would otherwise have been impracticable,—and again, by the inherent contradiction of a doctrine which proposed to cultivate the social affections by the prior encouragement of an exorbitant selfishness, for ever occupied with its own future lot, looking for infinite reward for the smallest well-doing, and thus neutralizing the sympathetic element which resides in the benign universal affection of the love of God;—yet these great and inevitable evils have not prevented, but only impaired, a regeneration which could not have begun in any other way, though it must be carried on and perfected on a better intellectual basis in time to come.

Thus was Morality finally placed at the head of social necessities, by conceiving of all the faculties of our nature as means subordinate to the great end of human life, directly sanctioned by a universal doctrine, properly erected into a type of all action,

individual and social. It must be acknowledged that there was something thoroughly hostile to human development in the way in which Christianity conceived of the social supremacy of morality,—greatly as this opposition has been exaggerated: but Catholicism, at its best period, restrained this tendency, inasmuch as it recognized capacity as the basis of its ecclesiastical constitution: but the elementary disposition, whose philosophical danger became apparent only when the Catholic system was in its decline, did not interfere with the radical justness of the social decision which subordinated mind itself to morality. Superior minds, which multiplied in number by means of spreading cultivation, have always, and especially of late, secretly rebelled against a decision which restrained their unlimited ambition; but it will be eternally confirmed, with deep-felt gratitude, amidst all disturbances, both by the multitude to whose welfare it is directed, and by philosophical insight, which can fitly analyse its immutable necessity. Though mental superiority is the rarest and most valuable of all, it can never realize its highest expansion unless it is subordinated to a lofty morality, on account of the natural feebleness of the spiritual faculties in human nature. Without this condition, the best developed genius must degenerate into a secondary instrument of narrow personal satisfaction, instead of pursuing that large social destination which can alone offer it a field and sustenance worthy of its nature. Hence, if it is philosophical, it will strive to systematize society in accordance with its own inclinations: if scientific, it will be satisfied with superficial conceptions, such as will procure an easy and profitable success: if æsthetic, it will produce unprincipled works, aspiring, at almost any cost, to a rapid and ephemeral popularity: and if industrial, it will not aim at capital inventions, but at lucrative modifications. These melancholy results of mind deprived of moral direction, which cannot annul the value of social genius, though largely neutralizing it, must be most vicious among men of second-rate ability, who have a weaker spontaneousness; and then intelligence, which is valuable only in improving the prevision, the appreciation, and the satisfaction of the chief real needs of the individual and of society, issues in an unsocial vanity, or in absurd pretensions to rule society in virtue of capacity, which, released from the moral condition of the general welfare, becomes equally injurious to private and public happiness. In the view of all who have studied human nature, universal love, as proposed by Catholicism, is of more importance than intellectual good itself, because love makes the most of even the humblest mental faculties, for the benefit of each and all; whereas selfishness perverts or paralyses the most eminent powers, which then become more disturbing than beneficial to both public and private welfare. Such is the evidence of the profound wisdom of Catholicism in placing morality at the head of

human interests, as the guide and controller of all human action. It thus certainly established the main principle of social life: a principle which, however occasionally discredited or obscured by dangerous sophisms, will ever arise with increasing clearness and power from a deepening study of the true nature of Man.

In all moral appreciation of Catholicism we must bear in mind that, in consequence of the separation between the spiritual and the temporal power, and therefore of the independence of morality in regard to polity, the moral doctrine must be composed of a series of types, which, not expressing *Moral types.* immediate practical reality, fix the ideal limit to which our conduct must approximate more and more. These moral types are, in nature and object, analogous to the scientific and æsthetic types which guide our various conceptions, and which are needed in the simplest human operations, even the industrial. It would be as wise to reproach the artist for the unattainable perfection of his ideal model, as Catholic morality for the supposed exaggeration of its requirements. In both cases the attainment will fall short of the ideal; but it will be greater than it could be without the ideal. The philosophical instinct of Catholicism led it to fulfil the practical conditions of the case by transferring the type from the abstract to the concrete state. It applied its social genius in gradually concentrating in the Founder of their system all the perfection that they could imagine in human nature, thus constituting a universal and operative type, admirably adapted to the moral guidance of humanity, and in which the highest and the humblest could alike find a model for human conduct; and they completed the lesson by the addition of that yet more ideal conception which offers as the feminine type the beautiful mystic reconciliation of purity with maternity.

There is no department of general morality which was not eminently improved by Catholicism, as I could show, if my space and my purpose admitted of it. I can only briefly point out the most important instances of advancement, under the three heads of personal, domestic, and social morality.

The great aim being the exaltation of reason over passion, Catholicism justly regarded personal virtues as the *Personal* basis of all others. The sanitary practices and the *morality.* personal privations it imposed had therefore some social efficacy, being, at the least, beneficial auxiliaries to moral education,—especially in the Middle Ages. Again, the personal virtues which were recommended in more ancient times as a matter of individual prudence were now first conceived of in a social connection. Humility, so strongly enforced by Catholicism as to form a popular reproach against it, was of eminent importance, not only during a period of haughty oppression which proved its necessity, but in reference to the permanent moral wants of human nature, in which

we need not fear that pride and vanity will ever be too much repressed. Nothing is more remarkable, under this head, than the reprobation of suicide, which had been erected into a sort of honour among the ancients, who valued their own lives no more than other people's; or, at least, into a resource which their philosophers were not blamed for recurring to. This anti-social practice would no doubt have declined with the predominance of military manners, but it is certainly one of the moral glories of Catholicism to have organized an energetic condemnation of it.

Under Catholicism, domestic morality issued forth from the subjection to polity in which the ancients had placed it, and assumed its proper rank. When the spiritual and temporal orders were separated, it was felt that the domestic life must henceforth be the most important for the mass of mankind, —political life being reserved for the exceptional few, instead of absorbing everything else, as it did when the question concerned the minority of free men in a population of slaves. The special care of Catholicism for domestic life induced such a multitude of happy results as defies even the most summary analysis here. The reader must imagine for himself the improvement in human families when Catholic influence penetrated every relation, to develop without tyranny the sense of reciprocal duty,—solemnly sanctioning, for instance, the paternal authority, while abolishing the ancient patriarchal despotism, under which infants were murdered or abandoned,—as they still were, beyond the pale of monotheism. I can specially notice only what relates to the closest tie of all, with regard to which I am of opinion that we have only to consolidate and complete what Catholicism has happily organized. No one now denies that it essentially improved the social condition of women; but it is seldom or never remarked that it deprived them of all participation whatever in sacerdotal functions, even in the constitution of the monastic orders to which they were admitted. I may add that it also, as far as possible, precluded them from royalty in all countries in which it had political influence enough to modify, by the consideration of aptitude, the theocratic principle of hereditary succession, embodied in caste. The benefit bestowed on women by Catholicism consisted in rendering their lives essentially domestic, in securing the due liberty of their interior existence, and in establishing their position by sanctifying the indissolubleness of marriage; whereas, even among the Romans, who married but one wife, the condition of women was seriously injured by the power of divorce. I shall have occasion hereafter to treat of the evils attending the power of divorce. In the intermediate period of human history, when Catholicism interdicted it, that beneficent influence so connected the two sexes that, under the morals and manners of the system, the wife acquired an imprescriptible right, independent even of her own conduct, to an unconditional participation in not only all the social advantages of him

who had once chosen her, but, as far as possible, in the consideration he enjoyed; and it would be difficult to imagine any practicable arrangement more favourable to the dependent sex. As civilization develops the essential differences of the sexes, among others, it has excluded women more and more from all functions that can withdraw them from their domestic vocation. It is in the higher classes of society that women work out their destination with the least hindrance; and it is there, in consequence, that we may look for a kind of spontaneous type, towards which the condition of women must, on the whole, tend; and looking there, we apprehend at once the law of social progression, as regards the sexes, which consists in disengaging women more and more from all employment that is foreign to their domestic functions; so that, for instance, we shall hereafter reject, as disgraceful to Man, in all ranks, as now in the higher, the practice of subjecting women to laborious occupations; whereas they should be universally, and more and more exclusively, set apart for their characteristic offices of wife and mother.

In regard to social morality, properly so called, every one will admit the distinctive influence of Catholicism in modifying the energetic but savage patriotism of the ancients by the higher sentiment of humanity or universal brotherhood, so happily popularized by it under the sweet name of charity. No doubt the nature of the Christian doctrines, and the religious antipathies which resulted from them, greatly restricted this hypothetical universality of affection, which was generally limited to Christian peoples; but within these limits the brotherly affections of different nations were powerfully developed, apart from the common faith which was its principle, by their uniform habitual subordination to one spiritual authority, whose members were, notwithstanding their separate nationalities, fellow-citizens of Christendom. It is a true remark that the improvement of European relations, the advancement of international law, and the humane conditions imposed, more and more, on war itself, may all be referred to the period when Catholic influence brought all parts of Europe into connection. In the interior condition of each nation the duties which arise out of the great Catholic principle of universal brotherhood, and which have temporarily failed only through the decay of the theological system which imposed them, afforded the best obtainable means to remedy the inconveniences inseparable from the social state; and especially the imperfect distribution of wealth. This was the source of so many admirable foundations devoted to the solace of human suffering, institutions unknown in ancient times, and the more remarkable because they usually grew out of private munificence, in which public co-operation has seldom any part.—While expanding the universal sentiment of social union, Catholicism did not neglect that of perpetuity, which is, as I have before pointed out, its natural complement,

connecting all times as well as all places. This was the general use of the great system of customary commemoration, so happily constructed by Catholicism, in wise imitation of polytheism. If I had space, it would be easy to show how wise were the precautions introduced by Catholicism, and usually respected, to make canonization, replacing deification, fulfil its social purpose by avoiding the disgraceful abuses caused by the confusion of the spiritual and temporal powers among the Greeks, and yet more the Romans, in their declining period: so that the lofty recompense was very rarely decreed to men who were not more or less eminently worthy, remarkable, or useful, while they were selected, with careful impartiality, from every class of society, from the highest to the lowest.

We may now form some idea of the vastness of the moral regeneration accomplished by Catholicism in the Middle Ages. Impaired as it was by the imperfections of the philosophy, and the difficulties of the social phase of the time, it manifested the true nature of the requisite improvement, the spirit which must guide it, and the attendant conditions in preparation for the time when a sounder philosophy should permit the completion of the work. It remains for us to review the intellectual attributes of the system. It may appear that the supreme importance of the social mission of Catholicism could not but restrict the development of its intellectual characteristics: but the consequences of those attributes make up our present experience; and all that has happened in human history, from the Catholic period till now, is an unbroken chain of connection which links our own period with that cradle of modern civilization. We shall see that the entire spiritual movement of modern times is referrible to that memorable season in human history, which Protestantism is pleased to call the dark ages.

Our theory explains how the intellectual movement of the monotheistic system might be retarded without its following that the system was hostile to human progression. It never was so except during its decline (and then much less than is commonly supposed), when it was engrossed with the cares of self-preservation. It is an exaggeration also to attribute to the Germanic invasions the retardation of intellectual development during the Middle Ages; for the decline was taking place for centuries before the invasions were of any engrossing importance. Two facts, one of time and one of place, may throw light upon this ill-understood question. The supposed rival of human intelligence (which however had not been asleep, but only otherwise employed), in other words, the acceleration of the mental movement, immediately followed upon the full maturity of the Catholic system, in the eleventh century, and took place during its high social ascendancy. Again, it was in the very centre of this dominion, and almost before the eyes of the supreme sacerdotal authority, that the acceleration appeared; for it is impossible to deny the superiority of Italy in the

*Intellectual  
condition under  
Catholicism.*

Middle Ages, under all the four aspects of intellectual action. These two facts are enough to show how favourable Catholicism then was to human development. The preceding inactivity was owing to the laborious and anxious character of the task of organizing the system; a work of supreme importance, absorbing almost the whole intellectual resources, and commanding the strongest interest of the peoples concerned: so that the provisional direction of the mental movement was left to second-rate minds, amidst a state of affairs which was unfavourable to marked progression, and which barely allowed the preservation of what had been gained. This seems to me the simple and rational explanation of this apparent anomaly: and it releases us from the necessity of imputing to any men, institutions, or events any tendency to repress the human mind, while it refers us to the great obligation to devote the highest abilities to the task required, in each age, by the chief needs of mankind: and certainly nothing could, in this view, be more interesting to all thinkers than the progressive development of Catholic institutions. The intellectual movement, which had never stopped, was joined, in the time of Hildebrand, by all the intellect that was set free by the completion of the Catholic system, and of its application to political life; and then were realized the vast consequences which we shall have to review in a subsequent chapter. The share attributed to the Arabs in the revival is much exaggerated, though they may have assisted a movement which would have taken place, somewhat more slowly, without them: and their intervention had nothing accidental about it. Mohammed attempted to organize monotheism among a people who were in every way unprepared for it: the effort issued in a monstrous political concentration, in the form of a military theocracy: yet the intellectual qualities inherent in monotheism could not be wholly annulled; and they even expanded with the more rapidity from the failure of the corresponding *régime*, whereby the highest spiritual capacities were left free for intellectual pursuits; and especially for those which had been remanded to the East, while the West was occupied with the development of the Catholic system. Thus the Arabs make their appearance in the midst of the western interregnum, without their intervention being at all necessary in the transition from the Greek to the modern evolution. The special reasons for the intellectual properties of the monotheistic system being developed only in the age of its decline, will be best considered when I treat of that decline. Having assigned the general grounds of the delay, I have to notice briefly the four aspects in which the mental influence of Catholicism presents itself.

The aptitude of Catholicism for philosophy is as remarkable as it is ill-appreciated. However imperfect we now know the theological philosophy to be, it exercised a happy influence over the intellectual development of the multitude, among

*Philosophy.*



whom, as we have seen, it is the glory of the system to have spread its educational benefits. They were lifted above the narrow circle of their material life; their habitual feelings were purified; and sound, though empirical notions of the moral nature of Man, and even some dawn of historical conception, through the connection of general history with the Church, were conveyed to the whole range of classes of society. Through the efforts of Catholicism to prove its superiority to former systems, even the great philosophical principle of human progression began to arise throughout Christendom,—however inadequate in strength or quality. When each individual thus became empowered to judge of human actions, personal and collective, by a fundamental doctrine, the spirit of social discussion which distinguishes modern periods began to arise. It could not exist among subordinate persons while the two authorities were concentrated in the same holders: and, when the separation was effected, the spirit of discussion was long restrained by the intellectual discipline imposed by the vague and arbitrary nature of the theological philosophy: but it was at this time that it began to move.—As for the cultivated class, the leading fact on their behalf was that Catholicism generally allowed free scope to the metaphysical philosophy, to which the polytheistic *régime* was hostile. It was under Catholicism that the metaphysical philosophy was extended to moral and social questions; and, in proof of the protecting disposition of the *régime*, we have the fact that the calumniated Middle Ages gave the first worthy reception to the most advanced part of Greek philosophy,—that is, to the doctrine of Aristotle, which had certainly never been so appreciated before,—even by the Greeks themselves. We must point to the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers as an intellectual as well as social service, because it separated at the same time social theory from practice, and thus laid the foundation of social science, in distinction from mere Utopias. Earnestly as I have insisted that social science is only now beginning to be formed, I acknowledge with gratitude that its source lies in that remote age, called dark; where it is seldom sought for by those who make the freest use of its benefits. The scientific influence of Catholicism was equally favourable. Monotheism is not, it is true, very consistent with the conception of the invariableness of natural laws; and there is a stage of human development at which the monotheistic doctrine, with its conception of an arbitrary will as the universal governing power, is the only essential obstacle to the view which lies at the base of science. But that stage was not in the Middle Age period; and monotheism was of immense service in disengaging the scientific spirit from the trammels imposed by polytheism. Before, a few simple mathematical speculations were all that was possible, when all scientific inquiry must clash with the theological explanations which extended to the minutest details of

*Science.*

all phenomena. When monotheism concentrated the supernatural action, it opened a much freer access to these secondary studies, and did not interpose any sacred doctrine as an obstacle, as long as some vague and general formulas were respected; and at that time, the religious disposition to admiration of divine wisdom, which has since proved a retrograde influence, was promotive of scientific inquiry. I need not point out that, as polytheism was a state of religious decline, in comparison with fetichism, so was monotheism in regard to polytheism. The suppression of inspiration, with all its train of oracles and prophecies, apparitions and miracles, testifies to the noble efforts of Catholicism to enlarge, at the expense of the theological spirit, the as yet narrow field of human reason, as far as the philosophy of the period would allow. Adding to these considerations that of the facilities which sacerdotal life afforded to intellectual culture, we may conceive of the happy influence of the monotheistic *régime* on the growth of the chief natural sciences:—in the creation of Chemistry, founded on Aristotle's conception of the four elements, and sustained by the wild hopes which were necessary to stimulate nascent experimentation:—in the improvement of Anatomy, so restricted in more ancient times:—and in the development of pre-existing mathematical speculation and astronomical knowledge; a progression which was attested by the rise of algebra, as a distinct branch of ancient arithmetic, and by that of trigonometry, which was, in the hands of the Greeks, too imperfect and limited for the growing requirements of astronomy.

The æsthetic influence of monotheism did not reach its highest point till the next period; but it is impossible to be blind to its scope when we consider the progress made by music and architecture during the Middle Ages. The introduction of musical notation and the development of harmony gave a wholly new character to Song; and the same extension was given to instrumental music by the creation of its most powerful and complete organ; and the share borne by Catholic influence in each needs no pointing out. Its effect on the progress of Architecture is equally clear. It was not only that there was a great change in ordinary habitations, in consequence of the private relations which, under Catholic and feudal encouragement, succeeded to the isolation of the domestic life of the ancients. Besides these improvements in private life, there arose those religious edifices which are the most perfect monumental expression of the ideas and feelings of our moral nature, and which will for ever, notwithstanding the decay of the corresponding beliefs, awaken in every true philosopher a delicious emotion of social sympathy. Polytheism, besides that its worship was outside the temples, could not originate an improvement which was appropriate to a system of universal instruction, followed up by a continuous habit of personal meditation. In

Art.

regard to poetry, it is enough to name Dante to show what the system could effect, notwithstanding the obstacles presented by the slow and laborious elaboration of the modern languages, and the difficulty arising from the equivocal and unstable character of the corresponding social state, which was unfavourable to poetical inspiration. I noticed before the superior aptitude of polytheism in this respect even to this day, as is shown by the inability of even our best poets to free modern poetry from its traces. As to the rest, the influence of the period, in this case as in others, so stretches forward into the next, that we cannot appreciate its services fully till we arrive at that part of our analysis.

Turning now to the lower and more universal aspect of the mental movement,—the industrial,—it is clear that,

*Industry.*

starting from the time of personal emancipation, we must adjourn the estimate of industrial progress to the next period. The greatest industrial improvement of all however must be the gradual abolition of serfage, accompanied by the progressive enfranchisement of communities, such as was accomplished under the guardianship of the Catholic system, and furnished the basis of the vast success of a later time. We may notice here—what we must dwell longer on hereafter—the new character of industry, shown in the substitution of external forces for human efforts. It was not only that men were becoming better acquainted with nature: a stronger reason was that the Catholic and feudal world were placed in a wholly new position by the emancipation of labourers, whence arose the general obligation to spare human forces by using inorganic or brute assistance. As evidence of this, we may notice the invention of water-mills, windmills, and other machines, the origin of which we are too apt to overlook. It was the slavery more than the ignorance of a prior time that prevented the use of machinery, which could not be sufficiently desired while there was an abundant provision of intelligent muscular force always at hand; and when the use of machinery had begun, we trace the wisdom of the Catholic system in interposing between this inevitable improvement and the theological discouragement which must forbid any great industrial modification of the external world as a direct offence against the providential optimism which had succeeded to the polytheistic fatalism.

This brief survey seems to prove the injustice of the reproach of barbarism and darkness brought against the period; against the very age illustrated by Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, Dante, and others. To conclude our analysis of the period, I have only to exhibit the principle of the irrevocable decay of this transitory system, the great destination of which was to prepare for the gradual and safe decomposition of the theological and military *régime*, taking place at the same time with the rise and expansion of the new elements of order.

Whichever way we look at the organization proper to the Middle Ages, its provisional nature is evident from the fact that the developments it encouraged were the first causes of its decay. In the spiritual region the concentration of deity into one object was the last possible modification, as the reduction could go no further without a total perversion of the theological philosophy, and the loss of its social ascendancy; while, at the same time, the more rapid and extensive rise of the positive spirit, not only among educated men, but among the masses of civilized nations, could not but bring on such fatal modifications. We have seen that the existence of the Catholic system depended on numerous conditions, the failure of any one of which involved the destruction of the whole; and we have ascertained the precariousness of the greater number of those conditions. The system was not, as I have shown, hostile to intellectual progress: on the contrary, it favoured it; but it never incorporated that improvement with itself. The improvement grew up under the shelter of Catholicism; but it outgrew the provisional protection, which was thenceforth done with. The great intellectual office of Catholicism was to prepare, under the theological *régime*, the elements of the positive *régime*. In the same way, in morals it prepared men for the new system by encouraging the exercise of human reason in judging of conduct; and thus it rendered the downfall of theological influence inevitable,—apart from the instruction it gave to Man's moral nature to revolt against its own violations of his noblest feelings, in support of its declining existence,—thus offending, in its hour of necessity, the moral sentiments which were its own best work.

*Provisional  
nature of  
the régime.*

If we are to trace the principle of decay through its whole existence, we must admit that it was older than the system itself; for we find it in the great division, considered in a former chapter, between natural and moral philosophy; the philosophy of the inorganic world, and that of moral and social Man. This division, proposed by the Greek philosophers a little before the establishment of the Alexandrian Museum, by which it was openly sanctioned, was the first logical condition of all future progress, because it permitted the independent growth of inorganic philosophy (then in the metaphysical stage), whose more simple speculations might be rapidly perfected without injury to the social operation of moral philosophy (then in its theological stage), which was much less occupied with the abstract improvement of its doctrines, than with trying the fitness of theological conceptions for civilizing mankind. A rivalry, extending from doctrines to persons, immediately grew up between the metaphysical spirit, which was in possession of the scientific domain, and the theological, which governed morals: and it was the social ascendancy of moral philosophy which kept down intellectual enterprise in the direction of natural philosophy, and was

*Division be-  
tween Natural  
and Moral  
philosophy.*

the first cause of the retardation of science which I explained just now. We see the conflict reflected in the struggles of such a man as St Augustine against the mathematical reasonings, already popularized among students of natural philosophy, by which the Alexandrian philosophers proved the form of the earth, and the necessary existence of antipodes. One of the most illustrious founders of the Catholic philosophy was seen enforcing objections so puerile that the lowest understandings would not now condescend to them. Comparing this case with that before mentioned, of the astronomical extravagances of Epicurus, we shall see how thorough was this separation,—very like antipathy,—between natural and moral philosophy.

It was the metaphysical spirit which had wrought the transition from fetichism to polytheism; and, quite recently, from polytheism to monotheism; and it was not likely to desist from its office of modification at the moment when it was most earnest and strong. As there was nothing beyond monotheism but a total issue from the theological state, which was then impracticable, the metaphysical action became destructive, and more and more so; its propagators being unconsciously employed in spoiling, by their anti-social analyses, the very conditions of existence of the monotheistic system. The more Catholicism aided the intellectual movement, the faster did the destruction proceed, because every scientific and other intellectual advance added honour to the metaphysical spirit which appeared to direct it. The antagonism was certain to overtake Catholicism when it had fulfilled the social conditions which were its proper office, and when intellectual conditions should become the most important to human development.—Thus the general cause of the mental dissolution of Catholicism was its inability to incorporate with itself the intellectual movement, by which it was necessarily left behind: and, from that time, the only way in which it could maintain its empire was by exchanging its progressive for a stationary, or even retrograde character, such as sadly distinguishes it at this day. It may be thought, in a superficial way, that the intellectual decline may be reconciled with an indefinite protraction of that moral sway to which Catholicism seems to be entitled by the excellence of its own morality, which will be respected when the prejudices of its enemies have died out: but it is philosophically true that moral influence is inseparable from intellectual superiority; for it can never be in the natural course of things for men to give their chief confidence, in the dearest interests of their life, to minds which they respect so little as not to consult them about the simplest speculative questions. Catholicism was once the organ of universal morality; and we now accept it as a precious legacy, without insisting that the giver shall not die, or refusing the gift because the bestower is dead. We have derived valuable truth from astrology and alchemy, finding the truth

remain when the vehicle was broken up: and the process is the same in the case of the moral and political progress set on foot by the theological philosophy. It could not perish with the philosophy, if another spiritual organization had been meantime prepared to receive it,—as we shall see hereafter.

The temporal decline of the Middle Age system proceeded from a cause so evident as to require little remark. In all the three aspects of the feudal *régime*, its transitory *Temporal decline.* character is distinctly marked. Its defensive organization was required only till the invaders should have settled down into agricultural life at home, and become converted to Catholicism: and military pursuits thenceforth became more and more exceptional, as industry strengthened and extended itself.—The breaking up of the temporal power into partial sovereignties, which was the second feature of the feudal system, was no less a transient arrangement, which must give place to a new centralization; as we shall presently see that it did.—As for the third feature,—the transformation of slavery into serfage, it is unquestionable that while slavery may exist a long time under suitable conditions, serfage can be no more than a transition state, sure to be speedily modified by the establishment of industrial communities, and serving no other special purpose than gradually leading on the labourers to entire personal freedom. Thus, it is the same with feudalism as with Catholicism,—the better it discharged its function, the more it accelerated its own destruction. External circumstances, however, which were in themselves in no degree accidental, prolonged the duration of the system very unequally among the European nations,—its political rule having lasted longest on the various frontiers of Catholic feudal civilization, that is, in Poland, Hungary, etc., with regard to Tartar and Scandinavian invasions; and even, in some respects, in Spain and the larger Mediterranean islands, especially Sicily, with regard to Arab encroachments: a distinction which it is well to notice here in its germ, as we shall find an interesting application of it in a future part of our analysis. This short explanation will help us to fix on the class by whom the disintegration of the feudal system was conducted. The advent of the industrial class was the issue from it; but it could not be that class which should conduct the process, on account of its subordinate position, and of its having enough to do in its own interior development. The work was done by the legists, who had risen in social influence as military activity declined. Like the metaphysicians, they had a provisional office; and the one class in philosophy, and the other in polity, effected the critical modifications required, and founded nothing.

The reflection which naturally occurs at the end of our survey of the monotheistic *régime* is that the immense time required for its slow political elaboration is out of *Conclusion.* all proportion to the short period of its social sway: its rise having

occupied ten centuries; whereas it remained at the head of the European system for only two,—from Gregory VII., who completed it, to Boniface VIII., under whom its decline conspicuously commenced,—the five following centuries having exhibited only a kind of chronic agony perpetually relaxing in activity. The only possible solution of this great historical problem is that the part of Catholicism which was thus destined to expire was the doctrine, and not its organization, which was only transiently spoiled through its adherence to the theological philosophy; while, reconstructed upon a sounder and broader intellectual basis, the same constitution must superintend the spiritual reorganization of modern society, except for such differences as must be occasioned by diversity of doctrine. We must either assent to this, or suppose (what seems to contradict the laws of our nature) that the vast efforts of so many great men, seconded by the persevering earnestness of civilized nations, in the secular establishment of this masterpiece of human wisdom, must be irrevocably lost to the most advanced portion of humanity, except in its provisional results. This general explanation is grounded on the considerations we have just reviewed, and it will be confirmed by all the rest of our analysis, of which it will be the main political conclusion.

## CHAPTER X.

METAPHYSICAL STATE, AND CRITICAL PERIOD OF MODERN  
SOCIETY.

WE have seen the theological philosophy and the military polity supreme in antiquity: we have seen them modified and enfeebled in the Middle Ages: and we have now to study their final decline and dissolution in the transitional modern period, in preparation for a new and permanent organic state of society. The task seems to mark out its own division. I must first review the process of the dissolution of the old systems; and this will be the work of the present chapter: and next, I shall exhibit the progressive evolution of the chief elements of the positive system. The two processes are inseparably connected in practice, as we must carefully remember: but they must be divided in analysis, or *Conduct of the inquiry.* the conjunction of two orders of considerations so opposite as decomposition and recomposition would introduce endless confusion into our speculations. Such a division was not necessary in treating of earlier periods, because such opposing movements as then existed were convergent; and such transitions as took place were from one phase of the theological system to another. But the case is different when we have to study the issue from the theological system into one which is of a wholly different nature,—that is, the greatest revolution, intellectual and social, that the human race could undergo at any period of its career. We should even lose sight of the organic elements of the case in their critical investiture, if we did not study them by themselves, and after the others. In a concrete history, of course, this process would be out of the question: but the form of our historical review has been abstract throughout; and, this being the case, we are not only permitted but bound to use such a method as may best illustrate our subject. Such a method is the division I propose. What we have to be careful of is to bear in mind that the two processes, though separated here for purposes of investigation, are for ever co-operating;—the destruction of old elements being the very means of disclosing the new; the motive force of one period naturally imparting itself to the next; and the mutual reaction of the antagonistic systems being favourable to the func-



tions of both. One side of this view is evident enough: we all see how the disorganization of the theological and military system aided the scientific and industrial development of a later time: but the reverse action is less understood, though it is not less important. We shall see as we proceed, however, that it was the latent development of the positive spirit which sustained and substantiated the gradual ascendancy of the metaphysical spirit over the theological,—saving it from utter waste in bootless discussion, and directing it towards a genuine philosophical renovation. The same office is fulfilled by the industrial spirit in the temporal system: it in like manner saves the legists and the military class from sterile conflict, and points out the radical incompatibility between the military system, which the legists can only revile, and the characteristic nature of modern civilization. Remembering, therefore, these considerations, that we may avoid supposing the two movements to be unconnected, we may now, seeing them to be heterogeneous and convergent, critical and organic, proceed to consider them separately; taking the critical process first, by reviewing the growing disorganization of the theological and military system for the last five centuries.

The negative character of this great revolutionary operation naturally arouses a sort of philosophical repugnance, which must be met by the consideration that this social phase with all its errors and disorders, is as necessary in its intermediate place as any other to the slow and laborious progress of human development. The ancient system was irrevocably doomed: the new elements were in course of disclosure: but it must be long before their political

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tendencies and their social value could be verified, so as to form the basis of a new organization. An immediate substitution of the new for the old was therefore impossible, even if there had been no existing human feelings and interests connected with the past: and it was necessary for modern society to go through the process which we now find ourselves in the midst of,—through that thoroughly exceptional and transitional state, in which the chief political progress must be of a negative character, while public order is maintained by a resistance ever becoming more retrograde. The revolutionary doctrine which is the agent of the change does its work by exhibiting the insufficiency of the old organization, and protecting the elements of progress from the interference of old impediments. Without the impulsion of this critical energy, humanity would have been stationary; and its office could not have been fulfilled if the critical movement had not been urged to its last natural degree, and especially in its mental action; for nothing short of the entire suppression of the religious and political prejudices relating to the old organization could have saved us from a series of fruitless attempts at modifying what was fit only for dismissal.

Such a preparation of the ground may be considered a negative condition; but it is an indispensable one; and all repugnance attendant upon the spectacle of destruction ought to give way before this consideration.

For the date of the beginning of this disorganization, we must go back further than the time usually assigned, *Its commencement.* which is the sixteenth century. The Catholic constitution had, however, fulfilled its office before the end of the thirteenth century, while, at the same time, the conditions of its political existence had become seriously impaired. I therefore fix on the opening of the fourteenth century as the origin of the revolutionary process, which has, from that date, been participated in by every social class, each in its own way. In the spiritual domain, Catholicism transcended its bounds, during the pontificate of Boniface VIII., by setting up an absolute domination, which of course excited universal resistance, as formidable as it was just, at the very time when it had manifested its radical incompetency to direct the intellectual movement, which was becoming of more social importance every day. Serious precursory symptoms of decline began to appear; such as the relaxation of the sacerdotal spirit, and the growing vigour of heretical tendencies. The Franciscans and Dominicans, whose institution was then a century old, were as powerful a reformatory and preservative power as the system admitted; and they effectually counteracted the decay for a time; but their power did not long avail; and the very necessity for its use was a prediction of the speedy downfall of a system which received such a support in vain. Another symptom was the violent means resorted to on a great scale for the extirpation of heresies; for as spiritual authority can finally rest only on the voluntary assent of men's minds, all resort to material force is an unquestionable token of imminent and conscious decline. These indications assign the opening of the fourteenth century as the date of the concussion received by the Catholic system in its most central prerogatives.

In the temporal order, in the same way, the feudal system fell into decay because it had fulfilled its military office. Two series of efforts had been required during the defensive period,—one to guard the uprising civilization from the incursions of the wild polytheists of the north, and the other to protect it from Mussulman monotheism. In the first, the great hero of the Middle Ages found a field for his energy; but the struggle was harder in the second case. Catholicism could put the seal on the conquest of the northern nations by converting them; whereas, there could be no conversion where the hostile powers were both monotheistic, and each insisting that his form of monotheism should prevail. The great result of the Crusades, among many which have engrossed more attention, was that they preserved the Western progression,

and remanded the Mussulman proselytism to the East, where its action might be really progressive. The success of the Crusades could not be complete till the Northern migrations had been brought to an end by stout resistance and wise concessions: and this is why the defence of Catholicism against Islamism became the chief object of military activity during the two centuries when the Middle Age polity was in its perfection. The great defensive operation may be regarded as complete towards the end of the thirteenth century, though there were occasional irruptions from the East till the seventeenth, and the habit of crusading excitement required time for subsidence. When the protective and conservative office of the feudal *régime* was accomplished, the military spirit became disturbing; and the more so as the European authority of the papacy declined. Its services were partial, in guarding the nationality of the various European peoples; but then it was through this very military spirit that those nationalities were endangered. It declined, together with the spiritual power, when its political ascendancy would have stood in the way of progress.

In any scientific analysis of the whole critical period of five centuries,—from the fourteenth to our own,—the *Division of the critical period.* period must be divided into two parts; the first comprehending the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in which the critical movement was spontaneous and involuntary, without any intervention of systematic doctrine; and the other comprehending the last three centuries, during which the disorganization has proceeded under the growing influence of an avowedly negative doctrine, extended by degrees to all social ideas, and indicating the tendency of modern society to renovation, though the principle of renovation has remained undisclosed.

By what has gone before, we see that the critical doctrine was not, as is commonly supposed, the cause, but the effect, of the decay of the system that was passing away. And nothing exhibits so plainly the provisional character of the Catholic *régime* as the spectacle of its sinking under the mutual conflict of its own instruments, without any systematic external attack: but the decay is not difficult to account for, after what we have seen of its germs, included in the organism in its best days, and sure to grow with a rapidity proportioned to its decline.

The separation between the spiritual and temporal power was itself a cause of decline, both from the want of conformity of the existing civilization, and from the *Causes of spontaneous decline.* imperfection of the only existing philosophy. The military spirit is always aiming at exclusive rule, even when it has arrived at the defensive stage of character; and therefore the division of authority, desirable and useful as it was, was a premature attempt at what can be fully accomplished only when the industrial

spirit shall have completely superseded the military. The theological spirit was no less disposed to pass its limits, the sacerdotal boundary being moreover thoroughly empirical and indeterminate. The mental discipline, which became more and more stringent and oppressive as the necessary convergence became more difficult, strengthened the sacerdotal disposition to usurpation. Again, though the temporal dominions annexed to the papacy became important among European sovereignties only when the Catholic system was in a state of political decline, the temporal sovereignty no doubt aided the spirit of ambition in the popes. Between an imperfect civilization on the one hand and a vicious philosophy on the other, the fundamental division which it was the glory of the period to have proposed, was overthrown; and the wonder would be that it lasted so long as to the fourteenth century, if we had not seen how slow and feeble was the growth of the new social elements, and how much remained to be done, to the last, before the function of the Catholic and feudal system was fulfilled. Our conclusions will be the same if we study the principal subdivision of each of these main powers; that is, the corresponding relation between the central and the local authorities. We shall see that the interior harmony of each power could have no more stability than their mutual combination. In the spiritual case there was a stronger peril of discord between the central sacerdotal authority and the national clergies, than always attends upon human imperfection. The system had special liabilities of its own. When the severe discipline necessary to preserve unity in the Church began to react, any partial rebellion might become important by attaching itself to national rivalries, under the guardianship of the respective temporal powers. The same causes which limited the territorial extension of Catholicism were fatal to its interior constitution, quite apart from dogmatic difficulties. In the most favouring countries the national clergy claimed special privileges, which the popes declared to be incompatible with the political existence of Catholicism; and the opposition was doubtless as real in more remote countries, though less formally expressed. At the same time the papal tendency to centralization, which indulged Italian ambition at the expense of all other, aroused very energetic and obstinate national susceptibilities on every hand. Thus there was danger of a breaking-up, from the formation of independent national Churches before doctrinal schism was heard of. Considering the liabilities of such a system, and the imperfection of its intellectual bases, it is clear that no excellencies of organization could preserve it from decay when once its discordant forces were set free from their combined pursuit of a common end; that is, when the system had once reached its culminating-point. As for the temporal case, we are all familiar with the struggles between the central power of royalty and the local powers of the various classes of the feudal

hierarchy. No efforts to reconcile the contradictory tendencies of isolation and centralization, both of which were sanctioned by the feudal spirit, could possibly avail for any length of time; and the ruin of the system must follow upon the victory of either of them.

The spectacle of this spontaneous decomposition suggests the reflection, first, that it confirms the estimate in the last chapter of the transitoriness of this extreme phase of the theological and military system; and again, that as the spontaneous decay was favourable to the growth of the new social elements, it becomes a fresh evidence of the fitness of the *régime* to carry on the great human evolution; and again, that the spontaneousness of the decay is really a distinctive feature of the Catholic and feudal *régime*, inasmuch as it was far more marked than in any preceding instance. In the spiritual order, carefully organized as it was, it is remarkable that the first agents of disorganization always and everywhere issued from the body of the Catholic clergy; whereas, there was nothing analogous to this in polytheism, in which the two powers were confounded. So provisional is the theological philosophy, that, in proportion as it advances, intellectually and morally, it becomes less consistent and less durable,—a truth which is confirmed by all historical observation. Fetichism was more deeply rooted and stable than polytheism, yet gave way before it. Polytheism had more intrinsic vigour and a longer duration than monotheism; and this appears, on ordinary principles, thoroughly paradoxical; while our theory explains it all by showing that the rational progress of theological conceptions consists in a perpetual diminution of intensity.

Turning now to the second period,—that in which the destruction of the old system proceeded under the superintendence of a systematic negative doctrine,—we must bear in mind what I have already said of the indispensable need of such a doctrine, to shelter the growing germs of the system to come, and to obviate the danger of eternal fruitless conflict, or of a return to an exhausted *régime*. As to the inevitableness of such a negative doctrine, that is easily established: for instance, we see it to be certain that Protestantism must arise, in course of time, from the very nature of the monotheistic *régime*. Monotheism introduces into the very heart of theology a spirit of individual examination and discussion, by leaving comparatively unsettled those secondary matters of belief which polytheism dogmatically fixed to their last particulars; and thus a natural though restricted philosophical liberty was admitted, at least to determine the proper mode of administering the supernatural power in each particular case. Thus theological heresy is impossible in polytheism, and always present in monotheism; because speculative activity must fall into more or less divergence with regard to essentially vague

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and arbitrary conceptions; and the division between the spiritual and temporal powers greatly enhanced the tendency in the case of Catholicism, because it incited free inquiry to extend itself from theological questions to social problems, in order to establish among them the special applications of the common doctrine which could be proved legitimate. The tendency gained strength perpetually during the whole period of the decay of the system, while the temporal powers were fighting against the spiritual, and the national clergies against the papacy; and we see in it the origin of the appeal to free inquiry which characterizes Protestantism, the first general phase of the revolutionary philosophy. The scholars who supported the authority of kings against the popes, and the national Churches which resisted the decisions of Rome, could not but claim for themselves a right of inquiry, urged more and more systematically, and unavoidably extended to all individuals and all questions, till, by a mental and social necessity, it brought on the destruction of the Catholic discipline first, then of the hierarchy, and, finally, of the dogma.

As for this character of the provisional philosophy, it is determined by the nature of its function. Popular sense *The provisional philosophy.* has given its character in its title of Protestantism, which applies to the whole revolutionary philosophy, though commonly confined to the first state of the doctrine. In fact, this philosophy has, from the rise of primitive Lutheranism up to the deism of the last century, without excepting the systematic atheism which is its extreme phase, been nothing more, historically speaking, than a growing and increasingly methodical protest against the intellectual bases of the old social order, extended, in virtue of its absolute character, to all genuine organization whatever. Serious as are the perils attending this negative spirit, the great necessary renovation could not take place without it. In all preceding times the destruction of each form could be subordinated by the human mind to the institution of a new form, which had some perceived character and purpose; but now a total renovation was needed,—a mental as well as social renovation,—more thorough than the experience of mankind can elsewhere show. As the critical operation was necessary before the new elements were ready, the ancient order had to be broken up, while the future remained wholly unsettled; and in such a case there was nothing for it but giving an absolute character to critical principles; for, if any conditions had been regularly imposed on the negative rights which they proclaimed, such conditions must have been derived from the very system proposed to be destroyed (no other social system being then in view), and thus the whole work would have been a mere abortion. The critical dogmas concerned in the process I shall notice hereafter, more or less explicitly; meantime, I have so exhibited the grounds of the hostility and defiance manifested by this negative philosophy

towards all authority whatever, and of its instinctive and absolute tendency to control and reduce all social powers, and both the origin and aim of such tendencies, that the thoughtful reader may obtain for himself the elucidations which it is not within my scope to provide.

One more division remains to be made—of the last period of three centuries into two nearly equal portions. In the first, which comprehends the chief forms of Protestantism, properly so called, the right of free inquiry, while fully admitted, was restrained within the limits of the Christian theology; and, in consequence, the spirit of discussion was chiefly employed in destroying, in the name of Christianity, the admirable system of the Catholic hierarchy, which was, in a social sense, the only thorough realization of it. In this appeared conspicuously the inconsistency which characterizes the whole of the negative philosophy, proposing, as we here find it, to reform Christianity by destroying the indispensable conditions of its existence. The second phase presents the various schemes of deism which constitute what is called the philosophy of the eighteenth century, though its methodical formation really belongs to the middle of the preceding century. In this case the right of free inquiry was declared to be indefinite; but it was taken for granted that metaphysical discussion would remain within the general limits of monotheism, whose foundations were supposed to be unalterable. They were in their turn, however, broken up before the end of the period, by a prolongation of the same process. The intellectual inconsistency was notably diminished by this extension of the destructive analysis; but the social dissolution appears more evident, through the absolute disposition to establish political regeneration on a series of mere negations, which can produce nothing but anarchy. It was through Socinianism that the historical transition from the one phase to the other was made. Our preceding survey explains enough of the origin and formation of these two phases; for it is evident that, in the first place, the right of free inquiry must have appeared to be limited, or it would not have been admitted; and in the next, its limits could not but be found to be movable; and the extravagances and disturbances which were sure to ensue must have compelled the strongest minds to withdraw altogether from an order of ideas so arbitrary and discordant, and therefore so perverted from their original destination. The distinction between the two phases is so indispensable that, notwithstanding their extension among all the peoples of Western Europe under forms which, though various, are politically equivalent, they could not have the same principal seat, as we shall see hereafter. There was also a difference between them as to their share in the new social elements; for the positive spirit was at first too restricted and concentrated, as to topics and minds, to have much

effect on the advent-of Protestantism, which, on the other hand, rendered great services to positivism; whereas, under the second phase, the powerful though indirect intervention of positivism imparted a rational consistency to anti-theological analysis which it could not otherwise have obtained, and which will prove to be the chief basis of its ulterior efficacy.

The course of progress during the whole five centuries encountered no serious opposition, except from the legitimate apprehension of an entire overthrow of society; and it was this fear which imparted such energy as there was in the resistance of the ancient powers, which were themselves drawn in to participate, directly or indirectly, in the universal unsteadiness. The leaders of the movement were necessarily placed in a position of extreme difficulty, and especially after the sixteenth century; their office being to satisfy the needs of both order and progress, which became imperative in proportion as they were found to be nearly irreconcilable. During the whole period, the highest political capacity was that which could most wisely carry on the steady demolition of the ancient system while avoiding the anarchical disturbances which were always imminent where the critical philosophy was at work. The ability to derive social benefit from the spirit of logical inconsistency was quite as important and quite as delicate as that which is so much honoured for its beneficent social application of the theological doctrine, in the preceding ages. At the same time, the social success of the critical doctrine, in spite of its extreme logical imperfection, shows its accordance with the needs of the time; but for which the success would be inexplicable. We must therefore regard this memorable critical movement as being no accidental disturbance, but one of the necessary stages of the great social evolution, however serious are the dangers involved in its irrational protraction to the present day.

When we study the organs of the operation which we have surveyed in the abstract, we shall find it difficult or impossible to follow up, steadily and clearly, the *Organs of the doctrine.* separation between the spiritual and temporal power, though at intervals, we shall find it reappear, under all the main aspects of modern civilization. One division, however, among the social forces which superintended the transition of the last three centuries, is naturally distinct enough,—that between the metaphysicians and the legists, who are, in some sort, the spiritual and temporal elements of the mixed and equivocal *régime* that corresponds with the inconsistent and exceptional social condition of the period. Both must necessarily arise, as I shall show, from the respective elements of the ancient system,—the one from the Catholic, and the other from the feudal power,—and grow up in rivalry to them first, and then in hostility. Their rise is plainly distinguishable in the season of the greatest splendour of the monotheistic *régime*,



especially in Italy, which was always foremost in the Middle Ages, and in which the metaphysicians, and also the legists, were rising in importance, from the twelfth century,—chiefly in the free towns of Lombardy and Tuscany. Their character and office could not however be fully revealed till the rise and spread of change called for their intervention in laying the foundations of the exceptional system which they have since administered. They found their instrumentality in the universities and parliaments, which have been from that time the organs of the metaphysical action and of the power of the legists. The Heads of faculties or doctors, who represented the metaphysical power, produced the men of letters as a secondary class; and the legists, in like manner, yielded an accessory class in the judges and lawyers. We shall see hereafter how the secondary classes have now obtained the ascendancy, thereby indicating that the end of this singular anomaly is near at hand.

Fixing our attention now upon the spiritual element which continues to be the most characteristic, even in this *Scholasticism*. case,—we have seen how the metaphysical spirit must naturally obtain social sway at this period. After the Greek division of philosophy into natural and moral, the metaphysical spirit assumed two forms, which, in harmony with the distinction, became gradually antagonistic. The first, of which Plato must be considered the chief organ, most resembled the theological philosophy, which it at first tended rather to modify than to destroy. The second, whose type was Aristotle, approached much nearer to the positive philosophy, and tended to disengage the human understanding from all theological guardianship. The one was critical only on the side of polytheism, and superintended the organization of monotheism, under which it was itself absorbed by the theological spirit, and transmuted into religious philosophy: whereas the other, occupied at first with the study of the external world, could not but be altogether critical, from its anti-theological tendency, in combination with its total lack of power to produce any organization whatever. It was under the direction of this last that the great revolutionary movement went on. Discarded by Platonism, while the best minds were engaged in the organization of the Catholic system, the Aristotelian spirit, which had been perpetually extending its inorganic domain, began to assume the ascendancy in philosophy, by gradually comprehending the moral, and even the social world under its sway, as soon as the need of a rational philosophy began to prevail. It was thus that, after the twelfth century, when the monotheistic system was in its glory, the growing triumph of scholasticism was actually working the destruction of the theological philosophy and authority. It assumed consistency from its natural aptitude for engrossing public instruction in the universities, which were no longer devoted to ecclesi-

astical education alone, but embracing all the chief kinds of intellectual culture. The works of Thomas Aquinas, and even of Dante, show that the new metaphysical spirit had invaded the whole intellectual and moral study of individual Man, and was already extending to social speculations so as to indicate the approaching emancipation of human reason from all purely theological guardianship. The canonization of the great scholastic doctor was his due for his eminent political services; but it shows the involuntary implication of the popes in the new mental activity, and their prudence in incorporating with their system whatever was not directly hostile to it. At first, the anti-theological character of metaphysics could disclose itself only in the form of a livelier and more pertinacious heresy and schism: but the great decisive struggles of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries against the European power of the popes and the ecclesiastical supremacy of the papal see, occasioned a large and permanent application of the new philosophy to social questions. Having attained all the speculative perfection it admitted of, it entered henceforth more and more into political controversy; and, as it grew more negative in regard to the old spiritual organization, it became necessarily destructive also of the corresponding temporal power, which it had at first stimulated in its universal encroachments. Thus it is that, up to the last century, the metaphysical power of the universities came to take the lead in the work of destructive change. When we hereafter review the results of the movement, we shall find abundant light cast upon the analysis here presented.

If we turn to the corresponding temporal state, we can now see how necessary was the relation, in regard both to doctrines and persons, between the class of scholastic metaphysicians and that of the contemporary legists. *The Legists.* Through the study of ecclesiastical law, the new philosophical spirit must enter into the study of social questions and of law in general; and next, the teaching of law must be a privilege of the universities; besides that the canonists, properly so called, who were the immediate offspring of the Catholic system, were the first order of legists subjected to a distinct organization. The affinity of the two orders is so marked that it might be natural to look upon the legists as metaphysicians passed from the speculative into the active state: but they are not so; but rather an emanation of the feudal power, whose judiciary functions fell into their hands: and their hostility to the Catholic power was naturally for ever on the increase through the collisions between the ecclesiastical tribunals and the civil jurisdictions, royal and seigneurial. They began to be powerful before the decline of the Catholic system; their influence increased during the absence of the feudal chiefs in the Crusades, from the judiciary administration of affairs at home remaining in their hands; and the great conflicts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries opened

boundless scope and congenial employment to their activity. This was the season of their highest triumph, because their political ambition was then in harmony with their real service in aid of human progression: and, in regard to both classes, this was the age of lofty intellect and noble character. When this new social element had sufficiently aided, first, the efforts of the kings to free themselves from the control of the popes, and then, the opposition of the national churches to the papal supremacy, it had done its highest work on behalf of modern society, and had little more to do than to guard the results obtained from the always threatening reaction of the discomfited forces of the old organization. What its later action has been, we shall soon have occasion to observe. All that I need point out here is that, as these two bodies never had any organizing principle or power, their sway could be only temporary, and for purposes of mere preparation for a future organic state; and that such social order as was preserved during their rule must be attributed to the resistant action of the ancient powers, which still retained the direction of society, though more and more encroached upon by revolutionary modifications. If led to any attempt to construct and organize, the metaphysicians have no other resort, for principles and materials, than to the theological system, nor the legists than to the military system, which it is their very function to discredit and destroy; and thus we know by anticipation that their power must expire with the last remains of the ancient *régime*.

Having surveyed the revolutionary movement of modern society in its nature, its course, and its organs, we have now only to observe its fulfilment.

The spontaneous stage of the spiritual decay is the first aspect which claims our attention, because it brings after it all the rest. It was not only the first to be fulfilled, the most difficult and the most decisive; but it involved the ruin of the whole *régime*. The efforts of the kings to overthrow the European power of the popes, which constitute the first aspect of the decline, may be referred to the fourteenth century, beginning with the strong reaction of Philippe-le-Bel, followed by the translation of the Holy See to Avignon: while the fifteenth century is the date of the second series of efforts,—that of the national churches against the papacy; beginning with the schism which arose out of the removal of the Holy See, and strengthened by the impulse imparted by the spontaneous union of the various churches against the papacy, in the celebrated Council of Constance. The first movement was essential to the second; as the national clergies could not place themselves under the direction of their respective chiefs till the chiefs themselves had escaped from the papal thralldom. Of all revolutionary operations, this appears to me to be the greatest; for it broke up the foundations of the

*Period of spontaneous spiritual decline.*

monotheistic *régime* of the Middle Ages, by occasioning the spiritual power to be absorbed by the temporal. The kings were blind to the consequences of their own acts when they destroyed the intellectual and moral foundations of the supremacy which they hoped to usurp, but which was effectual only in virtue of being independent of temporal power; and the various clergies, striving for nationality in order to escape from Romish centralization, were unaware that they were degrading their order by passing over from the authority of a single natural head to that of a multitude of military powers, whom they must regard as their spiritual inferiors;—thus placing each church in an oppressive state of political dependence, through their own desire for an irrational independence. The reaction of these movements upon the popes tended to aggravate the injury to the Catholic constitution. From the middle of the fourteenth century, when the sagacity of the popes assured them of the approaching emancipation of the kings in England, France, etc., while the eagerness of the national clergies in supporting all restrictions on papal power indicated their approaching nationalization, it is evident that the popes began to occupy themselves with their principality, which had before been merely an accessory object of solicitude, but which was now becoming the only real part of their political power. Before the close of the fifteenth century, the ancient chief of the European system had sunk down to be the elective sovereign of a part of Italy, no longer ruling the civilized world, but striving for his own territorial aggrandisement, and to obtain a royal station for the long series of pontifical families, so as to make the absence of the hereditary principle almost an evil in the midst of this flood of nepotism. The papal power was now merely Italian: it had abdicated its noblest political attributes: and it lost its social utility, so as to become, more and more, a foreign element in the constitution of modern society. Hence dates the retrograde character of the Catholic polity, which had been so long progressive. Thus it was that all the essential elements of the Middle Age polity concurred, in their several ways, in the irrevocable decline of the spiritual power, which constituted its strength and dignity. And thus it is clear that the first disorganization was almost accomplished before the advent of Protestantism, which was its result and not its cause, whatever may have been the subsequent influence which flowed from its systematic sanction of the demolition of the Catholic system.

Indispensable as this demolition was, it left an immense gap in the body of European polity, the elements of which were now delivered over to conflict without restraint. A melancholy example of this is afforded by the frivolous and fierce wars of the principal countries, and especially by those between England and France, while the unavailing efforts of the popes to make peace

proved merely that their European authority was gone. An exuberant military activity remained over from the system of defensive war; and the protracted ascendancy of the military caste united with it to give that strange character to the wars of the period which contrasts so unfavourably with the social interest of wars of an earlier time, and even with that of the religious wars of the next century. The evils of the situation were aggravated by the decline, at the same time, of the political influence which had hitherto regulated international relations. Two centuries before, the papacy had struggled successfully with a similar difficulty: but now it was decrepit. Its period of splendour was not long gone by, and its will was ardent and sincere as ever; but, in accordance with, and in proof of its temporary character, it failed utterly in its political vocation, through no accidental obstacles, but in consequence of its early disorganization. We shall soon see by what provisional expedient modern polity endeavoured to supply, as far as possible, this vast defalcation.

The disorganization of the temporal system, though proceeding throughout the thirteenth century, could not show its effects while the Catholic system remained unimpaired: but no sooner did the spiritual system begin to fall asunder than there was such disorder in the temporal as threatened the entire subversion of the feudal system, by destroying the balance of powers of the kings and the nobles. The local force of the nobles had, before the end of the fifteenth century, almost entirely absorbed the central force of the kings, as well as the spiritual power,—an inevitable consequence of the rise of the industrial spirit, and the attendant antipathy to the old military temper. It may seem as if the struggles of that time showed anything but a release from a military state of society: but, in fact, such wars as were taking place were fatal to the social consideration of the dominant military class, who, in warring against the civilization which it had been their function to protect, were manifesting the most unquestionable of all symptoms of decay,—that of turning against their original aim. The feudal organism was near its end when, instead of restraining the system of invasion, it became the general invader. The memorable institution of standing armies, begun in Italy and fully developed in France, marked the complete dissolution of the temporal system of the Middle Ages, both by manifesting the repugnance of industrial society to feudal service, and by substituting a wholly new military subordination for that of feudal warriors to their chiefs. The change was highly beneficial to industry; but it deprived the ancient military caste of its special prerogative. In this process of change, the gain was certain to be on the side of the kings. When the balance was once destroyed, the nobles were sure to be the sufferers, from the encouragement that the feudal system offered to the growth of the central

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power. As the decline of the spiritual power wrought in the contrary direction,—that is, against the kings,—all Europe would have been in a state of complete dismemberment, but for the advantage given to the central power by the temporal dissolution. Of the few exceptional cases of the political ascendancy of the aristocracy over royalty, the most remarkable is that of England; and that it is an exceptional case should be well understood by those who would transplant the temporary system peculiar to England to the Continent, with the idea that the work of political renovation was then complete. The case and polity of England are perfectly singular, owing, I think, to the two circumstances of her insular position and the double conquest she has undergone; the first admitting of an undisturbed course of social development; and the other provoking a coalition of the nobles against royalty, as a result of the Norman Conquest. Moreover, that conquest, by its results, favoured the combination of the aristocratic league with the industrial classes, by means of the valuable intermediary class of the Saxon nobles; an intervention which existed nowhere else. As it does not accord with the abstract character of my inquiry to go further into detail, I must content myself with referring the reader to the case of Scotland, in proof that the double conquest had more influence than insular position in determining the peculiarity of the English case; and to those of Venice first, and afterwards of Sweden, as instances of the political development of which England is the most striking example.

Thus, towards the end of the fifteenth century, we see that the spiritual power was absorbed by the temporal; and one of the elements of the temporal power thoroughly subordinated to the other: so that the whole of the vast organism was dependent on one active central power,—generally royalty,—when the disintegration of the whole system was about to become systematic. I have already said that the process occupied two periods, the Protestant, properly so called, and the deistical.

After what we have seen, we shall easily understand that the Reformation simply put the seal on the state of modern society, such as it was after the changes, particularly of the spiritual power, of the two preceding centuries. The revolutionary condition, I must observe, was as marked among the nations who remained Catholic, as among those who professed Protestantism; though the characteristics of the change were different. The subordination of the spiritual power affected all the West of Europe, and all orders of persons who inhabited it,—priests and popes, as well as kings, nobles, and people. When Henry VIII. separated from Rome, Charles V. and Francis I. were almost as fully emancipated as he. The two points of change which alone have remained common to all sects were the breaking up the centralization of the papal power, and the national

*True character  
of the Reformation.*

subjection of the spiritual to the temporal authority: and the achievement of Luther, with all its stormy grandeur still investing it, was in fact a simple realization of this first stage of Catholic decline; for its dogma was at first a collateral affair; and it essentially respected the hierarchy, and seriously attacked only the discipline. If we look more closely at the nature of the changes, we shall find them such as not only propitiated the human passions which exist in clergy as in other men, but confirmed the destruction of sacerdotal independence,—namely, the abolition of clerical celibacy and of general confession. Such being the earliest character of Protestantism, it is easy to see why it made its first appearance among nations remote from the centre of Catholicism, and to whom the Italian tendencies of the papacy during the last two centuries were especially vexatious. At the same time (the time of Luther), the kings of Catholic countries,—of France, Spain, Austria, etc.,—were as completely the masters of their clergy, and as completely independent of the papal power, as the Protestant princes, though they did not openly arrogate to themselves a useless and absurd spiritual supremacy. But the Lutheran movement, especially when it had reached the Calvinistic phase, wrought powerfully in converting the clergy to such a political subjection, which had been repugnant to them before, but in which they now saw the only security for their social existence amidst the universal passion for religious emancipation. It was then that the coalition of social interests began, between Catholic influence and royal power, which has been erroneously attributed to the best days of Catholicism, when that system was in fact glorious for its antagonism to all temporal power. It is another mistake to suppose that the opposition to human progress is more attributable to modern Catholicism than to Lutheranism, which in its English or Swedish or any other form, is yet more hostile to progress, having never proposed to be independent, but been instituted from the beginning for perpetual subjection. From whatever cause, the Catholic church, finding itself powerless in regard to its highest offices, and restricted to the control of the individual life, with some little remaining influence over the domestic, has applied itself more and more exclusively to the preservation of its own existence by making itself a necessary auxiliary to royalty, in which alone the remains of the life of the monotheistic age were concentrated. It needs no showing that this was a vicious circle, out of which nothing could issue but ruin both to Catholicism and to royalty. Catholicism offered itself as a support precisely because it was itself in need of support; and it lost its popular credit by thus renouncing its ancient and most prominent political office, retaining only the empty power of preachment, which, however sublime in eloquence, was essentially declamatory, and very inoffensive to the now superior power. At the same time, royalty had connected its political fate with a system of doctrines and in-

stitutions certain to excite in time universal repugnance, intellectual and moral, and doomed to universal and speedy dissolution.

The dissolution was systematized, from the beginning, chiefly by the institution of the society of the Jesuits, which, *The Jesuits.* eminently retrograde in its nature, was founded to serve as a central organ of Catholic resistance to the destruction which threatened on every side. The papacy, of late chiefly engrossed by the interests and cares of its temporal sovereignty, was no longer fit for the necessary opposition to spiritual emancipation; and the Jesuit leaders, who were usually eminent men, assumed, under all modest appearances, the function of the popes, in order to bring into convergence the partial efforts which were more and more scattered by the tendencies of the time. Without them Catholicism could not, it appears to me, have offered any substantial resistance for the last three centuries; but not the less must the Jesuit influence, from its hostility to human progress, be eminently corrupting and contradictory in its character. It engaged all the social influence it could lay hold of in the service of Catholicism, by persuading the enlightened that their own power depended on their support of a system of sacerdotal authority over the vulgar, while they themselves might enjoy a secret emancipation;—a procedure which was possible only as long as such emancipation was exceptional, and sure to become ridiculous when religious liberty should be more widely spread, when, of necessity, Jesuitism must be reduced to an organized mystification, in which every person concerned must be at the same time and for the same purpose deceiver and deceived. Again, by striving for the direction of education, Jesuitism helped to propagate the intellectual movement; for, however imperfect its teachings, they were an apparatus directed against the end of its own institution. Its famous foreign missions offer the same contradiction between the means; for they offered homage to the intellectual, and especially the scientific, development of modern society, which it was their object to contravene; and derived their own spiritual power from that intellectual teaching which they made the means of introducing articles of faith that they at first were compelled to disown or conceal. I need not point out the perils to which such an institution must have been exposed, holding so exceptional a position amidst the Catholic organism, and by the superiority of its special destination provoking the jealousy of all other religious bodies, whose attributes it absorbed, one by one, and whose antipathy became so intense as to neutralize, in the heart of the Catholic clergy themselves, all regret for the final fall of the only possible support of their Church.

Jesuitism was indeed the only barrier set up, with any chance of success, against the incursions of religious liberty; *Final decay of Catholicism.* and the Spanish monarchy, as secluded from heresy, was the only effectual support of Jesuitism. Nothing better than



a negative result was given forth by the Council of Trent, as the popes seem to have foreseen, judging by their reluctance to summon and prolong the Assembly, which could only reproduce, after a long and conscientious revision, the Catholic system, with a fruitless admiration of the consistency of all its parts, and the conclusion that, with every conciliatory desire, they could consent to none of the concessions proposed for the sake of peace. I pointed out before that the Franciscans and Dominicans had offered, three centuries earlier, the only real promise of Catholic reformation; and, as they failed, there was no hope. The universal prayer of the Catholic world for the regeneration of the Church had for some time shown that the critical spirit was predominant even there. Thus far advanced towards dissolution, no ground was left to Catholicism but that of resistance to human development; and thus reduced to be a mere party in Europe, it lost not only the power but the desire to fulfil its old destination. Absorbed in the care of its own preservation, degraded by the perpetration of foul and suicidal acts, through its partnership with royalty, and resorting to material repression, its activity of resistance only disclosed its intellectual and moral impotence, and indirectly hastened the decay which it strove to arrest. From the first days of decline to the present,—from the time of Philip II. to that of Bonaparte,—there has been the same struggle between the retrograde instinct of the ancient organization and the spirit of negative progression proper to new social forces: only the situation was at first inevitable; whereas now it is protracted for want of a philosophy appropriate to the actual phase of human development. It does not follow that Catholicism was not illustrated in its decline by many men of eminence, intellectual and moral; but the number rapidly decreased, and the social decay of Catholicism was made manifest in the very men who most adorned it. The finest logic was employed in defending inconsistencies and humiliations, as in the instance of Bossuet; and the virtues of such men as St Carlo Borromeo and St Vincent de Paul had no characteristics which attached them to Catholicism, as must have been the case in earlier times. Their natures must have received an equivalent development, though under a different expression, under any religious sect, or outside of all.

We must beware of attributing the vices of hypocrisy and hostility to progress to Catholicism alone. From the moment that Protestantism changed its natural attitude of simple opposition, it shared those vices to the full. Catholicism became retrograde against its nature, in consequence of its subjection to temporal power; and Protestantism, erecting that subjection into a principle, could not but be retrograde in at least an equal degree. For instance, Anglican orthodoxy, rigorously required from the vulgar for the political needs of the coexisting system, could not generate very deep convictions and a very high

*Vices of Protestantism.*

respect among those same Lords of Parliament whose decisions had so often arbitrarily changed various articles of faith, and who must officially claim the regulation of their own belief as one of the essential prerogatives of their order. The forcible repression of religious liberty was, in Catholicism, simply a consequence of its modern disorganization; whereas, it is inherent in the very nature of Protestantism, from its confounding the two kinds of discipline; and it could not but manifest itself as soon as it had the power, as long experience has only too well proved. And this has been the case, not only with primitive Protestantism, through the despotic spirit of Lutheranism towards all that goes beyond it: it has been the case in all the more advanced sects from the moment that power passed into their hands, for however short a time. The deist Rousseau proposed the juridical extermination of all atheists; and he is only a fair exemplification of the doctrines which pretend to tolerance while subjecting the spiritual to the temporal order of affairs.

Before quitting the study of modern Catholic resistance, I must remark that, so far from being merely hurtful to social improvement, as we are apt to suppose, it has aided political progress for three centuries past. Besides its office in preserving public order, of which I have already said enough, we must consider the social benefit that has accrued from its active opposition to the spread of the Protestant movement. The imperfect operation of the spirit of free inquiry must have retarded the emancipation of the intellect, especially among the multitude, by humouring the indolence of proud human reason: and in political matters, Protestantism proposes modifications which, in spite of their insufficiency, keep up a delusive notion of the tendency of society to true regeneration. Thus, Protestant nations after first outstripping their Catholic neighbours, have stood still, in a position further removed than the Catholic nations from any real issue of the revolutionary movement: and such would have been the disastrous state of suspension of the whole civilized world, if it had been all pervaded by Protestantism. Instead of the final organic state being made to depend on the indefinite duration of the old organism in that state of half-decay sanctioned by Protestantism, it is aided by the action of Catholicism in retarding the revolutionary movement, intellectual and political, till it could become decisive in both relations.

As for the effect of the critical spirit on the temporal changes of the last three centuries,—we find it at work among the social powers which gathered round the preponderant temporal element, whether it were the royal power, as in France, or the aristocratic power, as in England and some other countries. The only active element in either case was naturally invested with a sort of permanent dictatorship, the establishment of which was so far retarded by religious troubles as not to have been

fully characterized till the second half of the seventeenth century, and which remains to this day, notwithstanding its exceptional nature, together with the corresponding social situation; because of the incapacity of the special agents of the transition to conduct it to its issue. This long dictatorship, royal or aristocratic, was at once the consequence and the corrective of the spiritual disorganization, which would otherwise have destroyed society altogether. We shall hereafter see what its influence has been in hastening the development of new social elements, and even aiding their political advent. The operation of the dictatorship, in the one case in *Royal and Aristocratic.* England, and in the other in France, is full of interest and instruction. Both have equally broken up the feudal equilibrium; but France, from the predominance of the regal element, is nearer to a permanent settlement than England, with its aristocratic system: and the royal element being more indispensable to the issue than the aristocratic, France has been better able to dispense with a peerage than England with a sovereign; so that the aristocratic power has been more subordinated in France than the regal in England. Royalty in France, isolated in the midst of a people bent on emancipation, has opposed less obstruction to progress than the English aristocracy, who, equally disposed to the stationary or retrograde policy, have more power to sustain it, by their closer connection with the people at large. Again, the principle of caste, which in France has long been confined to royalty, is sustained in England by a great number of distinct families, whose continual renewal maintains its vigour, though its character is certainly not ameliorated by the new additions. However proud the English oligarchy may be of their old historical prerogative of making and unmaking kings, the rare exercise of such a privilege could not affect the spirit of the temporal organization so much as the daring permanent power of making nobles which the sovereigns of France appropriated as long ago, and which they have used so recklessly as to make their noblesse almost ridiculous, since the revolutionary phase began. I must observe in this connection that Protestantism has nowhere, and least of all in England, shown itself averse to the spirit of caste, which it has even tended to restore, by re-establishing, as far as possible, the sacerdotal character, of which the Catholic philosophy had deprived it. For one instance, the spirit of Catholicism, opposed to the principle of caste, and favourable to that of capacity, has always opposed the succession of women to the throne or to feudal authority; whereas official Protestantism, in England, Sweden, etc., has sanctioned the political existence of queens and even of peeresses: a contrast which is the more remarkable from Protestantism having made royalty a genuine national papacy.

In both the cases of temporal dictatorship, Protestantism has done something to retard the disorganization which in other re-

spects it accelerated, by reinforcing the element which was to succumb. In England, and in cases analogous to the English, this was done by means of the national papacy instituted by Protestantism,—a spiritual authority which, without being able to inspire very serious convictions, did for a time partially compensate to the multitude for the loss of the real papal guidance, and hence grew to an excess which occasioned great political convulsion. An equivalent, but opposite result of Protestantism took place on the Continent, and even in Scotland, but especially in France, by the noblesse being supplied with fresh means of resistance to the growing ascendancy of royalty: and in this second case it took the Presbyterian or Calvinistic form, as best suited to opposition, instead of the Episcopalian or Lutheran form, which is best adapted for government. Hence, violent repression or convulsive agitation, as the two powers alternately struggled to repair their former decline; the mass of the people still, as before, interfering no other-wise than as a natural auxiliary, though certain to obtain a personal interest ere long in the controversy, by means of their co-operation. This appears to me to be the true account of the memorable social troubles of England, France, and all the west of Europe, from about the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century; and thus is explained the thorough unpopularity, generally speaking, of French Calvinism, which was welcomed by the noblesse as a means of recovering their ancient feudal independence, in opposition to royalty, and which was therefore repugnant to the old anti-aristocratic instinct of the mass of the population.

If we look to the general social effect of the dictatorship of the temporal power, in either of its aspects, we shall find it to be that, when its authority was fully consolidated, it raised up its old antagonist, which, on the other hand, accepted, more or less explicitly, a final political subordination. It was quite natural that it should be so, considering how much alike royalty and aristocracy were in origin, caste, and education, and how congenial they must therefore be, when once their rivalry was brought to an end. From that moment the explanation of any democratic tendencies shown by either was clear enough; for each invariably employed its ascendancy in favour of its old rival, and against its steady ally. Such was the attitude of the English aristocracy in regard to royalty, on which it lavished a more and more affectionate guardianship; and such was in France, from Louis XIV. onwards, the growing predilection of royalty for its humbled noblesse. It is not to be supposed that these transactions took place for calculated reasons. On the contrary, they were the inevitable results of natural affinities, though the consideration might, and no doubt did, afterwards occur, of the utility of such unions as a means of resistance to the revolutionary movement, which was about to become systematic. We observe here a repetition of the error of the pre-

ceding period,—that of mistaking a charge for a support: and here we also recognize the natural term of the spontaneous disorganization which characterized the preceding period, and which was extended into this till the remains of the ancient system were gathered round the element which was to prevail. The dissolution being complete, we shall see the critical action assume a new direction towards a decisive revolution, for which the way was now open. From this juncture, the dictatorship of both kinds assumed the retrograde character which was impossible till the respective positions of royalty and aristocracy were settled; and now was that system of retrograde resistance matured which had been begun by Philip II. under Jesuit inspiration, and against which the whole revolutionary spirit, now also matured, was to be brought to bear.

When the kings ceased to be mere warrior chiefs, and engrossed prerogatives and offices too vast to be wielded by themselves alone, the ministerial function arose,—a new symptom of the times, and a new political power. Louis XI. seems to me to have been (with the exception of the anomalous case of Frederick the Great) the last European sovereign who really directed all his affairs himself. Richelieu's elevation was not attributable solely to his personal qualities: for both before and after him men of a far inferior genius acquired an authority quite as real, and perhaps more extended. Now, such an institution is an involuntary confession of weakness on the part of a power which, having engrossed all political functions, is compelled to abdicate the practical direction of them, to the great injury of its own social dignity and independence. The most striking feature of this new position is the surrender of that military command which was once the primary attribute of sovereignty: and this surrender took place in the seventeenth century, behind some official disguises. In the same way, the aristocratic dictatorship resigned its actual political power and military leadership. The English oligarchy confided its chief prerogatives to ministers derived from the nobility, and chose out of a lower rank the real leaders of military operations both by land and sea: but in the English case, the change was less marked than in the converse, because the peerage could incorporate its ministers with itself, and thus disguise its own weakness. The Venetian aristocracy had already gone through the same process, though with less remark, because the situation was less conspicuous.

*Military decline.* It is evident that not only is the decay of the military régime signalized by the substitution of standing armies for a feudal militia, but the profession of arms was completely degraded when the ministerial power arose, and was usually exercised by men entirely unversed in war, at the very time that kings were retiring from military command. If any superficial thinker should object that we have had great wars up to very

recent times, I need only refer him, for a proof that these recent wars do not indicate a military *régime*, to the difference in position and power, between the greatest of modern generals, who are merely the agents of a jealous and distrustful civil authority, and the ancient generals, especially the Roman, who enjoyed an almost absolute and indefinite empire during the whole course of their operations. The best proof that the modern position of military commanders is no accident, but accordant with the natural course of affairs, is the acquiescence of the generals themselves, who have never yet been deterred by the most irksome conditions from eagerly soliciting the command of modern armies. Nothing can verify more strikingly than such a change, natural and universal as it is, the anti-military character of modern society, to which war is more and more an exceptional state, the very crises of which yield only an accessory social interest, out of the military profession.

This view is confirmed by an unprejudiced study of the great modern wars, which are hastily cited in contradiction to it. Generally speaking, these wars in no degree proceeded from any feudal exuberance of military activity after the abasement of the European authority of the popes. The last wars that can be referred to such an origin are, I think, those belonging to the first half of the sixteenth century, during the rivalry of Francis I. and Charles V., consequent on the French invasion of Italy. That very struggle presently became defensive on the part of France, for the maintenance of her nationality against the dangerous pretensions of Charles V. to a kind of universal monarchy. From that time, Protestantism checked the spirit of conquest by the pre-occupation of intestinal troubles, and by assigning a new end and course to military activity, thenceforth connected with the great social struggle between the system of resistance and the instinct of progression ;—to say nothing at this time of what I shall have to speak of hereafter,—the anti-military tendency of Protestant ways,—encouraging habits of discussion and free inquiry evidently hostile to the commonest conditions of military discipline. To this time then we must refer the origin of the revolutionary wars, properly so called, in which foreign war was complicated with civil conflict, for the solemn sake of an important social principle, by which pacific men were brought into the struggle by the force of their convictions, so that military energy might be very intense and sustained without being more than a mere means, and without indicating any general predilection for military life. Such was, in my view, the new character, not only of the long wars which agitated Europe, from about the middle of the sixteenth to that of the seventeenth century, not even excepting the Thirty Years' War, but of the yet more extended warfare which lasted from the above period to the peace of Utrecht. No doubt there was ambition of conquest in each case,

and the more as the first religious and political fervour declined; but it was an accessory and not a primary influence. These wars, like the former, bear the revolutionary impress, inasmuch as they related to the prolongation of the universal struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism. There was a further change in the character of the wars of the eighteenth century, in consequence of the humbler aim of the European states,—to maintain the hostile systems in their existing positions, in order to leave scope for the industrial development whose social importance was becoming more and more conspicuous. From that time, military activity was mainly subordinated to commercial interests, till the advent of the French Revolution; during which, with the exception of a great natural outbreak of war, the military spirit began to undergo a final transformation, which, as we shall see hereafter, marks more clearly than any other its doom of inevitable extinction.

The chief agency in accomplishing the changes that we have just seen to be connected with the decline of the *Rise of Diplomatic function.* military system was that small but very remarkable class,—the diplomatists. This class arose out of the necessity of fulfilling the political relations between different states which the papacy had hitherto taken charge of: and the Catholic constitution supplied its first elements by offering many intelligent and active men, naturally placed at the highest social point of view, without being in any degree military: and we observe, in fact, that the diplomatists were for some time taken from the Catholic clergy, some of whom were glad to employ in this way the political capacity which was no longer required by their declining corporation. Though, from circumstances, apparently aristocratic, the spirit of the class is essentially progressive, capacity being always placed in the first rank of personal titles, behind the disguises of official forms: and there has certainly not been, in Europe, for three centuries past, any other class so emancipated from political, and perhaps philosophical prejudices,—in virtue of the superiority of its habitual point of view. This civil class, born and bred side by side with the ministerial power, of which it is a sort of natural appendage, has always wrought well in stripping military leadership of its ancient political prerogatives, reducing it more and more to the condition of an instrument, more or less passive, of designs conceived and directed by the civil authority. It especially contributed to the decline of military power by appropriating the work of negotiation for peace or alliance, which was once an inseparable part of the military function: and this easily explains the instinctive antipathy which has always existed in modern times, under forms more or less expressive, between the higher ranks of the two classes.

This last view leads us on to the final consideration in regard to the temporal dictatorship,—of the efforts which it made to fill up

the immense chasm which was left in the political system of Europe by the extinction of the universal authority of the popes. The difficulty arose early in the transition period; but its solution was necessarily deferred; for the only discernible remedy was a regulated material antagonism among the states of Europe; and this could not be had till they had composed their internal troubles, and decided on the character of the temporal dictatorship of each. When that time came the diplomatists went to work with zeal, sustained by a sense of the dignity of their mission, to institute that balance which was rendered necessary by the almost equal division of Europe between Catholicism and Protestantism. The great treaty of Westphalia is a monument of their office in the system of modern civilization, manifesting, as it does, a generous spirit of universal and permanent pacification. The diplomatic solution is, no doubt, very inferior to the old Catholic intervention; for the international organism needs, as much as the national, an intellectual and moral basis, such as the Catholic constitution afforded; and the mere physical antagonism, which was all that diplomacy could establish, could never attain any solidity, and has been of very doubtful utility, if not mischievous, in as far as it afforded scope for political ambition. But it would be unjust to require that a provisional expedient should have the virtues of a normal instrumentality; and the diplomatic function has at least kept alive, among the European states, the idea of some sort of organization, however loose and inadequate, in readiness for the time when a thorough intellectual reorganization shall close the great revolutionary period.

Such was the process of temporal disorganization during the Protestant period; and it was carried out in the same direction, without any essential change, through the deistical period and up to the time of the first French Revolution. Here then we may dismiss the first phase of the systematic destruction of the old social system; and, having established the starting-point of the great revolutionary movement, we can proceed all the more rapidly and clearly to estimate the intellectual influence of the Protestant period.

Besides the political action proper to Protestantism, it served as the organ of the universal spirit of emancipation, by preparing for the dissolution, intellectual and social, that the old system must undergo. Though not answerable for the critical doctrine, properly so called, it laid the main foundations of it; and thus the Protestant concussion formed an intermediate situation, which, however transient, could not have been dispensed with. We may consider the whole critical doctrine as reducible to the absolute dogma of individual free inquiry; for this is certainly its universal principle. We have already reviewed, in the first chapter of this volume, the operation, individual, social,

*Intellectual  
influence of  
Protestantism.*



and national, of this principle; and there can be no dispute about the fitness of Protestantism to lay the foundations of the revolutionary philosophy, by proclaiming the right of every individual to free inquiry on all subjects whatever, notwithstanding the illogical restrictions for ever attempted by itself; restrictions which were, of course, successively rejected by various sects, and which, by their very inconsistency, facilitated the universal admission of the general principle. It was in this way that Protestantism indirectly influenced the nations that had not expressly adopted it, but could not but suppose themselves as well qualified as others for religious emancipation; the greatest philosophical results of which were, in fact, specially reserved for them, as we shall presently see. Now, the universal inoculation with the critical spirit certainly could not operate in a more unmistakable manner; for, after having audaciously discussed the most respected opinions and the most sacred powers, human reason was not likely to recoil before any social maxim or institution, when the process of analysis should be directed that way. Thus, the first step was by far the most important of all that relate to the formation of the revolutionary doctrine.

The principle of free inquiry was at first a simple consequence of the social changes which had been preparing during the two preceding centuries. It was purely negative in its character, being nothing more than a sanction of the state of no-government which intervened between the decay of the old discipline and the formation of new spiritual ties. It was simply an abstract declaration of a general fact; and its existence would otherwise have been incomprehensible. There could never be any hindrance to any one exercising the right, but the restraint of former convictions; and the general proclamation of the will to use the right merely testified to the decay of the restraining convictions. The long discussions of the fourteenth century about the European power of the popes, and that of the following century about the independence of the national Churches, had occasioned a large spontaneous exercise of the right of free inquiry, long before that right was set up in dogmatic form; and the Lutheran proclamation of the dogma was a mere extension to the Christian public of a privilege which had been abundantly used by kings and scholars. Thus, the spirit of discussion which is inherent in all monotheism, and especially in Catholicism, had anticipated, throughout Europe, the direct appeal of Protestantism. Indeed, the Lutheran revolution produced no innovation, in regard to discipline, ecclesiastical orders, or dogma, that had not been perseveringly proposed long before: so that the success of Luther, after the failure of various premature reformers, was mainly due to the ripeness of the time: a confirmation of which is found in the rapid and easy propagation of the deci-

sive explosion. The spirit of personal emancipation was animated by the subjection of the spiritual to the temporal power, which had now taken place for some time; the late rightful guides of opinion and belief were subordinated to incompetent temporal authorities; and when the ancient intellectual prerogatives of Catholicism had passed into the hands of kings, they could not be regarded with the ancient veneration, but must soon yield to that passion for spiritual freedom to which the kings had no objection as long as it did not interfere with material order. And thus was Protestantism, with its dogma of free inquiry, a mere sanction of the pre-existing state to which all Christian nations had been tending for two centuries. Comparing it with the corresponding social state, we shall see it to be the necessary corrective of the temporal dictatorship, in which, as we have seen, the theological and military system had merged. Without it the temporal power would have degenerated into a dark despotism, extinguishing all intellectual and social vigour under the tyranny of an absolute authority which could naturally conceive of no other method of mental discipline than forcible repression. However great the dangers of abuse of the revolutionary doctrine, we can easily understand the invincible attachment of the European peoples to it, when, amidst the consolidation of aristocratic or regal absolutism, it became the organ of social progression. And, negative as was its essential character, it was the fitting and necessary preparation for the establishment of new social elements, from its encouragement of the spirit of individuality, and the consequent development which it caused of personal energy, whether industrial, æsthetic, or scientific. The two great anomalies,—the temporal dictatorship and the revolutionary doctrine,—must be regarded as inseparable, mutually antagonistic, equally necessary for the preservation of society, and together constituting the final phase of the general movement of social decomposition. The one, by its blind reverence for the past, was for ever restraining the innovations of the other; while the absolute character of negation, on which the critical doctrine prided itself, gave it its counteracting energy, and thus they had in common the absolute tendencies which belong alike to the theological and metaphysical philosophies. Thus it is that by an increasing restriction of political action modern governments have more and more abandoned the direction of the social movement, and have contented themselves with the care of material order, which it became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the continuous development of mental and moral anarchy. In sanctioning such a political situation, the revolutionary doctrine has erred only in setting up as a normal and permanent state of things an exceptional and transient phase, to which its dogmas were perfectly suitable.

Meantime we must not fail to observe the effect of the movement in countries which were not Protestant. The critical action showed itself where the temporal dictatorship was not legally established, by Catholicism solemnly invoking the principle of the right of private judgment in favour of its own faith, which was violently oppressed wherever Protestantism prevailed. Special heresies also arose within the body of the Catholic clergy. France was the main support of the Catholic system in the seventeenth century ; yet it was

*Catholic share in Protestant results.* in France that Jansenism arose,—a heresy almost as injurious to the old spiritual constitution as Lutheranism itself. This kind of French Protestantism, ardently embraced by a powerful and respected portion of the clergy, and placed under the active protection of judiciary corporations, would certainly have been erected into a real national religion, if the approaching rise of the pure negative philosophy had not carried the leading minds of the nation far beyond it. As it was, Jansenism showed its anti-Catholic tendencies by its antipathy to the Jesuits, whose power it ultimately overthrew ; while its reception by great philosophers and eminent poets, who could not possibly be suspected of voluntary revolutionary tendencies, shows how congenial it was to the intelligence of the period. I must give a passing notice to another heresy,—that of Quietism,—which,

*Jansenism.* though much less important than Jansenism, is an equally decisive proof of the dissenting tendencies introduced by the use of the right of free inquiry. The philosophical character of Quietism seems to me remarkable as offering a first solemn and simple protest of our moral constitution against theological doctrine in general. It is only in virtue of such protest that the heresy ever had any consistency, or now has any among some natures whose mental development has not kept pace with the moral. All moral discipline founded on a theological philosophy appeals, perseveringly and exorbitantly, to the spirit of selfishness,—not the less for its relating to imaginary interests which must so engross the solicitude of the believer as to make every other kind of consideration very secondary. This religious supremacy of the care for personal salvation is necessary to the social efficacy of theological morality, which would otherwise issue in a mere sanction of apathy. It accords with the infantine age of humanity, which supposes the theological philosophy to be in the ascendant ; and it manifests to all eyes one of the radical vices of that philosophy, which thus tends to starve out the noblest part of our moral organism, and that which by its small natural energy requires precisely the most systematic culture, by the encouragement of the disinterested and benevolent affections. In this view, Quietism is an involuntary exposure of the imperfection of theological doctrines, and an appeal against it to the finest affections

of human nature; and it would have been a movement of high importance, if such a protest had not been premature, and framed by the heart more than the mind of the beloved and immortal Fénelon, who was the organ of the heresy. The issue of the controversy involves the death-sentence of the theological philosophy. Fénelon was compelled to admit that he had unintentionally attacked one of the main conditions of existence of the religious system; and any system must be in a state of irrevocable decay that could be so misapprehended by its purest and most eminent champions.

The moral characteristics and prerogatives of the critical doctrine in their provisional state remain to be noticed. Catholicism had spontaneously abdicated its direction of social morals, virtually, though not avowedly.

*Moral influence of Protestantism.*

Without admitting that it had changed its moral doctrine, it controlled only the weak, on whom it imposed passive obedience, while it extolled the absolute rights of rulers, being silent about their duties, even when it did not husband their vices in the interest of the priesthood; and its subserviency, attending upon power of every kind, descended lower and lower among social ranks, spreading its corruption successively among all, till it at length affected even domestic morality. The critical doctrine, insisting upon the rights of those to whom Catholicism preached only duties, naturally inherited the moral prerogatives that Catholicism had abdicated, and all its principles wrought to the same end. The dogma of liberty of conscience revived the great moral obligation, dropped by Catholicism, of using only spiritual instruments in the consolidation of opinions. The dogma of the sovereignty of the people declared the paramount importance of the general interest, too much sacrificed by the existing Catholic doctrine to the ascendancy of the great. The dogma of equality roused the universal dignity of human nature, ignored by the spirit of caste, which had outlived its destination and escaped from moral control. And, finally, the dogma of national independence was the only security, after the rupture of Catholic association, for the existence of small states, and the sole restriction on the tendency to material incorporation. The hostile character of the critical doctrine prevented its fulfilling its great moral office with regularity and in perfection; but it kept alive and in vigour for three centuries a genuine sense of the moral conditions of humanity. It was subject to insurrectionary tendencies, because the temporal dictatorship confided in a system of organized material force; but the insurrectionary tendency was necessary to avoid the moral abasement and political degradation to which modern society was exposed, while awaiting the reorganization which must at length put an end to the deplorable antagonism.

If it were compatible with my object, it would be interesting to show how the views here given of the decline of Catholicism are confirmed by the heresies of modern times. These heresies are the

same, under other forms, that arose in the early days of Christianity: and hence the retrograde school would vainly derive hopes of the renovation of the system: but the fact that the same heresies which were extinguished by the rising Catholic power have been successful in modern times proves that they were once opposed to the corresponding social state, and that they have recently been in accordance with it. At all times, and in all places, the heretical spirit is inherent in the vague and arbitrary character of the theological philosophy: and it is restrained or stimulated, it fails or succeeds, according to the social exigencies of the time. The reproduction of certain heresies tells nothing; but their success indicates a final change in the conditions of the system from which they arise.

It is impossible to enter here upon any detailed account of the Protestant sects, each of which entertained pity for its predecessor and horror of its successor, as the decomposition of the theological system went on. I can only point out the historical principle by which they may be understood and tested, and distinguish the three successive stages of decay of the old system, as regards its discipline, its hierarchy, and its dogma; for, if each Protestant change affected all the three, it must have affected one conspicuously, to be distinguishable from foregoing efforts. The three phases may be indicated by the names of their respective organs, Luther, Calvin, and Socinus, who lived near together as to their years, but at considerable intervals as to their social influence. The dogmatic innovations of Lutheranism were trifling; and it respected the clerical system, except by sanctioning the political subserviency which was only implicit among Catholic peoples: but it overthrew the ecclesiastical discipline, in order to adapt it the better to the servile transformation. This first disorganization, which little affected the Catholic system, was really the only form in which Protestantism has ever been able to adapt itself to be a state religion,—at least among great independent nations. To this first demolition,

*Lutheranism.* Calvinism added that of the hierarchy which sustained the social unity of Catholicism, while introducing only secondary modifications into the dogma, though more extensive than those of Lutheranism. This second phase, with its characteristics of mere opposition, without any formative power or organic durability, seems to me to constitute the true normal situation of Protestantism; for the critical spirit discloses itself in antipathy to the inert regularity of official Lutheranism. Then the third action, that of the anti-Trinitarian or Socinian outbreak, added to the rest of the destruction that of the chief articles of faith which distinguished Catholicism from every other form of monotheism: and arising in Italy, under the very eyes of the papacy, it showed the tendency of the Catholic mind to urge the theological

*Socinianism.*

dissolution beyond what had hitherto been attempted by Protestant reformers. This was necessarily the movement which doomed Catholicism beyond recall; but, for the same reasons, it made Protestantism too like mere modern deism, to let this phase stand as the representative of the transition, of which Presbyterianism remains, in an historical sense, the special organ. After this, there remains really nothing to distinguish among the multiplicity of sects, in regard to social progress, except the general testimony borne by the Quakers against the military spirit of the old *régime*, when the destruction of the spiritual system by the three instrumentalities just noticed, led to a similar action upon the temporal system. We have seen that the spirit of Protestantism is generally averse to any military system, countenancing war only for the benefit of its own principles: but there is no doubt that the celebrated sect of the Friends, with all its absurdities, and even its quakeries, served as a special organ for that particular manifestation, which places it above all other Protestant sects for the more complete spread of the great revolutionary movement.

*Quakerism.*

Lest my readers should take, or should suppose that I give, too systematic a view of the process of decomposition, I must remind them that the only way in which Protestantism can be viewed as operating systematically is that it caused the decay to go on under the direction of reforming doctrines, instead of by mere conflict of the old political elements. The formation of the negative philosophy into a system could take place, as far as it was possible at all, only under the deistical phase, whose chief office it was, as we shall see, to effect this. The mental operations of Protestantism were in fact the results and not the causes of the revolutions with which we historically connect them; and no political explosions, whatever their force and their interest on other grounds, could establish the tendency of modern societies to complete renovation till they had been preceded by a thorough and systematic critical preparation, which could not happen except under the following phase. For this reason, I can only barely indicate the purely Protestant revolutions which, apart from their local and temporary importance, could be nothing more than a mere introduction to the great final change destined to open an issue for the general movement of the human race. The first of these revolutions was that by which Holland threw off the Spanish yoke: and it will be ever memorable as a lofty manifestation of the energy proper to the critical doctrine, thus directing the fortunate insurrection of a small nation against the most powerful monarchy in Europe. The dogma specially illustrated in this case was that of the sovereignty of the people, and also that of national independence,—the chief need being to break an external bond which had become intolerably oppressive.

*Political revolutions of Protestantism.*

*Holland.*

A more general character, more complete and decisive, more marked in its direction towards the social regeneration of the race,

*England.* was the great, unsuccessful English revolution :—not

the little aristocratic and Anglican revolution of 1688, which could meet only a local want ; but the democratic and Presbyterian revolution, superintended by the lofty genius of the most advanced statesmen that Protestantism has to boast of. It was the dogma of equality which was mainly elaborated under that conflict. Historically the revolution consisted in the generous but premature effort for the political degradation of the English aristocracy,—the chief temporal element of the ancient nationality ; and the fall of royalty, under the Protectorate of Cromwell, was only a secondary incident in comparison with the bold suppression of the House of Lords. The social revolution failed politically, for want of due mental preparation ; but it was the chief in the whole series of symptoms which were the known precursors of the great decisive European revolution remaining to be examined hereafter. The

*America.* American revolution was as purely Protestant as the others, and ought to be classed with them, though

its date causes it to be erroneously referred to a more advanced stage of the general movement. It did not volve any new portion of the critical doctrine ; and it was simply an extension of the other two Protestant revolutions, but with a prosperous development of political consequences through a combination of favourable conditions. In its origin, it was a reproduction of the Dutch revolution, and in its final expansion, it carried out the English, which it realizes as far as Protestantism will allow. There is nothing to be said for its success, as a decisive social enterprise ; for it has developed to excess the inconveniences of the critical doctrine ; it sanctions more emphatically than any other society the political supremacy of metaphysicians and legists, among a people who pay, through their innumerable unconnected modes of worship, without any real social purpose, a tribute more costly by far than the treasury of any existing Catholic clergy. Thus this universal colony, notwithstanding the eminent temporal advantages of its present position, must be regarded as, in fact, in all important respects, more remote from a true social reorganization than the nations from whom it is derived, and to whom it will owe, in course of time, its final regeneration. The philosophical induction into that ulterior state is not to be looked for in America,—whatever may be the existing illusions about the political superiority of a society in which the elements of modern civilization are, with the exception of industrial activity, most imperfectly developed.

This sketch of the revolutionary doctrine and its action would

*Attendant  
errors.*

not be complete without some notice of its attendant errors. Omitting all merely local and exceptional abuses, I will briefly refer to a few evils which may be called natural

to the doctrine. Of these errors the oldest, the most general, and the most mischievous is the prejudice which condemns, in the absolute spirit of the metaphysical philosophy, the political existence of any spiritual power, distinct from the temporal, and independent of it. Inevitable and indispensable as was *Subjection of spiritual power.* the temporal dictatorship which followed upon the Catholic period, it could not destroy the value of the principle of the separation of the two powers, the theory of which is the most valuable legacy left us by Catholicism, and the only one on which, when united with a true positive doctrine, the reorganization of society can proceed. As the reorganization must begin, as did the decline, with the spiritual order of power, this absolute spirit, which aims at establishing eternal principles from transient facts, is a serious misfortune; and the more so, of course, from its universality during the last three centuries. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, the revolutionary spirit has assumed this form in its operation upon all classes of society. Protestantism took advantage of the prejudice, though it did not originate it; and the greater part of the Catholic clergy have undergone their political degradation with a growing submission which has effaced the very memory of their ancient independence. Thus has the main principle of modern civilization,—that of the separation of the two powers,—been lost sight of throughout Europe; and the only appearance of a rational appreciation of it is found among the Italian clergy, where it is of no social value, because of the partiality and self-interest naturally attributed to those who hold it. No adverse influences can however prevent the ultimate recognition of a principle so accordant with the condition and needs of modern society. It will assume its full force when the positive philosophy opens the way to social reorganization. We may attribute to the prevalence of this great error the irrational disdain of the Middle Ages entertained in our time, even by Catholics who do not appreciate the theory of Catholicism; and also the blind admiration for the polytheistic system of antiquity, which prevailed so deplorably during the revolutionary period, though Catholicism had before rightly assigned an inferior position to the civilization of that *régime*: and again, to this error is owing the exclusive predilection of Protestantism for the primitive church, and its yet more injurious enthusiasm for the Hebrew theocracy. The great conception of social progress has thus been overlaid, and wellnigh lost; saved only, as we shall presently see, by that growth of new social elements which has proceeded amidst all the disturbances of the critical period.

Another consequence of the error has been that all ambition, political and philosophical, has tended towards the absolute concentration of the two kinds of power. Kings dreamed of the Mohammedan type as the ideal of modern monarchy; priests, and



especially the Protestant clergy, dreamed inversely of a kind of restoration of the Jewish or Egyptian theocracy; and philosophers renewed, under a different form, the primitive Greek dream of that metaphysical theocracy which they called the reign of Mind. The last is now the most dangerous of these dreams, because it seduces the greatest number of active minds. Among the thinkers of the progressive school who have devoted themselves to social speculation, within three centuries, Leibnitz seems to me to be the only one who has entirely escaped the delusion. Descartes would doubtless have done so, if it had lain in his way to state his deliberate view of the subject, as Aristotle alone did in ancient times: but Bacon certainly participated in this illusion of philosophic pride. We shall hereafter consider the serious consequences of this view: and this brief notice of it is merely historical.

Finally, this capital error keeps up a habit of social disturbance by leading men to seek the satisfaction of social needs in change of legal institutions; whereas, in general, the thing wanted is a preparatory reformation of principles and manners. The temporal dictatorship, whether monarchical or aristocratic, was little aware of its own responsibility when it made political questions of all that had hitherto been moral. It matters little that such avidity for power brought on its own punishment: but the results to society have been most disastrous, as we see in a long series of disorders and disappointments, and in the mischievous operations of quacks and fanatics, who see, or pretend to see, the solution of all social difficulties in barren political revolutions: and, during the quietest times, in that narrow view which embraces only the immediate redress of social wants, when moral means, extensive and long-prepared, are the true remedy. All political parties agree in proscribing lofty and comprehensive speculation, because all are alike involved in the error which causes the low and material view: and it is only under the positive philosophy that the true solution can be found.

As for the moral evils engendered by the Protestant introduction of the critical doctrine,—we need not dwell long on them, serious as they are; for they are too evident to require explanation. Considering that every mind

*Moral changes  
under Protes-  
tantism.*

was confided to its own decision on subjects the most important, and about which it must be least disinterested, the wonder is that the moral dissolution has not been complete. That it has not been so,—that morality has remained stable in the most evident cases,—is owing first to the spontaneous rectitude of human nature, which it is impossible altogether to corrupt; and next, to the power of modern habits of steady toil, which divert the nations of our day from the social extravagances into which, in their position, the idle populations of Rome and Greece would certainly have fallen. Protestantism must be charged with having seriously impaired the

fundamental principles of morality, both domestic and social, which Catholicism had established, under precepts and prohibitions which will be sanctioned, in their spirit, more and more emphatically as the positive philosophy prevails. It was a sound observation of Hume's, that the Lutheran revolution was aided by the passions of ecclesiastics who desired a release from celibacy, and the rapacity of nobles who coveted the territorial possessions of the clergy; and it was a necessary consequence of the lowered position of the moral authority, that it lost the power, and even the will, to sustain the inviolability of the most elementary rules of morality against the attacks of the critical spirit. I need point out only the permission of divorce, the relaxation of rules about the marriage of relations; and, as a decisive instance, the disgraceful dogmatic consultation by which the chiefs of Protestantism, with Luther at their head, solemnly authorized bigamy in the case of a German prince; and again, the accommodating temper of the founders of the English Church towards the shocking weaknesses of their strange national pope. Catholicism was never thus openly degraded; but its growing weakness produced nearly equivalent effects. It was unable to repress the license of the time, in public speech and private act; and it so far supported moral excess that it roused a spirit of rebellion against its own authority by its repression of mental development. Thus the various religious doctrines showed themselves inadequate to the moral guidance of mankind; either by using their intellectual liberty to impair the principles of morals, or by proving their impotence to keep moral order; or, by discrediting invariable laws by obstinately connecting them with articles of belief which human reason could never again receive. We shall perceive more and more as we proceed that morality, so far from having any occasion to dread philosophical analysis, can find a solid intellectual foundation only outside of all theology whatever; resting on a rational appreciation of human dispositions, actions, and habits, according to their total results, public and private. It was necessary to say thus much, to mark the period at which religious faith began to lose its power of moral guidance, and to show its tendency, so striking for three centuries past, to promote hatred and disturbance rather than order and charity. We see, now, that the degeneracy dates from the political degradation of the spiritual power, the dignity and purity of the moral laws being deeply impaired by their being subjected to the ascendancy of the passions which they were intended to rule.

We have now observed the advent of the negative philosophy, and of the corresponding social crises. The last phase remains to be reviewed,—that which presents the revolutionary doctrine in its full development. This phase however is little more than a protraction of the last, and we shall have a sufficient view, generally speaking, of the

*Stage of full  
Development  
of the Critical  
doctrine.*

historical course of the revolutionary philosophy if we merely attach deistical consequences to Protestant principles. Our attention must henceforth be concentrated on the spiritual disorganization, till we have to notice the great final explosion of the temporal power in connection with the reorganization which will be the closing topic of this Work.

We give too much credit to human intelligence if we suppose that it could have dispensed with this final elaboration of the critical doctrine, on the ground that its great principles having been furnished by Protestantism, the consequences of those principles might be left to develop themselves without assistance from any systematic formation of negative doctrine. In the first place, human emancipation must thus have been seriously retarded, as

*Protestantism  
opposed to  
progress.*

we shall admit if we consider how resigned the majority of men are to a state of logical inconsistency like that sanctioned by Protestantism, and especially when the understanding is still subject to the theological system. In countries where the philosophical movement has not fully penetrated the national mind, as England and the United States, we see the Socinians and other sects, which have rejected almost all the essential dogmas of Christianity, persisting in their original restriction of free inquiry within the purely biblical circle, and fostering a thoroughly theological hatred towards all who have pursued their spiritual liberty beyond that boundary. Moreover, it is evident that the expansion of the revolutionary doctrine would have been wholly repressed without the deistical movement which characterized the last century; for Protestantism, after having introduced critical principles, always abandoned them when they could be dispensed with, using its triumph to organize a retrograde system of resistance. It was thus with Lutheranism, which was as hostile to mental liberty as Catholicism; and thus it was with every form of Christianity, according to its power, till the triumph of the Anglican church and the expulsion of the Calvinists from France gave a systematic character to Protestant discouragement of progress. Protestantism having thus seceded from the progressive movement, which it had hitherto represented, it became necessary that new and more consistent leaders should assume the conduct of the march; and we find in this case the usual correspondence between great social exigencies and their natural means of satisfaction. The Protestant period had brought the ancient social system to such a state of decay that it could not guide, but only impede the formation of modern society, so that a universal and decisive revolution was seen to be impending, by such thinkers for instance as Leibnitz. On the other hand, the system would have lasted for an indefinite time, in its state of decay, and without fulfilling its professions, in virtue of its mere inertia, if the revolutionary ferment, which we shall see more of presently, had not

entered in to direct the movement of -decomposition towards that regeneration which is its necessary issue. The heretical movement which I before noticed aided the systematic formation of the negative philosophy. We have seen how ancient was the tendency to entire emancipation from theology, as when, in the decline of polytheism, there were Greek schools which speculatively transcended the limits of simple monotheism. At that time, when the very conception of a true natural philosophy did not exist, such an effort could issue in nothing but a kind of metaphysical pantheism, in which nature was abstractly deified; but there was little difference in fact between such a doctrine and that which has since been improperly called atheism; and it resembled it particularly in its radical opposition to all religious beliefs susceptible of real organization,—which is the point that concerns us here, where our business is with negative ideas. This anti-theological disposition was overborne during the long continuance of Catholicism; but it never disappeared entirely, and we see its traces in the whole course of the persecution of the philosophy of Aristotle, in consequence of its sanction of the tendency. We trace it again in the predilection for the freest thinkers of Greece, who indirectly influenced many speculative men, and chiefly among the high Italian clergy, who were then the most thinking portion of mankind. Without actively interfering in the destruction of the Catholic system, the anti-theological spirit was stimulated and expanded by it: and in the sixteenth century, while leaving Protestantism to its work, it profited by the half-freedom afforded by philosophical discussion to develop its own intellectual influence, as we see by the illustrious examples of Erasmus, Cardan, Ramus, Montaigne, and others, confirmed by the artless complaints of true Protestants of the spread of an anti-theological spirit, which threatened the success of their nascent reform by showing forth the decrepitude of the system to which it related. Religious dissent was naturally favourable to the tendency, *The negative philosophy.* which ceased to become a source of mere personal satisfaction to leading minds, and extended to the multitude, to whom it served as the only refuge from the fury and extravagance of the various theological systems, which had now degenerated into mere principles of oppression or disturbance. The negative philosophy was, in fact, systematized about the middle of the seventeenth century, and not in the subsequent century, which was occupied by its universal propagation. Its advent was powerfully aided by an intellectual movement, which is perpetually confounded with it, but which is far nobler in nature and destination. The positive spirit had hitherto been concentrated upon obscure scientific researches; but, from the sixteenth century onwards, and especially during the first half of the seventeenth, it began to disclose its philosophical character,—no less hostile to metaphysics than to theology, but

obliged to ally itself with the one to exclude the other. Its influence arose from its favouring the invasion of faith by reason, by rejecting, provisionally at least, all articles of belief that were not demonstrated. Bacon and Descartes could hardly have entertained any anti-religious design, scarcely reconcilable with the object of their active solicitude; but it is unquestionable that the preparatory state of full intellectual enfranchisement which they prescribed to human reason must henceforth lead the best minds to entire theological emancipation at a time when the mental awakening had been otherwise in this respect sufficiently stimulated. The result was the more certain from its being unsuspected, for it was the consequence of a simple logical preparation, the abstract necessity of which could not be denied by any sensible man. Such is, in fact, the irresistible spiritual ascendancy of revolutions which relate purely to method, the dangers of which cannot commonly be perceived till it is too late to restrain them. While the best minds were thus inevitably influenced, the multitude were troubled, at the moment of shaken conviction, by the rising and growing conflict between scientific discovery and theological views. The memorable persecution of Galileo for his demonstration of the earth's motion must have made more unbelievers than all Jesuit intrigues and preachings could retrieve or save,—to say nothing of the exhibition that Catholicism made of itself as hostile to the purest and noblest aspirations of the human mind. Many other cases, less conspicuous but perfectly analogous, brought out this antagonism more and more towards the end of the seventeenth century. In both its aspects this influence, acting on all orders of minds, wrought against the beliefs which contended for the moral government of mankind, and therefore in favour of a final emancipation of human reason from all theology whatever,—the incompatibility of theology with the spread of genuine knowledge being thereby directly revealed.

The ascendancy of the negative philosophy was assisted by the good and the bad passions of men, as elicited by the circumstances of the time. The spirit of religious emancipation is closely connected with that of free individual activity; and there can be no doubt that the struggle against the retrograde dictatorship of the seventeenth century roused all the generous passions in favour of the critical doctrine, which, in its systematized condition, was the only universal organ of social progress. On the other hand, negative doctrine, speculative and social, is congenial with the worst parts of human nature. Vanity is pampered by the sovereignty given to every man by the right of private judgment. The term freethinker has been sufficiently abused by theological hatred; but, necessary as the title was to express resistance to intellectual bondage, it indicates also that no equivalent is provided for the ancient guidance. Ambition accepts with eagerness the principle of the

sovereignty of the people, which opens a political career to all who can achieve it. Pride and envy are gratified by the proclamation of equality, which may be either a generous sentiment of universal fraternity or a hatred of superiority, according to the natures that entertain it. In short, the mental influences which conduced to the formation of the negative philosophy were strengthened by powerful moral influences, tending in their combination to insurrectionary crises, in which there is usually a welcome ready for those who fret under the habitual restraint of social laws.

In surveying the history of the critical philosophy, we must carefully separate the spiritual from the temporal case. *Three periods.* The latter was indispensable to the political action of the revolutionary doctrine; but it could not take form till the spiritual function was accomplished. The philosophical emancipation was the most important, because it brought the political after it; and the political could not have occurred without the philosophical. The survey is, in fact, naturally divided into three portions: the first comprehending the systematic formation of the critical doctrine; the second, the universal propagation of the movement of mental emancipation; and the third, the political emancipation, which is the complement of the spiritual.

The first operation, though commonly referred to the eighteenth century, certainly belongs to the seventeenth. *Systematized.* Arising out of the most advanced Protestantism, it grew in silence in countries which, like England and Holland, had been chief seats of Protestant change. Its organs, like those of Protestantism, must be derived from the metaphysical school, which had risen to power in the chief universities; but they were genuine philosophers, seriously at work, in their own way, on the whole range of human speculation, and not at all like the mere men of letters of a succeeding age. Three great men led the philosophical revolution,—men mutually unlike and unequal, but concurring in the result;—Hobbes first, then Spinoza, and finally *Hobbes.* Bayle, who, a Frenchman by birth, was obliged to go to Holland to work freely. Spinoza, under the special influence of the Cartesian principle, no doubt aided the emancipation of many systematic minds, of which indeed we have proof in the multitude of refutations aroused by his audacious metaphysics; but he cannot be called the founder of the negative philosophy, both because he followed Hobbes, and because the highly abstract nature of his obscure dogmatic exposition admits of no sufficiently marked social use. Bayle's labours had this last quality; but the disconnected character of his partial attacks, even more than chronological considerations, marks him out as a leader of the propagation of the doctrine rather than as one of its framers; though he had undoubtedly a share in its formation. We are thus obliged to regard Hobbes as the father of the revolutionary philosophy. We shall hereafter find

that he held a much higher position than this, as one of the chief precursors of the true positive polity; but he was also the author of some of the most important critical views which have been attributed to men of the succeeding century who were only the propagators of them.

In this philosophy, the anti-theological analysis is urged as far as the metaphysical spirit admits; and it therefore affords the best opportunity for contrasting the negative philosophy with the positive, with which superficial inquirers are very apt to confound it. The negative doctrine, improperly called atheism, is simply a final phase of the ancient philosophy, first theological, then more and more metaphysical, while retaining the same qualities, the same absolute spirit, and the same tendency to handle questions which sound philosophy discards, as inaccessible to human reason. It substitutes Nature for the Creator, with much the same character and office, impelling to a very similar worship; so that this supposed atheism amounts to inaugurating a goddess in the place of a god,—by those at least who regard this transient stage as a settled one. Such a transformation may effect an entire disorganization of the social system which corresponded to the theological philosophy; but it is altogether inadequate to the formation, social or intellectual, of a genuine new philosophy. The human understanding must remain subject to the theologico-metaphysical *régime* till the consideration of universal natural laws becomes prevalent: and that was impossible at the time of which I speak, from men's imperfect knowledge of those laws. The positive philosophy therefore can acknowledge no connection with the negative doctrine, further than that the negative opened a way, and established a preparation for the positive. Till positive conceptions prevail, there is perpetual danger of a recurrence to the old theological doctrine; and the negative philosophy affords little better security against this danger than deism itself. It partakes of the nature of all theological ideas, which are identical through all their transformations; and thus we may explain the seeming paradox of the affinity between the obscure systematic pantheism of the metaphysical schools which are most proud of their advanced position, and the spontaneous fetichism of primitive times. Such is the historical estimate of the intellectual character of the critical movement.

Morally considered, the metaphysical philosophy presents the first rational co-ordination of the celebrated theory of self-love, improperly ascribed to the following century. The theory is an immediate consequence of the doctrine of the *I*, as before explained,—of the notion of unity in the human being, where a great multiplicity in fact exists; for the preponderance of personal inclinations in our organism is unquestionable. The laborious efforts since made to concentrate our moral nature on

benevolence or justice, the centres of which are naturally weak in comparison, may have been of use as a test and exposure of the metaphysical doctrine; but they have been no corrective of the foregoing error, and therefore no resource against the injury to our moral progress that it has caused. It is right to add that the selfish theory, though speculatively appropriate to the metaphysical theory, is directly derived from theology, which makes morality consist in a care for personal salvation, to the exclusion of the disinterested affections which the positive philosophy alone can duly encourage and direct. Metaphysics has merely transferred the personal anxiety from eternal to temporal interests, without being able to rise to the conception of a morality which should not rest on personal calculation of one kind or another. The appropriate danger of the negative doctrine, in this respect, was that by its dogmatic confirmation of this view of human nature it destroyed the antagonism which went far to neutralize the mischief of the theological view,—the setting up of imaginary personal interests in happy opposition to real ones; but it must not be forgotten that the original mischief was in the religious proposal of a personal interest so engrossing that its prescribed consideration must repress, as far as our nature allows, all other affections whatever. Here again we see that the metaphysical philosophy is a protraction of the theological, in its moral as in its intellectual aspect; and the theory of self-interest is no mere accident occurring in the development of the metaphysical philosophy, but one of its primary features, transferred, under modification, from the preceding régime.

Politically regarded, the formation of the negative philosophy is marked by the dogmatic sanction it gives to that *Its political* subordination of the spiritual to the temporal power *character.* which we have seen to be already established, but which was not fully accounted for till Hobbes offered his decisive discussion. I have said enough of the necessity and probable duration of this state of things to be enabled now to pass over the subject lightly, merely observing that while there was a general acquiescence in the temporal dictatorship, the action of the critical philosophy must stop at the spiritual disorganization, deferring its attacks on the temporal till the corresponding reorganization had begun. No doubt, Hobbes had such a course of things in view, though his metaphysical treatment of his subject gave him the appearance of supposing the provisional state to be a permanent one. It is inconceivable that a man of his sagacity should have supposed that he was thus framing a natural and durable state of modern society so immediately after the best thinkers had declared the inevitableness of a universal revolution. Nor is it probable that his philosophical successors, of whom Voltaire was the chief, could, however much levity was, as in his case, mingled with sagacity, have doubted that their doctrine was a transitional one. However this may be,



it is easy to see that a doctrine which restricted its action to the spiritual order of ideas must have been in a favourable position, from the security which was felt by rulers as long as their temporal power was undisturbed. In regard to Hobbes, it seems to me remarkable that, notwithstanding his national predilection for aristocracy rather than royalty, he should have chosen monarchical power for the single centre of his political scheme; and this view of his has furnished to the retrograde school, which is more powerful in England than anywhere else at present, a specious pretext for avenging the peers and clergy on the progressive spirit, by representing it as an abettor of despotism, so as to impair by a welcome calumny its European reputation. My impression is that, in the first place, Hobbes was aware that the monarchical dictatorship was better adapted than the aristocratic to facilitate the necessary decay of the old system, and the development of new social elements: and that, in the second place, he was instinctively aware that his doctrine, far from being specially English, must meet with its completest reception and development among nations in which royalty was the form of political concentration: instances of insight and foresight to which I believe the sagacity of the illustrious philosopher to be fully adequate.

So much for the formation of the negative doctrine. We must now proceed to observe its propagation. Hitherto, it had been restricted to a few select minds; but its final destination depended above everything on its becoming sufficiently popularized. The first observation we have to make on this new revolutionary phase relates to the change in the centre of movement, and in its permanent organs.

The work of destroying the old theological and military system had first been carried on, as we have seen, in Germany, Holland, and England. In those countries the political triumph of Protestantism had neutralized its tendency to philosophical emancipation by connecting with the conservative system the kind of organization that Protestantism would admit of. Thenceforth, all emancipation of the human mind became more repugnant to official Protestantism than to the most degenerate Catholicism itself, because it evidenced the radical insufficiency of the spiritual reformation which had cost so much. The repugnance extends beyond official Protestantism, to the least orthodox dissenting sects, which, proud of their comparative freedom, cling the more earnestly to the doctrines they have retained, and which therefore hold in especial horror such an irresistible concurrence of philosophical opinions as dispenses at once with all this laborious Protestant transition. In Catholic countries, on the other hand, where the people had any intellectual liberty left at all, the only refuge from complete mental despotism was in the negative philosophy, systematically extended. The centre of the intellectual and social

movement was therefore transferred to Catholic countries, and especially to France. The whole of Christendom was concerned in the entire reformatory movement; but its purely Protestant periods were conducted by Germany, Holland, and England, in succession, while France was destined to illustrate its last revolutionary phase. With the change of the centre of philosophical movement, came a change of its organs. We may assign to this period the rise as a class of the scholars, or men of letters, who now took the place of the heads of faculties, or doctors properly so called; in the same way that the lawyers provisionally assumed the social authority before held by the judges. The change took place as a matter of necessity from the adhesion of the universities to the retrograde system, after having been the first movers in the critical direction. This kind of defection, which began in Protestant countries, soon spread to Catholic nations, where the parliaments and universities were seen, at the end of the seventeenth century, to have as much horror of intellectual freedom and as much attachment to the retrograde coalition as the official administrators of legalized Protestantism in reformed countries. Meantime, the universities were giving an education less and less doctrinal and more and more literary, and were sending forth, in every country, a great number of men who, having neither positivity enough for true scientific culture, nor a logical training for the philosophical profession, in its true sense, nor imagination to qualify them for the poetic career, and yet deciding upon an intellectual vocation of some kind, were led to form that highly equivocal class of modern European society, which have no express mental function, and are known by the names of men of letters, authors, etc. All circumstances being, in their case as in that of the lawyers, unfavourable to the generation of deep convictions,—even of such obscure metaphysical convictions as every ancient doctor had of his own,—these modern scholars could not be the agents by whom the negative philosophy should be systematically wrought out: but, when it was once founded by genuine philosophers, they were the men to direct its propagation, in a manner more active, more varied, and more effectual than could have been adopted by a more truly philosophical order of minds. Their defects were favourable to their work. Their want of profound conviction lessened the absolute character of their propositions; and their versatility enabled them to meet the existing social need of partial stimulation in various directions. Such an intellectual condition would be truly monstrous if it were regarded as permanent; but it was adapted to the requisitions of the last stage of the spiritual disorganization.

By this time the emancipation had proceeded so far that the mere existence of anti-theological discussion brought after it the certainty of the propagation of the philosophical movement, the only hindrance to which was the horror with which men were

taught to regard the organs of emancipation,—a horror which must presently give way before familiarity. The advocates of the old theology confirmed the tendency to scepticism by themselves subordinating faith to reason in their appeals on behalf of the entire body of doctrine; and from the very nature of religious conceptions, whose power results altogether from their spontaneousness, nothing can preserve them from destruction when they have once become the subject of discussion, whatever triumph they may at first obtain. Thus the spirit of controversy peculiar to monotheism, and especially to the Catholic form of it, must be historically regarded as an evidence of the continuous decline of the theological philosophy. The innumerable demonstrations of the existence of God, so ostentatiously disseminated since the twelfth century, prove that bold doubts on that subject were in existence; and the defence tended to increase them, both by the weakness of many of the extremely various arguments, and by the very decision of others, which suggested the logical sin that had been committed all along in admitting corresponding opinions, without being able to support them by such victorious proofs. Pascal seems to me to have been the only philosopher of the theological school who really understood, or at least clearly pointed out, the danger of controversial demonstrations, such as abounded in his time: and when he stated his view, the consequence was that theology was reproached with receding before reason, after having long appealed to its arbitration. This was especially true in regard to the famous arguments derived from the scheme of natural phenomena. Pascal regarded these as particularly indiscreet, though dogmatic theology derived its chief evidences thence for several centuries, little suspecting that a further study of nature would disclose the extreme imperfection of the economy which inspired a blind and absolute admiration, before it could be explored in the positive spirit.

We thus see how the way was cleared for the propagation of the negative doctrine,—for its transmission from the pure thinkers to the authors who were to popularize it. We may discern how the title of philosopher had been lowered before it could be applied to these last, to whom the art of expression was more important than the power of thinking; but the intellectual and social need of their office assigns a place in history to the most important of their class, with Voltaire at their head,—the singularly admirable combination of secondary intellectual qualities in his mind presenting so largely the appearance of strength and genius. In its passage from the thinkers to the writers, the negative philosophy assumed a weaker character, both in accommodation to the feebleness of the new organs and for the sake of the universal propagation of the movement. The school of Voltaire brought the doctrine of Spinoza, Hobbes, and Bayle to a stop at deism, properly so called, which was sufficient for the entire destruc-

*School of  
Voltaire.*

tion of the religious system, while it was less alarming. It suited that school, in their logical weakness, to prolong for their own use the inconsistency of Protestantism, by which religion is destroyed in the name of the religious principle, so as to include within the movement the most timid believers. The intellectual and social mischief of their method is evident now in the encouragement thereby given to convenient hypocrisy, and by the confusion it has caused in the popular mind about the real direction of the movement, which it is supposed by many pretended thinkers, may be stopped at deism. In like manner their predecessors supposed it might be stopped at the Socinian phase, at the Calvinistic, and even at the Lutheran,—no failure having conveyed any instruction to successive sects. The absurdity reached its height when the movement of emancipation was expected to stop at the least substantial and durable of all theological states. It does not fall within my purpose to examine the methods of propagation employed by the school of Voltaire; but I may just point out that their work was less hindered than might be supposed by the negative character of their doctrine. The absence of common convictions, and the presence of as many views as there were men, were of little consequence when the work to be done was that of destroying what they all alike disbelieved. Their intellectual differences and moral and social rivalries might however have discredited their work, as they had that of Protestantism, but for Diderot's happy expedient of the Encyclopedic enterprise, which might serve as a centre for the most divergent efforts, and give some appearance of a philosophical system to the aggregate of these incoherent speculations. There is no need to dwell on the powerlessness of the conception, directed by the metaphysical spirit alone, and wholly unfit to give an idea of Bacon's great original project, either as to spirit or method. The carrying out of that project is even yet premature, being in no way related to a negative philosophy, and impracticable till a truly positive philosophy shall have obtained its due ascendancy.

Such is the historical view of the most decisive and prolonged part of the philosophical movement appointed to the eighteenth century. When we consider the superficial or sophistical nature of the attacks aimed against the old system, and the weak logic and the irrational direction with which they are chargeable, we shall see that nothing but miracle could have accounted for their success, if they had not been in accordance with the needs of modern society, as it stood at the end of four centuries of change. The efforts of the destructive school, which would have exerted but little influence some centuries before, were now countenanced and sustained by eminent contemporaries of every order, whether they took any active part in them or not. The original sanction which the negative philosophy had given to the temporal dictatorship happily concealed its revolutionary tendencies from commonplace states-

men, who can estimate none but immediate material consequences; but it is impossible to suppose that the political genius of Frederick the Great was blind to the bearings of the intellectual movement. The constant protection afforded by so competent a judge to the propagation of the movement could arise only from a strong conviction of the provisional necessity of a negative phase like that of his time, in preparation for the natural organization of a rational and pacific philosophy, such as had ever been, from the time of the Roman conquest, the object of aspiration of all superior men, of all castes and conditions.

It only remains for me now to notice very briefly the political  
*Its political* action of the negative philosophy,—the preparation  
*action.* for the great revolutionary outburst which was sure

to occur whenever the spiritual disorganization should have gone so far as to turn attention upon the temporal. The new philosophical school had appealed to the intellect of men, however feebly and frivolously. The new political school appealed to the passions of men, and thence derived such strength as it obtained. I need not say that its advent and its action were inevitable. Hobbes had favoured the temporal dictatorship so far as to advocate its being left intact,—provisionally, of course, and as long as there was work to do in the spiritual department; and when the critical spirit had finished the work of destruction there, it was so far exhausted, or alarmed at the prospect of total anarchy, that it passed on somewhat feebly to the attack on temporal institutions, and showed little firmness against serious resistance. As philosophy extended to the multitude, the philosophical class consisted of minds more and more ordinary, united to characters less and less lofty, and fully inclined to reconcile, each in his own case, the honours of an easy mental emancipation with the profit of an indulgent political approbation, according to the example set by many of their Protestant precursors. At the same time, the temporal rule was becoming more and more retrograde and corrupt, through the growing incapacity of royalty and the progressive demoralization of the aristocracy, which had abdicated its original and honourable function. In this state of things the critical philosophy would have been of less social

*School of* use, as it was more urgently needed, if Rousseau had  
*Rousseau,* not roused men by convincing them that moral and political regeneration was the true end of the philosophical movement, which would otherwise end in mere fruitless intellectual agitation. Rousseau brought to the task only his sophisms and his passions, which closely belonged to each other. His nature was more that of the artist than the philosopher; and the work of framing the revolutionary philosophy into a political system was left to another order of minds. This had been partly done before; and some sober-minded men were employed upon it now; but the audacious outbreak of Rousseau, with his great paradox, was neces-

sary to direct social indignation upon the general vices of the old social organization, while it not the less involved the principle of all possible social disturbance by the barbarous negation of Society itself. To understand the service rendered, amidst fearful mischiefs, we must consider that political philosophy was then so imperfect that the best minds conceived of no other improvement than by means of modifications of the old system, whose very conditions of existence were extinct. Thus all chance of reorganization seemed to be thrown away, and the movement to be abortive in its last stage, when the anarchical school of Rousseau intervened, to open an issue to the great negative process which had been carried on for so long, and must now be brought to its revolutionary crisis. Such is the sad necessity which condemns social conceptions to gain ground only through the antagonism of empirical errors, till the ascendancy of the positive philosophy shall have rationalized this last great order of human speculations.

One noticeable feature in this temporal application of the negative philosophy is its retrograde tendency in spiritual matters, which connected it rather with the Protestant than with the philosophical movement, though it took its origin from the latter. In the philosophical school, systematic deism was merely a provisional concession, preparatory to entire theological emancipation; whereas, in the political school, deism was the basis of the social Utopia, and the only security against total anarchy. The growing tendency of this natural disposition was to bring back the school to Socinianism, or even to Calvinism, in its strict sense, in proportion to the sense of the social inanity of a religion without a worship and a priesthood. Thus we see how the two chief schools of the last century were led by their respective opposite instincts to regard deism as a temporary station, whence the one may go forward and the other backward, amidst the ruin of the old religious system; and here we find the explanation of the different impression made by the two schools on the sacerdotal instinct of our time, notwithstanding the apparent conformity of their theological dogmas.

The political school of the negative doctrine is usually supposed to be represented by Rousseau; but we must not overlook the participation in it of the political sect of the *The Economists.* Economists, who bore a large share in the disorganization of the ancient social system. Without repeating what I have said before, or anticipating what I shall have to say in the next chapter, I must just observe here that the revolutionary action of the Economists consisted in the proof that they offered to rulers themselves that governments cannot direct industrial progress,—an all-important point, because, military activity having declined, governments were thus deprived of their chief temporal prerogative, and, with it, of the last habitual pretext for war, which had by that time become essentially commercial in character. Notwithstanding its absurdi-

ties and exaggerations, this school rendered, in this way, unquestionable services to the task of the last century. Its chief influence is attributable to the work of Adam Smith; and it was the offspring of Protestantism, through the industrial superiority of Protestant nations; but its chief development took place, together with the rest of the negative philosophy, in France. It is curious that the first professorships of this pretended science were established in Spain, and in the least advanced parts of Italy; so curiously were its revolutionary origin and tendency concealed under special forms which made it acceptable to the existing powers, which it in fact regarded only as a useful administrative instrumentality. Yet it sanctioned the spirit of individualism and the state of no-government; and some of its professors deduce from it the superfluity of all regular moral instruction, and all official encouragement of science and the fine arts; and, as I before remarked, the latest attacks on the institution of property itself have arisen out of the metaphysics of political economy,—now that its proper office is accomplished, and that it tends, like other parts of the negative philosophy, to the anarchy which succeeds.

The intellectual and moral evils attendant on this phase of the negative philosophy will come under consideration hereafter. Here I need merely notify what they were, for the sake of historical completeness. The intellectual guides of the time were wanting in depth of conviction, and accordingly in rational consistency. The most important and difficult questions were delivered over to the minds the least qualified to treat of them; the social movement was in the hands of sophists and orators, and the passions were appealed to to settle difficulties which required the most careful intellectual management. The Catholic system became the subject of an undue hatred; and the Protestants longed to restore the early Christian times, and others, the polytheistic system,—a curious evidence of the last desire being an actual series of attempts to revive the reputation of Julian the Apostate. Again, there was a reproduction of the old Greek notion of a kind of metaphysical theocracy, under the form, in Protestant minds, of a reign of Saints, and in others, of a reign of Sages. There was, again, a decided aggravation of the tendency to set practice above theory,—to prefer immediate expedients to general principles, and to refer all social difficulties to temporal institutions for their cure; and hence arbitrary regulations, which were dignified with the name of laws, encroached upon the domain of morals and opinions. Such were the intellectual errors and extravagances of the time, in some of which the philosophical, and in others the political, school was most deeply involved, while neither school was irreproachable in regard to any one error. The moral errors are obvious enough. All the ancient bases of morality,

public and private, were destroyed, and principles of conduct were delivered over to the estimate of individual consciences, which were but too apt to involve moral ideas in their hatred of the corresponding theological conceptions. Wise as were the moral prepossessions imparted by Catholicism, they could not withstand the dissolving action of such metaphysical discussion as that of the last century; and that we possess any morality at all beyond the simplest rules applicable to the most obvious positions, and comprehensible by the rudest minds, is owing to the natural instinct of morality in Man, and the increasing influence of modern civilization. Between the moral impotence of a negative doctrine and the active vitiating influence of a sophistical doctrine, the philosophical schools of the last century exhibited a moral deterioration very like that of Epicurus, which indeed it was the fashion of the time to extol. We can see how the deistical movement developed the moral evils which grew out of the Protestant movement, by urging to its ultimate limit the spiritual disorganization which was its universal principle. In such a result we see the proof of the temporary character of this pretended philosophy, formed as it was to destroy, while it was utterly unable to organize even the simplest human relations; and the more it triumphed in its political direction, the more conspicuous was its organic imbecility. Looking at the two philosophies, and seeing how the theological could not preserve the morality that the metaphysical destroyed, and how the process was hastened by the old morality being disgraced by the intellectual discredit of theology, we cannot but see that the only resource is in the positive philosophy, which alone can satisfy the needs at once of order and of progress, in which the two former philosophies, taking them under their respective charge, have, when it became necessary to unite them, signally failed.

We have now contemplated the dissolution of the old system under the action of the revolutionary movement. In the next chapter we shall see how the elements of a new system had been forming and silently arising in the midst of the destruction; and we must endeavour to form that estimate of these materials of social reorganization which has hitherto been impracticable, for want of the doctrine which should guide the process, and to which we must look for the full termination of the transition stage, which was virtually fulfilled in the eighteenth century.



## CHAPTER XI.

RISE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE POSITIVE STATE.—PREPARATION  
FOR SOCIAL REORGANIZATION.

WE have finished the irksome task of observing the process of dissolution of the old system of society during the last five centuries; and we may now turn to the pleasanter consideration of the reorganizing movement which was going on at the same time.

In fixing the date of the beginning of the new social formation, *Date of modern history.* we must remember that there is an interval between the generation of new social classes and the first manifestation of their tendencies. Considered in this way, it is the opening of the fourteenth century that we must fix upon as the time when the organic industry of modern society began to assume a characteristic quality. All the chief tokens of civilization indeed concur in marking that era as the true origin of modern history. The industrial expansion was then signalized by the universal legal admission of communities as general and permanent elements of the political system, not only in Italy, where it had happened some time before, but throughout Western Europe, where the event was sanctioned by various titles in England, France, Germany, and Spain; and the fact is marked and confirmed by the vast insurrections which, in almost every country, and especially in France and England, testified, during the second half of the century, to the nascent force of the labouring classes against the powers which were, in the respective cases, specially opposed to them. At the same period the great institution of paid armies was established in Italy; and they, marking a phase of industrial life among modern peoples, are as important in the organic as in the critical connection. Such innovations as the use of the compass and of firearms coincide with other tokens of commercial activity. And the same impulsion is traceable in the department of the arts, which we can hardly carry back, in their modern aspect, further than Dante and Petrarch in poetry, and the works of their time in painting and music. The scientific movement is somewhat less evident; but this was the time when natural philosophy became a special study, under forms corresponding with prevailing opinions,

as we see by the new interest excited by astronomy in the intellectual centres of Western Europe, by chemical researches, and even by the first sound anatomical observations that had ever been regularly instituted. The rise of philosophy, though the latest, and mixed up with the metaphysical spirit and the beginning of scholasticism, indicated the approach of a radical renovation, one symptom of which was the direction taken at that time by the controversy of the Realists and the Nominalists. From all the four points of view it thus appears that the beginning of the fourteenth century is the date of the first development of modern civilization, as far as we may venture to assign dates to sociological processes, which are too gradual to have any natural connection with special dates, such as we introduce as aids to order of thought and precision of memory.

The development of new social elements was coincident with the decay of the old ones in this way. Their early growth was both repressed and concealed under the *Rise of new elements.* contemptuous protection of the preponderant powers of the time, till those powers entered into mutual conflict; then the new elements, being necessarily called in as auxiliaries, could not but aid by their mere action the disorganization of which the conflict was a sign. To the same end, as the Catholic and feudal system was transient in its nature, its decline must begin from the moment of its highest splendour; for, its provisional office being fulfilled, its elements immediately began to lose at once the aim of their activity and the restraint which had curbed their mutual antipathy. From that precise moment the germs of the new system began to expand. When aggressive warfare was over, the human energy which was set free resorted to industrial interests for occupation; and when the monotheistic philosophy had obtained all the political ascendancy it could ever have, the highest minds, finding no more theological development to be looked for, obtained a worthy scope in a scientific or artistic career. Thus we see that there was nothing accidental or empirical in the coincidence of the rise of the new order of things with the decay of the old, but rather a precise accordance between the principles and the facts of the case.

As to the order which we should assign to the four kinds of development,—it is determined by the great law of the priority of the more general and simple over the more special and complex,—though the working of the law may not be recognized till it is revealed by distance of time. This law is not confined to the co-ordination of speculative conceptions, but extends to all positive modes of human activity, practical and individual, as well as theoretical and collective; and its final customary application will be in social classification, the character of which will be determined by the whole of its deductions. We shall see this fully in the next

chapter,—and I mention it here only because I have to arrange my historical material by means of the principle.

The way in which it is to be applied, amidst the distracting speciality of the multitude of human occupations, is by drawing out a vast line comprehending all those occupations, from the most insignificant material acts to the sublimest speculations, æsthetic, scientific, or philosophical, in an ascending succession of generality and abstractness, in a normal view of their character ; and therefore in a descending series of professions, according to the increasing complexity of their immediate purpose, and the more direct utility of their daily operations. Regarded as a whole, this vast series presents in its higher divisions a more eminent and extended relation, but one less complete, direct, and certain, so that it in fact often fails ; whereas the lower divisions compensate for their inferior and restricted nature by the plenitude, promptness, and clearness of their unquestionable services. Individually compared, these degrees should manifest as they ascend a more and more marked preponderance of the noble faculties which most distinguish humanity ; and the corresponding social labours will exhibit a more complete concentration and closer connection in proportion as we ascend to works which are, on account of their difficulty, accessible to a smaller number of co-operators, while they need a smaller variety of organs, according to the more extended scope of their respective action ; whence results a more vast but less intense development of the universal sociality which, on the contrary, in the descending hierarchy, diminishes more and more till it is restricted almost within the limits of domestic life, where, in truth, it is most valuable and best relished.

This series is like the animal hierarchy (of which it is in fact a kind of special prolongation), in admitting and even requiring, in the midst of its continuity, some rational divisions, founded on the affinities which occasion certain modes of activity. Of those divisions, the first and most important results from the distinction between the practical and the speculative life, which we have been studying under the names of the temporal and the spiritual order. We need not subdivide the first of these, which we may call, in a general way, the action of Man upon nature : but the other, the speculative life, must be divided into two,—æsthetic and scientific speculation. And thus we have that part of the scale appropriate to modern civilization divided into three great orders ;—the Industrial or practical ; the Æsthetic or poetic ; and the Scientific or philosophical,—of which this is the natural order. All are indispensable in their several ways : they represent universal, though not equally pressing needs ; and aptitudes also universal, though unequally marked. They correspond to the three several aspects under which every subject may be

positively regarded,—as *good* or beneficial, as *beautiful*, and as *useful*. They are regarded in this ascending order by commonplace minds, in which the affective life prevails largely over the intellectual; whereas the reverse order is the rational one, and that which gains upon the other in proportion as the intellect assumes a larger share in the human evolution:—all which is consistent with what we have seen to be the result of our cerebral organization, which compels men in general to think most of practical utility, and next of ideal perfection; while very few are qualified for the persevering search after abstract truth. Whichever way we enter upon the study of the classification of human pursuits, I am convinced that we shall find the æsthetic element always intermediate between the industrial and the scientific, partaking of the nature of both, without however preventing their having direct relations with each other. Such is the series which furnishes the only rational basis for a statical, and therefore for a dynamical analysis of modern civilization. But there is a further subdivision which, though merely provisional, it is necessary to notice, because, however certain to disappear, its duration is no less than from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the future complete establishment of the positive philosophy. I refer to the distinction between science and philosophy, which, it may have been observed, I have just spoken of as one. They are radically one: but at present our science is not so philosophical, nor our philosophy so scientific, as to permit their being thoroughly united in our view; and for purposes of historical exposition of the last five centuries, we must make a fourth element out of this subdivision. In fact, we must submit to a final protraction of that old Greek error of twenty centuries ago, of separating natural from moral philosophy; an error which has been sustained and rendered conspicuous during the last five centuries by the expansion of natural philosophy, properly so called, and the consecutive transformations of moral philosophy. I proceed, then, on the supposition of there being four classes of social elements,—the industrial, the æsthetic, the scientific, and the philosophical,—striving to keep before my own mind and the reader's the merely provisional character of the last division.

It will be at once admitted that while all the four elements coexist permanently, they are, from their nature, developed at unequal rates; and also that the same law which regulates their respective positions in the scale, decides the succession of their development; and again, that the rise of any one of them impels that of the rest. I need not enlarge again on the reciprocal influence, for direction and excitement, of the scientific evolution and the industrial; and the great social consequences of this connection will appear hereafter. But we are much less aware of the equally certain connection between the æsthetic and

*Order of  
succession.*

the two extreme evolutions. The positive theory of human nature shows us that the cultivation of art naturally succeeds that of industry, and prepares for science and philosophy; and when the progression is, by an exceptional course, in an inverse direction, it is certain, though not so obvious, that scientific activity urges to a certain æsthetic activity, if only for the sake of mental relaxation; and that the practice of art is again favourable to industry. And thus it appears that the mutual action of these elements is as unquestionable as their respective position; that is, their dynamical as their statical arrangement.

In regard to the historical application of this arrangement, and bearing in mind that it is not the origin of any element that we are here concerned with, but its historical appearance,—it seems unquestionable that we must ascend the scale, noticing first the industrial aspect of modern civilization, and rising to the philosophical. It is certainly the industrial quality of modern societies which offers their first great contrast with those of antiquity. The industrial element is new; and the others, though far more powerful in recent than in ancient times, had then a very conspicuous existence. After the emancipation of the primitive labourers, the most advanced societies were mainly distinguished by the gradual preponderance of the industrial over the military life; and it was thus the source of their other essential attributes, and the mainspring of their method of social training. The intellectual awakening consequent on this practical activity, and the relative ease spread through society, naturally occasioned a more disinterested extension of the fine arts, which had never been so widely propagated, in their three chief forms, during the polytheistic period. In another view, we see that the improvement in the industrial arts has raised them to a kind of æsthetic quality,—especially in the case of the geometrical arts. Again, the industrial evolution was necessary to impart to the scientific spirit of modern times the thorough positivity which characterizes it, and which has extended from it to the philosophical spirit. So that, on all accounts, we see that the ascending direction is that in which human progression is to be traced; and that the descending one, which alone is perfectly rational, is impracticable till social science has advanced much further than at present.

Such doubt as there is, relates to the order of the æsthetic and scientific evolutions. Though their order is usually what I have now made it, it may be objected that in Germany, the development of science clearly preceded that of art. But, for this single instance, exceptional reasons might be assigned, if it were within my province; and it must be our rule to study the civilization, not of any one nation, however important, but of the whole portion of mankind involved in the movement of western Europe; that is (specifying the nations once for all), Italy, France, England, Germany,

and Spain. These five great nations may be regarded as having constituted, after the first half of the Middle Ages, one single people, immensely different in various respects, but bound up together under the Catholic and feudal system, and undergoing together all the subsequent changes which the system brought after it. This being our field of observation, we shall decide that the scientific development was certainly posterior to the æsthetic. This is remarkably clear in regard to Italy, which led the rest of the world in the most important particulars of civilization, and in which we observe the spirit of Art gradually growing up on the traces of industry, and preparing the way for science and philosophy, through its beneficent property of awakening speculation in even the most ordinary minds. As the descending order, however, was the natural one in the infancy of society, when all civilization issued from the theocratic principle; and as it will again be the natural one when society shall be philosophically organized, it is now the natural order in the interior of each of the divisions in the scale of human pursuits. In each, we shall find the course of progression to be from the more general to the more special,—from the abstract to the concrete. And thus, for five centuries past, the ascending and descending order of progression has gone forward,—the one for the general human advancement, and the other for the three special modes of advancement. The actual case represents the natural course of an ideal society, whose early stages could be preserved from theology and war; and it is exhibited to us now in the more restricted instance of individual education,—in as far, at least, as it is spontaneous,—in which æsthetic follows industrial activity, and prepares for scientific and philosophical action.

I have thus laid down the date and order of succession of modern civilization; and we may proceed to survey its four great departments,—beginning with the industrial evolution.

It appears to me that when serfage succeeded to slavery, the change constituted a kind of direct incorporation, in the earliest degree, of the agricultural population with society in general, to which that population had been hitherto a sort of domestic animals. From that moment, the cultivator, attached to the land, which was then the most stable of possessions, began to acquire, even in his poor and precarious condition, something like social rights;—if no more, the most elementary of all,—that of forming a family, properly so called, which was now for the first time sanctioned by his new position. This amelioration, from which all other civil emancipation proceeded, seems to assign the country as the first seat of popular enfranchisement; and this great social phenomenon connects itself naturally with the instinctive predilection of feudal chiefs for an agricultural life, with its precious independence, and with the fine spectacle, so

THE INDUS-  
TRIAL MOVE-  
MENT.

common in the Middle Ages, of the holy hands of monks being extended to labours always before regarded as degrading. Thus, the condition of the country appears to have been at that time less miserable than that of the towns, except in the case of some few centres, which were of great importance as points of support for future efforts. There can be no doubt of the tendency of the medieval system to distribute the population uniformly, even in the most unfavourable localities, by an interior influence, analogous to the exterior, which, interdicting invasion, established settled populations in the most barren countries of Europe. We must unquestionably refer to this period the systems of great public works undertaken to improve places of abode, whose inconveniences could not longer be escaped from by a hostile emigration; for it was now that the miraculous existence of Venice, and yet more, of Holland, began to become possible, by means of obstinate and thoroughly organized efforts, beside which the most laborious of ancient operations appear but secondary affairs. Here then was a beginning of popular emancipation, which must necessarily precede and prepare for a total abolition of personal slavery of every kind. The next period, of three centuries, from the beginning of the eighth to that of the eleventh, was the season of a final preparation for the industrial life, which must succeed to the abolition of popular servitude. Of the two great objects of the institution of personal bondage, one had been accomplished under the period of conquest;—the leaving scope to military activity for the accomplishment of its ends. The other,—the providing industrial training to the mass of men, to whose nature toil was repugnant,—was fulfilled when there was a cessation of the influx of new slaves, and when, under the feudal system, the chiefs were dispersed among submissive populations, and their inferiors were initiated into industrial life by a regular organization. A starting-point was fixed for each serf, whence he might proceed, by extremely slow degrees, towards individual independence,—the principle of which was universally sanctioned by Catholic morality. The conditions of ransom, usually very moderate, affixed to such liberation, besides regulating a just and useful indemnification, furnished a significant safeguard of such progress, by showing that the freedman was capable of such moderation and foresight as rendered him fit for self-government. For this indispensable preparation the slave of a more ancient time was unfit, while the serf of the Middle Ages was more and more disposed to it, both in town and country, by the influences of the corresponding social state.

Such was the temporal influence of the period immediately preceding personal emancipation. The spiritual influence is obvious enough. The serfs had the same religion with their superiors, and the same fundamental education which was derived from it; and not only did religion afford them rights by prescribing reciprocal

duties, but it steadily proclaimed voluntary emancipation to be a Christian duty, whenever the labouring class showed its inclination and its fitness for liberty. The famous bull of Alexander III., on the general abolition of slavery in Christendom, was merely a systematic sanction, and a rather late one, of a custom which had been extending for some centuries. From the sixth century, the temporal chiefs, who were under the fresh influences of Catholicism, had conferred personal freedom, sometimes on the inhabitants of a considerable district; and the practice spread so rapidly that history relates some few cases in which the boon came too early for the needs and the desires of the recipients. The influence which thus wrought, was not that of moral doctrine alone. The morality was enforced by the persevering action of a priesthood which was opposed to the institution of caste, and open to be recruited from every social class, and which relied mainly for the permanence of its organization on the labouring classes, whose rise it therefore constantly favoured.

I have said that at the beginning of the change, the condition of the agricultural labourers was less burdensome than that of the artificers in the towns: but the emancipation proceeded faster in the towns than in the country. The diffusion of the agricultural population, and the more empirical nature of their daily employment, must have retarded the tendency to entire emancipation, and the fitness both to obtain and to use it; the residence of their chiefs in the midst of them would generally relax the desire, and increase the difficulty of enfranchisement; and the spiritual influence itself would be at its weakest in that case. Whereas, the town populations which had obtained, as organized communities, full industrial development, reacted upon the country; so that during the twelfth, and yet more the thirteenth century, the cultivators gradually obtained freedom in almost all important parts of Western Europe, as Adam Smith and Hume have shown us in expositions which are luminous, in spite of the injurious influence of the philosophy of their day.—If we look at the process from the other end, we shall see why personal liberty must have been first obtained in the cities and towns. The servitude was more onerous there, from the absence of the master, who delivered over the multitude to the despotism of his agent. The wish for liberation, which must thence arise, was aided by the concentration of numbers, which made its fulfilment the easier. A far more important reason was that the labour of the townsmen, whether manufacturing or commercial, was of a more abstract and indirect nature, requiring a more special training than that of tilling the soil: it required a smaller number of agents, a more easy and habitual concert, and a greater freedom of operative action; a concurrence of qualities which easily explains the earlier emancipation of the manufacturers and traders. If my space permitted further analysis, I could easily show that the traders, concerned in the more abstract and indirect employment, were



enfranchised before the manufacturers; and that the first class of traders who obtained their freedom were those who were concerned in the most abstract and indirect kind of commerce,—that of money exchanges. The money-changers rose to be opulent bankers, the first of whom were usually Jews; and, as Jews, outside of a servitude which would have incorporated them with Christians, however otherwise oppressed. But they were systematically encouraged by the polity of the time, and always more free in Rome than in any other part of Christendom. In precocious Italy, the most special precocity was in the commercial genius which made Venice the wonder of the civilized world; and Genoa and Pisa, even before Florence. The same kind of importance distinguished the commercial elements of the Hanseatic League and cities of Flanders: and the nascent industrial prosperity of France and England was attributable to the establishments, in the thirteenth century, of the Italian and Hanseatic traders, which, from being mere counting-houses, became magazines, and were at length transformed into great centres of manufacture.

In inquiries of a different nature from this, it is usual to present the phase of political struggle as beginning with the *Birth of political liberty.* enfranchisement of communities, without inquiring whether that enfranchisement had any other origin than accident, or some evidently insufficient cause. I must avoid any such fatal break in the history of society by pointing out how and when any collective liberty was acquired by communities. The interval between the obtaining of personal and collective liberty was short; for the latter was not only a necessary consequence of the former, because without it there could be no great industrial progress, but it was obtained more and more rapidly as the forces of opposition relaxed before growing success. Independence was obtained more easily than personal liberty, because it was known that the one could not long be withheld when the other was granted; and it can scarcely be said that the interval between the completion of the first movement and the beginning of the other was longer than the earlier half of the eleventh century. The feudal organism, dispersive in its nature, and foreseeing nothing of the future struggles which must ensue, made no difficulty of admitting industrial communities among the elements of which it was composed. The Catholic organism was even more favourable to such a progression, not only from Christian principle, but from the support that the sacerdotal polity expected to derive from the elevation of the new classes, whose mental emancipation was as yet dreamed of by nobody.

With regard to the dates,—the entire movement of personal emancipation, from the end of slavery to the end of serfage, coincided with that of defensive warfare, beginning with Charles Martel, and ending with the establishment of the Normans in the West: and the next phase,—that of the establishment of industrial com-

munities, with its resulting operation on rural enfranchisement,—was coincident with the crusading struggle against the invasion of Mussulman monotheism. As for the area, it was precisely that of the Catholic and feudal system,—the movement taking place universally within the limits of that system, and nowhere outside of it, either under the Mohammedan or the Byzantine monotheism ; and it was easy and rapid above all in Italy, where the Catholic and feudal organism manifested its greatest vigour. The Catholic influence showed itself in the permanent anxiety of the popes to accommodate the differences which impeded the nascent coalition of the industrial communities, whose polity was for a long time habitually directed by the religious orders. And the feudal influence was seen at the western limit of the area, where the Hanse Towns arose under the protection of the Empire, corresponding with the Italian cities by the natural intervention of the Flemish towns, and completing the general constitution of the great industrial movement of the Middle Ages, which spread, by the Mediterranean basin, to the furthest parts of the East, and by the Northern seas to the northern extremities of Europe ;—an area of European relations far more vast than the Roman dominion could boast in its proudest days. It is for philosophical minds to feel how great is our obligation to the *régime* which gave its first impulse to our existing civilization, however incompatible with further human progress that system may have become.

Our next step must be to ascertain the natural characteristics of this new moving power, and to point out the vices which have equally distinguished it, up to this time.

There can be no doubt that the change we have been examining constitutes the greatest temporal revolution ever experienced by mankind, since its direct effect was to change irrevocably the natural mode of existence.

*Characteristics  
of the Indus-  
trial move-  
ment.*

If the Greek philosophers of twelve centuries before had been told that slavery would be abolished, and that the freemen of a great and powerful population would subject themselves to labours then considered servile, the boldest and most generous thinkers would have called out upon a Utopia so absurd and utterly baseless : for the world was yet too young for men to have learned that, in matters of social change, spontaneous and gradual evolutions always end in far transcending the most audacious original speculation. By this vast regeneration, the race closed its preliminary period, and entered upon its definitive state, in regard to practical life, which was thenceforth brought into agreement with our general nature ; for a life of labour is, when become habitual, the fittest to develop all our chief dispositions of every kind, as well as to stimulate to co-operation ; whereas military life exercises the faculties very partially, and makes the activity of some depend on the repression of others.

By the highest and truest test that we can apply,—the gradual ascendancy of the faculties of humanity over those of animality,—the substitution of the industrial for the military life has raised, by one degree, the primitive type of social Man. The use of the understanding in practical matters is more marked in the industrial life of the moderns than in the military life of the ancients, if we compare two organisms of the same rank in the two situations, and discard all reference to modern military life, which requires a special mechanical character in the common soldier. Industrial pursuit is suitable to the intellectual mediocrity of the vast majority of the race, which can best deal with clear, concrete, limited questions, requiring steady but easy attention, admitting of a direct or proximate solution, relating to the practical interests of civilized life, and bringing after them a pretty certain reward of ease and independence, in return for sense and industry. The next test,—the influence of the social on the personal instinct,—shows us that industrial life favours a universal goodwill, because every man's daily toil may be regarded as concerning others quite as much as himself; whereas the military life encouraged the most malignant passions, in the midst of the noblest devotedness. If it is objected that minds are restricted, and that selfishness is encouraged, by such extreme division of labour and care for private interest as we every day witness, the explanation is that the industrial expansion has thus far been merely spontaneous, not having been systematized by rational principles, as it is destined to be. Till it is organized to the same extent as the military system was in its best days, it would be unjust to compare the social qualities of the two. If war, with its barbarous origin and temper, could be organized into an instrument of social service, there is every reason to hope that the vices which are involved in industrial pursuit may be, in like manner, neutralized by a similar method. In the absence of such discipline, the industrial life has unquestionably developed new intellectual and sympathetic power in the very lowest class of the population, from the Middle Ages to this day.

The influence of the change on domestic life has been vast; for it opened that mode of existence for the first time to the most numerous class,—there being nothing in the condition of slaves or serfs which is worthy the name of family life. Even free men were not before aware of the destination of mankind at large for domestic life, and were perpetually drawn from it by the tumultuous emotions of the city and the battle-field. Again, the two great family relations were improved by the change which brought the occupations, and therefore the manners, of the two sexes into more resemblance, and which lessened the absolute dependence of children upon their parents. Much of the benefit is lost by the absence of organization: but the industrial and the Catholic system worked well together in favour of domestic

morality. . And if there seemed reason to apprehend that the subordination of the female sex would suffer by the independence obtainable by women under the industrial system, the danger was fully compensated for by men having engrossed various occupations that before belonged to women, and thus consigned the feebler sex to that domestic destination to which alone it is completely adapted.

Proceeding to the social aspect of the change, we see that the industrial movement abolished the system of Caste by setting up against the ancient superiority of birth *Social effect.* that of wealth acquired by industry. What the Catholic system had done in suppressing the sacerdotal caste, and founding spiritual rank on capacity, the industrial movement realized in its own way, in regard to even the lowest social functions. The tendency to inheritance of occupation gave way in the lower ranks before the instinct of general improvement which had caused the enfranchisement itself; and in the higher ranks, before the well-known impossibility of preserving great commercial and manufacturing fortunes in the same families. These causes, combined with the increasingly special character of employments, favoured, by merely temporal methods, a closer agreement between aptitudes and destination: and at the same time, the natural connection between private and public interest was directly improved by that marvellous instinctive social economy by which each industrial member is constantly employed in devising and carrying out new methods of serving the community,—every private operation assuming the character of a public function, and the broad old division between the two becoming indistinguishable. Much of this action arose, certainly, from the self-interest and cunning proper to emancipated slaves: but the love of gain is surely preferable to the love of pillage which preceded it. Much of the imperfection of the industrial system is due to the absence of organization; and the rest to the imperfection of human nature; but the vices which may be remedied and those which cannot are a good exchange for those of a period of slavery and war. As for the industrial influence, as it affected social transactions,—it substituted the principle of reconciliation of interests for the spirit, first hostile and then litigious, which had prevailed before. During the medieval period, when industrial communities legislated independently, before the formation of the greater polities, there were commercial tribunals and regulations which do great honour to the Hanseatic merchants, whose jurisdiction contrasts very favourably with others of that age. Even such despotic action as there was in the system was an improvement. Considering the natural indolence of the human constitution, it could hardly have been foreseen that the prevailing desire of the majority of free men would be for permanent labour; but when this happened, the granting or refusal of work became the

common basis of social discipline, preventive and coercive, and the great substitute for direct force. However this new power may need regulation, there can be no doubt of its superiority to the military principle of discipline, in which pain and death were the sanction of all subordination. The industrial principle of discipline is less oppressive, more indirect, and therefore avoidable; and it leaves room for a clearer and more active sense of the reciprocal need of co-operation, and for more conciliating manners. The international operation of the industrial spirit is as remarkable as any part of its action. All causes of international antipathy, even the religious, have succumbed to it. Deficient as it is in organization, the most powerful retrograde system has receded before it; even the national egotism of England having been unable to restrain the perpetual extension of the pacific dispositions of commerce towards rival nations. Whatever may have been the original effect of the military spirit in extending human association, it not only had been completely exhausted, but it could never have been comparable to the industrial spirit in admitting of the total assimilation of the human race.

This estimate of the qualities of the industrial system was required by the vastness of the change which it introduced into social life. It brings us up to the assigned date, at the opening of the fourteenth century, whence, having settled the relation of the industrial period to more ancient institutions, we may proceed with our historical analysis of its development. In what remains for me to say, it will be understood that, for reasons already sufficiently explained, I speak of the concentrated industry of towns.

The policy of the labouring classes, from their first emancipation onwards, has been, generally speaking, distinguished by two characteristics,—speciality, with liberty for its condition; that is, such new powers as have been sought have been desired for industrial purposes; and political efforts have had industrial liberty for their object.

It was as a safeguard of such elementary freedom that the primitive independence of the town populations was so important, in the midst of many errors: and this was the destination of the guilds which incorporated the members of each craft, and protected individual industry at first, however they might oppress it at last. By preventing capricious changes of occupation also, they helped the formation of industrial manners, and exerted a moral influence which was of high importance in so new a mode of life. This is the true origin of the characteristic passion of modern society for universal and permanent liberty, as a natural consequence of personal emancipation, and a condition of every man's proper activity. In as far as it rested on an industrial basis, their policy was secure: and we must therefore depart from

*Industrial  
policy.*

common opinion so far as to think that the preceding political repression, under the theological and military system, was fortunate for the new element, as long as it was not fatal to it. An evidence of this is afforded by the misfortunes of communities in which the repression ceased too soon, and retrograde influences were mixed up with the progressive, in the form of political ambition. The Italian cities, which had been foremost in political liberty, paid for the privilege by fatal mutual animosities and internal quarrels, till their turbulent independence issued everywhere in the supremacy of a local family,—first feudal in Lombardy, and afterwards industrial in Tuscany. But Venice was saved from the fate of her neighbours: and the Hanse Towns, by their political liberty being restricted till their commerce was established, escaped all fruitless disturbances of the industrial life, which grew up within them as prosperously as in the midst of the most powerful feudal organizations,—like those of England and France. And thus the action of the corresponding *régime*, which appeared to be so much pure hindrance to the new element, was in fact one of the main conditions of its development.

The relation of the industrial element to the corresponding powers, and especially the spiritual, may be easily anticipated. It was warmly welcomed by Catholicism, both on account of its conformity with the general spirit of the system, and as an ally of the ecclesiastical power in its political antagonism. On the other hand, there were discordances from the theological character of the philosophy of the time. Besides the anti-theological character of industry, as action by Man on the external world, a more direct discrepancy arose between the ardour of industrial activity and the due Christian care for personal salvation. The absolute character of theological doctrine prevented its accommodation to circumstances unforeseen at the time of its formation; and it could only interfere by vague and imperfect precepts, which were often incompatible with the conditions of industrial life. One instance of this is the denunciation of usury by the clergy. After being of some use in restraining cupidity, this prohibition became a hindrance to indispensable transactions, and indirectly stimulated extortion. To this day the clergy have been unable, after all their laborious theological speculation, to agree upon any theory about the interest of money lent; and thus has religious morality, devoid of popular good sense, been for ages an unsuccessful adversary of industry, with popular wisdom for its ally. The opposition thus arising explains why the labouring classes, though receiving with respect the intervention of the clergy in their general affairs, always turned with decided preference to the temporal power, which never seriously interfered with their activity. Before the time came for social rivalry between the aristocracy of birth and that of wealth,

*Relation to  
Catholicism.*

*Relation to  
the temporal  
authority.*

the industrial class regarded the nobility as (by their luxury) the great cause of production, and, by the superiority of their moral training, the best types of individual perfection. In both these ways feudal manners have certainly been constantly favourable to industry. To this day new inventions are proposed even too much with a view to the rich few rather than the great multitude of consumers; and social superiority and hereditary wealth have, on the whole, encouraged a largeness of views and a generosity of sentiment among the feudal class which would have been incompatible with the special pre-occupations of industrial pursuit, and which have ever been looked up to as matters of imitation by the labouring classes. There is every reason to suppose that the possession of a great patrimonial fortune will always be a ground of social influence; and it is difficult to overrate its importance in the times nearest to the origin of industrial pursuit. The attachment to royalty must have been more eminent than that to aristocracy; and while industry was looking up to the local temporal authority, whatever might be its form, it usually turned with a higher preference to the central element; for royalty offered all the advantages of aristocracy, without the same danger from collision; the only set-off being the payment of taxes, which could not have appeared burdensome to nations who were yet in the fresh enjoyment of this power of commuting their social difficulties. Thus the industrial populations in general were specially attached to royalty, at the very time that in some exceptional cases—in England, for one—they were leagued with the nobility against royalty, and, by that permanent tendency, retarding the natural decline of the royal power.

As for the management of the industrial polity, it at first fell into the hands of the clergy or nobles, whose interests  
*Administration.* were bound up with those of the industrial communities; and chief among them we observe the recent religious orders, and then some great feudal families, who acquiesced in the new state of things, and were content to establish their greatness on an alliance with industry. But a special class was soon required for the conduct of the new polity; and that class was the Legists, whom we have seen before to be occupied in taking the old system to pieces, while we here find them helping to construct the new one. However deplorable their influence has since been found, from its undue protraction, we must not forget that it was indispensable, at a time when the Legists were the only class who could confer with the ancient powers about industrial affairs, whose interests were bound up with those of town populations, and whose intervention set the working classes free to follow their own occupations, without disturbance from political agitations which could be carried on by deputy.

The reader will remember that the five centuries of the revolutionary period were, in the last chapter, divided into three portions : that the period of spontaneous decay *Three periods.* of the ancient system extended to the end of the fifteenth century ; and that the subsequent period of systematic destruction was divided into two,—the Protestant period of the negative philosophy, extending to about the middle of the seventeenth century, and the Deistical period, occupying the rest of the time. The same division precisely suits the analysis of industrial development ; and I therefore repeat it, impressed with the coincidence of the periods of critical and organic progression. It was perfectly natural that the two movements should proceed together. The decaying powers gave out some of their strength to the rising ones, both through the sympathy which the Catholic and feudal spirit entertained for nascent industry, and for the political reasons which urged the temporal power to secure the support of the new body of social forces ; while, on the other hand, the extension and consolidation of industry helped the decay of the old system, by undermining the customary subordination of the classes which were learning independence. From this time the great cities, the centres of civilization, became united in common interests ; and drew into their influence the more diffused populations of which they thus became the protectors ; and London, Amsterdam, and other great commercial cities, and even Paris, assumed, on other than political grounds, an influence very unlike that proud spirit of universal domination exhibited of old by the few strongholds of military activity. Then arose paid armies, as an expedient at *Paid armies.* first, and soon as a permanent institution. The innovation had an industrial origin, beginning at Venice, at the opening of the fourteenth century, and then extending by way of Florence to other states, and over all Western Europe, testifying to the antipathy of the new populations for military life, which was henceforth consigned to a special minority, ever decreasing in its proportion to the rest of society, though actually more numerous in some instances of modern warfare. The decline of the old system was hastened by the people being thus withdrawn from the military chiefs and placed under industrial leaders ; and again, by the discrediting of the charities administered by the clergy, when better resources against want were opened by industry. These advantages were the greater from the workmen being few, and highly-skilled workmen extremely few, in comparison with the present time, and therefore individually more powerful. We see in this period even the first indications of public credit, which is usually supposed to be of much later *Public credit.* origin. I cannot hesitate in referring it to the efforts of Florence and Venice about the middle of the fourteenth century, presently followed by the Bank of Genoa, which was a vast and active organiza-



tion before Holland and England had acquired any considerable financial importance.

In the decisive struggle between royalty and nobility we see industry taking different sides in different places, but always on the same principle,—that of supporting the feebler party, in expectation of reciprocal service, and in the intention of victory. There

*Political  
alliances.*

was no concert in this, but merely natural policy ; and we see, accordingly, that the industrial power formed a political alliance with royalty in France, and with the feudal aristocracy in England, notwithstanding the natural sympathy which, as I have explained, would have decided the English case the other way. Here we find the origin of the characteristic differences between French and English industry,—the first tending to centralization, and the second to partial combinations,—according to the feudal principles on which each set out. The first is the most natural and favourable to industry, and spread over the greater part of Western Europe ; the second was an exceptional case, though shared by some few Continental populations. The first encouraged a greater generality, and prepared the working class for an earlier conception of a genuine organization, such as is even yet however too little dreamed of by anybody ; whereas, the second encouraged a greater speciality, and thus aggravated the besetting vice of the industrial movement. As an exemplification of the two methods, Louis XI. established the post,—a truly royal intervention in European industry ; while the English carried their distrust of centralization so far as to refuse as long as possible the institution of a police sufficient to protect their great cities.

I mentioned before that the condition of slavery was unfavourable to mechanical inventions ; and we may look to this period for confirmation of the converse truth. We must refer to the latter part of the period for the majority of such inventions ; but I must point out here that the earlier portion gave

*The Compass.*

us the compass, firearms, and the invention of printing. It is true, the compass was invented two centuries before ; but it was not till the fourteenth century that it was improved and adapted for use ; that is, it lay useless till the extension and improvement of navigation converted it into a practical need. Whether gunpowder was now invented, or revived from

*Firearms.*

disuse, the sudden employment of firearms is a sign of the times. Military methods were improved, that the industrial population might defend itself against the military caste, without undergoing the long and irksome apprenticeship formerly necessary ; and the art was particularly suitable to the paid soldiery, whom kings and cities might thus enable to conquer a powerful feudal coalition. I have before pointed out that this new facility did not protract the warlike period ; and we must be very

well aware that the prevalence of war does not depend on the excellence of its apparatus; for the warfare of our own time is immeasurably less than our knowledge and resources would enable it to be, if the spirit were not wanting. And again, I think it a mistake to suppose that the increased expense of modern warfare is owing to the introduction of new apparatus. I believe, on the contrary, that if we could compare the accounts of ancient and modern warfare, we should find that the new methods are decidedly economical, and that the increased expense arises from the substitution of mercenaries for volunteer armies,—a change which must have produced the same result, if the weapons had remained the same as of old. Again, I must point out the services rendered to natural philosophy by the scientific pursuit of war,—by means at once of the common interest in those departments of knowledge, and of the special establishments which seem to make the military spirit an instrument, as it were, of modern civilization, through the rational positivity which it has thus acquired.

The commonest error in regard to the third of these inventions is to connect the whole progressive movement with the art of printing, which was only the most powerful material means of its propagation, and therefore of its indirect consolidation. Like its predecessors, and even more than they, this great innovation was a result of the state of contemporary society, which had been preparing for three centuries. In the vaunted days of antiquity, when slavery and war left only a very small number of readers, the ordinary method of propagating writings sufficed, even for occasional extraordinary demands: but the case was far otherwise in the Middle Ages, when the vast clergy of Europe constituted a reading class to whom it was of the utmost importance to render transcription cheap and rapid. During the scholastic period, when the universities became thronged, the matter became one of serious anxiety; and in the twelfth century, the multiplication of copies far exceeded anything that the ancients could have known. And when universal personal emancipation succeeded, and industrial activity spread, and increased ease multiplied the number of readers, and more and more written instruction was required to supply to the lowest classes the want of the oral teaching which was now insufficient, the concurrence of demands, under the æsthetic, scientific, and philosophical pressure of the times is quite enough to account for the invention of printing. No such preparation had ever before been made for the rise of any art as now for that of printing, while yet modern industry had afforded some strong proofs of its aptitude to employ mechanical methods, in the place of human agents. Paper had been invented centuries before,—no doubt because it was wanted for transcriptions; and it would be more reasonable to inquire why the art of printing was so long in coming, than to wonder at its appearance. It was in

Germany especially that the need of a better method of multiplying books was felt, during the great controversies about the nationalization of the clergies of Europe. And when the method had been found, there ensued a most important connection between intellectual progress and the spread of a new art, of such industrial value that the guardian powers of industry could not but respect it more and more, and the most obscure policy was compelled to tolerate the free circulation of books, and to favour their production, as a source of public wealth. This was first the case in Holland, and then everywhere else, contributing to restrain the retrograde aspirations of the governments, instigated by abuses of the press, such as are mixed up with the noblest services, while the press remains under the liabilities of our spiritual anarchy.—Thus then it appears that while all the conditions were long preparing for these three great inventions, there were no technological difficulties about them which prevented their appearance when they were sought with a persevering intention. If it be true that they had long existed among Asiatic nations, we have only another proof that they did not originate the great social changes of which they were the instruments and the propagators; for they have produced no such effects in the East. In noticing them, I have for once quitted my principle of generality, in consideration of their importance, and of the erroneous judgment usually pronounced upon them. I need not say that I shall pass over all other discoveries, whatever may be their merit and importance, because these are enough for the purposes for which I diverged from my abstract dynamical analysis. The two great geographical discoveries of

*Maritime  
discovery.*

that age belong by their results to the next period; but they must be noticed here on account of their derivation from the earlier part of the movement. The expeditions of Columbus and of Vasco de Gama were certainly owing to the disposition of modern industry to explore the surface of the globe, after the school of Alexandria had proved its form, and now that the compass permitted bolder enterprises at sea, at the same time that new fields for commercial activity were wanted. The growing concentration of the temporal power now permitted the necessary accumulation of resources; which was not the case earlier, nor would have been later among powers like the Italian, for instance, which, however eminent in naval force, were occupied with struggles at home. If, as is probable, hardy Scandinavian pirates really visited North America some centuries before, the fruitlessness of their enterprise proves that there was nothing fortuitous in the achievement when it did take place, and that the social value of such deeds depends on their connection with contemporary civilization. In this case, the discovery of Columbus was prepared for during the fifteenth century by Atlantic excursions of increasing boldness, gradually followed by European settlements.

During the second of our three periods, the Protestant, we shall find the positive and the negative progression still coinciding, as before. The industrial movement was obtaining something like regulation, while the revolutionary movement was becoming subject to a directly critical philosophy. The working classes were no longer regarded merely as an auxiliary force which the temporal power would be wise to propitiate by concessions. The advanced concentration of the political power, favourable as it was to enlargement of views, revealed to the modern governments, whether royal or aristocratic, the relation that industry now bore to the rest of the political system. I do not mean that the time was come for rulers to take philosophical views of the necessary preponderance of industry. War was still regarded as the chief end of government; but it was perceived that industry must be favoured as the basis of military power. And thus we see that it is no fancy of the historian, but necessary fact, that the two kinds of progress became systematic at the same time and in the same degree. *Second period.*

Again, we find in the positive as in the negative case a great difference in the mode of progression, according as it related to the central, or to the local forces of the system; whether the temporal dictatorship in the one case resided in the sovereign or in the aristocracy; and whether, in the other case, the chief industrial cities should preserve their independence, or should give way before wide national organization. In the first instance, indeed, both the monarchical and the aristocratic polity required the sacrifice of the great commercial cities, whose independence had once been necessary, but was now become obstructive, through their mutual rivalry. They were humbled therefore without opposition from any quarter. But they left stronger traces of their original industrial constitution under the rule of the aristocracy than under that of royalty. The old urban privileges were more completely effaced by the systematic action of royalty than by the more desultory action of aristocratic rule. The difference was felt, beyond the period, in the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods, and in the attachment of their respective advocates. The French, or monarchical system, issued in the works which distinguished Colbert's administration, and which exhibited a regulation of industry which, considering the age, I believe to be the finest type of administration that is upon record. But the tendency of monarchy to fall back upon aristocracy prevented the method from being durable; so that it merely yielded a temporary impulse, and indicated what might be done under a future and better grounded organization. The other method, which originated in Holland, but was best exemplified in England, began to show its true tendencies in the time of Cromwell, though it had been prepared for in the reign of Elizabeth. Its chief advantage was the union between the industrial and the feudal

elements, through the active or passive participation of the nobility in industrial operations, which were thus ennobled in the popular view. It was in this way that the prosperity of Venice had been founded three centuries before; and we see in it something that contrasts finely with the stupid contempt of the French aristocracy for the working classes. But the example of Venice shows that this method is not favourable to the prosperity of industry, nor, in the long-run, to its organization. It aggravates the tendency to detail, and to national exclusiveness; and it preserves the influence of that element of the feudal system which clings the most pertinaciously to the old *régime*. As for the area occupied by each method,—with the exception of Prussia, which offered an anomalous spectacle of the union of legal Protestantism with genuine monarchy, for reasons which it is not possible for me to go into here,—the connection of industry with the royal power took place in Catholic countries, and with aristocratic power in Protestant countries. The theological spirit is equally adverse to industry in the Catholic and in the Protestant form; but the Protestant had the temporary advantage of encouraging personal activity. The effect was seen in Holland being first, and England afterwards, the centre of European industry: but the Protestant nations are probably destined to pay the price of their transient superiority by their comparative inaptitude for a genuine and extensive reorganization.

One evidence that the industrial movement was becoming organ-

*Colonial  
system.*

ized at this period is the rise of the Colonial system.

It is an interesting question whether colonization on the whole advanced or retarded the evolution of modern society. On the one hand, it opened a new career to the military spirit by land and sea, and there was a revival of the religious spirit, from its suitability to the less civilized populations abroad; and thus the theological and military *régime* was protracted, and the time of reorganization was set further off. But again, the new extension of human relations improved the existing idea of the final regeneration, by showing how it was destined to include the whole human race, and thus condemning the policy, then very common, of systematically destroying the races of men, in despair of incorporating them. Again, by the stimulus which colonization imparted to industry, its social and political importance was so much enhanced that, on the whole, I have no doubt that the general progress was accelerated by this great new European event,—though by no means to the extent commonly supposed. It is a true remark of some of the most eminent of the Scotch philosophers, that some countries, which by their geographical position, or from other causes, have had least share in colonization, have benefited quite as much by it as the rest, and some even more. The main diversity in modes of colonization results from its being effected under Catholic and monarchical, or Protestant and aristocratic rule. Dutch

colonization, with the regular destruction of products that it caused in the Indian Archipelago, is an example of the last mode, which encourages individual activity and rapacity and national selfishness. In the other case, the enterprise has more of a political than an industrial character. If we compare the colonial system of Spain, and even of Portugal, with that of Holland and England, we find in it, not only a systematic concentration, Catholic and monarchical, of the ruling power, but a complement of the retrograde policy organized at home: for it opened a new sphere of personal advantage to the priesthood and nobility, and at the same time an outlet for the restless activity which imperilled the system in the mother country. So that I suspect, as several philosophers have done, that for Spain, at least, the colonial movement was a social retardation.

I cannot quit this part of my subject without entering my protest, together with that of all philosophy, against the rapacity by which the great colonizing movement *Slavery.* has been everywhere disgraced. Three centuries after personal emancipation had been obtained in Europe, Catholicism, in its decay, not only sanctioned but instigated the extermination of whole races, and the institution of a slavery infinitely more dangerous than that which, in its better days, it had so nobly assisted to overthrow. I need not repeat my condemnation of the disgraceful anomaly of modern slavery, nor the grounds of that condemnation. As to the reaction of this monstrous crime on European civilization, —it indirectly favours the retrograde or stationary spirit, by preventing the true philosophical extension of the generous elementary principles of modern progress; since their most active defenders are apt to find themselves checked, in the midst of ostentatious philanthropic demonstrations, by their personal interest in the maintenance of the most oppressive policy. In this particular respect, Protestant nations are at a disadvantage in comparison with Catholic; for, enfeebled as the power of the priests now is, it has mitigated, by a perpetual beneficent intervention, its own great original offence; whereas, the legalized spiritual anarchy of Protestantism leaves entire impunity to private oppression, except that it admits the inert restraint of a few temporal rules, generally framed and always applied by the oppressors themselves. The excuse now commonly offered for slavery, that it promotes the civilization of the enslaved race, will not stand a moment's examination, and is of a wholly injurious tendency to the cause of civilization itself. If the enslavement took place on the spot, under circumstances analogous to those of ancient times, it is conceivable that benefit might arise to both parties at that stage of barbarism: but when the slaves are transplanted to, as it were, a subsequent age, the natural progression of the people of Africa is fatally interfered with. It is fatally rash to attempt to hasten pro-

cesses so slow and so vast, at the risk of introducing uncontrollable calamities, even if the method were as generous as it is odious. As it is, the promoters of this disastrous institution must at length accept, in their own social retardation and embarrassment, the just punishment prepared for them by all the fundamental laws of human society.

Our third period extends from the expulsion of the Huguenots from France, and the political triumph of the English aristocracy, to the beginning of the French Revolution. It is the same which, in the former connection, I called the Deistical period; and here again we find the positive and the negative progression coinciding. In the last period we saw that extending industry was regarded as the necessary basis of military superiority, which was still the chief consideration with governments. But during the period we now have to examine, a remarkable inversion gradually took place; an inversion which must be regarded as the greatest advance which it is possible for society to make during the existence of the old *régime*, and beyond which it is impossible to proceed but by entering upon a total reorganization. Here begins the last phase of warfare,—that series of commercial wars in which, at first spontaneously, and then systematically, the military spirit retires behind the industrial, and strives to retain its place in the social economy by conquering advantageous settlements for each nation, or by destroying the resources of foreign competition. Lamentable as have been some of the conflicts of this kind, the policy must be regarded as progress, inasmuch as it announces the decay of military activity, and the preponderance of industry, which is thus established, in a temporal sense, as the principle and the aim of modern civilization. The change was evident enough in the strifes about monarchy and aristocracy, and in other features of the second period; but it was not till the eighteenth century that the subordination of military to industrial action was decisively settled throughout Western Europe,—the Colonial system, founded under the preceding phase, having been the main cause of this kind of conflict.

As to the other points of view of the relations of industry,—it advanced more rapidly during the last period in England than on the Continent, because the Protestant spirit, and the close connection between the aristocratic and the mercantile classes, are favourable both to the self-reliance and the selfishness which have hitherto belonged to industrial life; whereas, the lingering influence of Catholicism in Continental countries, the greater sociality of temper and manners, the cosmopolitan character of the negative philosophy, and the want of affinity between kings and the industrial classes, have wrought together to leave the superiority to England. That provisional

superiority may be no advantage; for it protracts the military and theological system, which is incorporated in their case with the industrial; and it tends to the encouragement of an insatiable cupidity, and the repression of generous national sympathy; and thus there is a risk of future retribution for the provisional industrial prosperity of England.

The interior organization of industry has been largely affected by its peculiarity of offering interest and scope to a variety of minds; so that the most active and energetic men have entered it more and more eagerly, as it grew in social importance, while military life became the refuge of men of inferior ability or perseverance,—especially among the lower classes. The flood of cupidity which desolated France when Law's scheme was afloat proved that it was from no intellectual and moral superiority that the proud upper classes despised industrial life, but only from an aversion to work. The spectacle was not so openly shameful in Protestant countries, though the same temper might exist. The alliance between aristocracy and industry must disguise the alienation of spirit: but not the less was the energy of the national mind investing itself in industry, and its indolence, incapacity, and pride in war. Another interior element of progress was the expansion of the system of public credit, which began, as we have seen, in the Italian and Hanse towns, but which could not fulfil its function completely till industrial interests had become incorporated,—first as a means and then as an end,—with the whole European polity. Its most decisive extension was when, out of the great financial companies, arose the class of bankers, to be the head of the industrial interest, through the superior generality of their habitual views: and from the moment when they became actually a part of the commercial body, instead of being outside of it as at first, they formed a bond between all the other parts, which aided their organization. At this time, again, genuine relations began to be established between science and industry. The opposite elements, the abstract and the practical, had long been approximating, and Colbert had shown the power of their junction. But it was in the eighteenth century that they showed what they could do by their union. Before, there had been scarcely any arts, but navigation and medicine, in which any great scientific progress had been made: now it was not only the whole system of geometrical and mechanical arts, but the more complex and imperfect physical and chemical arts, that rapidly advanced. And now arose in consequence that remarkable intermediate class, small but rapidly augmenting, of engineers, whose business it is, as I pointed out in my former volume, to regulate the relations of science and industry. Their action in England and France has been characteristic of the social and political differences of the two countries:—the English showing the wonderful resources of free private instinct, backed by voluntary associations; and the



French preparing the way for a genuine final reorganization of labour of every kind. Again ; during this period, modern industry began to manifest its philosophical character,—till then discernible only by careful historical analysis. The time was come for it to appear as the systematic action of Man upon the external world, guided by the knowledge of natural laws. The two great inventions, of the steam-engine and the balloon, spread the true conception,—the one by its actual operation, and the other by the bold but fairly-grounded hopes which it awakened. If theology had before disclosed its anti-industrial tendencies, industry now clearly revealed its anti-theological character. Under polytheism, the antagonism between the supposed divine order of the universe and Man's power to interfere with that economy for his own advantage, could be evaded : but monotheism placed the question in the front rank by its hypothesis of providential optimism. The admirable organization of Catholicism deferred the settlement of the question by avoiding collision with industry as long as possible ; but when the theological system was in decay, and industry was rising from day to day, the final conflict could not but be destructive to the religious view. That view had become totally incompatible with the extension of Man's action upon nature : and thus was the industrial element brought into radical and permanent hostility to the theological and military powers, under whose shadow it had grown up. And thus was the most popular mental action of all brought into alliance with the other forces which were engaged in the destruction of the theological philosophy.

We have now traced the industrial movement through its three periods ;—its spontaneous rise, under Catholic and feudal guardianship,—its systematic encouragement by governments, as a means of political supremacy,—and its establishment as a permanent end of European policy, with the subjection of war to its service. It is evident that nothing remains to be looked for but the advent of a corresponding political system ; of which I shall have more to say hereafter. We must now proceed to survey the intellectual

*The intellectual movement.*

movement, æsthetic, scientific, and philosophical, which was going on at the same time. This review may be very brief in comparison with that which we have just concluded, for the intellectual evolution is less complex than the industrial, less subject to historical misrepresentation, and less important in regard to the constitution of modern society, being restricted to a small class, and capable of a merely modifying action thus far, however active and eminent its operation is destined to be at a future time. It is not compatible with my object to notice any but the social properties of the three intellectual elements ; and I shall not therefore enter on the special history of any of them, but merely sketch their rise, character, and development,—beginning with the æsthetic.

The function of the æsthetic faculties is to afford an ideal and sympathetic representation of human sentiment,— *The æsthetic development.* personal, domestic, and social; and their condition therefore can never be any sufficient test of the corresponding civilization. This is the only element of those which I have to consider in this chapter that is common to the military and theological, and the industrial and positive systems. The best way therefore of ascertaining its state at any particular time is, not by regarding it by itself, but by looking at those characteristics of modern civilization with which it is incorporated, to ascertain its share in them, and observe what new properties it may have disclosed. Considering the strong human interests which abounded in the medieval period, it is evident that the Fine Arts must have been favoured by it. The sense of personal independence was then energetic; domestic life had a strength and beauty in it unknown in ancient times; and the defensive wars of the period stimulated social activity. The Catholic and feudal system was undoubtedly more favourable to the Fine Arts than any preceding *régime*, if only it had had more stability. The cathedrals, which were in fact museums of music, painting, sculpture, and architecture, were one evidence of this; and another was the organization which permitted an unequalled encouragement of individual genius. But, on the other hand, the vague, abstract, inflexible character of monotheistic articles of belief was incompatible with æsthetic development; and it was the social condition of the period, and not its philosophy, that was favourable to the Fine Arts; the case being an inversion of the polytheistic, in which it was the doctrine, and not the corresponding *régime*, that so largely developed æsthetic genius. Under the feudal encouragement of that order of genius, we see it assuming the form of an ideal faith in the old polytheism, Greek, Roman, Scandinavian, or Arab. It appears to me that we here find the cause of the supposed opposition to the Fine Arts and decline of their influence, which may well be ascribed to the neutralizing effect of this logical inconsistency. Depending thus on social influences in that age, the æsthetic action must begin to show itself as soon as the Catholic and feudal constitution was sufficiently mature; and its opening period is marked by the institution of chivalry, while its main development was occasioned, for two centuries onward, by the Crusades, in which the whole moral energy of Europe was concentrated. All historical testimony agrees in asserting the extreme eagerness of all the classes of European society for that kind of mental action, which suited all capacities, affording excitement for the feeble in intellect, and diversion for the strong. And this was happening in the age which moderns have thought proper to call dark, and in the two countries, England and France, where the system of that age existed in its most perfect state. The admiration excited by the

Fine Arts, then and there, was far more energetic and universal than any ardour felt by some few ancient peoples for the works of their time. Italy was soon to eclipse every other country; but we have Dante's assurance that the Italian inspiration was derived from southern France, where the feudal system was stronger and the Catholic feebler than in Italy.

We must remember the delay and difficulty that were occasioned by the state of language in that age. There might be little apparent result from this long stage of preparation for the full development of the Fine Arts; but it was not the less true that earnest labour, and much power of an æsthetic kind, were absorbed by this task. Languages, and especially modern languages, are the result of a slow popular elaboration, in which the corresponding civilization is reflected: but the work must be taken up and carried out by the higher order of intellect; and the æsthetic order particularly,—both because it is the most naturally active, and because it is concerned with expression, and therefore in an eminent degree with language. This is particularly the case when the thing to be done is not to create an original language, but to transform an existing one, as a necessary consequence of a new social state. The æsthetic faculties having to represent, in the strength of nature, the ideas and feelings inherent in actual common life, could never speak a dead or a foreign language, except by artificial habit; and we see how they must have been occupied, long and sedulously, in the Middle Ages, in aiding and directing the spontaneous formation of the modern languages, though it is the fashion to suppose them lying idle at the very time that they were laying the foundations of the great social monuments of European civilization. It was poetry chiefly that was thus kept back, and music, in an accessory way; but the other three arts were more or less hindered, through their connection with the chief and most universal.

The chief feature of the intellect of that age is its originality and popular character, testifying to its being derived from the corresponding social state. Amidst all the reproaches about the abandonment of ancient works, we well know that the reading class of that time, who spoke Latin, must have read the Latin authors very diligently. But there was a growing feeling of the incompatibility between the rising æsthetical spirit and an exclusive admiration of works that related to a state of society now extinct. Besides this, it was insisted by Catholicism that the new social state was better than the old, insomuch that when the so-called restoration of letters took place, and the works of the ancients were brought up again, it was mainly owing to the reaction against the Catholic spirit which set in when it ceased to be progressive. Meantime, the spontaneous character of the new development required its perfect separation from one which belonged to a wholly different social state. For instance, Italy imitated the old Roman

monuments; and therefore, while superior to all the rest of the world in other branches of the fine arts, she fell behind in architecture, because Catholicism and feudalism were erecting edifices more adapted to the civilization which they were thus to immortalize in the memory of mankind. We find the same originality in every branch of the arts. In poetry especially we find it in its expression of the manners of chivalry; and again in its disclosures of the new importance of domestic life in the scheme of modern existence. A new order of compositions hence arose, such as the ancients could not have conceived of, because it relates to that private life of which they knew so little, and treats of public life only in so far as it reacts upon the private. This order of works, since so expanded as to have become the exponent of modern civilization, must be referred to the age under our notice; though a servile admiration of ancient literature has caused too great a neglect of the first works in what is significantly called the vulgar tongue,—a term which, however inappropriate now, I accept as historically true.

We have here found the origin of the æsthetic development of modern society: but it is not possible to dwell upon it to any purpose. Not only must the social state be very marked, but it must also be permanent, to favour the effect of the fine arts; because that effect requires a close and established harmony of ideas and feelings between the interpreter and the spectator. These conditions were fulfilled in antiquity; but they have never been so since, in any adequate degree, nor can be till we attain a fully positive state. It is because the intervening period has been a transition stage, that the permanent results of the æsthetic movement have been so disproportioned to the energy of its rise. The anomaly is not explained by any suppositions of the decay of the æsthetic faculties in Man, nor by any complaints of his devotion to the works of antiquity: but it is explained by the instability of Man's social condition, which has been undergoing successive transitions, such as could not but neutralize the necessary universality of art,—strong, and original, and popular as was its first evolution in the Middle Ages. Each social phase was dissolved before its spirit had penetrated the general mind and heart, so as to make it an immortal theme for the poet or the artist. The spirit of the Crusades, for instance, favourable to the loftiest poetry, was lost before the modern languages were formed which should have idealized them for ever: whereas every social condition among the ancients was so durable that, from age to age, Art found the popular passions and affections identical with those which it had to refer to a yet remoter time. The fine arts will never recover their full social efficacy till a perfect reorganization places Man once more in a condition of social stability.

Taking the Middle Ages, as hitherto, as comprehending the nine

centuries between the fifth and the fourteenth, we shall find the condition of the fine arts during that period to correspond with the contemporary condition of industry. When serfage succeeded to slavery, the new social state afforded materials for a beginning in art, and an excitement of its faculties: when the town populations were personally emancipated, art was occupied in the preparation of the modern languages: and when the industrial policy of towns was originated, and the rural population finally freed, the arts obtained a direct development, according to the nature of the corresponding civilization. The reign of Charlemagne, occurring about the middle of the period, may be taken as the date of the effectual stimulation of the elements of modern civilization. We have seen what were the characteristics of the nascent art of the period; and we have now to learn what were its characteristics, and what its relation to the pre-existing powers, from the beginning of the fourteenth century onwards; in other words, to observe the influence of industrial civilization on Catholic and feudal Art.

The first influence was in awakening mental activity, and in affording ease and security, without which Art could be neither understood nor enjoyed. Mental stimulus is first afforded by gross and urgent wants; and no great enjoyment can attend that sort of activity: and, at the other end of the scale of mental operations, the exercise of the scientific and philosophical faculties is attended with fatigue, which soon becomes insupportable, except in rare cases of organizations peculiarly fitted for abstract contemplation. Between these two extremes, we find the exercise of the æsthetic faculties, affording the pleasure of moderate activity and of an agreeable mingling of thought and emotion, such as the generality of men are capable of enjoying. Thus it appears that Art affords a suitable transition from the active to the speculative life. There can be no doubt that the relation of the arts to practical life became closer in proportion to the substitution of the industrial for military pursuits. While slavery and war made up the social economy, it is clear that the fine arts could not be popular, nor indeed enjoyed at all beyond the limits of the highest class of free men,—except in a partial and circumscribed way, in a portion of Greece. Everywhere else the popular recreation consisted in bloody sports, in imitation of their favourite mode of activity. When Industry became a true social element, the Catholic and feudal manners, penetrating the whole of society, prepared its humblest households for more or less enjoyment of Art, which from that time forward was destined to spread among the multitude, and become also a social element, which it had never been, in the slightest degree, in ancient times. In its inverse action, it counteracted the lamentable restriction, mental and moral, which is the attendant danger of industrial activity. Æsthetic education thus begins what scientific and philosophical education must finally

achieve; so as to furnish a means of filling up the chasm which is provisionally occasioned by the disuse of religious observances,—highly needful formerly as intellectual relaxation from industrial labour. Throughout Europe, the æsthetic movement followed close upon the industrial, tempering its dangers by inciting a more general and disinterested mental activity than was required by daily tasks, and awakening the benevolent affections by means of enjoyments which were vivid in proportion as they were unanimous. In individual cases, too exclusive a devotion to the fine arts may have occasioned mental and moral deterioration; but in a general way, they have prevented too strong a preponderance of the material life, and have sustained a degree of speculative ardour which will hereafter be instrumental to the highest objects. In a more special way, we may regard the development of the fine arts as being connected with the technical improvement of industrial operations, which can never be perfected among nations untrained to the pursuit of ideal perfection. This is particularly the case with regard to the numerous arts relating to external form, and thus connected with architecture, sculpture, and even painting, through so long a gradation of minute differences that it is sometimes impossible to draw the line between the artistical and the industrial. The technical superiority of populations familiar with art is so evident, that it is the ground of the efforts of modern governments to propagate æsthetic education as a security for industrial success amidst the commercial competition of the European nations.

Notwithstanding its natural advantages, Art could be only negative in its character and indecisive in its influence, during the critical period of the last five centuries. *Critical character of Art.* If it took for its subject the ancient faith and manners which alone had comprehended universal ideas and sympathies,—the Catholic faith was dying out, and the feudal manners were disappearing before pacific pursuits. Art could not grow up and expand on elements which were dissolving day by day. And the elements which were growing up had not yet so taken possession of the general mind as to afford material for Art. Such strength as it had, passed into natural alliance with the temporal power, and took form in different countries according as that power was monarchical or aristocratic. It was thus spread over all Western Europe, though in unequal force in different countries. Though Art has been accused of engendering national antipathies, from its implication with the proper development of each nation, it has certainly wrought more strongly in the contrary direction, reconciling the nations through the universal and admiring interest excited by masterly works of art towards the people which produced them. Each one of the fine arts has its own proper mode of exciting the universal sympathy of Europe; and of stimulating and aiding mutual communication. The most general and effectual influence of this kind

belongs to Poetry, because it has induced the study of foreign languages in a greater degree than any other incitement. Science and philosophy had little to do with the formation of the modern languages; and, from the generality and abstract character of their subjects, they have stood in no great need of them since; so that the æsthetic element has been mainly concerned both in their formation and their propagation.

As to its course, historically regarded, the æsthetic movement was, like the industrial, first spontaneous, then systematic, and finally established as an end (as far as it went) of the modern polity. In the first case, all the fine arts shared in the movement, more or less, and it extended over the countries of Europe; but it was Poetry only, and in Italy alone, that produced characteristic and imperishable works,—those of Dante and Petrarch. Here we see Italy preceding, as in other respects, the rest of Europe by two centuries. The first impulse was certainly original, for Dante's poem was not on the instant responded to by the sympathies which it was fitted to excite: but the unanimous admiration of Europe which presently followed testified to the agreement between this great work and the corresponding state of civilized populations: and not the less for the tardy justice being enjoyed by the poet's successors, Petrarch being in reality crowned as the representative of Dante, and not as the author of Latin poetry, by which only he was then known, and which is justly forgotten at this day. The characteristics of the age appear in Dante's poem, especially in the critical tendency, guided by metaphysics highly unfavourable to the Catholic spirit. It is not only that the work contains severe attacks upon the popes and the clergy: its whole conception is in a manner sacrilegious, usurping as it does the power of apotheosis and damnation, in a way which would have been out of the question during the full ascendancy of Catholicism, two centuries earlier. The temporal antagonism of the movement is less marked, because it could not, as yet, be direct; but it appears indirectly in the opportunity it afforded of founding a personal reputation, independent of hereditary superiority, and very soon in rivalry with it.

It was about the middle of this period that that action took place which has been commonly called the regeneration of the fine arts, but which was in fact a kind of retrogression, its spirit being a servile and exclusive admiration of the masterpieces of antiquity, which were the expression of a totally different state of society. Its full influence was not felt till a later time; but I note its origin in the season under our notice, because we must attribute to it that neutralizing influence which blighted the promise of the fourteenth century, and rendered the next age so lamentable a contrast to it. Much of the evil was no doubt owing to the religious controversies of the times; but much more is attributable to the passion for Greek and Latin productions, under whose prevalence the originality and popular quality which are the

*Retrograde  
character.*

most valuable of æsthetic attributes, languished more and more. The edifices of this period, though improved in technical execution, are not to be compared with the cathedrals of the Middle Ages. At the same time we must remember that this imitation of ancient Art could be no more than a secondary symptom, and not an occasion of the vague and indecisive aspect of modern Art, which we have seen to be owing to the critical character of the corresponding social state. The ancient works had never been really forgotten: they did not interfere with the first rise of modern Art; and their now coming up again was a sign of the decomposition which was proceeding, and also a means, however imperfect and merely provisional, of filling the gap in the career of Art, left between the expiration of the old public sympathy and the growth of the new, under a positive organization. Finding no existing sociality adequate to its objects, Art availed itself of the ancient kind, as it could be known ideally and from the monuments which remained; and this was the abstract medium with which the heterogeneous impressions of the existing environment were united, with more or less success. Inadequate and dangerous as was this method, it was the only one then possible, and the only alternative to total anarchy in art. We find accordingly not only Petrarch and Boccaccio, but the great Dante himself, earnestly and constantly recommending the diligent study of antiquity as the basis of Art; advice which was erroneous only so far as that it set up as an absolute principle what was only a temporary expedient. The necessity itself enhances our admiration of masterpieces produced under such shackles and with such imperfect means; and it certainly testifies to a growth rather than a decay of the æsthetic faculties in Man. The provisional system which impaired the preceding movement suspended the development of Art during the next. With the originality of the preceding age Art lost its popular quality: and then a public had to be trained for the factitious art which was to have a provisional reign; and that public must consist of privileged classes, placed by an elaborate education at the same point of view with the artists, in order to secure that community of feeling which must exist between the interpreter and the spectator. In a normal condition of art the harmony exists naturally, because the same medium pervades all minds: but in that provisional season a long preparation was necessary; and it was only when that preparation had gone on long enough to prepare a special public, destined to enlargement by means of an education founded on the study of the dead languages, that the æsthetic movement could resume its suspended course, and gradually produce the universal movement which I shall now proceed to describe. This provisional factitious system involved all the fine arts, but in unequal degrees. Its most direct and powerful influence was upon the leading art, Poetry. Sculpture and architecture were more affected by it than painting: and music suffered



least of all, being no otherwise involved than through its connection with poetry.

Arriving at the second period,—that of systematic encouragement of art,—we see at once the advantage that Art had over science in the same stage, inasmuch as it excited no political *Political* uneasiness among rulers, while it inspired much *relations.* more vivid and general sympathy. The popes, who were by that time merely Italian princes, paid little honour to science, but were the most zealous patrons of the arts, which their habits and education disposed them to appreciate. It was however more as a means of influence and popularity, than from taste, that monarchs in general bestowed this encouragement; and there could not be a stronger proof of the social power which Art was acquiring among modern populations.

Of the two forms of political rule, the monarchical and Catholic was more favourable to Art than the aristocratic and Protestant. The more elevated and central authority must be the most propitious to an element which, like the æsthetic, requires and occasions a broad, equable, social sympathy; and we find accordingly that academies of poetry and the arts rose up in monarchical states, and incorporated Art with modern polity. In the other case the local distribution of political power caused the arts to be confided to the irksome and precarious resource of private patronage, among nations whose æsthetic tendencies were already checked by Protestantism; and thus, but for the transient triumph of Elizabeth, and yet more of Cromwell, over the national aristocracy, we should probably not have had the genius of Shakspeare and Milton to plead in disproof of the supposed deterioration of the æsthetic faculties in modern times. There is some set-off against the unfavourable influences in the latter case in the superior originality which can work its way through by dint of independence; but the social effect, which we have here to consider, is unquestionably superior where the greatest aid is given to the propagation of Art among the people, and the training of minds in order to a future reorganization. We must refer to this political distinction the peculiarities of the dramatic art, and especially in England. It was not till now that the line was drawn between public and private life in dramatic representation; for in the Greek drama, notwithstanding the chorus, there was nothing that related to polity, except the station of the families whose passions and adventures were exhibited. This was inevitable among a people who could conceive of no social state but their own. Modern tragedy however has a more decided historical character, exhibiting former modes of social life; and its rise had a different aspect, according as it represented ancient or medieval society. The monarchical authority in France recoiled from the remembrance of the Middle Ages, in which royalty was so weak and aristocracy so strong; and it delighted in the revival of the great scenes of antiquity. Hence Corneille's

immortal idealization of the chief phases of Roman society. In England, on the contrary, where the feudal system was much less impaired, the most general sympathies favoured the remembrances of the Middle Ages; and Shakspeare's representations of them were popular accordingly. The isolation which distinguished the English polity more and more aided this result, and rendered the choice of national subjects almost exclusive. In Spain, under royal and Catholic ascendancy, we see that dramatic art was very like the English, and even further from imitation of the ancients; but in that case peculiar predilections existed in favour of medieval traditions, through the close connection of Catholicism with the corresponding polity. If the Catholic spirit had been equally strong among nations which escaped Protestantism, it would have saved them, in like manner, from their recurrence to antiquity in matters of Art, which was always a token of the instinct of religious emancipation. Thus the Catholic instigation wrought in Spain as the feudal did in England; only more strongly; because there was Protestantism to encounter in England, with its unfavourableness to Art. I have thought it worth while to say thus much to indicate how a sound theory of social progress may throw light on the study of the historical development of Art. I must add that this diversity affects only the representation of public life; whereas, those compositions which delineate private life could relate only to modern civilization. Thus, this class of works, epic or dramatic, must manifest a more complete originality, and obtain a more real and extensive popularity,—public life bearing too small a proportion to private to afford a clear and stable basis to Art. It was for this reason that Cervantes and Molière were always, as now, almost equally popular among various European nations, while it seems scarcely possible for Shakspeare and Corneille to be admired by the same people. No great genius has endeavoured to produce any dramatic delineation of public life; and the epics which have been attempted have only proved the impossibility of success. The marvellous poem of Ariosto relates much more, in fact, to private than to public life; and, as for Tasso's epic, it would be enough to point out its coincidence with the universal success of a composition designed to efface, by means of irresistible ridicule, the last popular remembrance of the same chivalry which Tasso embalmed in glory. The time was evidently past for the full success of such subjects, though they were the finest that modern civilization could offer; whereas, the poems of Homer were as acceptable as ever in Greece after ten centuries, the popular sympathies being still attached to the struggles of their country against Asia. We see the same contrast in the case of Milton, who strove to idealize the principles of the Christian faith at the very time when they were extinguished in the most advanced minds around him. These immortal efforts did not achieve an æsthetic result incompatible with the transitional state of society; but they

proved that the poetic faculty in Man was alive and advancing in growth. The operation of Art was of a critical nature, like every other genuine influence of the period. It not only awakened mental activity, but almost all the chief artists joined in attacking the Catholic and feudal constitution, under such forms as suited their art, in Italy, Spain, England, and France. Dramatic poetry was compelled to this by the sacerdotal anathemas aimed at the theatre, when the Church was obliged to relinquish the direction of it. Comedy was the most favourable to this work, because it most clearly reflected the instinct of the time. Molière's satires of the Catholic and feudal spirit, by no means sparing the metaphysical, or overlooking the empirical, extravagancies of the influential classes, are an evidence of the tone of dramatic art; and the protection granted to the moral disciplinarian against priestly and aristocratic rancour during the youth of Louis XIV. shows that the monarch had some dim instinct of the tendency of such criticism to aid in the establishment of the monarchical dictatorship.

The final period is marked by a development of Art, similar to that of Industry. Hitherto, the ruling powers had patronized Art for the sake of their glory and popularity: but now, the fine arts had advanced so far, and were so firmly established as a part of civilization, that it had become a duty of government to aid them by regular active encouragement, proceeding not from personal generosity, but from public solicitude. At the same time, the growing taste for the fine arts was rendering the life of poets and artists more and more independent, by releasing them from the necessity of that patronage which was still needed by the less popular pursuits of science. The institution of journalism was then becoming practically important,—to literature at first, and then indirectly, by its popularizing influence, to all the other arts. While the æsthetic element was thus obtaining independence and power, its special expansion underwent a remarkable change. The imitation of the ancients must come to an end, and some new form be assumed, yielding impressions more complete and more general. After a season of æsthetic anarchy the discussion arose, about the comparative merits of the ancients and moderns, which may be truly regarded as an event in the history of human progress, as it discredited for ever the old *régime* of Art, which henceforth made only abortive attempts, and proved its incapacity to produce any more masterpieces. But, at the same time, the other system, regarded as peculiar to England and Spain, underwent a similar change, and sank into decline and sterility, through the decay of medieval associations. The progress that was made was therefore necessarily in those productions that exhibit the interests of private life. On the stage, it is true, there was no surpassing Molière, who remains without a rival; but in the epic delineation of private manners, which is the most original and extensive kind of literary creation proper to modern society,

we have, among many others, the masterpieces of Fielding and Lesage, which are a standing testimony against the decline of the poetic faculties of Man. Another character of this phase is the decisive progress of dramatic music; especially in Italy and Germany: and its influence must be powerful in incorporating Art with social life in general.

The demolition of the ancient system by the negative philosophy was extremely unfavourable to Art, in as far as it permitted it to have none but fleeting inspirations, incompatible with all fundamental truth of poetic conception: but, at the same time, the decrepitude of the old *régime* gave a force to the artistic influence, through its connection with the social polity, which is sufficient to support it till the period of reorganization arrives. Thus it is that poets and artists, who were scarcely emancipated from patronage at the beginning of this phase, rapidly rose to be, in some sort, the spiritual leaders of modern peoples against the system of retrograde resistance, which was now to be irrevocably destroyed; the movement being before so prepared for by the metaphysicians that it suited æsthetic better than philosophical intellects, and afforded them a means of activity not then yielded by Art, properly so called. The consequences of so unnatural a state of things could not but be fatal both to society and to Art, if it were too long protracted: and the evil effects are seen in the rule of the men of letters, who are the offspring of the transition, and the leaders of the social revolution. We here find the necessary close of the preparatory season of the æsthetic element; for its incorporation with the sociality of a modern age has thus been urged to excess; and the time for reorganization has evidently arrived.

We have now to take a similar review of the scientific evolution, and after that, of the philosophical,—the separation of the two being provisional, as I explained before. *The scientific development.*

When we have completed the process, we shall obtain from their common issue the true immediate principle of the spiritual organization, and therefore of the temporal, which can have no other sufficient basis.

Though the scientific and philosophical faculties are, as I have so often said, the least powerful of any, the scientific and philosophical spirit obtains the rule over human progress, by means of its relation to the great general conceptions which support the whole system of our ideas about the external universe and Man. The slowness of the great changes wrought by this spirit may disguise the reality of its power; but it confirms the eminent difficulty and importance of those changes. We have seen how the primitive speculative exercises of mankind originated a theological philosophy which was modified more and more, and at length destroyed, without any possibility of its being replaced. We have now to explain how, starting from the Middle Ages (the cradle of all great subse-

quent changes), the human mind, having worn out all the social applications that the old philosophy admitted of, began to turn, though with a very confused instinct of its course, towards the final supremacy of a radically different, and even opposite philosophy, which must be the basis of a new organization. This great philosophical evolution has continued to depend more and more on the scientific development which first undermined the theological system, and transmuted its spirit into the metaphysical, in preparation for a further progress. The close connection of the two evolutions,—the scientific and the philosophical,—need not prevent our treating of them separately; and in that separate treatment we must take the scientific first, as the philosophical movement would remain unintelligible without it. Our survey may be very brief, as my first volume exhibits the historical filiation of the chief scientific conceptions, as well as their gradual influence, at once positive and negative, upon the philosophical education of society. This leaves me nothing to do but to co-ordinate in a general way the historical views which were before isolated,—being careful, moreover, to discard all that might degenerate into a concrete or special history of science or philosophy.

The scientific progression was necessarily connected with the *New birth of science.* beginnings of natural philosophy in ancient Greece; but it is habitually treated of as directly issuing from the medieval period, both because of its revival after a long retardation, and on account of the more and more decisive characteristics that it presented. Those differences must not, however, make us forget the connection between the discoveries of the Keplers and Newtons, and those of Hipparchus, Archimedes, and their ancient fellowship.

I have shown before that the sharp division between natural and moral philosophy permitted the simpler of the two to be so far independent of the more complex, as that it must be freely rising in the metaphysical scale while the other lingered in the last phase of the theological. Accordingly, natural philosophy remained external to the final organization of Catholic monotheism, which, when compelled to take it in and incorporate it, at once became liable to perversion through that compromise which, under the name of scholasticism, made theology dependent on metaphysics,—as we shall see presently. This last modification of the theological spirit was highly favourable to science, which remained thenceforward under the general protection of the dominant doctrines, till its anti-theological character was fully developed. But even before the distinct formation of scholasticism, Catholicism was favourable to natural philosophy by beginning to incorporate it with social life,—its doctrine doing for science in this way what its organization did for art. We have seen that the passage from polytheism to monotheism was favourable to the scientific spirit, and to its influence on human

opinion in general. So transient was the monotheistic philosophy, that, far from interdicting the special study of nature, like polytheism, it rather encouraged its contemplation, that providential arrangements might be admired in detail. Polytheism had connected every leading phenomenon with such particular and precise explanations, that every act of physical analysis stirred up a corresponding religious difficulty; and even when this incompatibility drove inquirers to a more or less explicit monotheism, the spirit of investigation remained shackled by reasonable fears of popular opposition, aggravated by the confusion between religion and polity: so that scientific progress had always been external to ancient society, notwithstanding occasional social encouragements. Monotheism, on the contrary, reducing the whole case to that of vague and uniform divine intervention, was willing that explorers should study the details of phenomena, and even disclose their secondary laws, which were at first regarded as so many manifestations of supreme wisdom. This was a point of extreme importance, as a connection was thus established between all the parts of nascent science. Thus it was that monotheism, which owed its existence to the first stirrings of the scientific spirit, was itself indispensable to its further progress, both in regard to its improvement and its propagation. We find the same action in the Arabian form of monotheism, though less marked; but the early promise of scientific cultivation in Mohammedanism was soon surpassed by Catholicism, which was better furnished for the work by its superior organization, and which aided the progress of knowledge, especially by restricting immediate supernatural intervention to the utmost, and substituting rational explanations for miracles, prophecies, visions, etc., which had come down from polytheism, and were too readily entertained by Islamism. Scientific activity was encouraged also by the institution of a speculative life under Catholicism, by its encouraging certain popular habits of rational discussion, by its adoption of the principle of capacity for office in the place of the hereditary principle, and by the facilities it afforded to the intellectual life. Thus, from the second phase of the medieval period, Charlemagne, and afterwards Alfred, were earnest in stimulating and propagating the study of science; and before the termination of that phase, the learned Gerbert, become Pope, used his power for the general establishment of the new mode of arithmetical notation, which had been ripening for three centuries, but did not come into common use till it was called for by the needs of industrial life. The system of education, ecclesiastical and lay, of that time bears witness to the estimation in which scientific culture was held,—the best minds being carried beyond the literature and metaphysics of the multitude of pupils into mathematical and astronomical studies. It was only during the last of the three phases, however, that Catholicism was the best promoter of science.

The Byzantine monotheism performed the service during the first phase, when the great western invasions were going forward; and the Arabian during the second, when the Christian world was absorbed by political cares, spiritual and temporal. Then, for three centuries, Arabian students improved upon ancient mathematical and astronomical knowledge, gave us algebra, extended trigonometry, and thus met the growing needs of celestial geometry. When Catholicism had wrought out its polity, and scholasticism ensued, the metaphysical spirit had finally gained the ascendancy over the theological, and prepared the way for the positive by permitting the study of the external world to supersede that of isolated Man. The solemn sanction attached to the name of Aristotle was at once a sign of the change and a condition of its continuance, as nothing short of such an authority could restrain the extravagances natural to a philosophy so obtained and so cultivated. We have seen that this revolution caused the decay of the Catholic philosophy. Its converse action was to stimulate scientific progress by incorporating it for the first time with social interests through the dominant philosophy, with which it was now closely connected, and which it was destined to cast out four or five centuries afterwards. That new scientific progression has gone on, from that day to this. It began with the cultivation of Greek and Arabian learning, and created Chemistry, at once in the east and in the west; and this fundamental investigation of nature was a step of the highest importance,—chemistry being, as we know, the link between inorganic and organic science. We see how great was the ardour of the most eminent thinkers by the prematurity of some of their efforts, to which we owe, however, amidst their failures, some valuable suggestions; as, for instance, those conjectures of Albertus Magnus which planted the germs of sound cerebral physiology. As for the agreement of the new impulse with the general state of minds, it is proved by the unremitting eagerness which drew crowds of auditors to the lessons of the great European universities, during the third phase of the Middle Age period,—it being certain that the development of natural philosophy had quite as great a share in the interest as the metaphysical controversies of the time. In those days the different sciences were too restricted and too little explored to admit of the speciality of study which, after having been a great benefit, has become a great embarrassment. Under a system of scholastic entities, connected together by the general entity called Nature, an intellectual harmony, scientific and logical, existed which could find no parallel but under the old polytheism, and which can exist again only when our rudimentary positive philosophy shall have become a true organization. The artificial union of theology and science, by a metaphysical bond, could not last; but it had its advantages, as all such efforts have; and they showed themselves especially in the encyclopedical direction

of abstract speculation. The monk Roger Bacon, for instance, wrote a treatise containing so vast a variety of views on different orders of phenomena, that most of our scientific men, so scornful about the Middle Ages, are certainly incapable, not only of writing, but even of reading it.

This scientific arrangement, precarious and imperfect, but the best that the times admitted, was effected chiefly through two general conceptions which served as a *Astrology.* basis for astrology and alchemy. Nothing can be more erroneous than the superficial popular classification of these with the occult sciences, as they are called, whereby retrograde superstitions are confounded with progressive conceptions. Magic is a relic of polytheistic, or even fetich superstition; whereas, astrology and alchemy are merely a too bold extension of the positive spirit, before the theological philosophy was got rid of. That the two classes have been confounded is owing to religious vindictiveness, and is a natural consequence of the antipathy between science and theology.—No doubt medieval astrology exhibits strong traces of theological influence in its supposition that the universe was made for Man,—a notion which gave way only on the discovery of the earth's motion: but, apart from that, it is evident that the doctrine rested upon the subordination of all phenomena to invariable natural laws. Its original title of judicial astrology conveyed this. No scientific analysis existed at that time which could assign to astronomical phenomena their true position in general physics; and there was therefore no principle which could restrain the ideal exaggeration attributed to celestial influences. In such a state of things, it was certainly right that human reason, resting upon the only phenomena whose laws were ascertained, should endeavour to refer to them all other phenomena, even human and social. This was the rational scientific course; and its universality and persistence till the seventeenth century prove its agreement with the corresponding situation. If we look at its action upon the general education of the human mind, we shall find that it was most serviceable in disseminating everywhere a first notion of the subordination of all phenomena to invariable laws, by which rational prevision became *Alchemy.* possible. The general conception of alchemy could not but be less philosophical, from the more complex and less advanced state of the corresponding studies, which were then barely proposed; but its primary rationality is unquestionable. We have seen, in our survey of chemistry, that phenomena of composition and decomposition could not be even perceived while, as under the old philosophy, but one principle was admitted, and that speculations of that order were necessarily based on Aristotle's doctrine of four elements. Now, these elements were common to almost all substances, real and artificial; so that, while that doctrine prevailed, the famous transmutation of metals could not appear more chi-



merical than the transformations daily effected by modern chemists among vegetable and animal substances, through the identity of their constituent principles. The absurdity of the bold hopes of alchemy could not appear till the discoveries of less than a century ago furnished the demonstration. Alchemy rendered the same service with astrology in spreading the conception of the subjection of all phenomena to invariable natural laws: for, whatever may have been the influence of the theological spirit on the hopes of the alchemists, their perseverance shows their conviction of this truth. The vague expectation of some sort of miracle might help to sustain their courage under perpetual disappointment: but it must have been some conviction of the permanence of natural laws which induced them to pursue their object by other means than prayer and fasting and religious expedients of that kind. I hope this brief notice may conduce to a tardy rendering of justice to these two great series of labours, which contributed so largely and so long to the development of human reason, notwithstanding all the errors involved in the process. The successors of the astrologers and alchemists not only found science instituted by their perseverance, but the more difficult task achieved,—the establishment of the principle of invariable natural laws. No influence less active and profound than theirs could have effected the popular admission of this truth; and we are reaping the fruits of it while we forget the hands that planted. The moral influence of these great provisional conceptions was not less favourable than the intellectual; for astrology engendered a high idea of human wisdom from its power of prevision under natural laws: and alchemy roused a noble sense of human power, before depressed by theological notions, by inspiring bold hopes from our intervention in phenomena which admitted of modification.

Such was the origin of modern scientific progress, which I have described up to the time when the industrial evolution called upon it for aid in daily labour, and the æsthetic evolution prepared the popular mind for science by rousing the speculative activity of Man. From this point, having examined the period which is beset with injurious prejudices, we can proceed rapidly to review the progressive course of science, during the five last centuries.

Happily, it was already too closely connected with social interests to be endangered by the struggles between popes and kings. It was not rendered secure by such great practical applications as now connect it with broad industrial interests: nor could it depend, like Art, on personal sympathies easily excited; for the scientific faculties of Man are weak; and the leaders of the time were quite satisfied with theological, or at least with metaphysical explanations. Royal lovers of science, like Charlemagne and Frederick the Great, are rare; while princely patrons of Art, like Francis I. and Louis XIV.,

*First modern  
phase of  
progress.*

are much more common : and thus it was only as astrologers and alchemists that scientific men could obtain any welcome ; the resources of the universities being then at the command of the metaphysical spirit, from which the scientific was beginning to separate itself. The footing which science had obtained, as astrology and alchemy, was all the more necessary because Catholicism, in its decline, was now manifesting its antipathy to the scientific expansion which it had at first assisted, but the irreligious influence of which it now began to fear. A long array of examples shows us what disastrous oppression science must have undergone if, at that period, astrological and alchemical conceptions had not secured protection to its professors among the clergy themselves.

As for the speculative development, it could not at that time occasion any remarkable progress in knowledge already existing. Chemistry must long remain in the preparatory stage of collecting material ; and this process went on rapidly. It might seem that astronomy, and geometry in connection with it, were in the way of improvement ; but, in astronomy, epicycles were still resorted to, to sustain the old hypothesis of circular and uniform motion ; and geometry was stopped short at special methods and researches, by the imperfection of algebra, and was waiting for Descartes : so that the chief improvement consisted in the simultaneous extension of nascent algebra and of trigonometry, completed in time by the use of tangents ; while in astronomy, calculations were beginning to be preferred to graphical procedures ; and observations, angular and especially horary, became more precise. This was the time when astrology afforded the strongest stimulus to scientific investigation, by proposing the most extended and decisive aim, with an instrumentality which served as a criterion of celestial theories,—that of determining the binary, ternary, and quaternary aspects, which could only be done by diligent study of the heavenly bodies. The movable feasts of the Catholic church were for a time useful in encouraging this kind of observation ; but the influence of astrology was much more powerful and durable. The only radical accession to natural philosophy at this period was from the rise of Anatomy, which had now, for the first time, the advantage of the dissection of the human frame. There had before been some inadequate exploration of brutes ; but religious prejudice had prevented the examination of the human body. Though the advance of anatomy could not rival that of chemistry, it was yet of great importance, because it completed the nascent system of modern science, which thus began to extend from the study of the universe to that of Man, with molecular physics for the link between them. Socially, it was of importance as connecting the physicians, as a body, with the speculative class ; they having risen from their very low ancient position to an influence nearly rivalling that of the priesthood. The union between biological science and medical art, which we

justly complain of now, was necessary then, to sustain anatomical studies in the absence of established theory: and the advantages yielded by astrological and alchemical conceptions were paralleled in this science by the strong belief in a Panacea, which involved the two suppositions of the invariableness of physical laws, and the power of Man to modify his own organism,—suppositions which could not but disclose the radical incompatibility between the scientific and the religious spirit.

The second phase of the period was, in science as in art, the most eminently progressive, on account especially of the movement which, from Copernicus to Newton, laid the foundation of the true system of astronomical knowledge, which presently became the type of the whole of natural philosophy. As in the other cases, too, governments began to afford systematic encouragement, partly from the general advance of speculation, and partly from the practical value of science, when mathematical and chemical doctrines were in demand for the purposes of a new art of war and an expanding industry. This systematic encouragement was however more tardy than in the case of the fine arts; and it was only towards the close of this phase that scientific academies were founded in England and France, the influence of which was chiefly felt in the next phase. They were of great use, however, in sustaining science through the crisis of its conflict with the ancient philosophy, from which it was now becoming finally disengaged. It is clear from the nature of the case that science could be protected by the temporal power, which was not concerned in the serious abstract animosities of the spiritual power, whether theological or metaphysical, which was now making its assaults on science; and thus science had even perhaps a more direct interest than art and industry in the establishment of a temporal dictatorship, under one or the other of its forms. If the spiritual power had obtained the ascendancy, science would have suffered more eminently than any other interest under its retrograde influence, and social progression would have been thereby found impracticable.

On the same grounds as in the former cases, it appears that the monarchical form of rule was more favourable to science than the aristocratic. Science is not usually attractive to the great: it is less so than art; and it requires a central authority, alike for its support and for its restraint from spreading out into too much speciality. Abstract speculation has held a freer and higher course under royal rule than under aristocratic influence, which has been too apt to subordinate scientific research to practical aims. In the one case, science becomes more favourably incorporated with the social polity, and spreads more certainly among all classes, to the great benefit of general education: and in the other case, there is likely to be a more spontaneous pursuit of science, and a more

original treatment of it. The evils in that case, moreover, were more evident in the third than in the second phase, as we shall presently see. Before Protestantism showed its anti-scientific tendencies, it exercised a favourable influence through its principle of free inquiry, which established a state of half-independence strongly conducive to the development of natural philosophy, whose great astronomical discoveries were at this time made among Protestant nations. Wherever the Catholic polity was the most decisively established, the scientific development was retarded;—in Spain, conspicuously, notwithstanding the promising beginning made at a former period.

The great speculative movement, carried on when the time was ripe by a few men of genius, exhibited two *Filiation of discoveries.* modes of progression, very closely connected; the scientific or positive, consisting of mathematical and astronomical discoveries; and the philosophical and usually negative, relating to the revolt of the scientific spirit against the thralldom of the old philosophy. The rallying-point of this last, in which Germany, Italy, France, and England bore a noble part, was Kepler's investigation, which, prepared for by the Copernican discovery, and the labours of Tycho-Brahe, constitutes the true system of celestial geometry; whilst, giving birth to celestial mechanics, it was connected with Newton's final discovery, through Galileo's mathematical theory of motion, necessarily followed by the achievements of Huyghens. Between these two series, whose succession is direct, the historical method naturally interposes the great mathematical revolution of Descartes, which issued, towards the end of this second phase, in the sublime analytical discovery of Leibnitz, without which Newton's achievement could not have been, as it was, the active principle of the final development of celestial mechanics in the next phase. The filiation of these vast discoveries is too evident to need illustration, especially after the character assigned to them separately in the first part of this work.

While engaged in these great operations, the scientific spirit had to sustain a perpetual conflict with the dominant philosophy,—the metaphysical no less than the theological; for the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler, and even Tycho-Brahe's, with regard to comets, were as distasteful to the one as the other. The antagonism became evident as early as the sixteenth century,—the fate of Ramus proving that metaphysical hatred is no less fatal than theological. We have before seen why Galileo's discovery must be the ground of the chief discussion; and the odious persecution which it occasioned has ineffaceably impressed human memory with the date of the first direct collision between modern science and ancient philosophy. This was indeed the epoch when the invariableness of physical laws

*Relation of science to old philosophy.*

was seen to be incompatible with theological conceptions, which were now the only hindrance to the reception of a truth confirmed by long and unanimous experience. In this connection therefore we must historically refer to the contemporary labours of Bacon, and yet more of Descartes, to exhibit the essential characteristics of the positive, as opposed to the theologico-metaphysical spirit. I must however connect with the scientific movement the bold conception of Descartes in regard to the general mechanism of the universe. Descartes probably did not deceive himself about its value or duration, which scarcely extended to two generations; and the existing state of the human mind rendered some such hypothetical venture necessary to the introduction of a sound system of celestial mechanics, such as Huyghens was then silently preparing, by following up the labours of Galileo. We have seen, while treating of the theory of hypothesis, why this mode of transition is the necessary way of passing from inaccessible questions and absolute explanations into the region of positive knowledge. We see two evident traces of this method still existing in every department but that of astronomy, to be surprised that it once existed there also.

To these great mathematical and astronomical acts of progression, we must add the truly creative works of Galileo *Galileo*, on barology, by which natural philosophy was substantially extended. Many fortunate discoveries of a secondary nature followed these, and ulterior creations in acoustics and optics. In those days, nothing but the most exceptional events excited astonishment; and yet those were the days in which, working out and disclosing the destination of modern science to regenerate the humblest elementary notions, Galileo revealed the unsuspected laws of the commonest phenomena, the study of which, in immediate connection with geometry and astronomy, turns out to be nothing less than a disclosure of the department of Physics. The new science assumed its place between astronomy and chemistry; and a new class of inquirers arose, whose special function was to develop the resource of experimentation. If we consider that the geometers and astronomers, who had hitherto been one and the same, now separated, in consequence of the rapid extension of the two sciences, we shall perceive that the organization of scientific labour, especially with regard to inorganic philosophy, which was almost everything at that time, was very much like what it is now. As for the other great departments, it is clear that Chemistry, and yet more Anatomy, were in the preparatory state of accumulating materials,—important as were the new facts which they amassed, and especially Harvey's discoveries about generation and the circulation of the blood, which imparted so strong a stimulus to physiological observation, though the time was not come for incorporating them with any true biological doctrine.

It is especially noteworthy that this was the time when the positive spirit began to manifest its true social character and its popular influence. The growing disposition of modern society to grant its confidence to doctrines founded on demonstration at the expense of ancient beliefs appears, towards the end of this period, in the universal admission of the double motion of the earth, a century before the papacy solemnly tolerated it. Thus was a new faith growing up amidst the disintegration of the old, partly from the verification of scientific prevision, and partly from the agreement of competent judges; the two in combination being enough for the satisfaction of minds which, from any cause, were inaccessible to direct demonstration. The growth of such habits of conviction proved that the provisional anarchy on social and moral subjects arose from no disposition to perpetual disorder, but merely from the defect of positive doctrine which could command assent. The action of science was certainly more effectual than that of Art in occasioning a wide social agreement: for Art, though operating more strongly and immediately, is restricted by differences of language and manners; whereas, the general and abstract character of scientific conceptions admits of unlimited intellectual communion. At a time when national divergences were still very great, and when the Catholic bond was dissolved, the universities threw open their doors to foreigners, so as to mark the new speculative class as European, and to afford the best testimony to the cosmopolitan character of the scientific spirit. The influence of that spirit on general education began to appear, though the organized scholastic system was perpetuated, as it is to this day, under some accessory modifications which do not affect its spirit. The mathematical order of studies was gaining upon the literary, as it has done ever since; and as it would have done yet more if the official course of modification had followed the general direction of manners and opinions, instead of being bound to keep up, at all cost, the ancient system of education.

During the third phase, the encouragement of Science, as of Art and Industry, became an express duty of government, the neglect of which would have called forth general censure: and at the same time the increasing implication of natural philosophy with military and industrial processes extended the social influence of science, both by the creation of special schools, and by the formation of the intermediate class whose function was to connect theory and practice. The men of science could not yet pretend to the private independence of poets and artists, whose works were of so much more popular a character; but their small number, and their closer co-operation for the public benefit, conferred an almost equal importance on their social existence. Their position was most favourable in the countries which had kept clear of Protestantism, where the old Catholic spirit of contemplation and of generality

was directly united with the boldness and independence of the revolutionary movement. Thus it was in France that the full benefit of royal protection was found, and that science flourished most. In England, the men of science were dependent on private protection, while the exorbitant popular interest in industrial affairs discredited all speculative discovery which did not admit of a direct practical application: and at the same time, the anti-scientific tendencies of Protestantism began to show themselves, not only through the incorporation of Protestantism with the government, in which form they manifested the repugnance of theology to the spread of the positive spirit, but in the mournful individual case of Newton himself, whose old age was darkened by absurd theological vagaries. The exclusive nationality of England was mischievous to science by its active adoption of none but indigenous discoveries. This appears even in regard to the mathematical sciences, universal as they are; for there was a repugnance in England to the common introduction of analytical geometry, which is still too unfamiliar in the English schools, and an analogous prejudice against the employment of purely infinitesimal notations,—so justly preferred everywhere else: and this irrational exclusiveness is all the more repulsive from its contrast with the exaggerated admiration of France for the genius of Newton, for whose sake Descartes was somewhat ungratefully set aside, during the reaction against his Vortex doctrine in favour of the law of gravitation. His merits are even now insufficiently acknowledged, though his genius has never been rivalled but by Newton, Leibnitz, and Lagrange.

The scientific progress during the third phase followed two lines  
*Relations of* in the mathematical province, which remains the  
*Discoveries.* chief. The first relates to the Newtonian principle, and the gradual construction of celestial mechanics, whence were derived the various theories of rational mechanics. The other arose out of the Cartesian revolution, and, by the analytical stimulus given by Leibnitz, occasioned the development of mathematical analysis, and a great generalization and co-ordination of all geometrical and mechanical conceptions. In the first direction, Maclaurin and Clairaut gave us, in relation to the form of the planets, the general theory of the equilibrium of fluids, while Daniel Bernouilli constructed the theory of the tides. In relation to the precession of the equinoxes, D'Alembert and Euler completed the dynamics of solids by forming the difficult theory of the movement of rotation, while D'Alembert founded the analytical system of hydrodynamics, before suggested by Daniel Bernouilli: and Lagrange and Laplace followed with their theory of perturbations. On the other line, Euler was extending mathematical analysis, and regulating its intervention in geometry and mechanics;—an ever-memorable succession of abstract speculations, in which analysis discloses its vast fecundity, without degenerating, as it has done since, into a

misleading verbiage. It was a curious retribution for the narrow nationality of England that, with the exception of Maclaurin, her men of science could take only a secondary part in the systematic elaboration of the Newtonian theory, which was developed and co-ordinated almost exclusively in France, Germany, and lastly, Italy, represented by Lagrange. In Physics, which had just produced barology and optics, there was now a scientific institution of thermology and electrology, which connect it immediately with chemistry. In thermology, Black made his luminous discovery of changes of state; and Franklin popularized electrology, and Coulomb gave it a certain degree of rationality. Pure astronomy had nearly merged in celestial geometry; so that, among many illustrious observers, we have only to notice one great name in this department,—Bradley, whose researches on the aberration of light were certainly the finest contribution to this part of science since Kepler's day.

The chief originality of this phase was owing to the creation of real Chemistry, which underwent a provisional modification very like, in its effects, that of the vortices in relation to celestial mechanics. In this case it was Stahl's conception that fulfilled the provisional office, preceded by Boerhaave's too mechanical attempt, and furthering the more rational course of Bergmann and then of Scheele. Then ensued the experiments of Priestley and Cavendish, preparing the way for the decisive action of Lavoisier, who raised Chemistry to the rank of a true science, intermediate, both as to method and doctrine, between the inorganic and organic philosophy. There was now a preparatory movement even in regard to Biology. There were desultory attempts made under all the three divisions of taxonomy, anatomy, and physiology,—uncombined by any common principle, but disclosing the spirit of each. Linnæus followed Jussieu in the first department; Daubenton was making comparative analyses in the second, to be rationalized by the general views of Vicq-d'Azyr: and Haller and Spallanzani were accumulating material, and carrying on experiments in the third. Buffon, with his synthetic and concrete genius, at the same time pointed out the chief encyclopedical relations of the science of living bodies, and its moral and social importance, which were well illustrated also by Leroy and Bonnet. Nothing definitive could be done in this science, however, while the animal hierarchy was as yet hardly recognized in the dimmest way, and the elementary idea of the vital state was still thoroughly confused and uncertain: but it is necessary to point out the first really scientific elaboration of organic philosophy.

On the whole, this epoch may, I think, be regarded as the best age of scientific speciality, embodied in academies, whose members had not yet lost sight of the fundamental conception of Bacon and Descartes, which considered special

*Stage of  
speciality.*



analysis to be simply a necessary preparation for general synthesis, —always kept in view by the scientific men of this period, however remote its realization might be. The dispersive tendency of labours of detail was as yet restrained by the impulse which induced scientific men, like artists, to aid the great philosophical movement, the anti-theological tendency of which was thoroughly congenial with the scientific instinct; and this adhesion of science to the movement gave it a most serviceable intellectual consistency. The negative philosophy, by its character of generality, repaid provisionally to science the advantage received from it: and the scientific men, like the artists, found in it, besides a social destination which incorporated them with the movement, a kind of temporary substitute for systematic direction. It is the undue protraction of this mental condition in our day which explains the deplorable aversion of both scientific men and artists to all general ideas.

The philosophical progression has always depended on the scientific, from the point of their divergence;—that point being the division in the Greek schools between natural philosophy, which had become metaphysical, and moral philosophy, which remained theological, as we have seen. There was, as I have also shown, a provisional fusion between the two philosophies during the scholastic period of the Middle Ages; and this union remained throughout the first phase of the period we are now surveying; so that we have only the two subsequent phases to review, during which the philosophical movement was more and more separated from the scientific. It is necessary to revert briefly to the latter point of departure, in order to ascertain the true nature of the transitory philosophy which, for the three last centuries, science has been destroying.

Scholasticism had realized the social triumph of the metaphysical spirit, by disguising its organic impotence through its incorporation

*Reason and  
faith.*

*Second phase.*

with the Catholic constitution, the political properties of which rendered an ample equivalent for the intellectual assistance which it provisionally received from the metaphysical philosophy. When this philosophy extended from the inorganic world to Man, implanting its entities in his moral and social nature, monotheistic faith began to be irretrievably perverted by admitting the alliance of reason. No longer resting on a natural universal obedience to a direct and permanent revelation, the faith subjected itself to the protection of demonstrations, which must necessarily admit of permanent controversy, and even of refutation; such as those which, in strange incoherence, were already named Natural Theology. This historical title is a good exponent of the temporary fusion of reason and faith, which could end in nothing but the absorption of faith by reason: it represents the contradictory dualism established between the old notion of God

and the new entity of Nature, which were the respective centres of the theological and metaphysical philosophies. The antagonism of the two conceptions was reconciled for the moment by the intervention of the positive instinct, which offered the hypothesis of a God creating invariable laws, which he bound himself never to alter, and confided to Nature for special and continuous application;—a fiction which is in close analogy with that of politicians about constitutional royalty. This supposition bears a characteristic metaphysical impress; and it made Nature the main object of contemplation and interest, reserving only a barren veneration for the majestic inertia of the supreme divinity, and therefore placing him at a remote distance from thought, which would naturally seek him less and less. Popular good sense never accepted this doctrine, which neutralized all theological ideas of arbitrary will and permanent action; and it is therefore no wonder that popular instinct urged the charge of atheism against so many learned assertors of Natural theology. At the present time, the case is so inverted, that that which was denounced by public reason as impiety is now considered to be religion *par excellence*; and it is laboriously cultivated by demonstrations which I have shown to be one of the chief causes of the mental destruction of monotheism. We thus see, how the scholastic compromise brought about only a thoroughly contradictory situation, which could have no stability, though it was provisionally necessary to scientific progress. The special discussion which best illustrates this general tendency is the controversy of the Realists and the Nominalists, which shows the superiority of medieval metaphysics, with its infusion of the positive spirit, over the ancient form of it. This debate was in fact, under its apparently idle names, the main struggle between the positive spirit and the metaphysical; and its stages mark the gain of the scientific philosophy upon the metaphysical, in the form of the growing triumph of Nominalism over Realism; for it was the very character of metaphysics to personify abstractions which could have a merely nominal existence outside of our intelligence. The Greek schools had certainly never proposed a controversy so lofty, nor one so decisive, either to break up the system of entities, or to suggest the relative nature of true philosophy. However this may be, it is clear that almost immediately after their combined victory over the monotheistic spirit, and therefore over the last remains of the religious system, the positive and the metaphysical spirit began that mutual divergence which could end only in the complete ascendancy of the one over the other. The conflict could not take place immediately; for the metaphysical spirit was busy in supporting the temporal against the spiritual power, while the positive spirit was engaged in amassing astrological and alchemical observations. But when, during the second phase, the metaphysical spirit was enthroned by Protestantism, at the same time that the positive was making discoveries

which were as incompatible with the metaphysical as with the theological system, the state of things was changed. The story of the great astronomical movement of the sixteenth century, and many mournful instances of the fate of scientific men, prove how metaphysics had succeeded, under different forms, to the domination hitherto exercised by theology. But the logical evolution, properly so called, is the one which can be least effectually restrained, aided as it ever is by those who assume to impede it, and undervalued in its scope till it has proved that scope; and the struggle issued therefore, in the early part of the seventeenth century, in the irreversible decline of the system of entities, which was abrogated in regard to the general phenomena of the external world, and virtually therefore in regard to all the rest.

All civilized Europe, except Spain, took part in this vast controversy, which was to decide the future of the human race. Germany had brought on the crisis, in the preceding century, by the Protestant convulsion, and by the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus, Tycho-Brahe, and Kepler: but she was now engrossed by political struggles. But England, France, and Italy each furnished a great warrior in this noble strife,—Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, who will for ever be regarded as the founders of the positive philosophy, because each was aware of its true character, understood its conditions, and foresaw its final supremacy. Galileo's labours, which were purely scientific, wrought in this movement by freely extending science, and not by abstract philosophical precepts. The works of Bacon and

*Bacon and  
Descartes.*

Descartes were alike aimed against the old philosophy, and destined to form the new; and their differences are in remarkable agreement with the nature of each philosopher and with their respective environment. Both showed the necessity of abandoning the old mental system; both set forth the genuine attributes of the new system; and both declared the provisional character of the special analysis which they prescribed as the path of approach to the general synthesis which must hereafter be attained. Agreeing thus far, all else proved the extreme unlikeness between these great philosophers, occasioned by organization, education, and position. Bacon had more natural activity of mind, but less rationality, and in every way less eminence; his education was vague and desultory, and he grew up in an environment essentially practical, in which speculation was subordinated to its application; so that he gave only an imperfect representation of the scientific spirit, which, in his teachings, oscillates between empiricism and metaphysics, and especially with regard to the external world, which is the immutable basis of natural philosophy. Descartes, on the other hand, was as great a geometer as philosopher, and derived positivism from its true source, thus being able to lay down its

sential conditions with firmness and precision. The discourse which he simply narrates his own evolution is an unconscious description of the course of the human mind in general, and it will still be read with profit when Bacon's diffuse elaboration will retain only an historical interest. But, in another aspect, the superiority of Bacon is no less striking,—in the study of Man and society. Descartes constituted the inorganic philosophy as well as the age allowed, and abandoned the moral and social field to the old methods: whereas Bacon aimed chiefly at the renovation of the second half of the philosophical system, which he foresaw to be the ultimate means of regenerating the human race altogether. These differences must be attributed partly to the diversity of their genius, and partly to the opportunity afforded to Descartes by his position of better estimating the revolutionary state of modern Europe. It must be observed that the tendency of the Cartesian school has been to correct the imperfections of its head, whose metaphysics did not rise in honour with his corpuscular theory; whereas, in England and elsewhere, the Baconian school has applied itself to restrict the noble social spirit of its founder, and exaggerate its abstract inconveniences, sinking his conception of observation into a kind of sterile empiricism, such as is always within the reach of patient mediocrity. Thus, when our men of science desire to give a philosophical appearance to their narrow specialities, they appeal to Bacon, and not to Descartes, whose scientific character they depreciate; and yet the precepts of Bacon are quite as hostile as the conceptions of Descartes to pursuits like theirs, which are completely opposed to the common aim of the two great philosophers. Important as were these two schemes, they were not sufficient, even when united, to constitute the positive philosophy. That philosophy had as yet scarcely touched Physics, and had not reached Chemistry; and its extension to moral and social conceptions, which was Bacon's noble aim, was impossible before the advent of biological science. The point of time was remarkable therefore as introducing a new philosophy, and vaguely disclosing the conditions of its development; and all that the two great philosophers proposed was a provisional method, which might render positive all the elements of speculation, in preparation for an ultimate system, which they knew to be unattainable without such preparation. The transitional state of the human mind must therefore endure till Chemistry and Biology should have taken their place among the sciences. Till that should happen, there was really nothing to be done but to modify once more the original separation, decreed by Aristotle and Plato, between natural and moral philosophy, by bringing each of them forward one stage, and thus showing their difference to be more marked than ever; for there is wider difference when natural philosophy is in the positive stage and moral philosophy in the metaphysical stage,

than when one was in the metaphysical and the other in the theological. Descartes saw the state of things more clearly and deeply than Bacon, and he applied himself to the extension of positivity to the utmost limit that could be then ventured, even including in it the intellectual and moral study of animals, under his famous hypothesis of the automatism of brutes, thus leaving to metaphysics only the domain which could not be emancipated from it in those days—the study of Man, moral and social. In doing this, he made useless efforts to invest the last functions of the old philosophy with more rationality than really belonged to an expiring doctrine; and therefore the second part of his work was less adapted to his time, and less successful than the first. Bacon's object being, not the distribution of the sciences, but the regeneration of moral and social science, he did not fall under the same liability; but the impossibility of rendering moral philosophy positive at that time compelled his school to recognize the old division, modified by Descartes, provisionally, though not doctrinally. Any attempt at a premature union could merely have set back everything under metaphysical domination, as we see by the attempts of Malebranche and Leibnitz, who laboured to set up a consistent system,—the one with his monads and the other with his pre-established harmony. Neither of them succeeded, more or less, in effacing the distinction between natural and moral philosophy; and though we now see the really contradictory nature of that division, we also perceive how its temporary admission must have been absolutely necessary, since the genius of a Leibnitz failed to abolish it.

We thus see the first result of the philosophical stimulus imparted by Bacon and Descartes. The positive spirit obtained complete possession of natural philosophy, while the metaphysical spirit was left for awhile in possession of moral philosophy; and thus the reign of entities, which had been universal, was fatally encroached upon. In the intervening period it appears to me that the pursuit of specialities in study has broken up the metaphysical *régime*, thoroughly and finally. The best minds have, with a few exceptions, turned to science; and philosophy, released from the grave, preparatory study, which was once thought necessary, and floating between science and theology, has fallen into the hands of men of letters, who have made use of it for the demolition of the old system, thus concealing for awhile its organic impotence. It cannot be necessary to treat of the varieties of a philosophy which has no adaptation to the needs of the times. It is notorious that it contemplates the abstract action of the human understanding, in one case through the external conditions, and in another through the internal; and that thus two systems, or two modes, have arisen, equally vicious, because alike separating the two indispensable considerations of the medium and the organism, the combination of which furnishes the only sound basis of biological

speculation of any kind. It appears to me that the two errors represent the Catholic and Protestant aspects of the philosophy of Europe: the Catholic metaphysics being more critical, and therefore more tending to the positive, and to the consideration of the external world; whereas, the Protestant metaphysics, incorporated with the governments, and tending to the theological state, must naturally take its stand in Man, and proceed thence to the study of the universe. In England however the school of Hobbes formed a memorable exception to this. This transitory school, represented by Locke, undertook, under the Baconian instigation, a direct regeneration of moral and social study, and began by a radical criticism, which was therefore of an Aristotelian character, and must be developed and propagated in another direction.

Before I go on to the next phase, I ought to point out that some preparation for the renovation of political philosophy *Political philosophy.* was already made by Hobbes and Bossuet. Machiavel had before made some able partial attempts to connect the explanation of certain political phenomena with purely natural causes, though he spoiled his work by a thoroughly vicious estimate of modern society, which he could never sufficiently distinguish from the ancient. Hobbes's famous view of primitive war and the supposed reign of force has been usually misunderstood; but, impartially considered, it will be granted to be a striking primitive view, statical and dynamical, of the preponderance of temporal influences among permanent social conditions, taken as a whole; and also, of the necessarily martial condition of primitive society. This was a sound view introduced in the midst of fantastic hypotheses about the state of nature and the social contract; and it was valuable accordingly. Bossuet's share in the work of preparation is more obvious and less disputed. I have before pointed out the value of his historical survey, where, for the first time, political phenomena are regarded as subject to invariable laws, which, by rational treatment, may be made to determine each other. The theological principle which prevails in this work impairs this very enlightened conception, but cannot altogether disguise its importance, nor intercept its beneficial influence on the historical studies of the ensuing period. It was the last great inspiration of Catholicism, which, as we have seen, was much more adapted than the negative philosophy to form an estimate of human progress, which indeed the negative philosophy could not justly appreciate at all. The nature of Bossuet's great service appears in its destination; which was to propose systematic history as the necessary basis of political education.

The third phase of the period was, in this case again, simply a prolongation of the second. The Scotch school *Third phase.* appears here favourably circumstanced in regard to Morals, by the speculative independence which it enjoyed, both as

being Presbyterian in the midst of Anglicanism, and as having no sympathy of principle with either side of the controversy on external and internal conditions of mental development. The *The Scotch School.* value of this school was solely in the merit of its individual thinkers, who had no systematic connection with each other. In an intellectual view, Hume, one of the chiefs of the illustrious group, treated of the theory of causation with great originality and boldness, but with the imperfection inseparable from a sundering of philosophy from science. He here proposed the true character of positive conceptions; and notwithstanding its serious defects, this work appears to me to be the only great step that the human mind has taken towards understanding the relative character of sound philosophy, since the great controversy between the Realists and the Nominalists. In this connection I must point out again the able survey, by Adam Smith, of the history of the sciences, and of astronomy particularly, in which he perhaps approaches even nearer than his friend Hume to the true sense of rational positivity. It gratifies me to record here my special gratitude to these two eminent thinkers, whose influence was very useful to my early philosophical education, before I discovered the great law which necessarily guided it from that time forward.

Political philosophy made a great advance during the last *Political philosophy.* century, inasmuch as social development became more and more the express object of historical treatment. The process was defective, of course, from the absence of all theory of evolution, by which alone any scientific dignity can be given to works which, without it, remain essentially literary. One class of students were at work whose labours have obtained too little credit,—the scholars who employed themselves during the second phase as well as the third in elucidating separate points of history by antiquarian and literary research. These labours are, in regard to positive sociology, analogous to those which at a former time accumulated provisional material for the future formation of chemistry and biology; and it is only by means of the lights thus afforded that sociology can begin to rise out of that preparatory state through which every science has passed on its way to its station in systematic positivism.

The one great conception which belongs to this third phase is *Idea of Progression.* that of human progress, as an express view. It could only arise from the scientific evolution as a whole; for the idea of true progression could no otherwise be so clearly conveyed as by the succession of terms through an unquestionable filiation. Pascal, who first expressed the philosophical conception of human progress in the maxim which I quoted before, certainly derived it from the general history of the mathematical sciences. The innovation however could not produce any effect while only one kind of evolution was studied; for two are required

for generalization on the simplest subjects of speculation; and then a third case is indispensable to confirm the prior comparison. The first condition was fulfilled through the evident conformity between scientific and industrial progression; but no third case was ready: for the spirit of the times caused a strange misjudgment of the merit of the æsthetic movement, which was supposed to be retrograde when it was much otherwise. From a comparison of modern with ancient Art, the discussion extended to other social aspects, and the result was that, though the original question remained doubtful, the idea of human progress, sustained by the universal instinct of modern civilization, was established as systematically as it could be before the clearing up of the apparent anomaly of the Middle Ages, —a difficulty which I may hope to have now removed. Political Economy afforded an indirect aid towards the close of the period, by fixing general attention on the industrial life of modern society, and by marking out the temporal differences between our civilization and that of the ancients, which again favoured a political understanding of the intermediate social state, according to the logical rule that a mean condition can be judged of only from a comparison of the extremes. We have seen the result in the enterprises of Turgot, Condorcet, and Montesquieu, whose merits and imperfections I pointed out in the first chapter of this volume.

At the close of our review of philosophical progress, from its origin in the Middle Ages to the beginning of the great French crisis, we cannot but see that, in the aggregate, made up as it is of a mass of remains, with a few rare and desultory materials of value, it is a merely preliminary affair, which can issue only in a direct institution of human regeneration. Though this conclusion has resulted from each of the several kinds of progress that I have treated of, its vast importance compels me to educe it again from their general approximation, by pointing out the chasms which remain to be filled, and which are common to and characteristic of them all.

In each kind of progression, pursued without a sense of its connection with the whole, an instinct of speciality must prevail, exalting the spirit of detail, at the expense of a more general view. This partial and desultory development was obviously the only one possible at a time when all systematic views related to a system which must pass away, and when it was only in such special pursuit that the new forces could manifest their character and tendency. Such a course, however inevitable, could not but produce the anti-social dispositions proper to those preparatory progressions, out of which the elements of future combinations could arise only very gradually,—not having even yet attained any real association. This dispersive empiricism did not come to an end when its destination was fulfilled; and it is now the great obstacle in the way of final regeneration. It insists that neither

*Gaps to be  
supplied.*

*In Industry.*



industry, nor art, nor science, nor philosophy itself requires or admits of any systematic organization in our modern social state; so that their respective progress must be left, even more than ever, to special instinct in each case. Now, the most complete exposure of the radical vice of this conception will be found in the proof that each of these four kinds of progress has been more and more impeded by the increase of the primitive empiricism.

With regard to Industry, first, by which modern society is constituted,—there is no case in which there has been stronger opposition to organization,—the doctrines of political economy having been constructed under metaphysical and negative influences.—We have seen that industrial progression was at first concentrated in the towns; and thus the main element, the agricultural, was left so far behind that it adhered more than all others to the ancient organization. We have even seen that, where feudal repression was insufficient, the opposite course of town and country industry often occasioned direct collision. This is the first case in which we recognize the need of a systematic action, bringing into a homogeneous state the elements which must thus be hereafter combined.—Again, if we observe only town industry, we see that, owing to the spread of individualism and speciality, the moral development is far in the rear of the material, though we should suppose that the more Man acquires new means of action, the more moral control is requisite at the same time, that he may not use his new powers to the injury of himself or society. As the whole industrial province lay outside of religious regulation, never having been contemplated in the theological scheme, it was tacitly abandoned to the antagonism of private interests, except that some vague general maxims were preached that there was no power to enforce. Industrial society was thus destitute, from its modern beginning, of all systematic morality which could regulate its various common relations. Among the innumerable connections of producers and consumers, and among the different industrial classes, especially capitalists and labourers, it seems agreed that the spirit of recent emancipation shall be preserved, unimproved,—every one seeking his own interest, without any consciousness of a public function: and this is the state of things to which the economists have given their sanction, in dogmatic form.—Again, the blind empiricism under which the industrial movement has gone on has raised up internal difficulties which can be got rid of in no other way than by a systematic management of the industrial province. The characteristic of modern industry is its improving to the utmost every inorganic agent, leaving to Man little but the intellectual action of directing the apparatus. We have seen how the use of machines followed naturally upon the personal emancipation of labourers; and it is evident that this action upon external nature, under the guidance of science, must tend to elevate not only the condition but the character of Man. But,

whatever may be the effects of the great change when it is completely wrought out, it occasions a serious difficulty meantime which must be solved before the industrial movement can fully benefit society. The haphazard extension of the use of mechanical agents is directly hostile, in many cases, to the legitimate interests of the most numerous class; and the collisions and complaints thence arising grow more and more serious, and will continue to do so while industrial relations are committed to a mere physical antagonism. I am speaking not only of the use of machinery, but of every kind of improvement in industrial processes. Every accession of the kind diminishes the number of labourers required, and occasions more or less disturbance in the life of the working classes. This mischief is a consequence of the specializing practice hitherto inherent in modern industry, which has never risen to any comprehensiveness of view, or therefore to any such foresight as might guard society from preventible evils, and help it to bear such as are inevitable.

These three kinds of evidence of the serious deficiencies in the industrial evolution concur in yielding a mournful closing observation on the remarkable disproportion between this particular development and the corresponding improvement in the condition of Mankind on the whole. Mr Hallam has proved that the wages of labour are sensibly inferior, in comparison with the prices of necessaries, to what they were in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,—this state of things being explained by many influences,—such as the spread of immoderate luxury, the increasing use of machinery, the progressive condensation of the working class, etc. While the poorest labourers obtain conveniences unknown to their ancestors, the ancestors probably obtained, in the early phases of the period, a more complete satisfaction of their main physical wants. The nearer relation of the employed to the employer must, in those days, have secured to the working classes a higher moral existence, in which their rights and their duties must have been better understood and admitted than now, when they are at the mercy of the selfishness which results from a dispersive empiricism. The more we look into this matter, the more we shall see that all interests concur in requiring that organization which historical analysis foreshows. The speculative anticipation of it is no philosophical fancy, but rests on a strong popular instinct, which will make itself listened to wherever it shall find rational organs of expression. The industrial evolution has been thus far only preparatory, introducing valuable elements of genuine and permanent order, and now awaiting the reorganization which will perfect it. As for Art, it is at present adrift from the old *régime*: it has neither general direction nor social destination: it is weary of the idle reproduction of its negative function under the third phase that we have surveyed;

*In Art.*

and it is impatiently awaiting the organic stimulus which will at once renew its vitality, and disclose its social attributes. Till then, it merely works so far as to keep its own high order of faculties from atrophy and oblivion.—I need not point out the nothingness into which Philosophy has fallen, in consequence of its irrational isolation. It requires a kind of mental activity whose very characteristic is comprehensiveness; and it is therefore deteriorated in proportion as it is condemned to separate specialities; and particularly when the subject is one which is naturally inseparable from the general system of human knowledge.—We saw, in the preceding volume, how injurious the system of special pursuit has been in every department of Science.

*In Philosophy.*

We saw that the mischief was more obvious in proportion to the advancement of the science, and, above all, in the inorganic province: and that the most perfect of the whole range is by no means exempt, as yet, from the lamentable influence of isolation and special pursuit. If all the evils which we now recognize from this cause were not fully developed at the close of the period under notice, they were impending: and it was therefore desirable to recall them here to the memory of my readers, in order to show that the scientific movement requires, like all the rest, the systematic direction now become essential to its speculative progress and its social influence. In the next chapter I shall exhibit more in detail the dangers which arise from the philosophical anarchy of our time. As I am now particularizing the chasms in our science and deficiencies in our practice, I may point out that, during the third phase, biological science was still so immature that there could be no social action of the positive philosophy, to which biological preparation is more essential than any other.

*In Science.*

Thus, then, we have seen how, all over Western Europe, the new elements of society were rising up from amidst the dissolution of the old: and how the dispersive tendency which was once necessary to positive progression has of late impaired the spirit of comprehensiveness in the advancing classes, while the negative philosophy destroyed it in the powers that were on the decline. We find ourselves therefore living at a period of confusion, without any general view of the past, or sound appreciation of the future, to enlighten us for the crisis prepared by the whole progress yet achieved. We find ourselves, after half a century of tentative confusion, oscillating between an invincible aversion to the old system and a vague impulsion towards some kind of reorganization. The next chapter will show the fitness of the new political philosophy to give a wise systematic direction to this great movement.

*Existing needs.*

## CHAPTER XII.

REVIEW OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS.—ASCERTAINMENT OF THE  
FINAL TENDENCY OF MODERN SOCIETY.

THE two progressions which were preparing society for its regeneration had advanced at unequal rates,—the negative having far outstripped the positive; and thus the need of reorganization was vehemently felt before the method and the means of affecting it were disclosed. This is the true explanation of the vicious course taken by the revolutionary movement to this day. The explosion which ensued, lamentable as it was in many ways, was inevitable; and, besides being inevitable, it was salutary,—inasmuch as without it the caducity of the old system could not have been fully revealed, nor all hopes from it have been intrepidly cast away. The crisis proclaimed to all advanced peoples the approach of the regeneration which had been preparing for five centuries; and it afforded the solemn experiment which was necessary to show the powerlessness of critical principles to do anything but destroy. The preparation of the different European nations for the lesson varied, according as the monarchical and Catholic, or the aristocratic and Protestant form of power was established. We have seen that the former was the more favourable to the decay of the old system and the construction of the new; and for various reasons, France was evidently the country to take the lead. The humiliation of the aristocracy had more radically destroyed the old *régime*: the people had passed at once from Catholicism to free thought, thus escaping the dangerous inertia of Protestantism: industrial activity was more distinct and elevated, though less developed than in England, from its great independence of the aristocracy: in Art, the French were in advance of the English, though far behind the Italians; in science, they were foremost; and even in philosophy, they were more thoroughly freed than others from the old system, and nearer to a rational philosophy, exempt from English empiricism and German mysticism. Thus, on both positive and negative grounds, France was clearly destined to lead the final revolutionary movement. Not the less for this were all the other nations interested and impli-

cated in her movement,—as in former cases when Italy, Spain, Germany, Holland, and England had in turn been foremost: and the deep and general sympathy felt in all those countries on the outbreak of the French Revolution, and lasting through the terrible extravagances which ensued, showed that there was a true universality in the movement.

The convulsion had indeed been clearly foreseen by eminent thinkers for above a century, and had been emphatically announced by three events, unequal, in importance, but alike significant in this relation;—first, by the abolition of the Order of the Jesuits, which proved the decrepitude of the system which thus destroyed the only agency that could retard its decay; next, by the great reformatory enterprise of Turgot, the failure of which disclosed the necessity of deeper and wider reforms; and thirdly, by the American revolution, which elicited the real expectation of the French nation, and therefore its needs. That revolution was regarded as a crisis in which the whole civilized world had a direct interest: and when it is said that France gained much by that event, it should be understood that the benefit to her was simply in the opportunity afforded for the manifestation of her impulses and tendencies; and that she gave more than she received by planting down among a people benumbed by Protestantism, the germs of a future philosophical emancipation.—While all indications thus pointed to a regeneration, there was no doctrine by which to effect it. All negative doctrine and action could be no more than a preparation for it; and yet a negative doctrine was all that then existed. From the attempt to render it organic, nothing ensued but a distribution, or limitation, or displacement of the old authorities, such as merely impeded action by supposing that restrictions could solve political difficulties as they arose. Then was the season of constitution-making, of which I have spoken before,—the application of metaphysical principles, which fully exposed their organic helplessness. Then was the triumph of the metaphysicians and legists, the degenerate successors of the doctors and judges, and the inadequate managers of society, of whose mischievous intervention I have also spoken before. Thus we see what was the necessary direction of the revolutionary crisis, its principal seat, and its special agents. We must now examine its course; and, for that purpose, divide it into its two distinct stages.

At the outset there was naturally some hope of preserving, under some form, more or less of the old system, reduced to its principles, and purified from its abuses. This was a low state of things, involving a confusion of moral and political authority, and of things permanent with things temporary; so that the provisional position was mistaken for a definitive one. The first effort of the French Revolu-

*First stage.*  
*The Constitu-*  
*ent Assembly.*

tion could be no other than a rising of the popular against the royal power, as all the elements of the old system were concentrated in royalty; yet the abolition of royalty was not contemplated, but a constitutional union of the monarchical principle with popular ascendancy; and again, of the Catholic constitution with philosophical emancipation. There is no need to dwell on speculations so desultory, nor to point out that they arose from a desire to imitate England, which affords too exceptional a case to admit of imitation. It was supposed that because the negative course of the one country had answered to that of the other, so that England had humbled one of the temporal elements and France the other, they might, by joining forces, destroy the old system altogether. It was for this reason that French reformers turned to England for a pattern for their new work; and again, that the French method is now in favour in the English revolutionary school; each having the qualities that are wanting in the other. But there is, as I showed before, no true equivalence in those qualities; and, if the imitation could have been carried out, it would have been found that the French movement was directed against exactly that political element which gives its special character to the English movement, and which prevents its transplantation to any other soil. It is a mistake to trace back the political constitution of England to the old Saxon forests, and to suppose that it depends on the fanciful balance of powers. It was determined, like every other institution, by the corresponding social state; and if this were thoroughly analysed, the relations of the English polity would be found very different from what is usually supposed. The most analogous political case is, in fact, that of Venice, at the end of the fourteenth century. The tendency to aristocratic rule is the ground of resemblance. The differences are, that the preponderance of the aristocratic power was more complete in Venice,—that the independence of Venice must disappear under the decline of its special government, whereas that of England may remain uninjured by any dislocation of her provisional constitution,—that English Protestantism secures the subordination of the spiritual power much more effectually than the kind of Catholicism proper to Venice, and is therefore favourable to the prolongation of aristocratic power; and again, that the insular position of England, and her consequent national self-engrossment, connect the interests of all classes with the maintenance of a polity, by which the aristocracy are a sort of guarantee of the common welfare. A similar tendency was apparent in Venice, but with less strength and permanence. It is clear that the continuance of the English polity is due, not to any supposed balance of constitutional powers, but to the natural preponderance of the aristocratic element, and to the union of conditions which are all indispensable, and not to be found in combination in any other case. We thus see how irrational were the speculations

which led the leaders of the Constituent Assembly to propose, as the aim of the French Revolution, a mere imitation of a system as contradictory to the whole of their past history as repugnant to the instincts arising from the actual social state; yet the imitation was meditated and attempted in all leading particulars, and, of course, with thorough failure;—a failure which exhibits the most striking contrast on record of the eternity of speculative hopes and the fragility of actual creations. When the second period

*Second stage.  
The National  
Convention.*

of the Revolution was entered upon, the National Convention discarded the political fictions on which the Constituent Assembly had acted, and considered the abolition of royalty an indispensable introduction to social regeneration. In the concentrated form of royalty then existing, any adhesion to it involved the restoration of the old elements which had supported it. Royalty was the last remnant of the system of Caste, the decay of which we have traced from the time that Catholicism broke it up, and left only hereditary monarchy to represent it. Already doomed by that isolation, hereditary monarchy could not but suffer serious injury by the excessive concentration of functions and prerogatives, spiritual and temporal, which obscured its view of its domain, and tempted it to devolve its chief powers on ministers who became less and less dependent. Again, the growing enlightenment of mankind in social matters made the art of ruling less and less one which might be learned in the hereditary way,—by domestic imitation; and the systematic training requisite for it was open to capacity, full as much, to say the least, as to royal birth, which before had naturally monopolized it.

The abolition of royalty was presently followed by that of whatever might interfere with a renovation of the social system. The first instance that presents itself is the audacious legal suppression of Christianity, which proved at once the decrepitude of a system that had become alien to modern existence, and the necessity of a new spiritual function for the guidance of the regeneration. The minor acts of the same kind were the destruction of all former corporate bodies, which is too commonly attributed to a dislike to all aggregation, but which is rather to be referred to a dim sense that there was a retrograde character about all such bodies, their provisional office being by this time fulfilled. I think this applies even to the suppression of learned societies, not excepting the Academy itself, the only one deserving of serious regret; and before this time its influence had become, on the whole, more injurious than favourable to the progress of knowledge, as it is at this day. It should be remembered that the Assembly, largely composed of legists, suppressed the law corporations with others: and that it showed its solicitude for the encouragement of real science by establishing various foundations, and especially by that of the Polytechnic School, which was of a far higher order than any of its predecessors.

These are proofs of disinterestedness and of forecast in regard to social needs which should not be forgotten.

A practical character of universality was given to the Revolution by the alliance of European Governments to put it down. During the second phase of social progress *Alliance of foes.* the powers of Europe had allowed Charles I. to fall without any serious effort on his behalf; but they were now abundantly ready to go forth against a revolution of which the French outbreak was evidently only the beginning. Even the English oligarchy, which had no great apparent interest in the preservation of monarchies, put themselves at the head of the coalition, which was to make a last stand for the preservation of the theological and military system. This attack was favourable to the Revolution in its second period, by compelling France to proclaim the universality of her cause, and by calling out an agreement of sentiment, and even of political views, such as was required for the success of the noblest national defence that history will ever have to exhibit. It was this also which sustained the moral energy and mental rectitude which will always place the National Convention far above the Constituent Assembly in the estimate of posterity, notwithstanding the vices inherent in both their doctrine and their situation. They wonderfully soon escaped from metaphysical toils, respectfully adjourned a useless constitution, and rose to the conception of a revolutionary government, properly so called, regarding it as the provisional resource which the times required. Putting away the ambition of founding eternal institutions which could have no genuine basis, they went to work to organize provisionally a temporal dictatorship equivalent to that gradually wrought out by Louis XI. and Richelieu, but much more responsive to the spirit of the time and the end proposed. Based on popular power, declaratory of the end proposed, animating to the social affections and to popular self-respect, and favourable to the most general and therefore the deepest and highest social interests, this political action of the Convention, supported and recompensed by sublime and touching devotedness, and elevating the moral temper of a people whom successive governments have seduced into abject selfishness, has left ineffaceable impressions and deep regrets in the mind of France, which can never be softened but by the permanent satisfaction of the corresponding instinct. The more this great crisis is studied, the more evident it is that its noble qualities are ascribable to the political and moral worth of its chief directors, and of the people who supported it so devotedly; while the serious errors which attended it were inseparable from the vicious philosophy with which it was implicated. That philosophy, by its very nature, represented society to be wholly unconnected with past events and their changes, destitute of rational instigation, and indefinitely delivered over to the arbitrary action of the legislator. It passed



over all the intervening centuries to select a retrograde and contradictory type in the ancient form of civilization, and then, in the midst of the most exasperating circumstances, appealed to the passions to fulfil the offices of the reason. Such was the system under which the political conceptions of the time must be formed, if formed at all; and the contrast between the action and the philosophy of that day will for ever excite the admiration of philosophers on behalf of the noble results that we reproduced, and their indulgence for such extravagances as were worthy of reprobation.

The proper close of that provisional polity would have been when France was sufficiently secured against foreign invasion; but the irritations of the time and the vices of the negative philosophy caused its protraction, under an increasing intensity; and hence the horrible vagaries by which the period is too exclusively remembered. Now appeared the difference between the schools of Voltaire and Rousseau, which had co-operated during the great revolutionary crisis. The school of Voltaire, progressive in its way, regarded the republican dictatorship as an indispensable transition stage, which it took the chief credit of having instituted, and always supposed the philosophy which directed it to the merely negative: whereas, the school of Rousseau, retrograde in its way, took the doctrine for the basis of a direct reorganization, which it desired to substitute for the exceptional system. The one showed a genuine though confused sense of the conditions of modern civilization, while the other was bent on an imitation of ancient society. The latter school prevailed, when it became a practical question what the philosophy could do in the way of organization; and when the political school had the field to itself, and proceeded to action, it proved how the metaphysical philosophy, disguised as antique civilization, was absolutely hostile to the essential elements of modern civilization. When the negative progression was used for organic purposes, it turned against the positive progression, injuring the scientific and æsthetic evolutions, and threatening the total disorganization of the industrial, by destroying the subordination of the working classes to their industrial leaders, and calling the incapable multitude to assist directly in the work of government.

Thus we see what the course really was, as a whole, which is usually rendered unintelligible by attempts to ignore one or another of its parts. The republican period proposed a substantive political plan, in a much more complete and energetic way than its constitutional predecessor had done; and that programme, which abides in all memories, will indicate, till the day of realization arrives, the final destination of the crisis, notwithstanding the failure of the experiment, through the defects of the means. All criticism and reproach about the failure can attach only to the instruments which caused it, and can never gainsay the fundamental need of reorgan-

ization, which was as keenly felt by the masses then as at this day. There cannot be a stronger confirmation of this than the remarkable slowness of a retrograde movement which was instinctively felt to be incompatible with the popular state of mind, and which found it necessary to make long and irksome political circuits to restore, under an imperial disguise, a monarchy which a single shock had sufficed to overthrow : if indeed we can speak of royalty as having been re-established at all, while it could not pass peaceably from kings to their natural successors, and had virtually lost the hereditary quality which distinguishes genuine royalty from dictatorship.

When the rule of the Convention was over, the retrograde action made itself felt first by reverting to the last preceding step,—the constitutional notion. It attempted a *Constitutional attempt.* blind imitation of the English, by parcelling out and balancing the fractional parts of the temporal power, as if any stability was really to be looked for in a political anomaly so imported. The party which intended to be progressive was carrying forward the negative movement, so as to dissolve the most elementary institutions of society. Both proceeded on the supposition that society was entirely at their disposal, unconnected with the past, and impelled by no inherent instigation ; and they agreed in subjecting moral regeneration to legislative rules ;—much as they continue to do at this day. Such political fluctuation, endangering order, and doing nothing for progress, could have no other issue than in Monarchy. This last test was necessary to prove what kind of order was really compatible with complete retrogradation ; a point which could never be settled but by experiment. The issue was hastened by the growth of the military power,—the revolutionary war having ceased to be defensive, and become eminently offensive, under the specious temptation of propagating the movement. While the army remained at home under civic influences, the *Military ascendancy.* preponderance of the civil over the military power had been more conspicuous than in any known case of military activity : but when the army was in remote places, uninformed of national affairs, it assumed a new independence and consistency, became compacted with its leaders, and less and less civic in its temper as it was needed for the repression of the barren social agitation of the time. A military dictatorship was the unavoidable consequence ; and whether its tendency should be progressive or retrograde depended, more than in any other case on record, on the personal disposition of that one of the great revolutionary generals who should assume the post. The great Hoche seemed at first to be happily destined for it ; but by a fatality to be eternally deplored, the honour fell upon a man who was almost a *Napoleon Bonaparte.* foreigner in France, brought up amidst a backward civilization, and remarkably and superstitiously adoring the ancient

social hierarchy; at the same time that his enormous ambition was no sign, notwithstanding his prodigious charlatanism, of any eminent mental superiority, except a genius for war, much more connected, in our times, with moral energy than with intellectual vigour. The whole nature of Napoleon Bonaparte was incompatible with political ability; with any conception of social progression; with the mere idea of an irrevocable extinction of the old theological and military system, outside of which he could conceive of nothing, and whose spirit and conditions he yet failed to understand: as he showed by many serious inconsistencies in the general course of his retrograde policy, and especially in regard to the religious restoration, in which he followed the tendencies of the populace of kings.

The continuous development of military activity was the foundation, necessary at any cost, of this disastrous domination. To set up for awhile a system thoroughly repugnant to social conditions, it was necessary to enlist and humour, by perpetual stimulation, all the general vices of mankind, and all the special imperfections of the national character; and, above all, an excessive vanity, which, instead of being carefully regulated by wise opposition, was directly excited to something like madness, by means derived, like all the rest of the system, from the most discredited customs of the ancient monarchy. Nothing but active warfare could have intercepted the effect of the ridicule which could not but be excited by attempts so ill-suited to the age as Bonaparte's restoration of a nobility and a priesthood. In no other way could France have been oppressed so long and so shamefully. In no other way could the army have been seduced into forgetfulness of its patriotism, and tyranny towards the citizens, who must henceforth console themselves under oppression and misery with the childish satisfaction of seeing the French empire extend from Hamburg to Rome. The Convention had raised the people to a true sense of brotherhood through the medium of self-respect, equally fostered in all: Bonaparte perverted the sentiment into immorality by offering, as a reward for popular co-operation, the oppression and pillage of Europe. But it is needless to dwell on this desolate period, except for the purpose of deriving from it such dearly-bought political instruction as it may yield. The first lesson is, that there is no security against fatal political versatility but genuine political doctrine. The retrograde policy of Bonaparte would have had neither allies nor support, if the people had been saved from the experience of the last part of the revolutionary crisis, and from the demoralizing influence of a negative philosophy, which left them open to the temptation of return to a system which their strong repugnance had so lately overthrown. The second lesson is of the necessity of active and permanent warfare as the foundation of a retrograde system, which could in no other way obtain any temporary consistence: and this condemns as chimerical and disturbing

a policy which depends on a condition incompatible with modern civilization as a whole. It is true, the revolutionary warfare was defended as the necessary means of propagating revolutionary benefits: but the result is a sufficient reply to the sophism. The propagation was of oppression and pillage, for the sake of enthroning a foreign family: and the action upon other nations was very unlike that proposed by the first sincere soldiers of the Revolution: while, in Paris, the leaders of the regeneration of the world were ignominiously beguiling their characteristic activity with the rivalries of actors and versifiers, Cadiz, Berlin, and even Vienna were echoing with patriotic songs and acclamations,—generous national insurrections having once more bound together the peoples and their rulers, and popular rights and regenerative action being covered with disgrace as deep as the silence in which the revolutionary hymns of France were buried. France was then subjected to a dislike and fear which have never since ceased to injure her name, and the cause which is bound up with it.

This system, founded on war, fell by a natural consequence of the war, when the resistance had become popular and the attack despotic. There can be no doubt in any impartial mind that the fall of Bonaparte was very welcome to the French nation in general, which, besides its sufferings from oppression and poverty, was weary of a state of perpetual fear of the only alternative,—the humiliation of its arms or the defeat of its dearest principles. The only cause of regret is that the nation did not anticipate the catastrophe by popular insurrection against retrograde tyranny, before its country underwent the disgrace of invasion. The humiliating form of the overthrow is the only pretence on which the national glory can be connected with the memory of the man who, more injurious to humankind than any other personage in history, was always and peculiarly the worst enemy of a revolution of which he is sometimes absurdly supposed to be the chief representative. The monarchical spirit which he had striven to restore, and the political habits formed under his influence facilitated the return, when he fell, of the natural heirs of the French throne. They were received without confidence, without fear, and with some hopes from the discipline they had undergone which were not fulfilled. The people supposed they must see, as all France did, the connection between conquest and retrogradation, and that both were detested: and the Bourbons supposed that the people, having allowed their restoration, were favourable to their ideas of sovereignty. The people would have left royalty to such fate as might have ensued from domestic dissensions; if the disastrous episodic return of Bonaparte had not once more united all Europe against France, and deferred for fifteen years, at a heavy cost, a substitution of rulers which had clearly become inevitable.

*Restoration  
of the Bour-  
bons.*

Once more constitutional discussions abounded, and a third

attempt was made to imitate the English parliamentary system,—the remains of the imperial system seeming likely to answer for the aristocratic element. The people, however, had long been disheartened about social regeneration, and were bent on profiting by the state of peace for the furtherance of industrial interests: and, for want of a sound theory, the new experiment, more durable, more peaceable, and therefore more decisive than any former one, soon disclosed the anti-historical and anti-national character of the enterprise, and its total disagreement with the social environment. In England, the royal power was a great sinecure granted to the nominal head of the British oligarchy, with the name of hereditary sovereignty, but with little more real power than that of the Doges of Venice. This was not the French notion of monarchy; and any attempt to imitate it in France could lead to nothing but a neutralizing of royalty; and the more decisively in this case, because, under the new forms, the adhesion of the sovereign was made specially voluntary. This is the juncture to which, in the history of the modern transition, we must refer the direct dissolution of the great temporal dictatorship in which the whole movement of decomposition had been concentrated, from the time when Louis XI. wrought at it, and Richelieu completed it. The form of dissolution now was—opposition between the central and local powers,—between imperfect royalty and the partial action of a popular assembly; under which all unity of direction disappeared, and each party sought a preponderance which was impossible to either. Bonaparte himself would have had to encounter a similar liability, sooner or later. The ministerial power also testified by its growth to the restriction of royalty. It had been, under the second modern phase, an optional emanation of power: it was now an established substitution, tending more and more to independence. This sort of spontaneous abdication helped the political dispersion, which seemed to be thereby erected into an irrevocable principle. The two polities were now in something like the same position that they were in before the revolution: only that the progressive school had avowed their end and proved the insufficiency of their means: and the retrograde party understood rather better the conditions of the *régime* it desired to restore. Now was the time for the stationary school to intervene, borrowing from each of the others the principles which can only neutralize each other; as, for instance and especially, when it sought to reconcile the legal supremacy of Catholicism with real religious liberty. I have shown before what are the moral and political consequences of such an intervention. As soon

*Fall of the* as the hopeless reaction appeared to threaten the  
*Bourbons.* revolutionary movement, it fell by a single shock; an event which might convince doubters that the fall of Bonaparte was owing to something more than the desire for peace,—to the aversion inspired by his tyrannical retrogression. It was now clear

that order and peace would not satisfy the nation, which must have progress also.

The great characteristic of the policy which succeeded the flight of the elder Bourbons was its implicit voluntary renunciation of regular intellectual and moral government, in any form. Having become directly material, the policy held itself aloof from doctrines and sentiments, and concerned itself only with interests, properly so called. This was owing, not only to disgust and perplexity amidst the chaos of conceptions, but to *The next reign.* the increasing difficulty of maintaining material order in the midst of mental and moral anarchy; a difficulty which left no leisure or liberty to government to think of anything beyond the immediate embarrassment, or to provide for anything higher than its own existence. This was the complete political fulfilment of the negative philosophy, all functions of government being simply repressive, unconnected with any idea of guidance, and leaving all active pursuit of intellectual and moral regeneration to private co-operation. A system of organized corruption was the necessary consequence, as the whole structure must otherwise be liable to fall to pieces at any moment, under the attacks of uncontrolled ambition. Hence the perpetual increase of public expenditure, as an indispensable condition of a system boasted of for its economy.—While closing my elucidation of the decay of the great temporal dictatorship, I must just observe on the novelty of the situation of a central power to which we may hardly apply the term royal, as all monarchical associations had vanished with the political faith that sanctioned them, and whose hereditary transmission appears extremely improbable,\* considering the course of events for half a century past, and the impossibility that the function should ever degenerate into the mere sinecure that it is in England; a condition which requires that genuine personal capacity which rarely descends from father to son. Meantime the encroachments of the legislature on the so-called royal power,—the forcing of its organs upon it, without liberty of choice, so that the action of government is in reality transferred to any one who may for the moment be in a position of parliamentary ascendancy,—the independence of the ministers who might presently determine the abstraction of the royal element altogether,—these dangers would render the royal function a totally impracticable one if it were not administered with personal ability, confined to the maintenance of public order, and so vigilant and concentrated as to have the advantage over the desultory and contradictory ambition of men who are appeased by new distributions of power and frequent personal changes. In this provisional state of affairs, when the official system declines the spiritual reorganization for which it feels its own unfitness, the intellectual and moral authority falls into the hands of anybody who will accept it, with-

\* Published in 1842.

out any security of personal aptitude in regard to the most important and difficult problems that have ever engaged or can engage human thought: hence the reign of journalism, in the hands of literary men and lawyers, and the hopeless anarchy which some of them propose and all of them, in their collective capacity, illustrate. The power actually possessed by this illegal social authority appears to me a kind of imperfect recognition of the proper priority of intellectual and moral regeneration over mere political experiment, the efficacy of which is wholly exhausted as long as it is separated from the philosophical guidance of the higher renovating agency.

The actual results of this last period consist of the extension of the crisis to the whole of the great European community, of which France is merely the vanguard. *Extension of the movement.* The germs of progress could not but be checked everywhere while it appeared that they failed in France; and the propagation of the movement was resumed only when the cause of the failure in France was made apparent. The imitation of the English type was never carried very far; for Catholic nations observed its effect in France; and even in Germany, where the aristocratic element is least reduced, no substantial experiment was tried, while the spectacle was before the world of the revolutionary excitement penetrating the British organization itself. There was no encouragement to transplant a system whose type was attacked at home. The negative doctrine presided over political movement everywhere; but it was nowhere so put to the trial as in France; and thus its radical impotence was universally manifest, without the need of any other nation undergoing the dreadful experience which had been endured by the French people for the benefit of all others. I observe lastly, that the common movement is rendered secure by this decisive extension. The French revolutionary defence first guaranteed its safety; and it now rests upon the impossibility of any serious retrograde repression, which must be universal to be of any effect; and which cannot be universal, because the nations will never again be seriously stirred up against any one of their number, and armies are everywhere engaged, for the most part, in restraining interior disturbance.

We have now reviewed the five periods of revolutionary crisis which have divided the last half-century; and the first consideration thence arising is of the necessity of a spiritual reorganization, towards which all political tendencies converge, and which awaits only the philosophical initiative that it requires. Before proceeding to discuss and supply that need, I must present a general view of the extinction of the theological and military *régime*, and the rise of a rational and pacific system, without regard to particular periods. It is necessary thus to estimate the natural and rapid fulfilment of the slow negative and positive movement of the five preceding centuries.

We must begin by considering the prolongation of the political decay; and the theological part of it first, as the chief basis of the old social system. The revolutionary crisis completed the religious disorganization by striking a decisive blow at the essential conditions, political, intellectual, and moral, of the old spiritual economy. Politically, the subjection of the clergy to the temporal power was much aggravated by depriving them of the legal influence over domestic life which they retain in appearance in Protestant countries; and again, by stripping them of special property, and making them dependent on the annual discussion of an assembly of unbelieving laymen, usually ill-disposed towards the priesthood, and only restrained from practically proving it by an empirical notion that theological belief is necessary to social harmony. Whatever consideration has been shown them has been on condition of their renouncing all political influence, and confining themselves to their private functions among those who desire their offices. The time is evidently near when the ecclesiastical budget will be suppressed, and the religious part of society will be left to support their respective pastors. This method, which is highly favourable to the American clergy, would be certain destruction in France, and in all countries nominally Catholic. The intellectual decay of the theological organization was accelerated by the revolutionary crisis, which spread religious emancipation among all classes. Such enfranchisement cannot be doubtful among a people who have listened, in their old cathedrals, to the direct preaching of a bold atheism, or of a deism not less hostile to ancient faith: and the case is complete when we add that the most odious persecutions could not revive any genuine religious fervour, when its intellectual sources were dried up: and any testimony of the kind that has been alleged in such instances has not been of the spontaneous sort that is socially valuable, but the result of retrograde prepossessions, imperial or royal.—A persuasion which lasted longer was that the principle of all morality was to be found in religious doctrine. After minds of a high order had obtained theological emancipation, many private examples,—and the whole life of the virtuous Spinoza for one,—indicated how entirely all virtue was independent of the beliefs which, in the infancy of humanity, had long been indispensable to its support. In addition to this case of the few, the many exemplified the same truth,—the feeble religious convictions which remained to them during the third phase having obviously no essential effect on conduct, while they were the direct cause of discord, domestic, civil, and national. It is long, however, before any habitual belief yields to evidence; especially on matters so complex as the relations of morality; and we have seen that there is no virtue which did not in the first instance need that religious sanction which must be relinquished

*Completion of  
the theological  
decay.*



when intellectual and moral advancement has disclosed the real foundation of morals. There has always been an outcry, in one direction or another, about the demoralization that humanity must undergo if this or that superstition were suppressed; and we see the folly, when it relates to a matter which to us has long ceased to be connected with religion; as, for instance, the observance of personal cleanliness, which the Brahmins insist on making wholly dependent on theological prescription. For some centuries after Christianity was widely established, a great number of statesmen, and even philosophers, went on lamenting the corruption which must follow the fall of polytheistic superstitions. The greatest service that could be rendered to humankind while this sort of clamour continues to exist, is that a whole nation should manifest a high order of virtue while essentially alienated from theological belief. This service was rendered by the demonstration attending the French Revolution. When, from the leaders to the lowest citizens, there was seen so much courage, military and civic, such patriotic devotedness, so many acts of disinterestedness, obscure as well as conspicuous, and especially throughout the whole course of the republican defence, while the ancient faith was abased or persecuted, it was impossible to hold to the retrograde belief of the moral necessity of religious opinions. It will not be supposed that deism was the animating influence in this case; for not only are its prescriptions confused and precarious, but the people were nearly as indifferent to modern deism as to any other religious system. This view,—of religious doctrine having lost its moral prerogatives,—concludes the evidence of the revolutionary crisis having completed the decay of the theological *régime*. From this date Catholicism could be regarded only as external to the society which it once ruled over;—as a majestic ruin, a monument of a genuine spiritual organization, and an evidence of its radical conditions. These purposes are at present very imperfectly fulfilled,—partly because the political organism shares the theological discredit, and partly from the intellectual inferiority of the Catholic clergy, who are of a lower and lower mental average, and less and less aware of the elevation of their old social mission. The social barrenness of this great organization is a sad spectacle: and we can hardly hope that it can be made use of in the work of reconstruction, because the priesthood has a blind antipathy to all positive philosophy, and persists in its resort to hopeless intrigue to obtain a fancied restoration. The obvious probability is, that this noble social edifice will follow the fate of polytheism, through the wearing out of its intellectual basis, and be wholly overthrown, leaving only the imperishable remembrance of the vast services of every kind which connect it historically with human progress, and of the essential improvements which it introduced into the theory of social organization.

Turning from the religious to the civic system, we find that, notwithstanding a great exceptional warfare, the revolutionary crisis destroyed the military, no less than the theological system. The mode of republican defence, in the first place, discredited the old military caste, which lost its exclusiveness; its professional practice being rivalled by the citizens in general, after a very short apprenticeship. Popular determination was proved to be worth more than tactics. Again, the last series of systematic wars,—those undertaken on behalf of Industry,—were now brought to an end. It was only in England that this old ground remained; and even there it was encroached upon by serious social anxieties. The colonial system was declining everywhere else; and its existence in the British empire is doubtless a special and temporary exception, which may be left to find its own destiny, unmolested by European interference. The independence of the American Colonies introduced the change; and it went forward while the countries of Europe were engrossed with the cares of the revolutionary crisis: and thus disappeared the last general occasion of modern warfare. The great exceptional warfare that I referred to as occasioned by an irresistible sway of circumstances must be the last. Wars of principle, which alone are henceforth possible, are restrained by a sufficient extension of the revolutionary action through Western Europe; for all the anxiety and all the military resources of the governments are engrossed by the care of external order. Precarious as is such a safeguard, it is yet one which will probably avail till the time of reorganization arrives, to institute a more direct and permanent security. A third token of military decline is the practice of forced enlistment, begun in France under the pressure of the revolutionary crisis, perpetuated by the wars of the Empire, and imitated in other countries to strengthen national antagonisms. Having survived the peace, the practice remains a testimony of the anti-military tendencies of modern populations, which furnish a few volunteer officers, but few or no volunteer privates. At the same time it extinguishes military habits and manners, by destroying the special character of the profession, and by making the army consist of a multitude of anti-military citizens, who assume the duty as a temporary burden. The probability is, that the method will be broken up by an explosion of resistance; and meantime it reduces the military system to a subaltern office in the mechanism of modern society. Thus the time is come when we may congratulate ourselves on the final passing away of serious and durable warfare among the most advanced nations. In this case as in others, the dreams and aspirations which have multiplied in recent times are an expression of a real and serious need,—a prevision of the heart rather than the head, of a happier state of things approaching. The existing peace, long beyond example, and maintained amidst strong incitements to

*Decay of  
the Military  
system.*

national quarrels, is an evidence that the change is more than a dream or an aspiration. The only fear for the maintenance of this peace is from any temporary preponderance in France of disastrous systematic movements ; and these would be presently put a stop to by the popular antipathy to war, and experience of the terrible effects thus induced.

There is nothing inconsistent with this view in the fact that each European nation maintains a vast military apparatus. Armies are now employed in the preservation of public order. This was once a function altogether subordinate to that of foreign warfare ; but the functions are reversed, and foreign war is contemplated only as a possible consequence of a certain amount of domestic agitation. While intellectual and moral anarchy render it difficult to preserve material order, the defensive force must equal at all times the insurrectional ; and this will be the business of physical force till it is superseded by social reorganization. As for the time when this martial police will cease to be wanted, it is yet, though within view, very distant ; for it has only just entered upon its last function, to which old opinions and manners are still so opposed that the truth is not recognized, but hidden under pretences of imminent war, which is made the excuse of a great military apparatus provided, in fact, for service at home. That service will be better performed when it is avowed, and all false pretences are put away ; and this might surely be done now that the central power itself is reduced to a similar provisional office. The military system and spirit are thus not doomed to the same decay as the sacerdotal, with which they were so long incorporated. The priesthood shows no disposition and no power to fuse itself in the new social organization ; whereas, there has never been a time since the decline of the military system began, when the soldiery were unable to assume the spirit and manners appropriate to their new social destination. In modern times the military mind has shown itself ready for theological emancipation ; its habit of discipline is favourable to incorporation, and its employments to scientific researches and professional studies ; all which are propitious to the positive spirit. In recent times, consequently, the spirit of the army has been, in France at least, strikingly progressive ; while that of the priesthood has been so stationary as to place it actually outside of the modern social action. Thus different are now the character and the fate of the two elements of ancient civilization, which were once so closely connected. The one is now left behind in the march of social improvement, and the other is destined to be gradually absorbed.

Here I close my review of the negative progress of the last half-century ; and I proceed to review the positive progression under the four heads into which it was divided in the preceding period.

The Industrial evolution has gone on, as in natural course of prolongation from the preceding period. The revolutionary crisis assisted and confirmed the advance by *Recent Industrial progress.* completing the secular destruction of the ancient hierarchy, and raising to the first social rank, even to a degree of extravagance, the civic influence of wealth. Since the peace this process has gone on without interruption, and the technical progress of industry has kept pace with the social. I assigned the grand impetus of the movement to the time when mechanical forces were largely adopted in the place of human industry; and during the last half-century the systematic use of machinery, owing to the application of steam, has caused prodigious improvements in artificial locomotion, by land, river, and sea, to the great profit of industry. This progression has been caused by the union of science and industry, though the mental influence of this union has been unfavourable to the philosophy of science, for reasons which I shall explain. In recent times the industrial class, which is, by its superior generality, most capable of entertaining political views, has begun to show its capability, and to regulate its relations with the other branches, by means of the system of public credit which has grown out of the inevitable extension of the national expenditure. In this connection we must take note, unhappily, of the growing seriousness of the deficiencies which I pointed out at the end of the last chapter. Agricultural industry has been further isolated through the stimulus given to manufacturing and commercial industry, and their engrossing interest under such circumstances. A worse and wholly unquestionable mischief is the deeper hostility which has arisen between the interests of employers and employed,—a state of things which shows how far we are from that industrial organization which is illustrated by the very use of those mechanical agencies, without which the practical expansion of industry could not have taken place. There is no doubt that the dissension has been aggravated by the arts of demagogues and sophists, who have alienated the working class from their natural industrial leaders; but I cannot but attribute this severance of the head and the hands much more to the political incapacity, the social indifference, and especially the blind selfishness of the employers than to the unreasonable demands of the employed. The employers have taken no pains to guard the workmen from seduction by the organization of a broad popular education, the extension of which, on the contrary, they appear to dread; and they have evidently yielded to the old tendency to take the place of the feudal chiefs, whose fall they longed for without inheriting their antique generosity towards inferiors. Unlike military superiors, who are bound to consider and protect their humblest brother soldiers, the industrial employers abuse the power of capital to carry their points in opposition to the employed; and

they have done so in defiance of equity, while the law authorized or countenanced coalitions among the one party which it forbade to the other. Passing thus briefly over evils which are unquestionable, I must once more point out the pedantic blindness of that political economy which, in the presence of such conflicts, hides its organic helplessness under an irrational declaration of the necessity of delivering over modern industry to its unregulated course. The only consolation which hence arises is the vague but virtual admission of the insufficiency of popular measures, properly so called,—that is, of purely temporal resources,—for the solution of this vast difficulty, which can be disposed of by no means short of a true intellectual and moral reorganization.

In Art, the main advance has been the exposure of the defect of *Recent Æsthetic progress.* philosophical principle and social destination, in modern Art, and of the hopelessness of imitation of antique types,—an exposure which has been brought about by the general direction of minds towards political speculation and regeneration as a whole. Amidst the wildness, the æsthetic vagabondism, to which the negative philosophy gave occasion and encouragement, especially in France,—taking the form for the substance, and discussion for construction, and interdicting to Art all large spontaneous exercise and sound general efficacy,—there have been immortal creations which have established in each department the undiminished vigour of the æsthetic faculties of mankind, even amidst the most unfavourable environment. The kind of Art in the form of literature which appears most suitable to modern civilization is that in which private is historically connected with public life, which in every age necessarily modifies its character. The Protestant civilization of times sufficiently remote and well chosen is represented, amidst the deep interest of all Europe, by the immortal author of 'Ivanhoe,' 'Quentin Durward,' 'Old Mortality,' and 'Peveril of the Peak;' while the Catholic civilization is charmingly represented by the author of 'I Promessi Sposi,' who is one of the chief ornaments of Art in modern times. This epic form probably indicates the mode of renovation of Art generally when our civilization shall have become solid, energetic, and settled enough to constitute the subject of æsthetic representation. The other fine arts have well sustained their power, during this recent period, without having achieved any remarkable advancement, unless it be in the case of music, and especially dramatic music, the general character of which has risen, in Italy and Germany, to higher elevation and finish. A striking instance of the æsthetic power proper to every great social movement is afforded by the sudden production, in a nation so unmusical as the French, of the most perfect type of political music in the Revolutionary hymn which was so animating to the patriotism of the citizen-soldiery of France.

The progress of Science was, at the same time, steady and effective, without any extraordinary brilliancy. On account of that progress, and of the supreme importance of science as the basis of social reorganization, and again, of the serious faults and errors involved in its pursuit, we must look a little more closely into its condition during this recent period.

In mathematical science, besides the labours necessary for the completion of Celestial Mechanics, we have Fourier's great creation, extending analysis to a new order of general phenomena by the study of the abstract laws of the equilibrium and motion of temperatures. He also gave us, in regard to pure analysis, his original conception on the resolution of equations, carried forward, and in some collateral respects improved, by various geometers who have not duly acknowledged the source whence they derived the master idea. Geometry has been enlarged by Monge's conception of the general theory of the family of surfaces,—a view still unappreciated by ordinary mathematicians, and perhaps even by Monge himself, Lagrange alone appearing to have perceived its full bearings. Lagrange at the same time perfected Rational Mechanics as a whole, by giving it entire rationality and unity. This great feat must not however be considered by itself, but must be connected with Lagrange's effort to constitute a true mathematical philosophy, founded on a prior renovation of transcendental analysis, a purpose which is illustrated by that incomparable work in which he undertook to regenerate in the same spirit all the great conceptions, first of analysis, then of geometry, and finally of mechanics. Though this premature project could not be wholly successful, it will be, in the eyes of posterity, the pre-eminent honour of this mathematical period, even leaving out of the account the philosophical genius of Lagrange, the only geometer who has duly appreciated that ulterior alliance between the historical spirit and the scientific, which must signalize the highest perfection of positive speculation. Pure astronomy, or celestial geometry, must always advance in an inferior way, in comparison with celestial mechanics; but there have been some interesting discoveries,—as of Uranus, the small planets between Mars and Jupiter, and some others. In Physics, in the midst of some hypothetical extravagance, many valuable experimental ideas have arisen in all the principal departments, and especially in Optics and Electrology, by means of the successive labours of Malus, Fresnel, and Young, on the one hand, and of Volta, Oersted, and Ampère on the other. We have seen how Chemistry has been advanced, in the midst of the necessary demolition of Lavoisier's beautiful theory, by the gradual formation of its numerical doctrine, and by the general series of electrical researches. But the great glory of the period in the eyes of future generations will be the creation of biological philosophy, which completes the positive

character of the mental evolution, while it carries modern science forward to its highest social destination. I have said enough, in the former volume, to show the importance of Bichat's conceptions of vital dualism, and especially of the theory of tissues; and of the successive labours of Vicq-d'Azyr, Lamarck, and the German school, to constitute the animal hierarchy, since rendered systematic by the philosophical genius of Blainville; and, finally, of the all-important discoveries of Gall, by which the whole of science, with the exception of social speculations, is withdrawn from the cognizance of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy. We ought not to overlook the important though premature attempt of Broussais to found a true pathological philosophy. His deficiency of materials and imperfect biological conceptions should not render us insensible to the merit and the utility of this great effort, which, after having excited an undue enthusiasm, has fallen into temporary neglect. The biological evolution has certainly contributed, more than any other part of the scientific movement, to the progress of the human mind, not only in a scientific view, by affording a basis for the philosophical study of Man, preparatory to that of Society, but far more in a logical view, by establishing that part of natural philosophy in which the synthetical spirit must finally prevail over the analytical, so as to develop the intellectual condition most necessary to sociological speculation. In this way, but without being suspected, the scientific movement was closely connected with the vast political crisis, through which social regeneration was sought before its true basis was ascertained.

Meantime, the scientific element was becoming more and more incorporated with the modern social system. In the midst of the fiercest political storms, scientific educational institutions were rising up, which were less devoted to specialities than they are now, though still too much so. Throughout civilized Europe there was a striking increase in the amount of scientific conditions imposed at the entrance on any of a multitude of professions and employments, by which means authorities who are most averse to reorganization are led to regard real knowledge more and more as a practical safeguard of social order. Among the special services of science to the time is the institution of an admirable system of universal measures, which was begun by revolutionary France, and thence slowly spread among other nations. This introduction of the true speculative spirit among the most familiar transactions of daily life is a fine example and suggestion of the improvements that must ensue whenever a generalized scientific influence shall have penetrated the elementary economy of society.

These are the favourable features of the scientific movement:

*Abuses.*

The vicious tendencies have grown in an over-proportion, and consist of that abuse of special research which I have so often had occasion to denounce and lament. In

all reforms, and in all progressions, the most vehement opposition arises from within. Hildebrand's enterprise of raising the Catholic clergy to be the head of society in Europe was counteracted by none so formidably as by the priesthood; and in like manner, it is the *savans* who now oppose, with violent prejudice and passion, the organization of science which alone can give it the social influence that it ought to be obtaining. It is not ambition that they want, but enlargement and elevation. The partial perfection of our positive knowledge may easily deceive both the public and the workers as to the real value of most of the contributors, each of whom has probably furnished an extremely minute and easy portion to the vast elaboration; and it is not always understood by the public that, owing to the extreme restriction of pursuit, any *savant* who may have won honour in some single inquiry, may not be above mediocrity in any view, even in connection with science. In the theological case, the clergy were superior to religion; in the scientific case, on the contrary, the doctors are inferior to the doctrine. The evil is owing to the undue protraction of a state of things inevitable and indispensable in its day.

We have seen that when modern science was detached from the scholastic philosophy, there was a provisional necessity for a system of scientific speciality; and that because the formation of the different sciences was successive, in proportion to the complexity of their phenomena, the positive spirit could in no way have elicited the attributes of each case but by a partial and exclusive institution of different orders of abstract speculation. But the very purpose of this introductory system indicated its transitory nature, by limiting its office to the interval preceding the incorporation of rational positivity with all the great elementary categories,—the boundary being thus fixed at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as my survey has shown. The two great legislators of positive philosophy, Bacon and Descartes, saw how merely provisional was this ascendancy of the analytical over the synthetical spirit: and under their influence the *savans* of those two centuries pursued their inquiries avowedly with the view of accumulating materials for the ultimate construction of a philosophical system, however imperfect their notion of such a system might be. If this spontaneous tendency had been duly grounded, the preparatory stage would have come to its natural close on the advent of biological science; and, during the last half-century, the discovery of the scientific place of the intellectual and moral faculties would have been received as completing the system of natural philosophy, up to the threshold of social science, and as constituting an order of speculation in which, from the nature of the phenomena, the spirit of generality must overrule the spirit of detail. But the habits of special pursuit were too strong to be withstood at the right point; and the preparatory stage has been extended to the most disastrous degree, and even erected



into an absolute and indefinite state of affairs. It even appears as if the radical distinction were to be effaced between the analytical and the synthetical spirit, both of which are necessary in all positive speculation, and which should alternately guide the intellectual evolution, individual and social, under the exigencies proper to each age; the one seizing the differences and the other the resemblances: the one dividing, and the other co-ordinating; and therefore the one destined to the elaboration of materials, and the other to the construction of edifices. When the masons will endure no architects, they aim at changing the elementary economy of the human understanding. Through this protraction of the preparatory stage, the positive philosophy cannot be really understood by any student, placed in any part of the present vicious organization of scientific labour. The *savans* of each section acquire only isolated fragments of knowledge, and have no means of comparing the general attributes of rational positivity exhibited by the various orders of phenomena, according to their natural arrangement. Each mind may be positive within the narrow limits of its special inquiry, while the slave of the ancient philosophy in all the rest. Each may exhibit the fatal contrast between the advancement of some partial conceptions, and the disgraceful triteness of all the rest: and this is the spectacle actually afforded by the learned academies of our day, by their very constitution. The characteristic parcelling out of these societies,—a reproduction of their intellectual dispersion,—increases the mischief of this state of things by facilitating the rise of ordinary minds, which are less likely to amend the scientific constitution than to be jealous of a philosophical superiority of which they feel themselves incapable. It is lamentable that, at a time when the state of human affairs offers every other encouragement to the active pursuit of generalities, science, in which alone the whole solution lies, should be so degraded by the incompetence of its interpreters as that it now seems to prescribe intellectual restriction, and to condemn every attempt at generalization. The demerit of the classes of *savans* implicated in the case varies in proportion to the independence and simplicity of the phenomena with which they are respectively engaged. The geometers are the most special and empirical of all; and the mischief began with them. We have seen how, though positivism arose in the mathematical province, the geometers see nothing before them but a future extension of their analysis to all phenomena whatever; and how the absolute character of the old philosophy is more thoroughly preserved among them than any other class, from their greater intellectual restriction. The biologists, on the contrary, whose speculations are necessarily dependent on all the rest of natural philosophy, and relating to a subject in which all artificial decomposition implies a spontaneous future combination, would be the least prone to dispersive errors, and the best disposed for philo-

sophical order, if their education were in any agreement with their destination, and if they were not too apt to transfer to their own studies the conceptions and habits proper to inorganic research. Their influence is beneficial on the whole however, as counteracting, though too feebly, the ascendancy of the geometers. Their progression has, accordingly, been more impeded than aided by the learned bodies, whose nature relates to a preparatory period when the inorganic philosophy, with its spirit and practice of detail, flourished alone. The Academy of Paris, for instance, which had no welcome for Bichat, and formed a junction with Bonaparte to persecute Gall, and failed to recognize the worth of Broussais, and admitted the brilliant but superficial Cuvier to a superiority over Lamarck and Blainville, has a much less complete and general sense of biological philosophy than prevails beyond its walls. These faults of the scientific class have become the more conspicuous from the new social importance that has been accorded to *savans* during the last half-century, and which has elicited at once their intellectual insufficiency and the moral inferiority which must attend it, since, in the speculative class, elevation of soul and generosity of feeling can hardly be developed without generality of ideas, through the natural affinity between narrow and desultory views and selfish dispositions. During a former period, when science began to be systematically encouraged, pensions were given to *savans* to enable them freely to carry on their work; a mode of provision which was suitable to the circumstances of the time. Since the revolutionary crisis, the system has been changed in some countries, and especially in France, by conferring on learned men useful office and its remuneration, by which they are rendered more independent. No inquiry was made, however, as to the fitness of the *savans* for the change. Education was one chief function thus appointed; and thus we find education in special subjects more and more engrossed by learned bodies; and pupils sent forth who are less and less prepared to recognize the true position of science in relation to human welfare. The end of this provisional state of things is, however, manifestly approaching. When science itself is found to be injured by the inaccuracy of observations, and by its too selfish connection with profitable industrial operations, a change must soon take place: and no influence will then impede the renovation of modern science by a generalization which will bring it into harmony with the chief needs of our position. We may regard the *savans*, properly so called, as an equivocal class, destined to speedy elimination, inasmuch as they are intermediate between the engineers and the philosophers, uniting in an untenable way the speciality of occupation of the one, and the abstract speculative character of the other. Out of the academies themselves the greater number of the *savans* will melt in among the poor engineers, to form a body practically offering to

direct the action of Man upon nature, on the principles specially required; while the most eminent of them will doubtless become the nucleus of a really philosophical class directly reserved to conduct the intellectual and moral regeneration of modern society, under the impulsion of a common positive doctrine. They will institute a general scientific education, which will rationally superintend all ulterior distribution of contemplative labours by determining the variable importance which, at each period, must be assigned to each abstract category, and therefore first granting the highest place to social studies, till the final reorganization shall be sufficiently advanced. As for the *savans* who are fit for neither class, they will abide outside of any genuine classification, till they can assume some social character, speculative or active,—their special labours meantime being welcomed with all just appreciation; for those who are capable of generality can estimate the value of the special, while the understanding restricted to special pursuit can feel nothing but aversion for complete and therefore general conceptions. This fact easily explains the antipathy which these provisional leaders of our mental evolution entertain against all proposals and prophecies of true intellectual government, dreaded in proportion as its positivity renders it powerful against all usurpation.

Turning to the consideration of philosophy during the last half-century, we find its state no less lamentable than that of science. It might have been hoped that this element might have corrected the peculiar vice of

*Recent Philosophical progress.*

the other, substituting the spirit of generality for that of speciality: but it has not been so. Instead of rebuking that vice, philosophy has given a dogmatic sanction to it by extending it to the class of subjects to which it is thoroughly repugnant. When science diverged from a worn-out philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, without being as yet able to furnish a basis for any other, philosophy, receding further and further from science, which it had before directed, restricted itself to the immediate formation of moral and social theories, which had no permanent relation to the only researches that could supply a true foundation, as to either method or doctrine. Since the separation took place, there has been in fact no philosopher, properly so called; no mind in which the spirit of generality has been habitually preponderant, whatever might be its direction,—theological, metaphysical, or positive. In this strict sense, Leibnitz might be called the last modern philosopher; since no one after him—not even the illustrious Kant, with all his logical power—has adequately fulfilled the conditions of philosophical generality, in agreement with the advanced state of intellectual progress. Except some bright exceptional presentiments of an approaching renovation, the last half-century has offered nothing better than a barren dogmatic sanction of the transitory state of things now existing. As however

this vain attempt is the characteristic of what is called philosophy in our day, it is necessary to notice it.

We have seen that the general spirit of the primitive philosophy, which still lingers through time and change, chiefly consists in conceiving the study of Man, and especially intellectual and moral Man, as entirely independent of that of the external world, of which it is supposed to be the basis, in direct contrast with the true definitive philosophy. Since science has shown the marvellous power of the positive method, modern metaphysics has endeavoured to make its own philosophy congenial with the existing state of the human mind by adopting a logical principle equivalent to that of science, whose conditions were less and less understood. This procedure, very marked from the time of Locke onward, has now issued in dogmatically sanctioning, under one form or another, the isolation and priority of moral speculation, by representing this supposed philosophy to be, like science itself, founded on a collection of observed facts. This has been done by proposing, as analogous to genuine observation, which must always be external to the observer, that celebrated *interior observation* which can be only a parody on the other, and according to which the ridiculous contradiction would take place, of our reason contemplating itself during the common course of its own acts. This is the doctrine which was learnedly prescribed at the very time that Gall was irreversibly incorporating the study of the cerebral functions with positive science. Every one knows what barren agitation has followed upon this false principle, and how the metaphysical philosophy of the present day puts forth the grandest pretensions, which produce nothing better than translations and commentaries on the old Greek or scholastic philosophy, destitute of even an historical estimate of the corresponding doctrines, for want of a sound theory of the evolution of the human mind. The parody at first implicated only the logical principle; but it soon comprehended the general course of the philosophy. The speciality which belongs to inorganic researches alone, was transferred to this just when it ought to have been allowed to disappear even in its own domain of science. A philosophy worthy of the name would at once have indicated to scientific men, and especially to biologists, the enormous error they were committing by extending to the science of living bodies, in which all aspects are closely interconnected, a mode of research that was only provisionally admissible even in regard to inert bodies. That instead of this, the so-called philosophy should have argued from the error of the other case, and have applied it systematically to the study which has always been admitted to require unity and generality above all others, appears to me one of the most memorable examples on record of a disastrous metaphysical infatuation. Such is the decayed condition of the philosophical evolution in the nineteenth century. But its

very weakness is an evidence of the common sense of the need and the power of intellectual generality, since it is the affectation of that quality which provisionally sustains the practical influence of a doctrine now in universal disrepute, which has no other office than keeping up, in an imperfect way, a notion of intellectual concentration in the midst of the most active dispersion. When the advent of the true philosophy shall have stripped the metaphysical doctrine of every vestige of this attribute, the supposed philosophy will disappear,—probably without any discussion, or any other notice than a comparison of its uses with those of its successor. Then the great preparatory schism, organized by Aristotle and Plato, between natural and moral philosophy, will be dissolved. As modified by Descartes, it has now reached its last term, after having fulfilled its provisional office. The intellectual unity, vainly because prematurely sought by scholasticism, will now result, irrevocably, from the perpetual coincidence of philosophical science and scientific philosophy. The study of moral and social Man will obtain without opposition the due normal ascendancy which belongs to it in the speculative system, because it is no longer hostile to the most simple and perfect contemplations, but is even based upon them and contributory to their use. However men may act in the presence of this change,—whether young thinkers adhere to the philosophy of egotism or join that of renovation; whether the *savans* will rise to philosophy, or philosophers will return to science; and however a narrow and self-interested majority may resist the change,—there will be a nucleus of eminent minds to form the new spiritual body (which may be indifferently called scientific or philosophical), under the sway and guidance of an adequate general education.

Here ends my historical review of the last half-century, and with it, of the whole past of the human race: a survey which yields the conviction that the present time is that in which the philosophical renovation, so long prepared for and projected by Bacon and Descartes, must take place. Amidst some personal impediments, everything is essentially ready for the process. I have endeavoured to show how clear it is, after the failure of all manner of vain attempts, that science is the only basis of a true philosophy; and that their union affords the only fulfilment of the conditions of order and of progress, by substituting a sustained and determinate movement for a vague and anarchical agitation. It is for the thoughtful to judge whether my fundamental theory of human evolution, illustrated by the history of human progress, contains the principle of this great solution. But, before I proceed to the philosophical conclusions derivable from the whole of this Work, I must offer a general elucidation of the new political philosophy which has been disclosed by the successive portions of my dynamical estimate, by specially and directly considering the

proper nature of the spiritual reorganization in which we have seen the whole past converge, and from which the whole future must evidently proceed. The reader *The law of evolution.* cannot fail to bear in mind the concatenation of events, as presented in my historical analysis; and he will not lose sight of my explanation that, though I was compelled, for the sake of clearness, to separate the negative from the positive progression of modern times, the two were in fact most intimately connected, and must be so considered, in the act of drawing conclusions from them. It certainly appears to me that the whole course of human history affords so decisive a verification of my theory of evolution, that no essential law of natural philosophy is more fully demonstrated. From the earliest beginnings of civilization to the present state of the most advanced nations, this theory has explained, consistently and dispassionately, the character of all the great phases of humanity; the participation of each in the perdurable common development, and their precise filiation; so as to introduce perfect unity and rigorous continuity into this vast spectacle which otherwise appears altogether desultory and confused. A law which fulfils such conditions must be regarded as no philosophical pastime, but as the abstract expression of the general reality. Being so, it may be employed with logical security to connect the past with the future, notwithstanding the perpetual variety which characterizes the social succession; for its essential course, without being in any way periodical, is thus constantly referrible to a steady rule which, almost imperceptible in the study of any separate phase, becomes unquestionable when the whole progression is surveyed. Now, the use of this great law has led us to determine the necessary general tendency of existing civilization by accurately marking the degree already achieved by the great evolution: and hence results at once the indication of the direction which the systematic movement should be made to take, in order to accord with the spontaneous movement. We have seen that the most advanced part of the human race has exhausted the theological and metaphysical life, and is now at the threshold of the fully positive life, the elements of which are all prepared, and only awaiting their co-ordination to form a new social system, more homogeneous and more stable than mankind has hitherto had any experience of. This co-ordination must be, from its nature, first intellectual, then moral, and finally political; for the revolution which has to be completed proceeds in fact from the necessary tendency of the human mind to substitute for the philosophical method which suited its infancy that which is appropriate to its maturity. In this view, the mere knowledge of the law of progression becomes the general principle of solution by establishing a perfect agreement in the whole system of our understanding, through the preponderance, thus obtained, of the positive method,

in social as in all other researches. Again, this last fulfilment of the intellectual evolution necessarily favours the ascendancy of the spirit of generality, and therefore the sentiment of duty, which is, by its nature, closely connected with it, so as naturally to induce moral regeneration. Moral laws are at present dangerously shaken only through their implication with theological conceptions that have fallen into disrepute; and they will assume a surpassing vigour when they are connected with positive ideas that are generally relied on. Again, in a political view, the regeneration of social doctrine must, by its very action, raise up from the midst of anarchy a new spiritual authority which, after having disciplined the human intellect and reconstructed morals, will peaceably become, throughout Western Europe, the basis of the final system of human society. Thus, the same philosophical conception which discloses to us the true nature of the great problem furnishes the general principle of the solution, and indicates the necessary course of action.

In the present stage, the philosophical contemplation and labour *Speculative preparation.* are more important than political action, in regard to social regeneration; because a basis is the thing wanted, while there is no lack of political measures, more or less provisional, which preserve material order from invasion by the restless spirits that come forth during a season of anarchy. The governments are relying on corruption and on repressive force, while the philosophers are elaborating their principles; and what the philosophers have to expect from wise governments is that they will not interfere with the task while in progress, nor hereafter with the gradual application of its results. The French Convention is, thus far, the only government that, since the opening of the crisis, has manifested any instinct of its true position. During its ascending phase, at least, it strove, amidst vast difficulties, to introduce progressive though provisional institutions; whereas, all other political powers have written on their flimsy erections that they were built for eternity.

As for the kind of persons who are to constitute the new spiritual *Spiritual authority.* authority,—it is easy to say who they will not be, and impossible to say who they will be. There will be no organization like that of the Catholic priesthood, for the benefit of any existing class. I need not say that it will not be the *savans*. It will not be any class now existing; because the natural elements of the new authority must undergo a thorough intellectual and moral regeneration in accordance with the doctrine which is to organize them. The future spiritual power will reside in a wholly new class, in no analogy with any now existing, and originally composed of members issuing, according to their qualifications, from all orders of existing society,—the scientific having, to all appearance, no sort of predominance over the rest. The advent of this body will be

essentially spontaneous, since its social sway can arise from nothing else than the voluntary assent of men's minds to the new doctrines successively wrought out: and such an authority can therefore no more be decreed than it can be interdicted. As it must thus arise, little by little, out of its own work, all speculation about the ulterior forms of its constitution would be idle and uncertain. As its social power must, like that of Catholicism, precede its political organization, all that can be done now is to mark its destination in the final social system, so as to show how it may act on the general state of affairs, by accomplishing the philosophical labours which will secure its formation long before it can be regularly constituted.

I cannot but suppose my readers convinced by this time that there is a growing pressure of necessity for a spiritual power entirely independent of the temporal,—governing opinions and morals, while the civil rule applies only to acts. We see that the grand characteristic of human progress is an ever-increasing preponderance of the speculative over the active life: and, though the latter always keeps the active ascendancy, it would be contradictory to suppose that the contemplative part of Man is to be for ever deprived of due culture and distinct direction in the social state in which the reason will find habitual scope and expansion, even among the lowest order, while the separation existed, in the Middle Ages, amidst a civilization which stood much nearer to the cradle of human society. All the wise now admit the necessity of a permanent division between theory and practice, in order to the perfecting of both; even in regard to the smallest subjects of study: and there can be no more hesitation about applying the principle to operations of the utmost difficulty and importance, when we are advanced enough for the process. Intellectually, the separation of the two powers is merely the external manifestation of the same distinction between science and art, transferred to social ideas, and there systematized. It would be a vast retrogression, most degrading to our intelligence, if we were to leave modern society below the level of that of the Middle Ages, by reconstituting the ancient confusion which the Middle Ages had outgrown, without any of the excuse that the ancients had for that confusion. Yet more striking would be the return to barbarism in the moral relation. We have seen how, by the aid of Catholicism, Morality escaped from the control of policy, to assume the social supremacy which is its due, and without which it could not attain a necessary purity and universality. This procedure, so little understood by the philosophic vulgar, laid the foundation of our moral education by securing from the encroachment of inferior and private interests the immutable laws which relate to the most intimate and general needs of the human race. It is certain that this indispensable co-ordination would have no consistence amidst the conflict of human passions if, resting only on an abstract doctrine, it was not animated and con-



firmed by the intervention of a moral power distinct from, and independent of, the political. We know this by what we see of the breaches of morals that take place through the spiritual disorganization, and though the morality which accords with modern civilization is thereby secured from dogmatic attack,—fallen as is the Catholic philosophy, which was its original organ. We may observe in our metaphysical constitutions themselves some recognition of the principle of separation in those remarkable preliminary declarations which give to the humblest citizens a general control of political measures. This is a feeble image and imperfect equivalent of the strong means furnished by the Catholic organism to every member for resistance to every legal injunction which should be contrary to established morality,—avoiding, the while, any revolt against an economy regularly founded on such a separation. Since Mankind first really entered upon a career of civilization, this great division has been, in all respects, the social principle of intellectual elevation and moral dignity.—It fell into discredit, it is true, with the decline of Catholicism; but revolutionary prejudices are not to last for ever; and the nature of modern civilization both prescribes and prepares for a renewal of the distinction, without any of the forced character which belonged to it in the Middle Ages. Under the ascendancy of Industry, there can be no confusion between the speculative and the active authorities, which could never be united in the same organ, for the simplest and most restricted operations; and much less for those of high social importance. Morals and manners are as adverse to such a concentration as capacities. Though the different classes imitate one another too much, and though wealth is held in pre-eminent honour at present, no one will pretend that riches can confer any right to decide on great social questions. Again, while artists, and, more disgracefully, scientific men, struggle in rivalry of wealth with industrial leaders, there is no reason to fear that the æsthetic and the scientific career can ever lead to high station by means of wealth. The generous improvidence of the one order of men, when their vocation is real, is incompatible with the anxious solicitude necessary to the acquisition of wealth. The highest degrees of fortune and of consideration can never be united; the first belonging naturally to services of immediate and material utility; and the other following, more remotely, upon speculative labours, which, in proportion to their superior social value, find at length their social reward in the highest veneration. There is some recognition of the necessity of a separate spiritual government in the influence which actually belongs to men of letters and metaphysicians in our day; and the only real question is whether society shall be governed on a basis of ascertained knowledge and unquestionable philosophy, or whether it shall be guided by organs qualified neither by sound knowledge nor by genuine conviction. The answer is found in the fact that, whereas in the Middle Ages

the separation of powers was necessarily as imperfect as it was arbitrary, the tendency of the modern social spirit is to render human government more and more moral and less and less political. The moral reorganization is the most urgent; and it is at the same time the best prepared. The governments decline it more and more, and thus leave it for the hands that ought to assume it: and the peoples have had experience enough to convince them that existing principles of government have done all that is to be expected of them, and that social progress must depend upon a wholly new philosophy.

We have seen how the Greek philosophers dreamed of a political reign of Mind, and how dangerous and futile such a notion was. During the Middle Ages the Catholic system provided satisfaction for intellectual ambition: but when, by the demolition of that system, the two orders of power were again confounded, the old Utopia was revived. Except the few whom their philosophy raised above such desires, almost all active minds have been actuated, often unconsciously, by an insurrectionary tendency against a state of affairs which offered them no legal position. As the negative movement proceeded, such men grew more eager for temporal greatness, which was then the only social eminence; and during the revolutionary convulsion, such aspirations exceeded all bounds. Such attempts, unsupported by any religious organization, must necessarily succumb to the power of wealth, which had established a material preponderance too strong to be shaken; but the efforts themselves were very disturbing to the state of things which they could not essentially change. This principle of disorder is the more dangerous from its appearance of reasonableness. It is all that the most eminent rationality and morality combined can do to preserve a mind of the present day from the illusion that, as modern civilization tends to strengthen the social influence of intelligence, the government of society, speculative and active, ought to be confided to the highest intellectual capacity. Most minds that are occupied with social questions are secretly swayed by this notion,—without excepting those who repel the error which no one attempts rationally to vindicate. The separation of the two powers will extinguish this cause of disorder by providing for the gratification of whatever is legitimate in this ambition. The sound theory of the case, as imperfectly presented in the Middle Age system, is, that it is the social function of Mind to struggle perpetually, in its own way, to modify the necessary rule of material power, by subjecting it more and more to respect for the moral laws of universal harmony, from which all practical activity, public and private, is apt to revolt, for want of loftiness of view and generosity of sentiment. Regarded in this way, legitimate social supremacy belongs neither to force nor to reason, but to morality, governing alike the actions of the one and the counsels of the other. Such, at least, is

the type which is to be proposed, though it may never be fully realized: and in view of it, Mind may sincerely relinquish its idle pretension to govern the world by the supposed right of capacity; for it will be regularly installed in a noble permanent office, alike adapted to occupy its activity and recompense its services. This spiritual authority will be naturally kept within bounds by the very nature of its functions, which will be those of education, and the consultative influence which results from it in active life; and again, by the conditions imposed on their exercise, and the continuous resistance which must be encountered,—the authority itself being founded on free assent, within the limits necessary to guard against abuse. Such an organization is the only issue for the disturbing political action of intelligence, which can escape from unjust exclusion only by aspiring to a vicious domination: and statesmen at present protract the embarrassment caused by the political claims of capacity by their blind antipathy to the regular separation of the two powers.—The system needed would be no less beneficial to the multitude than to the active few. The disposition to seek in political institutions the solution of all difficulties whatever is a disastrous tendency of our time. Naturally arising from the concentration of powers, it has been aggravated by the constitution-making of the last half-century. The hallucination will be dissolved by the same philosophical instigation which will destroy that of a reign of Mind. While a social issue is provided for a large mental capacity, just popular claims, which are oftener moral than political, will receive the guidance fittest for their object. There can be no doubt that the legitimate complaints lodged by the masses against a system under which their general needs are too little considered, relate to a renovation of opinions and manners, and could not be satisfied by express institutions. This is especially true in regard to the evils inherent in the inequality of wealth, which afford the most dangerous theme to both agitators and dreamers; for these evils derive their force much more from our intellectual and moral disorder than from the imperfections of political measures. The philosophical expansion which is to work out the new system must, in this and in many other respects, exert a very important rational influence on modern populations,—directly facilitating the restoration of general and durable harmony; always supposing that it is linked with conditions of progress, no less than of order, and that, while showing that our social embarrassments are independent of institutions, the new instruction shall teach us the true solution,—the submission of all classes to the moral requirements of their position, under the instigation of a spiritual authority strong enough to enforce discipline. Thus might disturbing popular dispositions, now the constant source of political illusion and quackery, be reformed; and the vague and stormy discussion of *rights* would be replaced by the calm and

precise determinations of *duties*. The one, a critical and metaphysical notion, necessarily prevailed till the negative progression was completed: the other, essentially an organic and positive idea, must rule the final regeneration: for the one is purely individual, and the other directly social. Instead of making individual duty consist politically in respect for universal rights, the rights of each individual will be regarded as resulting from the duties of others towards him: in the one case the morality will be nearly passive, and will be ruled by selfishness: whereas in the other the morality will be thoroughly active, and directed by benevolence. Here, again, the opposition of statesmen is wholly inconsistent with their own complaints of the eagerness of the popular mind for political solutions of their difficulties:—the difficulties exist; the popular tendency exists; and no complaints of either can avail while politicians themselves discountenance the only means of correcting the thoughtless popular habit and desire.

Such are the services to be rendered by the new spiritual authority. In order to dispel the natural uneasiness excited by the mention of such an agency in our day, connected as it is in most minds with theocratic notions, I will briefly indicate its offices and prerogatives, and the consequent nature of its normal authority.

If we resort to the Catholic organization as to a sort of pattern of spiritual government, we must remember that we have now nothing to do with the religious element; and we must consider the clergy in their social relations alone. Being careful to do this, we may refer to my statement of their function, *Its Educational function.* as being that of every spiritual authority;—that of directing Education, while remaining merely consultative in all that relates to Action,—having, in fact, no other concern with action than that of recalling in each case the appropriate rules of conduct. The temporal authority, on the other hand, is supreme in regard to Action, and only consultative in regard to Education. Thus the great characteristic office and privilege of the modern spiritual power will be the organization and working of a universal system of positive Education, not only intellectual, but also, and more emphatically, moral. In order to maintain the positive nature and social purpose of this education, it must be ever remembered that it is intended for the direct and continuous use of no exclusive class, however vast, but for the whole mass of the population of Western Europe. Catholicism established a universal education, imperfect and variable, but essentially homogeneous, and common to the loftiest and the humblest Christians: and it would be strange to propose a less general institution for a more advanced civilization. The revolutionary demand for equality in education manifested a sense of what was needed, and a forecast of what was coming. In our own time no feature of the existing anarchy is more disgraceful than the indifference of the upper classes about that absence of

popular education which threatens them with a fearful retribution. The positive philosophy teaches us the invariable homogeneousness of the human mind, not only among various social ranks, but as regards individuals : and it therefore shows us that no differences are possible but those of degree. The system must be necessarily identical, but applied according to diversities of aptitude and of leisure. This was the principle and mode of the Catholic religious education : and it is now found to be the only sound one in the one kind of education that is regulated among us,—special instruction. Round this fundamental system will ramify spontaneously the various collateral pursuits which relate to direct preparation for different social conditions. The scientific spirit must then lose its present tendency to speciality, and be impelled towards a logical generality ; for all the branches of natural philosophy must furnish their contingent to the common doctrine ; in order to which they must first be completely condensed and co-ordinated. When the *savans* have learned that active life requires the habitual and simultaneous use of the various positive ideas that each of them isolates from all the rest, they will perceive that their social ascendancy supposes the prior generalization of their common conceptions, and consequently the entire philosophical reformation of their present practice. Even in the most advanced sciences, as we have seen, the scientific character at present fluctuates between the abstract expansion and the partial application, so as to be usually neither thoroughly speculative nor completely active ; a consequence of the same defect of generality which rests the ultimate utility of the positive spirit on minor services, which are as special as the corresponding theoretical habits. But this view, which ought to have been long outgrown, is a mere hindrance in the way of the true conception,—that positive philosophy contemplates no other immediate application than the intellectual and moral direction of civilized society ; a necessary application, presenting nothing that is incidental or desultory, and imparting the utmost generality, elevation, unity, and consistency, to the speculative character. Under such a homogeneousness of view and identity of aim, the various positive philosophers will naturally and gradually constitute a European body, in which the dissensions that now break up the scientific world into coteries will merge ; and with the rivalries of struggling interests will cease the quarrels and coalitions which are the opprobrium of science in our day.

Under this system of general education, Morality will be immovably based upon positive philosophy as a whole. Human nature being one of the branches of positive knowledge, it will be understood how childhood is to be trained in good habits, by means of the best prepossessions ; and how those habits and views are afterwards to be rationalized, so as solidly to establish the universal obligations of civilized Man,—

*Regeneration  
of morality.*

duties personal, domestic, and social, with the modifications that will be required by changes in civilization. We have seen how all connection between theological faith and morality has long been recognized as arbitrary; and any such degree of theological unity as is necessary for affording a basis to morality, would now suppose a vast system of hypocrisy, which, if it were possible, would be fatal to the very morality it proposed to sustain. In the present state of the most advanced portion of the human race, the positive spirit is certainly the only one which, duly systematized, can at once generate universal moral convictions and permit the rise of a spiritual authority independent enough to regulate its social application. At the same time, the social sentiment, as a part of morals, can be fully developed only by the positive philosophy, because it alone contemplates and understands the whole of human nature. The social sentiment has hitherto been cultivated only in an indirect and even contradictory manner, under the theological philosophy first, which gave a character of exorbitant selfishness to all moral acts; and then under the metaphysical, which bases morality on self-interest. Human faculties, affective as well as intellectual, can be developed only by habitual exercise; and positive morality, which teaches the habitual practice of goodness without any other certain recompense than internal satisfaction, must be much more favourable to the growth of the benevolent affections than any doctrine which attaches devotedness itself to personal considerations,—the admission of which allows no fair play to the claims of our generous instincts. It will be long before habit, sustained by powerful interests, will permit the systematizing of morality without religious intervention; and when it is done, it will be by the fulfilment itself silencing all controversy: and this is why no other part of the great philosophical task can be nearly so important in determining the regeneration of modern society. Humanity must be regarded as still in a state of infancy while its laws of conduct are derived from extraordinary fictions, and not from a wise estimate of its own nature and condition.

I must point out another respect in which this great task will satisfy a serious present exigency. We have seen *International duty* how the revolutionary influence extended, as the Roman sway once did, and the Catholic and feudal system afterwards, over the whole of Western Europe; whereas, the metaphysical polity does not look beyond national action, in which the community of nations is wholly lost sight of. It cannot be otherwise while the temporal government is supposed to include the spiritual; for the temporal union of nations is impossible but through mere oppression by the strongest. The five great nations concerned cannot be for a moment supposed to be fused, or subjected to the same political government; and yet the perpetual extension of their

mutual relations already requires the natural intervention of a moral authority which should be common to all, according to their aggregate affinities. This is now, as in the Middle Ages, the privilege of the spiritual power, which will connect the various populations by an identical educational basis, and thus obtain a regular, free, and unanimous assent. Such an education must have a European character; because Western Europe alone is qualified to receive it. It may hereafter be extended, even beyond the white races, as the outlying groups of humanity become fitted to enter the system; but, while asserting the radical identity of human nature everywhere, the new social philosophy must distinguish between positive societies and those which are still theological or metaphysical; in the same way that the Middle Age system distinguished Catholic populations from those which were polytheistic or fetich. The only difference between the two cases is that the modern organization is destined to a wider spread, and that there is a superior reconciling quality in a doctrine which connects all human situations with the same fundamental evolution. The necessity of extending the modern regeneration to Western Europe in general teaches us how the temporal reorganization proper to each nation, must be preceded and directed by a spiritual reorganization common to them all: and at the same time, the philosophical constitution of positive education provides the best instrumentality for satisfying the social need of union by summoning all nationalities to the same task, under the direction of a homogeneous speculative class, habitually animated by an active European patriotism. The same power which administers education watches over the application, through life, of the principles taught: thus, this eminent authority, impartial in its nature, and planted at the general point of view, will naturally be the arbitrating power among the nations that it will have trained. International relations cannot be submitted to any temporal authority; and they would be at the mercy of mere antagonism if they did not fall under the natural decision of the only general authority. Hence must arise an entirely new diplomatic system; or rather, the closing of an interregnum instituted by diplomacy to facilitate the great European transition,—as I have already explained. The great wars are no doubt over; but the divergences which arise the more as relations extend will find new forms, less disastrous, but equally requiring the intervention of a moderating power. The selfish interests which, for example, are brought into collision by the extension of Industry, may be best kept in check by an authority which assigns its true value to the practical point of view, which directs the moral education of nations, as well as of individuals and classes, and which must therefore be best fitted to bring the divergences of practical life into subordination to a higher order of power.

The difference of social character between this authority and the Catholic sway is easily pointed out, and important to be understood. All spiritual authority must rest *Basis of Assent.* on free and perfect confidence and assent, such as are accorded to intellectual and moral superiority; and they imply an agreement and sympathy in a common primary doctrine, regulating the exercise and the conditions of the relation, which is dissolved when the doctrine is disbelieved. The theological faith was connected with some revelation in which the believer had no share; and it must therefore be wholly different from the positive faith, which follows upon demonstration, open to universal examination, under due conditions. Thus, the positive authority is essentially relative, like the spirit of the corresponding philosophy: and as no individual can know everything and judge of everything, the confidence enjoyed by the most eminent thinker is analogous to that which, in a limited degree, he accords in turn to the humblest intelligence, on certain subjects best understood by the latter. The absolute power of man over man, which was so dreadful and irresistible in former ages, is gone for ever, together with the mental condition which gave rise to it: but, though the positive faith can never be so intense as the theological, its unsystematic action during the last three centuries proves that it can spontaneously occasion a sufficient agreement on subjects that have been duly explored. We see, by the universal admission of the chief scientific truths, notwithstanding their opposition to religious notions, how irresistible will be the sway of the logical force of genuine demonstration when human reason attains maturity; and especially when its extension to moral and social considerations shall have imparted to it its full energy. There will be a sufficient harmony between the need and the power of a regular discipline of minds,—at all events, when the theologico-metaphysical system, with all its disturbing influences, has died out. These considerations may serve to dissipate the theocratic uneasiness that naturally arises on the mere mention of any spiritual reorganization,—the philosophical nature of the new government wholly precluding such usurpations as those which were perpetrated by theological authority. Nevertheless, we must not suppose, on the other hand, that the positive system will admit of no abuses. The infirmity of our mental and moral nature will remain; and the social superintendence which will be natural will be also needful. We have only too much reason to know that true science is compatible with charlatanism, and that *savans* are quite as much disposed to oppression as the priests ever were, though happily they have not the same means and opportunity. The remedy lies in the critical social spirit, which was introduced with the Catholic system, and which must attend again upon the separation of the two powers. Its disastrous exaggeration in our day is no evidence against its future efficacy, when it shall have been duly subordinated to the



organic spirit, and applied to restrain the abuses of the new system. The universal propagation of sound knowledge will check false pretension to a great extent: but there will also be need of the social criticism which will arise from the very constitution of the spiritual authority,—based as it must be on principles which may be at all times appealed to, as tests of capacity and morality. If, under the Catholic constitution, the meanest disciple might remonstrate against any authority, spiritual or temporal, which had infringed ordinary obligations, much more must such a liberty exist under the positive system, which excludes no subject whatever from discussion, under fitting conditions,—to say nothing of the greater precision and indisputableness of moral prescriptions under the positive system.

I have exhibited the nature and character of the spiritual reorganization which must result from the preparation of past ages. It is not possible to perform the same office in regard to the temporal system, because it must issue from the other; and it is impossible for any one to foresee more than the general principle and spirit which will regulate the classification of society. Of that principle and spirit I may briefly speak; but it would be countenancing the empiricism of the present day to enter into detail, which must be altogether premature. First, we must

*Public and  
private func-  
tion.*

discard the distinction between public and private functions,—a distinction which could never be more than temporary, and which it is impossible to refer to any rational principle. The separation was never contemplated till the industrial system succeeded to that of personal bondage; and then the distinction referred to the old system, on the one hand, with its normal functions; and, on the other, to the new system, with its partial and empirical operations, which were not perceived to have any tendency towards a new economy. Thenceforward the conception represents our view of the whole past, in its negative and its positive progression; and it assumed its present preponderance when the final crisis began, when public professions, spiritual and temporal, dissolved, as an extension took place of functions which were formerly private. The distinction will endure till the primary conception of the new system shall have taught all men that there is a public utility in the humblest office of co-operation, no less truly than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labour were but systematized, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honour of a share in the action of the general economy. Thus, the abolition of this distinction depends on the universal regeneration of modern ideas and manners. We have thus to discard altogether the notion of private functions, as belonging to a transitory system, and to consider all as alike social, after having put out of the question whatever functions have to be

eliminated; that is, the theological and metaphysical offices which will then have expired. The modern economy thus presenting only homogeneous elements, it becomes possible to form a conception of the classification that is to ensue. The elevation of private professions to the dignity of public functions need occasion no essential change in the manner of their discharge; but it will make all the difference in the world in their general spirit, and not a little in their ordinary conditions. While on the one hand there will be a universal personal sense of social value, there will be on the other hand an admission of the necessity of systematic discipline, incompatible with a private career, but guaranteeing the obligations belonging to each function. This one change will be a universal symptom of modern regeneration.

The co-ordinating principle must be the same that I have applied in establishing the hierarchy of the sciences,—that of *Principle of co-ordination.* the degree of generality and simplicity of the subject, according to the nature of the phenomena. The same principle was tested in its application in the interior of each science; and when we were applying it in biology, we found it assuming a more active character, indicating its social destination. Transferred from ideas and phenomena to actual beings, it became the principle of zoological classification. We then found it to be the basis of social statics; and our dynamical inquiry showed us that it has determined all the elementary evolutions of modern social practice. It must thus be regarded as the law of all hierarchies; and its successive coincidences are explained by the necessary universality of logical laws. It will always be found working identically in every system which consists of homogeneous elements, subjecting all orders of activity to their due classification, according to their respective degrees of abstractness and generality. This was the principle of classification in old societies; and we see vestiges of it yet in the military organization, where the very terms of office indicate that the less general are subordinated to the more general functions. It needs no proof then, that, in a regenerated society, homogeneous in its elements, the change that will take place will be found to be in the elements, and not in their classification; for such classification as has taken place during the modern transition has been all in accordance with the principle. The only difficulty therefore lies in estimating the degrees of generality inherent in the various functions of the positive organism: and this very task has been almost entirely accomplished at the beginning of the last chapter, while the rest of the necessary material is furnished by the preceding part of the Work; so that I have only to combine these different particulars to create a rational conception of the final economy.

The idea of social subordination is common to the old and the new philosophy, opposite as are their points of view, and transitory

as is the one view in comparison with the other. The old philosophy, explaining everything by the human type, saw everywhere a hierarchy regulated in imitation of the social classification. The new philosophy, studying Man in connection with the universe at large, finds this classification to be simply a protraction of the biological hierarchy. But science and theology, considering Man each in its own way,—the one as the first of animals, and the other as the lowest of angels,—lead to a very similar conclusion. The office of positive philosophy in this case is to substantiate the common notion of social subordination by connecting it with the principle which forms all hierarchies.

The highest rank is held, according to that principle, by the speculative class. When the separation of the two powers first took place under monotheism, the legal superiority of the clergy to all other orders was by no means owing only or chiefly to their religious character. It was more on account of their speculative character; and the continued growth of the tendency, amidst the decay of religious influences, shows that it is more disinterested than is commonly supposed, and testifies to the disposition of human reason to place the highest value on the most general conceptions. When the speculative class shall have overcome its dispersive tendencies, and returned to unity of principle amidst its diversity of employments, it will obtain the eminent position for which it is destined, and of which its present situation can scarcely afford any idea. While the speculative class is thus superior in dignity, the active class will be superior in express and immediate power, the division answering to the two opposite ways of classifying men, by capacity and by power. The same principle determines the next subdivision of each class, before pointed out in another connection. The speculative class divides itself, according to the direction taken by the contemplative spirit, into the scientific or philosophical (which we know to be ultimately one), and the æsthetic or poetic. Alike as these two classes are in their distinction from the active, they so differ from each other as to require division on the same principle as runs throughout. Whatever may be the ultimate importance and eminent function of the fine arts, the æsthetic point of view can never compare in generality and abstractness with the scientific or philosophical. The one is concerned with the fundamental conceptions which must direct the universal action of human reason; whereas the other is concerned only with the faculties of expression, which must ever hold a secondary place. As for the other leading class, the active or practical, which comprehends the vast majority, its more complete and marked development has already settled the point of its divisions; so that, in regard to them, the theory has only to rationalize the distinctions sanctioned by spontaneous usage. Industrial action is divided into production and

transmission of products; the second of which is obviously superior to the first in regard to the abstractness of the work and the generality of the relations. Further division seems to be indicated according as production relates to the mere formation of materials or their working up; and as the transmission is of the products themselves, or of their representative signs, the generality being greater in the second particulars than in the first. Thus we find the industrial hierarchy formed, the bankers being in the first rank; then the merchants; then the manufacturers; and finally the agriculturists; the labours of the latter being more concrete, and their relations more special, than those of the other three classes. It would be out of place to proceed here to further subdivisions. They will be determined by the same principle when the progress of reorganization is sufficiently advanced; and I may observe that when that time comes, the most concrete producers, the labourers, whose collisions with their employers are now the most dangerous feature of our industrial state, will be convinced that the position of the capitalist is owing, not to any abuse of strength or wealth, but to the more abstract and general character of his function. The action and responsibility of the operative are less extensive than those of the employer; and the subordination of the one to the other is therefore as little arbitrary and mutable as any other social gradation.

When the gradation is once established, it will be preserved from question and confusion, not only by the clearness of its principle, but by the consciousness in each order that its own subordination to the one above it is the condition of its superiority to those below it; and the lowest of all is not without its own special privileges. The abuses attending all inequality will be restrained, not only by the fundamental education common to all, but by the more extended and severe moral obligations which press upon members of society, in proportion to the generality of their functions. Again, in proportion as social occupations are particular and concrete, their utility is direct, incontestable, and assured, and the existence of the workers is more independent, and their responsibility more restricted,—corresponding as their labours do to the most indispensable wants. Thus, if the higher ranks are dignified by a more eminent and difficult co-operation, the lower have a more certain and urgent function: and the last could provisionally exist by themselves, without perverting their essential character; whereas the others could not. This difference is not only a guarantee of social harmony, but it is favourable to private happiness, which, when the primary wants are securely provided for, depends mainly on the small amount of habitual solicitude: and thus, the lowest classes really are privileged in that freedom from care, and that thoughtlessness, which would be a serious fault in the higher classes, but are natural to them.

If we consider the successive degrees of material importance, as tested by wealth, we find an apparent contradiction in our statical series, between the speculative and the practical order: for in the first, the preponderance lessens as we ascend the scale, while in the latter it increases. This is owing to a distinction too little attended to by the economists,—between the more general extension and the more direct utility of any public services. Concrete labours, which prove to all eyes their own immediate use, are sure of a special recompense in proportion to their extension: but when the service is highly abstract, admitting of only an indirect appreciation, remote and dim, it is incontestable that, whatever may be its final utility, extensive in proportion to its generality, it will bring in less wealth, through the insufficient private estimation of a class whose partial influence admits of no ordinary analysis. Hence the dangerous error of measuring social participation by wealth, without distinction of the two orders, the speculative and the active,—thus extending to the first the law which relates only to the second. For instance, if the final results, even industrial only, of the great astronomical discoveries which have improved navigation could be estimated in each expedition, it is evident that no existing fortune could give any idea of the enormous wealth which would be realized by the heirs of the Keplers and the Newtons of society,—be the toll fixed as low as possible. Such a case shows the absurdity of the principle of pecuniary remuneration for all genuine services, by proving that the most extended utility must, on account of the remoteness and diffusion that belong to its generality, find its reward, not in wealth, but in social honour. Even in the speculative class, the same distinction is evident,—the æsthetic order being more in the way of wealth than the scientific,—inferior as their ultimate utility must be,—because they are more easily and immediately appreciated. Yet, in the face of these facts, there are economists who propose that the most abstract labours should be left to the protection of private interest. On the whole, it is clear that the greatest deposit of wealth will be in the middle of the hierarchy, with the banking class, who naturally head the industrial movement, and whose ordinary operations are at once appreciable and sufficiently general to favour the accumulation of capital. These circumstances, at the same time, cannot but render them more worthy of their temporal importance,—whenever, at least, their education shall be appropriate to their function. Their familiarity with abstract and extended enterprises must foster the spirit of generality, and an unusual aptitude for social combinations; so that with them will the temporal power principally rest. It will be remembered that this class will always be the least numerous in the industrial order; for the hierarchy will constantly exhibit growing numbers, in proportion as work becomes more particular and urgent, and therefore admits and requires more multiplied agents.

What I have said of the public character of all social offices under the new organization relates only to their social aspect, and not at all to the mode of their fulfilment. *Practical privacy.* In fact, the more the individual is improved by education, the more freely may the execution of public operations be confided to private industry. The less general and more actual labours,—those which belong to the practical order,—may be safely delivered over to the natural action of individual minds; and, while the prerogative of the central authority is carefully preserved, there will be entire freedom from any regulating spirit which could impede spontaneous activity, on which progression directly depends. In the speculative case, however, the social efficacy is too indirect, too remote, and therefore too little felt by the multitude to depend altogether on private estimation for aid: and public munificence should protect labours of this kind, the political character of these functions becoming manifest, in proportion as they are more general and abstract. This is the only way in which there can be any distinction between public and private professions; and the distinction will not affect the idea of a common social destination.

It can hardly be necessary to point out that there will be perfect freedom in the formation of the respective classes of *Practical freedom.* the positive hierarchy. The direct effect of a universal education is to place every one in the situation best adapted to his abilities, whatever his birth may have been. This is a liberty which depends more on general manners than on political institutions; and it depends upon two conditions,—that access to every social career should remain open to the capable; and that there should be some means of excluding the unworthy. When order is once completely established, such changes will become exceptional; because it is natural for professions to be hereditary. Few have a determinate vocation, and few social employments require such a vocation; so that the disposition to domestic imitation will have its way; whereas, the quality of the universal education and the state of social manners will be safeguards against this hereditary tendency assuming any oppressive form. There is no room for apprehension of any restoration of the system of castes. Caste can have none but a theological foundation; and we have long passed out of the last social phase that is compatible with it; and its remaining traces are, as I have shown, fast disappearing from amidst the advanced civilization of Western Europe.

It remains for me to point out the connection between such an organization and the just claims of the lower classes: and for this purpose I must ascertain the influence of such a connection, both upon the mass of the people and upon the speculative class.

Any spiritual power must be, by its very nature, popular; for its function is to set up morality to guide the social movement, and

its closest relations therefore must be with the most numerous classes, who most need its protection. The Catholic Church was obviously doomed to decay when it forsook its task of enlightening and protecting the people, and inclined to aristocratic interests: and in the same way, the inherent nullity of Protestantism appeared in the impotence of its puny authorities to protect the lower classes: and in the same way again, we recognize the empiricism and selfishness which spoil the speculative elements of our modern society in the strange aristocratic tendencies of so many *savans* and artists, who forget their own humble origin, and disdain to apply to the instruction and protection of the people the influence they have acquired,—preferring indeed to use it in confirmation of their own oppressive pretensions. There must be, in the normal state of the final economy, a strong sympathy between the speculative class and the multitude, from their analogous relation to the possessors of the chief temporal power, from their somewhat similar practical situation, and from their equivalent habits of material improvidence. Yet more important is the popular efficacy of the speculative authority, on account both of its educational function and of its regular intervention as moderator in social conflicts, through its habitual elevation of views and generosity of disposition. Without at all quitting its attitude of impartiality, its chief care will always be directed towards the humbler classes, who, on the one hand, are much the most in need of a public education such as their private means cannot attain; and, on the other hand, are much more exposed to constant injury. Even now, vast benefit would ensue if, in preparation for the system to come, positive knowledge and philosophy were sedulously brought within reach of the people. In the educational direction, the intellectual expansion would be much greater than is now easily believed: and the advantage in the other respect, in protecting them from collision with the governing classes, would be no less evident. The positive philosophy would teach them the real value of the political institutions from which they are apt to hope so much, and convince them of the superiority of moral over political solutions. All evils and all pretexts derived from social disturbance would thus be obviated: quacks and dreamers would lose their vocation; and no excuse would be left for delay in social reform. When it is seen why wealth must chiefly abound among the industrial leaders, the positive philosophy will show that it is of small importance to popular interests in what hands capital is deposited, if its employment is duly useful to society at large: and that condition depends much more on moral than on political methods. No jealous legal provision against the selfish use of wealth, and no mischievous intervention, paralysing social activity by political prohibition, can be nearly so effectual as general reprobation, grounded on an

ascertained principle, under the reign of positive morality. ~~The~~ new philosophical action would either obviate or repress all the dangers which attend the institution of property, and correct popular tendencies by a wise analysis of social difficulties, and a salutary conversion of questions of right into questions of duty.—In its impartiality it will make the superior classes participate in the lesson, proving to them the great moral obligations inherent in their position ; so that, for instance, in this matter of property, the rich will morally consider themselves the depositories of the wealth of society, the use of which will not involve any political responsibility (except in extreme cases), but should lie under a moral supervision, necessarily open to all, from the indisputableness of its principle, and of which the spiritual authority is the natural organ. Since the abolition of personal servitude, the lowest class has never been really incorporated with the social system : the power of capital, once a means of emancipation, and then of independence, has become exorbitant in daily transactions, however just is its influence through its generality and superior responsibility. In short, this philosophy will show that industrial relations, instead of being left to a dangerous empiricism and an oppressive antagonism, must be systematized according to moral laws. The duty to the lower classes will not consist in almsgiving, which can never be more than a secondary resource, nor made reconcilable with any high social destination, in the present advanced state of human condition and dignity. The obligation will be to procure for all, suitable education and employment,—the only conditions that the lower classes can justly demand. Without entering on the perplexed subject of wages, it is enough to say that their settlement will be largely influenced by the same agency. We need not inquire whether any political institutions will in course of time embody social securities of this kind : it is enough that the principle will remain eminently moral, in as far as it will be efficacious and harmonizing.

Such will be the effect on society of the philosophical preparation for the new system. It is very observable that the *Reciprocal effects.* reciprocal action on philosophy will be no less beneficial. In such a combination, the people will give to the philosophers more than they will have received from them. The popular adhesion will be the safeguard of the spiritual power against aggression from the temporal, such as will be instigated by human passions under the positive system, as under every other, notwithstanding its milder practical activity, and the increased sway of reason over conduct. On the one hand, the rich men may show their pride of wealth on occasion of the material dependence of the speculative class ; and these again may manifest the disdain which men of theory are wont to feel towards men of practice : and then will the people become the regulators of their conflicts, more even than in



the Middle Ages, being indebted to the one power for education and moral influence, and to the other for employment and material assistance; and always holding the balance between them, as of old.

If such be the prospect of the normal condition, it is easy to describe the preparatory stage which is near at hand. *Preparatory stage.* If popular participation is necessary to the new spiritual authority in its established condition, much more must it be so as a help to attain that condition. The wise permanent advocacy of popular interests is the only means by which the people can be taught the importance of the philosophical action which statesmen scoff at: and, when the spiritual power has become strong enough, its intervention in the collisions which must happen frequently in the absence of industrial system, will make its value more felt, and its function better understood, perpetually, by all classes. The classes which now recognize the supremacy of wealth alone will then be led by decisive, and sometimes very painful experience to implore the protection of the spiritual authority which they now regard as purely chimerical. The same causes which will make it the arbiter in collisions will make it the moderator in the social controversies in which already the need of such an influence is sorely felt: and on such services will rest its power, because they will command free assent and allegiance. There is nothing to be hoped from the political controversies which agitate the upper classes. Their disputes about the substitution of persons, ministerial or royal, have little interest for the bulk of society, and have no organizing tendency. The popular point of view is the only one which naturally offers a survey sufficiently large and clear to connect the present with the whole of the past, and to give an organic direction to the general mind. No agitation about political rights will meet the popular need, which can be satisfied with nothing more restricted than security of Education and Employment; and these can be obtained by no means short of social reorganization. This is the strong bond between popular needs and philosophical tendencies; and by means of it, the true social point of view will prevail in proportion to the share borne by the claims of the lowest classes in the great political problem. When the positive philosophy shall have penetrated that class, it will doubtless find a readier and happier reception than in any other; and the reaction that will ensue upon the higher classes will be no less fortunate, as enlightening them, in the only possible way, in regard to the whole social situation. In the midst of the painful conflicts which must recur till the conditions of order and of progress are fulfilled, the true philosophers who will have foreseen them will be prepared to exhibit the great social lessons they afford, and will convince the hostile parties that political measures are altogether inadequate to the cure of social evils. These few remarks may direct the reader's attention to

the connection between the systematic development of the positive philosophy and the social establishment of the popular cause,—exhibiting the alliance that is needed between a great idea and a great force; and I could not close my general estimate of the spiritual reorganization with a more emphatic statement.

To the reader's mind it may be safely left to compare the conditions of order and of progress in the existing state of things, and in that which is to come. The new philosophy takes up the disorder at its source, and reorganizes opinions, which are next to pass into morals and manners, and lastly into institutions. It adopts positive methods as well as doctrines, transforms the position of existing questions, the way of treating them, and their preparatory conditions: thus affording a triple logical security for social order. Subordinating the spirit of detail to that of generality, and therefore the notion of right to that of duty, it demonstrates the moral nature of the chief social difficulties. It substitutes the relative for the absolute spirit, and thus regards the whole past as a gradual evolution of the human mind and destiny, preparatory to present and future action. Lastly, it educes the science of Sociology, and assigns its position in the scale of human knowledge, under indisputable conditions, which exclude the incompetent from interference, and devolve these lofty contemplations upon the rare order of minds that are competent to them. Such is the promise with regard to Order. As to Progress,—the revolutionary party, which alone is progressive, is by no means obliged to desert the great rules which have advanced it thus far; but only to strip them of their absolute metaphysical character, and to accept and use them as relative: and in fact, when the ancient system is fairly discarded, and the new order is steadily growing up, the dogmas of the progressive party will acquire new strength, and admit of a bolder application than ever. Whatever demolition remains to be effected will be done with the avowal that it is a transitional act, necessary to open the path of progress. We have seen that the critical spirit, while duly subordinated to the organic, is rather favourable than hostile to its social efficacy; and in its renovated and clearly defined state it must become a genuine aid to progress, by exposing the impotence of metaphysicians and legists as a governing power, and by making war with the intellectual and moral vices which impede the growth of the new social elements. Thus will the positive philosophy fulfil the conditions laid down at the beginning of this volume. Without effort, and without inconsistency, it will show itself to be more organic than the retrograde school, and more progressive than the revolutionary, so that it may be described indifferently by either attribute. Tending to unity or to dissolve all parties by the satisfaction of all their reasonable desires, the positive school may hope to gather disciples from every class. Among the

*Promotion of  
Order and  
Progress.*

clergy, there may be some who can appreciate the restoration of spiritual authority, amidst the change of conceptions on which it must be grounded. Among the military class, there must be some who can rightly understand their existing function of preserving material order till it is systematically provided for. The scientific and æsthetic classes must hail a philosophy which will elevate them to the highest social rank and rule. The industrial leaders would appreciate, if their education did but admit of it, the protection to be afforded them against popular collisions, and the award of temporal supremacy. And I have shown why the positive school is likely to have the emphatic support of the lowest class of all. Among the equivocal and anomalous orders which can be included in none of these, there must be individuals who would gladly enter the positive school;—metaphysicians who see the virtue of generality in contrast to excessive speciality; and literary men, and even lawyers, who might find stimulus and scope for the exercise of their particular talents of exposition and discussion. I have never concealed my conviction that no collective adhesion can be looked for during the stage when men's prejudices and passions will be hurt more sensibly than their best desires will be gratified. The empiricism and egotism that belong to our anarchical condition are but too congenial to the youth of society: and every class resists the proposal of a new classification: and thus, all accessions will be, for some time, of individuals. But from all quarters due support will arise. If, in the last century, the negative philosophy, with all its anarchical tendencies, found support even from kings, because it corresponded with the needs of the time, we may surely hope for an equivalent reception for the positive philosophy in the nineteenth century, when from it alone we may hope for what we need,—the re-establishment of a normal condition in the most advanced state of society, and the extinction of the collisions which are occasioned by intellectual and moral anarchy, and which are spreading with its propagation.

I have adhered throughout my survey and speculation to my original limitation,—speaking solely of Western  
*National participation.* Europe, and taking no notice whatever of the rest of the human race. Such must be the course of the positive philosophers, who must leave the Asiatic tribes, and even those of Eastern Europe, to work out for themselves their preparatory conditions, and enter into the most advanced, as the circumstances of a future age shall determine. It is not our business to decide by anticipation what that preparatory course must be, nor when it shall terminate; nor to suppose that each race or nation must imitate in all particulars the mode of progression of those which have gone before. Except for the maintenance of general peace, or the natural extension of industrial relations, Western Europe must avoid any large political intervention in the East; and there is as much to be

done at home as can occupy all the faculties of the most advanced portion of the human race.

Though the five nations of Western Europe are essentially homogeneous, there are differences among them all which affect the reception and establishment of the positive philosophy and organization. The survey that we have made of the negative and positive progression affords us materials for a judgment as to the aptitude of each, all local prejudice being, as far as possible, discarded. France is pointed out by all evidence as the chief

*France.*

seat of social reorganization, from the decomposition of the old system being earlier and more complete there than elsewhere, and the various kinds of scientific and æsthetic evolution being, if not more advanced, of greater social influence than in other countries. Industry, if not specially developed to the greatest extent, has carried up the temporal power to an unparalleled political position; and there is a national unity in France which is remarkable for its completeness and permanence. The disposition of men of science, philosophy, and art, all over Europe, to regard Paris as a common country, is as significant as the subordination of all France to Paris, in showing that the foremost place, which has been so hardly acquired, is likely to be maintained. I am

*Italy.*

disposed to think that Italy comes next, in spite of her want of nationality. The military spirit is more nearly extinct there than anywhere else; the theological emancipation is complete, as regards cultivated minds: and there may we find the strongest traditional sense of the division between the spiritual and the temporal powers. The scientific and industrial evolutions are almost as much advanced as in France, but with less social effect, from the extinction of the theological and aristocratic spirit being less popular. Both are nearer however to their final ascendancy than in any other nation. The æsthetic evolution is, as I need hardly say, so nearly complete and universal, as to have sustained speculative life in even the lower order of minds. The want of nationality must keep back Italy from such a political leadership as is reserved for France; but the propagation of the original movement is not hindered by this. On the contrary, the spiritual reorganization may be thereby stimulated, as a result both of the special presence of Catholicism and of the greater eagerness for a European unity, from the impossibility of establishing an Italian one; that European unity being obtainable only through intellectual and moral regeneration. Next comes the German

*Germany.*

nation, because the military or feudal, and even the religious spirit, while less thoroughly exhausted than in Italy, is not so dangerously incorporated with the movement of modern society as in England. Nor is the political influence of Protestantism so inwrought and universal; nor has the temporal concentration of power assumed the aristocratic form, but the far

more favourable one of monarchy. The great danger is from the metaphysical spirit, which is doubtless more prevalent there than anywhere else; but it is certainly rapidly on the decline. Apart from that, the positive evolution is, in nearly all its departments, more advanced than in England, and especially in regard to the social influence which belongs to it. Though the philosophy may be mistaken, the philosophical spirit of the Germans disposes them to general meditation, which compensates largely for the dispersive tendencies of our scientific specialities. The industrial evolution, while less developed than in England, is nearer to its ultimate destination, because its expansion has been more independent of aristocratic rule. The want of nationality, occasioned mainly by Protestantism, may be of a different character from the Italian; but it acts in the same way as a stimulus to the positive regeneration which is to be the common inheritance of Western Europe. The

*England.*

English nation seems to be, for reasons already exhibited, less prepared for such an issue than any other branch of the great family, except Spain, where retarding influences of a special kind have been at work. We have seen how the feudal spirit, and the theological also, have preserved a dangerous political consistence, by means of the modification which they have gradually undergone,—a consistence which is compatible with partial evolutions of considerable duration, but is a serious obstacle to final reorganization. The retrograde, or at least the stationary system had been organized there with unusual strength, in both its spiritual and its temporal province. The English constitution is as hostile as Jesuitism itself to human emancipation; and the material compensation which has been offered as a bond of incorporation with the modern movement has become, amidst a great excitement of industrial activity, a serious political hindrance in many ways,—among others, by protracting the sway of an aristocracy which stands, in virtue of a military principle, at the head of a practical movement; by vitiating the mental habits of the people at large, through an exorbitant prevalence of concrete and utilitarian views; and again, by encouraging, to the injury of the national morals and manners, a pride and cupidity which tend to separate the English people from the rest of the European family. This disposition has impaired, as we have seen, the development of science, and also of art, with the exception of Poetry, great as are the individual examples of achievement in both: and the social influence of both is more immature than in France, Italy, or Germany. All this is no hindrance to the new philosophy finding more effectual help from individuals in England than anywhere else, except in France, prepared as such minds are by the social state in which they live. They are saved from the chimerical hope, so fatal on the Continent, of redemption by means of a universal imitation of the British constitution, whose transitory and inadequate character must be better

understood at home than on the Continent. Again, if the practical spirit be exorbitant, it brings one advantage with it,—that, while it does not check general meditation in minds to which such contemplations are congenial, it gives them a character of clearness and reality which is not to be found elsewhere. Finally, in consequence of the inferior social importance of scientific bodies, individual *savans* have more originality than on the Continent, and can better withstand the dispersive tendencies that belong to the *régime* of speciality, the philosophical conversion of which will probably encounter fewer obstacles in England than in France. There is no occasion to justify at any length my assigning the last place to Spain. Though the retrograde system is in reality less substantial than in England, it is more repressive, from being badly administered. The extreme enforcement of Catholicism has been less favourable than in Italy to mental emancipation, and to the maintenance of the political habits of the Middle Ages in regard to the separation of the two powers. In the last respect the Catholic spirit was much impaired through a too close incorporation with the system of government; so as rather to excite vicious theocratic tendencies than to promote a rational co-ordination between the moral and the political power. These considerations however do not impair the claims of Spain to admission into the great European commonwealth, where former connection is an all-sufficient reason for present inclusion, notwithstanding some incidental embarrassment, philosophical or political, that may thence arise. The resistance of the Spanish people to the oppressive invasion of Bonaparte testifies to a moral energy and political tenacity which, in that country particularly, reside in the mass of the people, and guarantee their fitness for the final system when their special liabilities to retardation shall have been outgrown.

We see that the preparation for the positive system is unequal among these five nations: and it follows that in the working out of the scheme their respective advantages should be laid hold of, and converted into means of fulfilment. This must be done by the co-operation of the best minds in each nation, who should systematize the intellectual and moral offices which are declined more and more by the European governments, and delivered over to independent thinkers. Such thinkers may form a positive Council, under one form or another, and act either by reviewing and renovating all human conceptions; or by instituting seats of education for the advancement of positive knowledge, and the training of fit coadjutors; or by regulating the application of the system through unremitting instruction of all kinds, and even by philosophical intervention in the political conflicts which must arise till the old social action is exhausted.

*Co-operation  
of thinkers.*

By the review of the former social states of mankind, and the

sketch of the future organization of society which I have now completed, I trust I have fully redeemed my promises, as offered both at the beginning of this work, and at the outset of the sociological portion. At a time when moral and political convictions are fluctuating for want of a sufficient intellectual basis, I have laid the logical foundation of firm convictions, able to withstand discordant passions, public and private. At a time when practical considerations are excessively preponderant, I have restored the dignity of philosophy, and established the social reality of sound theoretical speculations by instituting a systematic subordination of the one to the other, such as is essential to social stability and greatness. At a time when human reason is liable to be frittered away under an empirical system of dispersive speciality, I have announced, and even introduced the reign of the spirit of generality, under which alone a universal sentiment of duty can prevail. These three objects have been attained by the institution of a new science, the last and most important of all, which is as positive and logical as any of the other sciences I have treated of, and without which the system of true philosophy can have neither unity nor substance. The future progress of Sociology can never offer so many difficulties as this original formation of it; for it furnishes both the method by which the details of the past may serve as indications of the future, and the general conclusions which afford universal guidance in special researches. This scientific foundation completes the elementary system of natural philosophy prepared by Aristotle, announced by the scholastics of the Middle Ages, and directly proposed, in regard to its general spirit, by Bacon and Descartes. All that remains for me to do is to co-ordinate the elements which I have passed under review, in the form of six fundamental sciences, under the heads of Method, Doctrine, and the general unity of the positive philosophy.

*Results of the  
Sociological  
theory.*

## CHAPTER XIII.

## FINAL ESTIMATE OF THE POSITIVE METHOD.

Now that we have completed our review of the six great sciences, it is evident that the hierarchical succession from Mathematics to Sociology is the means by which our understanding is gradually borne up to the definitive point of view of the positive philosophy, the true general spirit of which could not otherwise be disclosed. We have traced an individual evolution corresponding to the aggregate one, that we may, in a general way, consider to have set out from the conjoint philosophical and scientific action of Bacon and Descartes, in alliance with Kepler and Galileo. The entire survey was necessary to the estimate, methodical and doctrinal, of each principal phase of rational positivism: and the homogeneity of the partial disclosures has prepared us for their convergence towards an identical final philosophy,—never till now ascertained. All that remains for me to do is to exhibit the co-ordination of the different conceptions, logical and scientific, under a genuine principle of unity; by which we may discern what will be the intellectual and social *Principle of Unity.* action of the system which will henceforth guide the conduct of human life. That such a philosophical unity is the first condition of social reorganization the preceding chapter has shown us; and those who do not feel the social want are becoming more and more aware of the speculative necessity. The ancient system being worn out and discarded, and new materials and instrumentalities being obtained, the time has fully arrived for consolidating the great speculative evolution of the last two centuries, under penalty of sinking into the mental degradation which disgraced the old Greek and Medieval populations on the expiration of an old *régime*, and before the institution of a new.

The necessary co-ordination is an easy task, because positivity has been presented to us in a series of states, more and more complete, each of which includes all that went before; so that the last,—the most complex that human reason can ever be employed upon,—is the universal bond of connection among all positive speculations whatever. Laborious as has been our examination of the



whole series, our conclusions may, by such preparation, be drawn briefly, and without any difficulty.

The chief question is as to which of the speculative elements must finally prevail over the rest,—philosophical unity requiring the preponderance of one, for the practical development of the positive principle. The constitution of the scientific hierarchy shows that the intellectual pre-eminence must belong either to the first or the last degree of the scale; either to mathematics or sociology; for they alone can evidently be universal,—the one from its origin, and the other from its destination. Mathematical science (in which we may here include astronomy, as the embodiment of mathematics) claims a logical supremacy, in virtue of the indisputable extension of geometrical and mechanical laws to all possible orders of phenomena. In the other view, Sociological philosophy (in which we may include biology, as its basis) may establish its claim, now that the condition of genuine positivity is fulfilled, since all speculations of every kind may be regarded as necessary results of the speculative evolution of the human race. It will be undisputed that the two intermediate sciences, physics and chemistry, have no pretension, on account of either origin or destination, to be more than powerful auxiliaries of the rival impulsions. The question lies between mathematics and sociology.

According to my theory, Mathematics necessarily prevailed during the long training of the human mind to positivism; and Sociology alone can guide genuine speculation when its basis is once fully ascertained. This distinction, which is the first and greatest of our general conclusions, involves at once the explanation and the solution of the lamentable antagonism which has been growing up for three centuries between the scientific genius and the philosophical,—the one having claimed a positivity, and the other a generality, which are now for the first time reconciled. Before the progression of the human race was referred to natural laws, men neglected the consideration of generality for that of positivity, because the generality remained connected with a worn-out system which had to be discarded before progress could be made: but now that the positive character is extended to all orders of speculation, sociological conceptions may resume the supremacy which belongs to their nature, and of which they were only provisionally deprived during the last medieval period, by the temporary exigencies occasioned by the positive evolution.

We have seen, throughout this Work, that Mathematical science is the source of positivity: but we have also seen that mathematical conceptions are by their nature incapable of forming a genuine, complete, and universal philosophy. Yet all the attempts for three centuries past to constitute a philosophy that should replace that

which was worn out have proceeded on the mathematical principle. The only one of all these premature attempts which deserves eternal remembrance on account of its services is the Cartesian philosophy, which furnished the type of those that followed, while very superior to them all. This great scheme, which laid down geometry and mechanics as the basis of universal science, happily fostered for a century, in spite of its enormous inconveniences, the rise of positivity in all the chief departments of inorganic philosophy: but it not only failed to include moral and social researches, and was therefore imperfect, but it introduced disturbance into the simplest biological speculations, which has not even yet entirely subsided. However vast might be the progress of mathematical theories, they could never get over this imperfection, which became the more manifest, the stronger were the efforts to apply them; and by degrees their application was left to inferior workers, through a confused, but increasing sense in superior minds of their inaptitude. The attempts to find a starting-point in the physico-chemical sciences, unjustifiable as they were, afford evidence of the need that was felt of a universal connection, and explain why even philosophers, properly so called, have deserted the moral and social point of view for what they took to be a surer basis. The fruitlessness of the notion is no evidence that it was given up by scientific men, who have still hoped, with every accession of discovery, to find their mathematical principle universally applicable at last; and the practical effect of their persuasion was simply to prejudice them against any other systematic conception, and even against any portion of natural philosophy which was too complex to be brought under mathematical management. This is, even now, the great obstacle in the way of philosophical advancement; and in order to see how alone positive speculations may be brought into universal connection, the best way evidently is to compare the opposite courses of proceeding,—the mathematical and the sociological.

The claims of the mathematical spirit relate chiefly to Method; yet, as scientific logic there first arose, it could develop all its characteristics only by being extended to more and more complex subjects, till, through greater and greater modification, it finally entered into the most difficult speculations of all, and those which required a combination of all anterior means of investigation, as well as those which were proper to themselves. If, then, scientific men should stand forward to represent the positive attainments made in their respective sciences, the sociologists would be the only ones who could be regarded as having a complete knowledge of the positive method, while the geometers would have a more imperfect conception of it than any others, precisely because they know it only in its rudimentary state, while the sociologists alone would have carried it out completely. I have shown how the relative point of view, in

*The Mathe-  
matical ele-  
ment.*

opposition to the absolute spirit of the old philosophy, is the distinctive mark of the positive philosophy;—now, this relative spirit is scarcely perceptible at all in mathematical conceptions,—the extreme facility of mathematical deduction, often little other than technical mechanism, tending to deceive us as to the real scope of our knowledge. There is no lack of examples among geometers of inquisition into subjects wholly inaccessible to human reason; nor of obstinacy in substituting argument for observation. Sound biological speculation, on the contrary, perceives philosophy to rest on an historical basis; and this fulfilment of the first condition of positivism suffices to give sociology the supremacy. Again, the sense of the invariableness of natural laws cannot be much developed in mathematical researches, though it originated there; because the extreme simplicity of geometrical and mechanical phenomena hardly admits of a full and practical generalization of this great philosophical idea, notwithstanding the valuable confirmation arising from its extension to celestial phenomena. Hence it is that mathematicians drop the supposition of natural laws as soon as they encounter phenomena of any considerable degree of complexity, and especially when human action is in any way concerned; as we see by their pretended calculation of chances, through a special application of mathematical analysis,—an extravagance which is wholly incompatible with true positivity, but from which the vulgar of our algebraists still expect, after a century of wasted labour, the perfecting of some of the most difficult of human studies. In the other sciences we find still increasing manifestations of the invariableness of natural laws; but in sociology alone we find the full illustration of it, because there it is extended to the most complex of all events, which were excluded even by the Cartesian philosophy. Whichever way we look at the positive method, we shall perceive the eminent logical superiority of the sociological over the mathematical point of view. All the logical resources that the human mind can employ are exemplified in mathematical practice; but, through the extreme simplicity of the subjects to which they are applied, the most important of the means cannot be defined; and their scope can be duly estimated only when their chief destination is found, amidst the difficulties of an increasing complexity of phenomena, in the series of departments of natural philosophy. A reaction ensues, which cannot but be highly favourable to mathematical science, while it exposes the precise value of its claims. The comparative method proper to biology, and the historical method proper to sociology, are the two greatest of logical creations, achieved in the face of extreme scientific difficulties: but the disgraceful ignorance of almost all geometers of these two transcendent methods of logical investigation shows that it was not mathematics that furnished the conception, though some examples of them may be found in mathematical science, fruitless

and unintelligible to all who have not derived them from their original source. So much for the logical estimate.

As for the scientific,—the superiority of the sociological spirit is no less evident, in regard to the universality required. Though the geometrical and mechanical point of view is universal, in as far as that the laws of extension and motion operate, in an elementary way, upon all phenomena whatever, yet, however valuable may be the special indications thence arising, they can never, even in the simplest cases, obviate the necessity of a direct study of the subject; and that direct study must always be the preponderant one. The mathematical conditions moreover become vague and imperfect in proportion to the complexity of the case, though they can never be absent, and must always be taken into the account, as I have shown by my estimate of astronomical conditions in sociology. In fact, though not in principle, mathematical science has restricted its claims to the field of inorganic philosophy, scarcely even contemplating the admission of chemistry in some remote future; a pretension very unlike that of the universality which was once proposed. Hence the necessity of other guidance in moral and social pursuit; and hence the confusion and barren social agitation of modern times. If restricted to the inorganic domain, the supremacy of mathematics becomes much less injurious: but even there it can last only till the physicists have learned to take the use and application of this powerful logical instrument into their own hands. As the most general laws of inert nature must remain for ever unknown to us, from our inevitable ignorance of cosmical facts, properly so called, the mathematical spirit can frequently handle physical questions only by such hypotheses about the mode of production of phenomena as I have before exposed. When the repugnance of physicists to admit geometers to solve physical problems shall have taken due effect, the supposed mathematical philosophy, which appeared, two centuries ago, to have taken possession of the whole field of human speculation, will be reduced to one province outside its own,—that of astronomy, which appears to belong properly to it, in virtue of the geometrical and mechanical nature of its corresponding problems. Even there, if we go to the extremity of the case, the mathematical interference in astronomy has a precarious and forced character, which will prove to be merely transitory. It is certain that astronomical, like physical, discovery has been much impeded by the intrusion of the geometers, who do not perceive, in the one case, any more than in the other, that the pursuit of any science is the work of students who understand the special destination of the instrument, logical or material, as well as its structure. The mathematicians would reduce the whole band of physical astronomers to the rank of mere settlers of certain coefficients, to the serious injury of astronomical discovery. In astronomy itself, then, it appears that the sway of the mathematical

spirit is likely, not to increase, but rapidly to decline, till it shall be at length restricted to its own province of abstract and concrete mathematics. It is only owing to the temporary needs of the human mind, during the preparation for discarding the old philosophy, that any other expectation was ever justifiable.

From these considerations I have been able to show, at least in the way of exclusion, that, on both logical and scientific grounds, the sociological spirit must be recognized as supreme, even without any elaborate contrast of its high aptitudes for universal direction with the impotence proper to the mathematical spirit. As the science is newly created, and now first proposed, this is not the place to exhibit at length its certain reactionary effects on the other sciences; nor would the few special examples which might already be cited meet with due appreciation till our mental habits are somewhat improved: so that it is chiefly *à priori*, under sound philosophical regulation, that the rational supremacy of the sociological spirit over every other kind, or rather degree, of the scientific spirit may be established: but the immediate grounds of this procedure are so unquestionable that they cannot but be assented to by all duly-prepared minds.

The only really universal point of view is the human, or, speaking more exactly, the social. This is the only one *The Sociological element.* which recurs and is perpetually renewed, in every department of thought; in regard to the external world as well as to Man. Thus, if we want to conceive of the rights of the sociological spirit to supremacy, we have only to regard all our conceptions, as I have explained before, as so many necessary results of a series of determinate phases, proper to our mental evolution, personal and collective, taking place according to invariable laws, statical and dynamical, which rational observation is competent to disclose. Since philosophers have begun to meditate deeply on intellectual phenomena, they have always been more or less convinced, in spite of all prepossession, of the inevitable reality of these fundamental laws; for their existence is always supposed in every study, in which any conclusion whatever would be impossible if the formation and variation of our opinions were not subject to a regular order, independent of our will, and the pathological change of which is known to be in no way arbitrary. But, besides the extreme difficulty of the subject, and its vicious management hitherto, human reason being capable of growth only in social circumstances, it is clear that no decisive discovery could be made in this way till society should have attained a generality of view which was not possible till our day. Imperfect as sociological study may yet be, it furnishes us with a principle which justifies and guides its intervention, scientific and logical, in all the essential parts of the speculative system, which can thus alone be brought into unity. It appears to me that the mere existence of this book is a sufficient testimony to

the reality and fertility of the new general philosophy; for it presents the spectacle of the whole range of sciences subjected to one point of view, without interference with the independence of any, and with a confirmation instead of a weakening of their respective characters, by the power of a single thought—by the application of a single general law. Brief as my expositions have necessarily been, thoughtful readers cannot but be aware of the new light, generated by the creation of Sociology, cast upon all the foregoing sciences. Considering the inorganic sciences alone, in which such philosophical intervention is most questioned, we shall find the following results:—

1. In Chemistry, the conception of facultative dualism, by which difficulties in high chemical speculation may be dealt with which had hitherto appeared insurmountable:

2. In Physics, the foundation of a sound theory of scientific hypotheses, for want of which the positivity of the leading conceptions was seriously impaired:

3. In Astronomy, the just estimate of sidereal astronomy,\* and the reduction of our researches to our own system:

4. In Mathematics, the rectification of the bases of Rational Mechanics, of the whole system of geometrical conceptions, and of the first procedures of analysis, ordinary and transcendental.

All these improvements, tending alike to consolidation and advancement, are due, more or less directly, to the supremacy of the historical view proper to sociology; the only view which permits our first and constant attention to be given to the statical and dynamical working out of questions relating to the respective constitution of the various parts of natural philosophy.

We may thus fairly decide that the philosophical principle of unity is afforded by Sociology, and not by Mathematics. As the varying constitution of the speculative class necessarily represents the corresponding situation of the human mind in general, the nascent positivism of the last three centuries has given to the mathematicians more and more of that authority which, till the end of the medieval period, had belonged to moral and social researches. This provisional anomaly will now come to an end; for, when sociological theory has once reached the positive state, there is nothing except the opposition of the ignorant and the interested, to prevent the human view from resuming its natural place at the head of all human speculation. I have said that this conclusion was not only the first but the greatest: and in fact, the question of supremacy is the only one important to decide, at the point that we have now reached. The only possible alternative is now decided, by considerations drawn from abstract science alone, according to the original conditions of this Work;—that abstract science which, after Bacon, I have called the First Philosophy,

\* Compare vol. i. p. 153, note..

because it is the basis of all speculation whatever; but the same decision may be reached by considerations of concrete science, and even by æsthetic contemplation: for the sociological organization of positive philosophy favours their expansion; whereas the mathematical mode, if fully carried out, would be fatal to it.

In regard to the first order of evidence,—if abstract science must be the main subject of speculative study, it must serve as the basis of concrete science, which can acquire rationality only by the ascertainment and due description of the philosophical elements concerned; and the mathematical spirit, urged too far, and countenancing the use of analysis alone, is incompatible with the reality and concentration necessary to the study of the existence of actual beings. The sociological spirit, on the contrary, while duly preserving its abstract character, is highly favourable, by both complexity of subject and generality of view, to the mental dispositions requisite for the rational cultivation of natural history, which indeed is, from its human and synthetic character, much more congenial with sociology than with any other fundamental science,—not excepting even biology. The general interests of concrete study require therefore that the direction of abstract philosophy should reside in the science in which the inconveniences of abstractness are reduced to the utmost, in virtue of the most complete reality of the habitual point of view. The same considerations apply to the æsthetic case. The sociological mode must be fittest to regulate the subordination of the sense of the beautiful to the knowledge of the true: and the scientific spirit most disposed to unity must be most suitable to the synthetic character of æsthetic contemplation, which always, perceptibly or not, relates to the emotions of the human being. If the positive philosophy has been often reproached with its anti-æsthetic character, it is owing to the sway of the mathematical spirit for three centuries,—the dispersive and mechanical tendency of which affords fair ground for the reproach. By its contrasting character of true and fertile unity, the sociological philosophy will prove itself more favourable to Art than the theological, even in the polytheistic period. The positive spirit, in its sociological form, undertakes to disclose the general laws of the human evolution, of which the æsthetic evolution is one of the chief elements; and the requisite historical process is eminently adapted to exhibit the relation which must ever subordinate the sentiment of ideal perfection to the idea of real existence: and by discarding henceforth all superhuman intervention, sociological philosophy will establish an irreversible agreement between the æsthetic and scientific points of view.

There may be somewhat more doubt in regard to the remaining case,—that of Industry; because, depending as it does on the knowledge of the inorganic world, geometrical and mechanical first, and then physical and chemical,—it may appear to be in danger of

abandonment if the mathematical spirit loses its rank in scientific speculation. I might allege, in the first place, that there would be no great harm in retarding the progress of a kind of activity which, from its facility, and its adaptation to the commonest inclinations, threatens to absorb all others that are more noble. There can never be any serious apprehension that the growth of ideas and feelings suitable to a renovated social condition will proceed so fast and so far as to occasion any dangerous industrial negligence: and if such a thing could happen, the new philosophy, occupying the true point of view, would sufficiently rectify the fault. The mathematicians may be incapable of estimating social researches, but sociologists are free from their blindness, and can never possibly underrate mathematical labours. Again, we stand in much greater need, for industrial advancement, of a better use of means already acquired than of the unregulated accumulation of new ones: so that the restraint of synthetic tendencies is precisely the safeguard that we want against the desultory enterprises of wild analytical impulses: and thus again is the sociological *régime* more favourable than the mathematical to material improvement. Once more, when the action of man upon nature is duly systematized under the new body of doctrine, it must be done under the guidance of sociological philosophy, which alone is able to combine all the scientific aspects requisite for the great work,—the conditions and difficulties of which are yet scarcely suspected by our engineers, as I hinted in my former volume. Near the beginning of that volume I pointed out the true principle which must regulate the agreement between contemplation and action: and this reference must suffice, under my inability to go further into the subject here. Thus it appears that the supremacy of sociological philosophy over the mathematical is confirmed by all concrete, æsthetic, and technical considerations. The toilsome and protracted preparation by which this position must be attained is shown by the whole economy of this Work; and especially by the expositions of this volume. The vigour and patience requisite for the scientific and logical preparation, and for the ability to connect special progress with the general movement, form a striking contrast with the ease with which mathematicians qualify themselves for the authority which they claim. A few years spent in pursuing one kind of studies, so simple as to be accessible to average ability, are the mathematical qualification; but the result has been, in the most triumphant days of mathematical ambition, a supremacy more apparent than real, and wholly destitute, amidst all its pretensions to scientific universality, of the practical reality which belongs to sociological ascendancy.

This unity, thus established and regarded both historically and dogmatically, puts an end to the long and fatal antagonism between the conceptions which relate to Man, and those which



concern the external world. Hitherto they have been concluded to be irreconcilable; but my philosophical solution combines them entirely and for ever. I need not repeat the history of this antagonism, from the first antipathy between the theological and positive spirit, owing to their assumption of the opposite points of view, through the Cartesian compromise, and the struggles of the mathematical philosophy with expiring theology and metaphysics, up to the present hour, when the solution is offered by the extension of the positive spirit to moral and social speculation, affording all the positivity of the one and all the generality of the other. With this antagonism disappears that other fatal one, closely implicated with it, by which intellectual progress appeared to be contradictory to moral progress. The state of things under which mental requirements gradually prevailed over moral needs, dates from the beginning of the modern transition,—and it was its most deplorable condition. The more deplorable that condition, the more regard is due to the philosophy which alone can resolve the antagonism. We have seen how this philosophy takes up the best work of Catholicism, where Catholicism let it drop, through its connection with a worn-out system. The natural preponderance of Morals which I have shown to be ascribable to the positive system, is quite as indispensable to the efficacy of the intellectual, as of the social evolution; for indifference to moral conditions, so far from corresponding with the exigencies of intellectual conditions, is a growing impediment to their fulfilment, inasmuch as it impairs the sincerity and dignity of speculative efforts, already too subservient to personal ambition, so as to destroy, in course of time, the very germ of genuine scientific progress. To make this connection perfectly clear, it is necessary to strip away the last metaphysical illusions, and show what is the true human point of view,—that it is not individual but social; for under either the statical or the dynamical aspect, Man is a mere abstraction, and there is nothing real but Humanity, regarded intellectually or, yet more, morally. It is only through its holding this view, that the theological philosophy has retained any of its influence to this day; and the fate of the metaphysical philosophy is decided by its inability to treat of Man otherwise than individually. The same vice marked the positive system, while it was directed by the mathematical spirit alone; and this compelled philosophers, as Cabanis and Gall, for instance, to fix on biology as the centre of scientific unity. This was so far a good as that it brought the modern centre of organization much nearer to its real seat; but it would not answer further than for a necessary transition; and it protracted the old intellectual system by impeding the development of sound social speculation, which it looked upon as merely a natural corollary of biological studies. Whether the science of the individual is instituted metaphysically or positively,

it must be utterly ineffectual for the construction of any general philosophy, because it is excluded from the only universal point of view. The evolution of the individual mind can disclose no essential law : and it can afford neither indications nor verifications of any value unless brought under the methods of observation taught by the evolution of the human mind in general. Thus, the biological phase is only the last introductory stage, as each of the preceding sciences had been before, to the development of the positive spirit, by which its own scientific and logical constitution must be consolidated. The preparation being fully accomplished, and the positive spirit having reached the last degree of generality, we may judge of its claims by comparing it with the programme drawn so powerfully by Descartes and Bacon, whose chief philosophical aspirations are thus found to be united in their fulfilment, however incompatible they once appeared. Descartes denied himself all social research, as we have seen, to devote himself to inorganic speculation, from which he knew that the universal method must take its rise ; while, on the contrary, Bacon applied himself to the renovation of social theories, to which he referred the advancement of natural science. The tendency of Hobbes was the same ; and he was the type of the school. The two procedures, complementary to each other, accorded, the one to intellectual demands and the other to political needs, a too exclusive preponderance which must reduce both to a merely provisional rank,—useful as both were in their place. Descartes directed the agency of the positive spirit in inorganic science : and Hobbes brought to light the germs of true social science, besides assisting to overthrow the ancient system, which must be cleared away to make room for the new. The one method prepared the general position of the final question, and the other opened logical access to its solution. This work results from the combination of the two evolutions, determined under the influences of the great social crisis, by the extension of the positive spirit to subjects verging on social research. Thus, the new operation consists in completing the double initiatory procedure of Descartes and Bacon, by fulfilling the two conditions, indispensable, though long seeming irreconcilable, adopted by the two chief schools which prepared the way for the positive philosophy.

Such is the relation of this solution to the present and the past. As to the future,—I need not point out the unreasonableness of any fears that the supremacy of the *Spirit of the Method.* sociological philosophy can injure any of the anterior sciences. That supremacy would be compromised by the neglect of any one of them, even if such neglect were possible. It may and will be the case that irrational and undisciplined labours will meet with less favour and less impunity than hitherto ; and also that the highest scientific capacity, and the most earnest public attention,

will be directed to sociological researches, as the best ability and interest always are at the command of the needs of their time. But there is nothing to lament in either of these results. As to the effect on private education, there is no greater cause for anxiety. The sociological theory requires that the education of the individual should be a reproduction, rapid but accurate, of that of the race. In his brief career, he must pass through the three stages which an aggregate of nations has wrought out with infinite comparative slowness; and if any material part of the experience is evaded, his training will be abortive. For the individual then, as for the race, mathematical speculation will be the cradle of rational positivity; and the claims of geometers are certain, therefore, of just consideration,—and the more, as the order and urgency of the needs of the human mind become better understood. But it will not be forgotten that a cradle is not a throne; and that the first demand of positivity, in its humblest degree, is to have free way, and to pursue it up to the point of universality, which is the only limit of genuine education.

These are the considerations which prove the fitness of the positive philosophy to reconcile the antagonistic methods of connecting our various speculations,—the one taking Man and the other the external world for its starting-point. Here we find the solution of the great logical conflict which, from the time of Aristotle and Plato, has attended the entire evolution, intellectual and social, of the human race; and which, once indispensable to the double preparatory movement, has since been the chief obstacle to the fulfilment of its destination.

Having thus ascertained the spirit of the positive method, I have to indicate briefly its nature and destination, and then its institution and development, in its complete and indivisible state; that its attributes, hitherto spontaneous, may be duly systematized, from the sociological point of view.

The Positive philosophy is distinguished from the ancient, as *Nature of the Method.* we have seen throughout, by nothing so much as its rejection of all inquiring into causes, first and final; and its confining research to the invariable relations which constitute natural laws. Though this mature view is yet too recent to be fully incorporated with all our studies, it is applied to every class of elementary conceptions, and is firmly established in regard to the most simple and perfect,—showing that a similar prevalence in the more complex and incomplete is merely a question of time. The true idea of the nature of research being thus attained, the next step was to determine the respective offices of observation and reasoning, so as to avoid the danger of empiricism on the one hand, and mysticism on the other. We have accordingly sanctioned, in the one relation, the now popular maxim of Bacon, that observed facts are the only basis of sound speculation; so that we agree to

what I wrote a quarter of a century ago,—that no proposition that is not finally reducible to the enunciation of a fact, particular or general, can offer any real and intelligible meaning. On the other hand, we have repudiated the practice of reducing science to an accumulation of desultory facts, asserting that science, as distinguished from learning, is essentially composed, not of facts, but of laws, so that no separate fact can be incorporated with science till it has been connected with some other, at least by the aid of some justifiable hypothesis. Besides that sound theoretical *Inquiry into laws.* indications are necessary to control and guide observation, the positive spirit is for ever enlarging the logical province at the expense of the experimental, by substituting the prevision of phenomena more and more for the direct exploration of them; and scientific progress essentially consists in gradually diminishing the number of distinct and independent laws, while extending their mutual connection. I have explained before that our geometers have been led, by contemplating only the wonderful scope of the law of gravitation, and exaggerating even that, to expect and strive after an impracticable unity. Our intellectual weakness, and the scientific difficulties with which we have to cope, will always leave us in the midst of irreducible laws, even in regard to the interior of each science. The universality which is proper to the sociological point of view instructs us how to establish as wide a connection as our means admit, without repressing the spirit of each science under a factitious mathematical concentration. In this way, while sound generalization will be for ever reducing the number of really independent laws, it will not be forgotten that such progress can have no value whatever, except in its subordination to the reality of the conceptions which guide it.

The next important feature of the positive method is the accordance of its speculative conclusions with the development of popular good sense. The time is *Accordance with common sense.* past for speculation, awaiting divine information, to look down upon the modest course of popular wisdom. As long as philosophers were searching into causes, while the multitude were observing indications, there was nothing in common between them: but now that philosophers are inquiring for laws, their loftiest speculations are in essential combination with the simplest popular notions, differing in degree of mental occupation, but not in kind. I have repeatedly declared in this work that the philosophical spirit is simply a methodical extension of popular good sense to all subjects accessible to human reason,—practical wisdom having been unquestionably the agency by which the old speculative methods have been converted into sound ones, by human contemplations having been recalled to their true objects, and subjected to due conditions. The positive method is, like the theological and metaphysical, no invention of any special mind, but the product of the general mind;

and the positive philosopher takes the spontaneous wisdom of mankind for his radical type, and generalizes and systematizes it, by extending it to abstract speculations, which have thus obtained the advancement that they exhibit, both in their nature and treatment. It is only by the popular determination that the field of scientific research can be marked out, because that determination alone can be perfectly and certainly free from personal bias of every kind, and directed upon impressions common to all men; and it is in fact impossible to conceive of either the origin or the final unanimous propagation of positive speculations apart from the general impulse and interest in them. The commonest facts are, as I have often said, the most important, in all orders of knowledge; and we have seen that the best instrumentalities of rational positivity are the systematized logical procedures given out by common sense. We see how modern psychology, setting out from the opposite point,—from the dogmatic formation of the first principles of human knowledge, and proceeding to analyse complex phenomena by the method which we now reject in the case of the simplest,—has never yet, with all its toil and perplexity, risen to the level of popular knowledge derived from general experience. Public reason determines the aim as well as the origin of science;—directing it towards provisions which relate to general needs; as when, for instance, the founder of astronomy foresaw that, as a whole, it would afford a rational determination of the longitudes, though that result was not realized till Hipparchus had been dead two thousand years. The proper task of positive philosophers is then simply to institute and develop the intermediate processes which are to connect the two extremes indicated by popular wisdom; and the real superiority of the philosophical spirit over common sense results from its special and continuous application to familiar speculations, duly abstracting them, ascertaining their relations, and then generalizing and co-ordinating them;—this last process being the one in which popular wisdom fails the most, as we see by the ease with which the majority of men entertain incompatible notions. Thus we perceive that positive science is, in fact, the result of a vast general elaboration, both spontaneous and systematic, in which the whole human race has borne its share, led on by the specially contemplative class. The theological view was widely different from this; and it is one of the distinctive characters of the positive philosophy that it implicates the thinking multitude with the scientific few in the general progress,—not only past but future; showing how familiar a social incorporation is reserved for a speculative system which is a simple extension of general wisdom. And here we recognize a fresh evidence that the sociological point of view is the only philosophical one.

So much has been said about the fundamental principle of sound philosophy being the subjection of all phenomena to invariable laws,

that I need advert to it here only because it must occupy its place in the statement of our general conclusions. *Conception of natural laws.* We have seen how late and partial was the development of the germs of this truth; how the principle was long recognized only in geometrical and numerical subjects, which seemed naturally placed beyond the theological pale that included everything else: how it began to show its value when it made its way into astronomy: how it afforded the intellectual ground of transition from polytheism to monotheism: how it was introduced, by means of alchemy and astrology, into physico-chemical speculations: how scholasticism then took it up, and extended it into a new field by its transient doctrine of a Providence submitting its action to rules: a doctrine which, by its apparent reconciling tendency, has protected the positive principle to this day, while it was spreading through all the provinces of inorganic philosophy, and taking possession at last of the science of Man, with all his intellectual and moral attributes. Here its progress stopped, till I extended it to social phenomena. Some metaphysical speculation there has been about the existence of general laws of society; but their germs have never been brought to light, nor their application to the most common and interesting phenomena been exhibited; but the exposition made in this work leaves no doubt of the universal presence of the principle, the generality of which is in the way henceforth of being proved, both by its philosophical ascendancy and its agreement with the general mind, to the satisfaction of all thinking men. Nothing but the protracted influence of monotheistic conceptions could have thus long prevented its universal acceptance amidst the overwhelming evidence of law afforded by the fulfilment of rational human prevision; and now, the nascent discovery of sociological laws will extinguish all remaining opposition by withdrawing its last province from theological explanation, and uniting it with the rest of the empire of human knowledge. While completing and consolidating the great mental revolution begun by the preceding sciences; this sociological recognition of laws perfects the conception of law in all the other provinces, by securing to them that independence in the case of each science which they could not obtain under the supremacy of the mathematical spirit; for, instead of being regarded as an indirect consequence, in the later sciences, of their action in the earlier, and as even growing weaker and more remote, they are suddenly reinforced in importance and dignity by being found in full action in a region inaccessible to mathematical conceptions. The sense of the presence of invariable laws, which first arose in the mathematical province, is fully matured and developed in high sociological speculation, by which it is carried on to universality.

As to the scientific nature of these laws, our ignorance of anything beyond phenomena compels us to make a distinction which does not at all interfere with our power of prevision under any

laws, but which divides them into two classes, for practical use. Our positive method of connecting phenomena is by one or other of two relations,—that of similitude or that of succession,—the mere fact of such resemblance or succession being all that we can pretend to know ; and all that we need to know ; for this perception comprehends all knowledge, which consists in elucidating something by something else,—in now explaining and now foreseeing certain phenomena by means of the resemblance or sequence of other phenomena. Such prevision applies to past, present, and future alike, consisting as it does simply in knowing events in virtue of their relations, and not by direct observation. This general distinction between the laws of resemblance and those of succession has been employed in this work in the equivalent form of the statical and dynamical study of subjects,—that is, the study of their existence first, and then of their action. This distinction is not due to mathematics, in the geometrical part of which it cannot exist. It only begins to be possible in the mechanical portion of mathematics ; manifests its character when the study of living bodies is arrived at, and organization and life are separately considered ; and finally, is completely established in sociological science, where it attains its full practical use in its correspondence with the ideas of order and of progress.

Logically considered, these laws offer one more distinction, according as their source is experimental or logical. The force and dignity of the laws are in no way affected by the different degrees of credit attached to the modes of ascertaining them. And it is usually a mistake to assign different degrees of credit to two modes of ascertainment which are necessary to each other, and each preferable in some portion or other of the field of knowledge. What the one finds, the other confirms and elucidates ; what the one indicates, the other searches for and finds. The positive system requires, on the whole, that deduction should be preferred for special researches, and induction reserved for fundamental laws. The different sciences present varying facilities for the application of the two methods, of which I will only briefly say that they go far to compensate each other. Sociology, for instance, might seem to be too complex for the deductive method, and at the same time less adapted to the inductive than the simpler sciences which admit of the broadest extension of positive argumentation : yet, through the dependence of the more complex sciences on the simpler, the latter yield *à priori* considerations to the former, which actually render the greater number of fundamental ideas deductive, which would be inductive in sciences that are more independent. Another consideration is that the more recent sciences, which are the more complex, have the advantage of being born at a more advanced stage of the human mind, when mental habits are improved by a stronger prevalence of the philosophical spirit. Thus, if a comparison were fairly established between the

first and last terms of the scale of sciences, I will venture to say, that sociological science, though only established by this book, already rivals mathematical science itself, not in precision and fecundity, but in positivity and rationality. It is more completely emancipated from metaphysical influence; and it is so interconnected as to issue in unity, as I have shown by deducing from a single law the general explanation of each of the successive phases of the human evolution. There is nothing comparable to this in the whole range of the anterior sciences, except the perfect systematization achieved by Lagrange in his theory of equilibrium and motion, with regard to a subject much less difficult and much better prepared: and this proves the natural aptitude of sociology for a more complete co-ordination, notwithstanding its recency and complexity in virtue simply of its natural position at the close of the encyclopædical scale.

These considerations point out to us the correlative characters which distinguish the positive method of philosophizing,—the logical and the scientific. The first *Logical method.* consists in the preponderance of observation over imagination, contrary to the earliest mode of proceeding. We have no longer anything to fear from theological appeals to the imagination: but the metaphysical procedure, which follows neither fictions nor facts, but its own train of entities, is still too attractive to minds which are not sufficiently established in positive practices. It is still necessary to point out that laws are the true subject of investigation, and that the function of imagination in philosophizing is to create or perfect the means of connection between established facts, but not, in any case, to meddle with the point of departure or the direction of the inquiry. Even in the *a priori* mode of proceeding, the general considerations which direct the case have been derived from observation in the science concerned or in some other. To see in order to foresee is the business of science: to foresee everything without having seen anything is only an absurd metaphysical Utopia, which still obtains too much favour. The scientific view which corresponds with this logical one is, that *Scientific method.* the positive philosophy substitutes the relative for the absolute in the study of qualities. Every inquiry for causes and modes of production involves the tendency to absolute notions; and the tendency therefore existed throughout the theological and metaphysical periods. The greatest of modern metaphysicians, Kant, deserves immortal honour for being the first to attempt an escape from the absolute in philosophy, by his conception of a double reality, at once objective and subjective; an effort which shows a just sense of sound philosophy. Placed as he was however between the Cartesian philosophy behind and the positive philosophy in its completion before him, he could not give a truly relative character to his view; and his successors lapsed into the absolute



tendencies which he had restrained for a time. Now that the scientific evolution comprehends social speculations, nothing can stop the decay of the absolute philosophy. Inorganic science, presenting the external world, where Man appears only as a spectator of phenomena independent of him, shows that all ideas in that sphere are essentially relative,—as I have before remarked, especially with regard to Weight, for one instance. Biology confirms the testimony by showing, with regard to individual Man, that the mental operations, regarded as vital phenomena, are subject, like all other human phenomena, to the fundamental relation between the organism and its medium, the dualism of which constitutes life, in every sense. Thus, all our knowledge is necessarily relative, on the one hand, to the medium, in as far as it is capable of acting on us, and on the other to the organism, in as far as it is susceptible of that action; so that the inertia of the one or the insensibility of the other at once destroys the continuous reciprocity on which every genuine idea depends. This is especially noticeable in instances in which the communication is of a single kind, as in astronomical philosophy, where ideas cease in the case of dark stars or of blind men. All our speculations, as well as all other phenomena of life, are deeply affected by the external constitution which regulates the mode of action, and the internal constitution which determines its personal result, without our being able in any case to assign their respective influences to each class of conditions thus generating our impressions and our ideas. Kant attained to a very imperfect equivalent of this biological conception: but, if it could have been better accomplished, it would have been radically defective, because it relates only to the individual mind; a point of view much too remote from philosophical reality to occasion any decisive revolution. The only natural and sound view was obviously one which should present a dynamical estimate of collective human intelligence, through its whole course of development. This is at length done by the creation of Sociology, on which the entire elimination of the absolute in philosophy now depends. By it, biology is rendered complete and fertile; showing that in the great elementary dualism between the mind and the medium, the first is subjected also to successive phases; and especially disclosing the law of this spontaneous evolution. Thus the statical view showed us merely that our conceptions would be modified if our organization changed, no less than by a change in the medium: but, as the organic change is purely fictitious, we did not get rid of the absolute, as the unchangeableness seemed to remain. But our dynamical theory, on the contrary, considers prominently the gradual development of the intellectual evolution of humanity, which takes place without any transformation of the organism, the continuous influence of which could not have been left out of the inquiry but by the vicious freedom of abstraction that characterizes metaphysical

study. This last effort alone, therefore, is thoroughly effectual in destroying the absolute philosophy: and if it were possible that I could be mistaken as to the true law of human development, the only inference would be that we must find a better sociological doctrine; and I should still have constituted the only method that could lead to positive knowledge of the human mind, regarded henceforth in the whole of its necessary conditions. Mental immutability being thus discarded, the relative philosophy is directly established: for we have been thus led to conceive of successive theories as accelerated approximations towards a reality which can never be rigorously estimated,—the best theory being, at any time, that which best represents the aggregate of corresponding observations, according to the natural course so well understood by scientific minds; to which sociological philosophy adds a complete generalization, and thenceforth a dogmatic sanction.

If there should be any fear for the stability of opinions, under this view, it is enough to point out that, in a statical *Stability of* aspect, however different the universe may appear to *opinions.* any existing and any conceivable order of beings, the foundation of knowledge must be essentially the same in all cases, differing largely in degree, but not in kind. Both the experimental and the logical part of every idea must be of the same sort to all minds, however differing in intensity; and we cannot deny the universality of the intellectual laws without denying that of all the other biological laws. The inferior animals know the universe much less than we do, as superior beings might know it much better, by more complete observation and more general reasoning: but in all these cases, the subject of investigation and the basis of conception remain the same, amidst wide differences of degree, such as we see in a small way every day among men of different capacities,—even mental maladies not affecting the case. In a dynamical view, it is clear that the variations in human opinion, according to time and place, do not affect the radical uniformity; for we now know the law of evolution to which these mutations are subject. There never would have been any apprehension about the matter, except for the absolute philosophy which could not conceive of truth apart from immutability: and to this it is owing that modern thinkers of the revolutionary school sever themselves wholly from the past, and regard all ancient opinion as a kind of chronic state of mental alienation, without inquiring any more into the reasons of its cessation than into its origin. Our historical survey has shown us that, through successive phases, the human race was advancing towards the fundamental truth to which we ourselves are only approximating, without any hope of attaining it. Sound philosophy interprets to us the progress, analogous to our own, by which the general mind grew up towards maturity, through the same principle of an increasing accordance between observations and conceptions, which now

convinces us of the progressive reality of our various positive ideas, since the inquiry into laws prevailed over the search after causes. Such is the relative character of the sociological philosophy,—setting before us the great human evolution, subject to a determinate course; governing at each period aggregate human thought, so as to reconcile the most mutually repugnant systems, by referring each to its corresponding position, without ever compromising the strength of the final decision by any such eclecticism as now aspires to lead the intellectual movement, while itself perpetually oscillating between the absolute and the arbitrary, which it appears equally to admire. The spectacle of dogmatic variations, as exhibited in human history, which is really dangerous to unfortified understandings, is thenceforth converted, by a judicious historical observation, into a direct and permanent source of the firmest and most extensive agreement.

Such is the nature of the positive method. The next inquiry is of its destination,—in regard to the individual, the race, speculative life and practical life. The theoretical office in regard to the individual consists in satisfying the double need of extending and connecting his real knowledge. The connection between our conceptions offered by the old philosophies,

*The Individual.*

hindered their extension by providing beforehand an explanation to suit all imaginable cases; and the consequence would have been a total obstruction of knowledge, but for the secondary questions, pertaining to common affairs, which disclosed the operation of laws, without which Man could not have guided his conduct from hour to hour. From this accessory, special, and desultory positivity, genuine investigation proceeded at length, and manifested its aptitude, first to connect our conceptions, and by that very connection to extend them; and then, using every extension to perfect the anterior connection. Though the introduction of new facts may appear to disturb the positive arrangement, all experience proves,—and the experience is now long enough to be relied on,—that the positive method solves all such difficulties by its faithful subordination of conceptions to realities. Meeting these two needs as it meets those of order and progress in social affairs, its function may be simply described as constituting the general harmony of our intellectual system, so as to express the natural pre-eminence of statical over dynamical needs,—those of existence over those of motion, in the case of the race as well as the individual. The relative character of the philosophical spirit exhibits this logical coherence as always constituting the most decisive testimony to the reality of our conceptions, because their correspondence with our observations is thus secured, and we may depend upon being as near the truth as the corresponding state of things allows. Now, as all rational prevision consists in passing regularly from one idea to another, in virtue of their mutual connection, such a prevision is necessarily the most perfect criterion of true positivity,—

manifesting as it does the destination of that fundamental harmony which makes the extension of our knowledge result from its general co-ordination. It is true, the feebleness of the speculative faculties in the human being prevents these intellectual needs from being very prominent; but they are more keenly felt than might be supposed from the patient resignation with which the human mind has endured a philosophical system which affords them no satisfaction; and it is a proof of this that there has never been a time when the introduction of new truth from without has not been hailed with extreme eagerness; an avidity which shows that theological and metaphysical explanations had been put up with merely under the impossibility of obtaining anything better, and without in any degree impairing the cerebral appetite for sound alimentation. The very weakness of our understandings is only another reason for our involuntary predilection for real knowledge,—important as is the comfort to us of reposing on the steadiness and continuity which cannot be recognized in single phenomena, and which bring all irksome doubt to a welcome close. Even greater,—immeasurably greater,—is the service rendered to the race by the speculative office which is thus important to the individual; for it constitutes the logical basis of human association. It harmonizes the collective in the same way as the individual mind, by means of the same property, though with unequal rapidity in the two cases. The resemblance between the individual and the collective human mind assures us that whatever philosophy constitutes a logical coherence in a single mind may be relied on, for that reason, to bring all thinkers into harmony, sooner or later. It is in this way that great philosophical minds become the intellectual guides of Humanity, undergoing first the mental revolution which they make easier and more speedy to others by its manifestation in themselves. If this oneness of interest was evident amidst the extravagances of former philosophies, it must be complete and irresistible in the positive state,—all minds speculating on a common basis, open to their examination, but untouched by their authority, and proceeding by a homogeneous course from the same starting-point to identical investigations,—their inequality affecting only the date of their success. The inverse action is clear;—that such an inevitable and unanimous concurrence must confirm the reality of the new conceptions, no less than their opportuneness. In another view, no partial intelligence can so separate itself from the general mass as not to be essentially carried on with it,—even if it be—as an extreme case—that of a wise physician compelled to live among madmen, whose vehement convictions inevitably act upon his own. The most profound thinker will therefore never forget that all men must be regarded as coadjutors in discovering truth, as well as in applying it. However nobly bold may be the genius destined to advance the general wisdom, its absolute isolation would

*The race.*

be as irrational as immoral. The state of abstraction which is a condition of high intellectual achievements, involves so much danger of error, by either negligence or illusion, that every good mind will prize the control of the general reason, steadying and correcting his particular adventurous course, till he shall have established his claim to that general assent which is the object of his labours. This speculative convergence, once obtained, becomes the first elementary condition of true association, which requires a union of concurrent interests with not only a sufficient conformity of sentiment, but also, and above all, of opinions; this triple foundation being indispensable to practical and durable association, from the household up to the whole human race. The deep-seated hatred always aroused by serious intellectual disagreement, indicates that, notwithstanding the feebleness of our intellectual faculties, any action on them affects the whole of our conduct, and that human association requires, in its highest state, their universal coincidence. I need only point to the disturbances, personal, domestic, and social, occasioned by the old philosophy which once exercised a harmonizing influence, however imperfect, to show the need of the new philosophy, which can alone furnish the basis of true intellectual communion, manifesting a consistence and extension to which the past can afford no parallel. This is the speculative destination of the positive method, for individual and collective Man.

Whenever, in the course of this Work, we have noticed the intellectual needs that relate to practical life, we have found them confirmatory of my view of the positive philosophy. It is as the basis of rational action that science has hitherto been universally prized; and that attribute will never lose any of its value. We have seen throughout how practical needs have generated science in all departments; though the science could not have been thus generated if our mental tendencies had not been favourable to it; since the practical aptitude of positive theories could be discovered only by adequate culture, driving out theological and metaphysical chimeras which made much larger promises. When once the relation of science to practical wants was made clear in a few cases, it became a very effectual stimulus to the philosophical spirit by exposing the impotence of the system of arbitrary wills and entities in directing Man's action upon nature; and the rationality and positivity of our conceptions were proved, to the eminent advantage of lofty scientific speculation, when prevision was made the ground of action, and the humblest practical problems were seen to be connected with the highest theoretical researches; as in the arts which relate to astronomy. Though some few minds find sufficient stimulus to the philosophical labour which is repugnant to our nature in the need to know phenomena and to connect them, the philosophical discipline would have been considerably retarded if practical exigencies had not

afforded a more general instigation. By completing the system of natural philosophy, the creation of sociology must prodigiously extend the relation between speculation and practice, which must henceforth embrace all possible cases. The rational subordination of art to science has already begun to *Practical life.* be organized, however imperfectly, in the natural order of the sciences, beginning with the geometrical and mechanical arts, proceeding through the physico-chemical, and now, in our own time, including the biological, which are concerned with the preservation of health and the treatment of disease. The political art remained unattempted,—its proud severance from all theory whatever being a mere testimony to the radical insufficiency of any theory yet proposed, and being destined to give way whenever the general reason shall perceive that here, as in other departments, phenomena are referred to real natural laws, such as may habitually supply practical guidance. Hence again, as in other cases, philosophy will derive fresh stimulus from its connection with practice, and our knowledge will increase and improve both in positivity and rationality. In thus ascertaining the destination of the positive method, we arrive at a better knowledge of its nature, through the inquiry into the direction of its efforts, and the degree of precision they admit of. In the absence of all guidance, in the earliest days of positivism, its spirit applied itself to everything that came in its way; but the blind instinct must yield, with the progress of science, to philosophical discipline, sanctioned by the popular good sense which is always opposed to a useless expenditure of our intellectual forces. When our theoretical labours are duly organized, the highest scientific and philosophical minds will be at command, to give their attention to the great subjects of the period, instead of being wasted as they are at this day; and the limit of research will be fixed no less indisputably than its kind, from its being ascertained to what point the natural laws which are the real object of study, are compatible with detail in investigation. We find in various cases, and especially in astronomy, that sound theory cannot successfully transcend the precision demanded by practical needs,—a purposeless inquisition being too likely to end in destroying laws already established, without any substitution of new guidance.

One more suggestion remains, with regard to the destination of the positive method; that, from its relative spirit, it determines the kind of liberty of option left to our *Liberty of method.* understandings in the formation of conceptions, as long as we respect the reality of external laws. In the construction of scientific works, we may give them the most suitable form, as we would in the æsthetic province. There are two kinds of cases to be considered in each department of research; those which are, though of a positive nature, indefinitely inaccessible, and those which are simply premature, but on which it is of consequence to us to have

some kind of opinion, as a basis for speculation. In the first class are included questions, arising in every province of natural philosophy, which our reason can never solve, but which may yet be regarded as positive, because it is conceivable that they would be manageable by a better organized intelligence, qualified for a more complete investigation and more powerful deductions. In such a case, we may select such artifices as are suggested by the genius of the science concerned, with due care that they shall aid, and not impede, the accretion of real knowledge. Of this kind is the hypothesis spontaneously adopted in physics, relative to the molecular constitution of bodies; and the device of dualism which I suggested in chemistry, in aid of the higher speculations of the science. In the second case, it is only necessary to apply the theory of hypotheses, sufficiently treated of in connection with physics; and which, when duly applied to practice without abuse, cannot but improve the cultivation of genuine knowledge. Thus we find the philosophical view of the study of natural laws to be, that that study represents to us the external world, by satisfying the essential inclinations of our reason, as far as is allowed by the precision prescribed by our practical needs. Our statical laws correspond to this instinctive predilection for order and agreement; and our dynamical laws accord with our irresistible tendency to believe in the perpetuity of any return once established.

We have now only to consider the institution and gradual development of the positive method.

The whole procedure of our reason affords promise that the positive philosophy will, in course of time, comprehend all subjects of human thought; not only science, but art,—æsthetic and technical. Yet, while keeping this prospect in view, we must abide by the double preparatory division which has thus far existed;—between speculation and practice first; and then between scientific and æsthetic contemplation. We have seen that these divisions date from the polytheistic period; the first becoming visible under the theocratic phase, and the other under the Greek system; and both having persisted to this day, notwithstanding the growing importance of their mutual relations. In all the six provinces of knowledge, we find the first condition of mental progress to be the independence of theory, as no conceptions could have been formed if the theoretical point of view had been inseparable from the practical. We see too how both must have entire freedom,—the theoretical spirit to retire into its condition of analytical abstraction, and the practical to occupy itself with specialities. If either repressed the other, the consequences would be fatal to progress: the practical supremacy would extinguish those tendencies which are already too weak; and the theoretical would exclude reality by preventing any practical operation from being completed. Our mental habits, generated by the old philos-

ophy, induce us to exaggerate the value of *à priori* considerations. They are very efficacious if wisely instituted and conducted; but the first condition of their utility is, that they should be applied by the practical spirit in each concrete case, the scientific data being merely comprehended among the elements of the special combination employed. Any greater subordination of the practical to the theoretical than this, could lead to nothing but hopeless disturbance. The nature of modern civilization tends to obviate such disturbance, by establishing the division in more and more clearness; and now the sociological spirit entirely consolidates it, by extending it to political conditions, in the way that we have seen. The division between the two kinds of contemplation,—the scientific and the æsthetic,—is much less disputed, though it is less marked. Even when imagination ruled in philosophy, the poetical spirit, in its utmost freedom, always recognized its subordination to the philosophical spirit, through the fundamental relation which connects the sense of the beautiful with the knowledge of the true, and thereby subjects the ideality of Art to the collective conditions of scientific reality. As reorganization proceeds, their combination will become closer, and especially in practical life,—Art affording to science, in return for a secure basis, not only intellectual solace and moral stimulus, but much reactive aid in perfecting its philosophical character. Under a relative philosophy, Art may be employed as it could not be under an absolute system, in facilitating scientific expression, and even suggesting modes of scientific pursuit. Whatever may be the ulterior value of such a connection, the distinction between the two kinds of contemplation will always be radical, and the more abstract and general will always govern the less.

A more modern, but wholly indispensable division remains to be noticed; that between abstract and concrete science, as established by me through the whole course of this Work. Bacon was the first who saw (and he but indistinctly), that what he called the First Philosophy (because it must form the basis of the whole intellectual system) could result only from an abstract and analytical study of the elementary phenomena which, in varied combination, constitute the existence of natural beings, for the purpose of ascertaining the laws proper to each order of incidents, considered directly and apart from the beings which manifest it. From no clear and express understanding of this distinction, but merely because it was impossible to proceed otherwise, scientific progress has been guided by it for two centuries past: for, as we have seen throughout, concrete science, or natural history, properly so called, could not be even undertaken till abstract science was instituted in regard to all the orders of elementary phenomena concerned; every concrete inquiry involving the combination of the two. Now, it is only in this work, which

*Abstract and  
concrete  
Science.*



first constitutes the final and most important science, that the condition has been fulfilled ; and it is therefore not surprising that the great scientific speculations between Bacon's time and ours have been of an abstract character,—the concrete speculations during the same interval having been necessarily impotent: nor can such a forced and empirical observance of the Baconian precept preclude the necessity of the demonstration which discloses the full bearings of the suggestion. Though the creation of Sociology, by completing and systematizing the first philosophy, must soon ensure an adequate treatment of concrete questions, it is not the less important to remember that the institution of the positive method must for ever rest upon the division, without which the two already pointed out would be altogether insufficient. This division constitutes in fact the most powerful and delicate of all the general devices required by the speculative working out of the positive system. The simplest, most general, and highest point of view attainable by the philosophical spirit has been reached by a gradual process of abstraction, discarding first practical requirements, then æsthetic impressions, and finally, concrete conditions: and if this last, founded on the same logical grounds as the others, had not accrued, to complete their efficacy, the positive philosophy could not have yet existed. In the simplest cases, even those of astronomical phenomena, we have seen that no general law could be established, while bodies were considered in their collective concrete existence, from which it was necessary to detach the leading phenomenon, and then to subject it to abstract examination, which, again, might react on the study of the most complex realities. The grand application of this logical precept is however in the case of sociological theories, from their extreme complexity; and in this province we see what rationality has been established, amidst all the dangers arising from a mass of unorganized learning, by my having put aside all concrete disturbance, in order to seize, in its simplicity, the law of human movement, leaving all apparent anomalies to be reduced to principle afterwards, as in the astronomical case. The maintenance of the division is necessary here for the same reasons as in regard to the two others, under penalty of lapse into such confused views and desultory speculations as we have with so much difficulty escaped from: and if this seems to remove the theoretical view too far from the practical, there will be a compensation in a superior generality, testifying to the necessity of the political and philosophical separation recommended in the last chapter as the basis of modern reorganization.

These are the three stages of successive abstraction, the combination of which determines the gradual institution of the positive method, in a spontaneous manner at first, and afterwards systematically. As the method is neither more nor less than a philosophical extension of popular wisdom to abstract speculation, it is clear that

its basis, corresponding with that of common sense, admits of no useful dogmatic explanation. If on this ground we decline looking for such dogmatic explanation of the lowest subjects of speculation,—of which all we can say is that our ideas are spontaneous and universal,—much more must we abstain from such barren and vicious systematizing in logical researches, properly so called. Thus are the logical and scientific points of view to be finally regarded as correlative and indivisible aspects of each positive theory, neither being in reality more susceptible than the other of an abstract and general appreciation, independent of any determinate manifestation. Thus they have been treated throughout this work, in which the logical training has always coexisted with the scientific, and their connection being such that the scientific results of one science have often been found to be the logical resources of another; a fact which shows the impossibility of separating them.

Thus have we ascertained the composition of the positive method: and we have only further to mark out the systematic co-ordination of the chief successive phases which it has naturally presented.

*Relations  
of phases.*

No irrational exaggeration of the claims of Mathematics can ever deprive that part of philosophy of the property of being the natural basis of all logical education, through its simplicity, abstractness, generality, and freedom from disturbance by human passion. There, and there alone, we find in full development the art of reasoning, all the resources of which, from the most spontaneous to the most sublime, are continually applied with far more variety and fruitfulness than elsewhere; whereas the art of observation, though there receiving its first scientific application, is scarcely traceable, even in mechanics. The more abstract portion of mathematics may in fact be regarded as an immense repository of logical resources, ready for use in scientific deduction and co-ordination: yet, as the human mind is indisposed to the most abstract speculation, it is geometry, rather than analysis, that will always be, in a logical view, the chief of the three branches of mathematics, and the fittest for the first elaboration of the positive method. When Descartes chose geometry for the ground of his organization of the relation of the abstract to the concrete, he made it the centre of mathematical conceptions, as analysis found there vast material and a noble application, in return for the generality which it imparted. Mechanics, on the contrary, though yet more important than geometry, in a scientific view, has by no means the same logical value, on account of its greater complexity; and the obligations of analysis to it are but secondary and indirect. In passing from geometrical to dynamical speculations, we feel how near we are to the limits of the mathematical province, from the extreme difficulty of treating the

*Mathematics.*

simplest questions in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.—We have seen abundant reasons, in the course of our survey, why the mind that confines itself within the mathematical province is subject to a variety of fatal snares, and very ill prepared for the loftiest aims of human reason. Without recapitulating the faults and errors arising from the misuse of the mathematical spirit, it is enough to say that when a sound philosophy prevails, it will be felt that the first phase of positive logic not only cannot dispense with those which follow, but must look to them for much reactive assistance from their combination, without which mathematical logic itself cannot be completely understood and valued.

These considerations show us the value of the next phase, the astronomical, in which the positive method obtains a second degree of development, in the closest connection with the first. It is overlaid, as we have seen, with mathematical ideas and procedures; but, discarding these as far as possible, we shall find that the distinction, logical and scientific, between this phase and the last is much greater than is commonly supposed. In geometry, the disproportion between the observation employed and the consequences obtained is so great as to render the function of observation almost inappreciable: whereas, in astronomy it is distinct and direct. Here, as the simplest and most general of the four resources for obtaining knowledge, it shows what may be done, in the most unfavourable situation, by a single sense in ascertaining the most intellectual kind of truth. Not less striking is the intervention of the logical processes which here guide an investigation singularly indirect: and thus if, in a scientific view, astronomy is fairly regarded as the most fundamental part of the system of inorganic knowledge, it is no less, in a logical view, the most perfect type of the general study of nature. Here men learned to modify the earliest philosophy by conceptions derived from the study of the external world; and here we find the fittest dogmatic exposition of rational positivity. Here, throughout all time, will be found the first philosophical sense of natural law; and here may be learned what is meant by the explanation of any phenomenon, by means of resemblance or connection. The whole of its historical and dogmatic course discloses the agreement between our conceptions and our observations which is the essential character of real knowledge. It yields us the true theory of scientific hypotheses; and it proves that its rationality is not less satisfactory than its positivity, by offering the first and most perfect example,—thus far indeed the only one, of that rigorous philosophical unity which must be kept in view in every order of speculation. No other science, again, has so familiarly manifested that rational prevision which is the most marked characteristic of positive theory. Its imperfections proceed from a want of definiteness in the circumscription of the objects and the subjects of its researches; an imperfection which time will cure.

Meanwhile it appears that, contrary to popular notions, the astronomical phase is a stage in advance of the mathematical, in all essential logical respects, and much nearer the true philosophical condition.

For logical purposes, we may combine physics and chemistry, though for scientific examination they must be separated. The only logical feature of chemistry is its art *Physics and Chemistry.* of systematic nomenclature: otherwise, it merely applies, in a less perfect way, the general method of investigation developed by physics. In combination, these two sciences form the bond between the two extremes, logically and scientifically: on the one hand completing the study of the universe, and preparing for that of Humanity, and on the other exhibiting an intermediate complexity of subject, and corresponding to a medium state of positive investigation. They require all foregoing resources for investigation, and present a new mode of observing. In physics, the experimental method takes its rise; and it is immediately attended by the logical resource of the corpuscular or atomic theory; both being limited to the same kind of investigations. When the logical and scientific conditions proper to the position in the scale are fulfilled, there can be no doubt that this third phase of rational positivity will be found to be as superior to the astronomical phase as that is to the mathematical, imperfect as it now is in its oscillation between a barren empiricism and an oppressive mysticism, metaphysical or algebraic. The varied and complex nature of such an order of investigations could not admit, even under a better intellectual system, of a precision and co-ordination comparable to those permitted by celestial theories; but these imperfections, transient or permanent, do not prevent the sense of natural law from receiving here a considerable extension, by being applied to the most complex phenomena of inorganic existence.

The next step is from inert to living nature: and we see the positive method rising to a new application much *Biology.* more different from the three former than they are from each other, and which will make this new science as essentially superior to the preceding by its logical plenitude as by its scientific importance, when its conditions are thoroughly understood. Thus far, investigations have permitted and required an almost indefinite parcelling out; but the interconnection of biological phenomena is such that no analytical operation can be conceived of otherwise than as introductory to a synthetical determination,—the division between the abstract and the concrete being all the while maintained, and the more carefully on account of the small interval that separates them. A radical change in the scientific system now therefore enters in, making the spirit of generality overrule the spirit of detail, till then preponderant, and thus carrying forward our reason remarkably towards its true natural condition. The statical view

now comes out clearly in connection with the dynamical, in a manner especially suitable to biological speculations, in which these two kinds of estimate appear more distinct and correlative than in any former application. But the grand feature of this fourth phase is the vast extension of the general art of observing, then augmented by the institution of the comparative method, hitherto very subordinate and obscure, but now proved to be the most powerful logical instrument applicable to such speculations. Corresponding with it, and summing up its results, we have, under the same phase, the theory of classification. The logical condition of the phase ought to be judged of by this double creation, and not by its existing imperfection, which is owing to its more recent formation, its higher complexity, and an inferior fulfilment of the preparatory conditions of its rational culture. The sense of natural law must arise out of inorganic research; but it could not acquire its full efficacy till it was extended to biological speculations, which are above all adapted to discredit absolute notions by exhibiting the immense variety of modes of existence. Great as is the advance attained in this phase, it remains no less merely introductory than the rest, though holding a higher place. Its insufficiency becomes broadly apparent when we advance from the study of the organic life, by which it is least separated from the foregoing sciences, to the study of animality; for then, in applying ourselves to the highest positive speculations, in contemplating the moral and intellectual functions of the brain, we become at once sensible of the irrationality of such a scientific constitution: for the most decisive case of all cannot be understood but by subordinating the study of it to the ulterior science of social development, for the reasons already assigned to show the impossibility of understanding our mental nature from the individual point of view; a method which must be unproductive in whatever way it is instituted.

In every view, social science offers the attributes of a completion of the positive method. All the others, even that of *Sociology*. Man, are preparatory to it. Here alone can the general sense of natural law be decisively developed, by eliminating for ever arbitrary wills and chimerical entities, in the most difficult case of all. The old philosophy must be doomed to extinction, when a regular study is able to disclose the laws of the continuous variation of human opinions. I have repeatedly said that this science permits, above any other, the prominent use of *à priori* considerations, both from its position in the hierarchy, by which it depends on all the rest, and in virtue of the perfect unity which is given to it by its plenitude of logical resources. It will soon be admitted to be the most logical of all the sciences, considering the degree of precision compatible with the nature of the phenomena, since the most difficult and varied speculations are naturally connected with one single fundamental theory. But the most striking

feature to us is the extension of the means of investigation required by, and involved in, this most complex subject of human study. It enjoys all the resources of the anterior sciences; but they would be almost useless, and even deceptive, without the addition of the historical method, properly so called, which investigates, not by comparison, but by gradual filiation. We have reviewed this method in its dogmatic form, and in its application, and we have seen how it must preponderate over all other resources, so as to bring out and utilize the properties of positive investigation, by which the regular action of human faculties is to be perfected. Thus a universal logical method corresponds in this case to a universal scientific view; and the result is that the human mind here finds its natural position. It would occupy too much space to exhibit the reaction of this science upon those that precede it; and it would be as yet premature. I have done what I proposed, in constituting the true system of positive philosophy, as a result of the preparation instituted by Bacon and Descartes; and its practical construction is a work for a future time,—probably near at hand.

These are the five phases of the positive method, through whose succession the scientific spirit rises gradually to the dignity of the philosophical spirit, effacing at length the provisional distinction between them which had been necessary during the earlier part of the human evolution. If we consider the miserable theoretical state from which human reason set out, we shall not wonder that so long a tutelage was required to enable Man to extend to his abstract and general speculations the same mental training that popular wisdom spontaneously employs in its partial and practical acts. Though there can be no exemption from the necessity of reproducing this natural succession for ever, the systematic education now prepared for, in place of the instinctive, will render the process much more rapid and easy; and I rejoice in the privilege of having prepared it for my successors, by the elaboration of this my original scheme.

In this chapter I have wrought out the most difficult and important part of my work, in as far as it relates to our general conclusions, according to the constant preponderance of our logical over our scientific needs; and especially at a time when, the doctrine being in a backward state, the philosophical procedure must consist in instituting the Method completely. What I have done in this direction must be considered as a natural equivalent of the discourse of Descartes on method, allowing for the diversities resulting from the new situation of modern mind, and the new corresponding wants. Descartes had for his subject the introductory evolution which had been for two centuries preparing for the ascendancy of rational positivism; while I have had to examine the fulfilment of that preparation, in order to determine the final constitution of a sound philosophy in connection with social objects,—a view which

Descartes avoided, but which Bacon already anticipated. This most difficult part of my task being achieved, I have only to complete my object by making a rapid scientific survey, to answer to the logical, and to venture upon an anticipation of the action of the positive philosophy, when it shall have attained its full maturity.

## CHAPTER XIV.

ESTIMATE OF THE RESULTS OF POSITIVE DOCTRINE IN ITS  
PREPARATORY STAGE.

As I have intimated, our scientific conclusions cannot be so important or so extensive as our logical conclusions, because they relate to a system of knowledge scarcely yet instituted: yet it is necessary to follow up the logical summary with a sketch of the proper nature and connection of the abstract studies that we have examined in succession; our present view regarding them as so many necessary elements of a single body of doctrine, according to our principle.

We have perceived throughout that, in the case of the human evolution at least, there exists a natural agreement between our knowledge and our needs. The knowledge which is inaccessible to us is precisely that which could answer no purpose but gratifying a vain curiosity. We have no concern with anything but the laws of phenomena which affect human beings; such action, however indirect, constituting a basis of positive estimate, the full realization of which can follow only very remotely the manifestation of the corresponding needs, at any rate till we can institute a better research. This scheme must comprehend, on the one hand, Humanity itself, in its existence and action; and, on the other hand, the general medium, whose permanent influence is an essential element in the whole movement. Every scientific as well as logical consideration shows the necessity of the study of the medium; and thus naturally divides science into the two departments,—inorganic and organic science; the first being the indispensable preparation for the second; and the second simply modifying the phenomena of the first by a nobler action. The three essential modes of the first order—the mathematical, physical, and chemical, and the two which are proper to organic existence—the individual and the social, thus present a scientific series precisely correspondent to the logical that we have just reviewed; and its five stages will, in like manner, lead us up to the normal state of true philosophy.

Mathematical existence is the simplest and most universal of all; and, in a geometrical form first, and then a mechanical, is the only kind of existence cognizable by us in  
*The Mathematical element.*  
 the many and important cases in which our investigation can pro-



ceed only on visual evidence. This is the scientific ground of the priority of the mathematical element in positive philosophy; and, scientifically speaking, the only great result derivable from it is a systematic development of the sense of logical laws, without which physical laws could not be conceived of. Thus, numerical speculations, the source of the logical instrument of analysis, have historically furnished the earliest manifestation of ideas of order and harmony, gradually extended afterwards to the most complex subjects. Apart from that, mathematical science evidently consists especially in geometry and mechanics, answering to our primitive notions of existence and action; for, in the statical case, all phenomena are reducible to relations of magnitude, form, or position; and, in the dynamical case, to mere movement, partial or general. Such a simplification is practically inconvenient, and may be misleading, as the encroachments of geometers plainly show: but it is true in an abstract sense; and therefore universally true, whatever other conditions may be added in cases of growing complexity. Geometry, too, is more general than mechanics; for we can conceive of existence without motion; as in the case of stationary stars, which come under only geometrical conditions; and to geometry we owe the earliest conception of laws of agreement, which may be regarded quite apart from those of succession. Yet, in a scientific sense, Mechanics is the more important branch of mathematics, on account of its more direct and complete relations with the rest of natural philosophy; and on account also of the implication of mechanical speculations with geometrical considerations; a drawback upon their logical perfection, but a source of marked reality, enabling them to represent the whole of mathematical existence. This introduction to natural philosophy, with its Astronomical manifestation, is, we know, the only portion of inorganic science which has attained its full normal constitution; and for this reason I hold it extremely important to show the coincidence between the primary laws on which this constitution depends, and the laws which seem to be proper to organic existence; that we may perceive by the direct correlativeness of the two extreme cases, the tendency of all our knowledge to scientific unity, corresponding to the logical unity already recognized. The intermediate ideas,—those of the physico-chemical order,—will no doubt add their confirmation when they shall have become rationally established.

I have shown that the physical laws which are the basis of the theory of motion and equilibrium, and therefore all their consequences, are as applicable to the mechanical phenomena of living bodies as to any others (allowing for the difficulties arising from a complication of details); and we have seen, in a more special manner, that the study of animal mechanics, in the province of biology, must begin with such an application, and would be wholly unintelligible without it; but we have now to

*Application  
to Sociology.*

go much further, showing that the application must extend even to the social form of existence. As to the first of these laws, Kepler's law of inertia, improperly so called,—seen in its true light as the law of mechanical persistence,—is merely a particular case of the tendency of all natural phenomena to persevere in their state, unless disturbed; a tendency specially established with regard to the most simple and general phenomena. I have traced back the biological case of Habit to this principle, modified only by the characteristic intermittence of the corresponding phenomena. In social life, less rapid and more durable than individual life, we see an analogous exemplification in the obstinate tendency of every political system to perpetuate itself. In physics, again, we have noticed, in acoustics, phenomena which prove that, in the smallest molecular changes, there is a disposition to the reproduction of acts which were before supposed proper to living beings, and which evidently come under the law of mechanical persistence. It is impossible to deny here the subordination of all natural effects to some universal laws, modified according to the conditions of each case. It is the same with the second law of motion,—Galileo's law of the reconciliation of any common motion with various particular motions,—which is extensible to all phenomena, inorganic and organic,—all active and passive mutual relations being radically independent of any action which is precisely common to the parts concerned. In biology, we find this true in the cases of sensibility and contractility; for, our impressions being purely comparative, our appreciation of partial differences is not interfered with by any general and uniform influence. In sociology, we find it again; any disturbance in the interior of any political system being due to the unequal progressive action on the different parts which, if participating in the movement in any equal degree, would be unaffected by a much more rapid progression. We discern an analogous case in the physico-chemical province, in thermometrical effects referrible to mutual inequality, and we shall no doubt encounter many more when the science is further developed. As to the third law of motion,—Newton's law of the equivalence of action and reaction,—its universality is more striking than in the other two cases; and it is the only case of the three in which the principle has hitherto been perceived and proposed. If we adapt our observation to the spirit of the corresponding phenomena, there is no doubt that the equivalence of action and reaction may be as really observed with regard to physical, chemical, biological, and social effects as in the case of mechanical effects. Besides the mutual quality inherent in all actions, it is certain that the general estimate of mechanical reaction, in the combination of masses and velocities, everywhere meets with an analogous appreciation. If Berthollet has shown the chemical influence of mass, before misconceived, an equivalent discussion would manifest no less clearly its biological or political influence. The close and preva-

lent interconnection which distinguishes vital, and yet more social phenomena, and in which all aspects are mutually dependent, is eminently fit to familiarize us with the universality of this third law of motion. Each of the three laws on which rational Mechanics is founded is, in fact, only a mechanical manifestation of a general law applicable to all possible phenomena. In order to illustrate this most important approximation, it must be extended, further, to the famous general principle by which D'Alembert completely connected questions of motion with questions of equilibrium. Whether it is regarded, as I propose, as a happy generalization of the third law of motion, or is still regarded as a distinct idea, it is in conformity with a universal conception by which the dynamical is always connected with the statical appreciation,—the laws of Harmony being always maintained in the midst of the laws of succession. Sociology here again affords us the most decisive exemplification (though often only implicit) of this general relation; because the two aspects are more marked and more interconnected than in any other case. If we could thoroughly know the laws of existence, I have no doubt that we should find them all, as in mechanics, to be mere questions of action. But, though we must proceed in an inverse manner, we proceed upon the same conception of the necessary convergence between the statical and the dynamical conclusions. It is only that the universal principle is employed in a new mode, in conformity with the nature of the phenomena; of which sociological speculation has often presented important examples. The laws of rational mechanics are then only the earliest philosophical manifestation of certain general laws, necessarily applicable to the natural economy of any kind of phenomena whatever. Though they must first be recognized in regard to the simplest and most general case of all, it does not follow that they are due to the mathematical spirit, which at present is the chief obstacle in the way of their being understood. The conception results from the first scientific reaction of the positive spirit proper to organic studies, and sociological speculation particularly, on fundamental ideas which have hitherto seemed proper to inorganic researches. Its philosophical value lies in its establishing an identity between the primary laws of the two extreme orders of natural phenomena: and the delineation I have now offered is intended to point out here, in the only case compatible with the extreme imperfection of science, the first type of the new character of universality which must belong to the chief positive ideas under the natural ascendancy of the true philosophical spirit. We have no equivalent case at our command: and in more complex subjects, these general laws can only go a part of the way in directing our speculations; though they will always afford valuable scientific guidance and suggestion, because they must always govern more special laws, relating to other abstract modes of existence and activity. Whether, as we may

hope these more special laws may in time obtain universality among their respective phenomena or not, we are now authorized in conceiving the whole system of our knowledge as susceptible, in certain respects, of a true scientific unity, independently of the logical unity, though in complete agreement with it.

If Mathematics furnishes us with the laws of inorganic existence, Astronomy discloses to us the medium, which is no less universal. Our examination of it may appear a *The Astronomical element.* departure from the great Baconian precept about the abstract nature of the speculations proper to the first philosophy: astronomical ideas being in fact nothing else than mathematical notions restricted to the case of the stars. But, true as this is, there is another view,—the same as that which justified the incorporation of the analysis of air and water with abstract chemistry;—that our study is not concrete, inasmuch as it relates to the general medium, which is truly abstract and unchangeable. The mathematical phenomena of astronomy remain abstract, as if the bodies they relate to could admit of no other; whereas the character of a concrete theory consists in the direct and permanent combination of the different modes inherent in each total existence. In astronomy, mathematical speculations do not lose their abstract nature, and only exhibit it in a case so important that we are compelled to make it special: its difficulties also constituting the chief destination of mathematical research, as well as its best logical instigation. The reaction on mathematics, again, affords us the most striking evidence of the reality and the scope of its conceptions. Here, again, the human mind obtains its first systematic sense of a necessary economy, arising from invariable relations proper to corresponding phenomena, and affording, by its inaccessible sway, a rule of conduct. This is the source of the philosophical guidance of collective Man which is carried out by training in the case of individual Man. Yet, the human point of view must prevail in this case, to secure the rationality of the corresponding studies; because our radical ignorance of cosmical laws, and our restriction to our own system, prevent our obtaining any external view of astronomical science. We find in astronomy the first instance of the encroachments of the mathematical spirit in an empirical way; but, as we have seen, the fault affects only the logical administration, and does not produce the scientific dangers which it occasions in the more complex departments, because it is in full conformity with the nature of astronomical research.

In Physics, a new action is first recognized, more compound and essentially modifying the simpler. All physical phenomena are common to all bodies; but their manifestation requires a concurrence of circumstances, more or less compound, and not continuous. Of the five physical categories, Weight alone

*The Physical.*

presents a really mathematical generality, thus being the natural transition between astronomy and physics. The others exhibit an increasing speciality, by which I have classed them. The importance of this province, in connection with that of chemistry, will appear if we try to imagine that such a transition from the mathematical to the organic sciences did not exist: for we shall see how all conception of unity must disappear if science consisted of two elements so heterogeneous, which could admit of no permanent relation; even supposing that the positive spirit could arise at all. This intermediate element is so connected with the others at each extremity as to constitute a sufficiently perfect scale. Some difficulties however arise out of this position, which will always largely affect the inherent imperfections of the duplicate science, the subject of which presents neither the simplicity of the first couple nor the characteristic interconnection of the last. We have seen how little prospect there is of scientific unity among the heterogeneous parts of which physics is composed; and the greater probability is that the number of irreducible elements will hereafter be increased; for the diversity must correspond not only with the subjects studied, but with our organic means of investigation. Of the five existing subjects, two address themselves to one sense each,—one to hearing and another to sight; and these can never be made to coincide. The other three relate equally to sight and touch: and yet no one will venture to regard thermology and electrology as susceptible of fusion with barology, or with each other, however indisputable are certain relations between them. Moreover, the actual number of our external senses is by no means finally ascertained,—so immature is at present the whole theory of sensation. A truly rational inquiry would, no doubt, show that we have two senses relating to temperature and pressure, which are both now confounded with that of touch, which seems to include all the offices whose special seat is not clearly determined. It is evident, again, that smell and taste, largely needed in chemistry, have no function in physics; yet it seems that each of them must have ere this constituted a department for itself, like sight and hearing, if our organization had been in this respect as perfect as that of many of the higher animals. The mode of inorganic existence which is disclosed by smell, seems in fact to be not less distinct from those which correspond to the other senses than they are from each other; of which the persistence and power of the sense through the whole animal series is an evidence. Our organic imperfection may perhaps be to a certain degree compensated by an artificial investigation, which may afford some scientific extension; and an improvement of our relations with the higher animals may conduce to the same end. Meantime, it is clear that the number of irreducible elements that constitute Physics, is not yet even rationally fixed. Till it can be, the science remains peculiarly liable to the encroachments of mathematical and

metaphysical abuse. The imperfections of its nature and method of culture, however, cast no doubt upon its rank in the scale of sciences. That rank is settled by the universal principle of decreasing generality; and the principle obviates the worst inconveniences of the multiple character of physics by instituting a gradual transition from the barological speculations which unite it to astronomy, and the electrollogical which border upon chemistry.

As for Chemistry, considered separately, it relates to so intimate and complete a mode of inorganic existence, that it has been found difficult to separate it from the *The Chemical.* organic. The phenomena of various substances present differences which are not reducible, as in the physical case, to inequalities of degree; and here we find fully developed the tendency of phenomena to become susceptible of modification in proportion to their complexity and increasing speciality. That tendency, it is true, showed itself in physics, so as to originate the art of experimentation; but it is far more complete in chemistry, inasmuch as it extends to molecular composition itself: and as such modification could not take place in vital cases without being liable to suspend or suppress phenomena of greater delicacy, chemistry will be always, and more and more, the chief basis of our material power. In a speculative view, chemistry is of extreme scientific importance, as revealing the most intimate mode of inorganic existence, and as completing our knowledge of the general medium in its direct influence on the organism; thus being, with physics, but in a more marked way, the link between inorganic and organic speculation. In regard to interconnection, too, it is so superior to physics as to approach very near to biology: and from biology it will, no doubt, hereafter derive some of the collective spirit in which, with physics, it is now very deficient. I have before pointed out the comparative method and the taxonomical theory as probable agencies for perfecting chemical speculation in this way. Here then we find the limit of the ascendancy of the analytical system, and the natural beginning of that of the synthetical. Meantime, the science is remarkably open to abusive encroachment, and to spoliation by dispersive treatment. It requires protection from encroachment, not only from mathematics, from which physics in a certain degree protects it, but from physics itself. As some scientific men see in physics only geometry and mechanics, others see in the best marked phenomena of chemistry nothing more than physical effects; a mistake the more hostile to chemical progression, that it rests in part upon the incontestable affinity of the two sciences. But whatever may be the logical and scientific imperfection of chemistry, in which prevision is scarcely possible in even secondary particulars, the sense of natural law, extended to the most complex phenomena of inorganic existence, is not the less strikingly and permanently developed. Thus then we survey as a whole the preparatory science.

of dead nature, from its astronomical beginning to its chemical conclusion, with physics for the link between the two.

Till biological science arose, the logical evolution required that the human mind should be occupied with inorganic science, which, from its superior simplicity, must constitute the basis of knowledge, from which alone rational positivity could arise; and till the positive spirit was extended to social phenomena, biology could not but suffer from the disturbance introduced into it from the anterior sciences. Biologists then have every reason to be grateful to sociology, as a protecting influence against the oppressive, though antagonistic pretensions of the physicists and the metaphysicians. Organic science marks out its own division into two parts,—the science of individual and of collective life: but human considerations are preponderant in both; and, while sociology is based on biology, it reacts upon it: first learning from it to understand the agent of its own phenomena, and then ascertaining the social medium, and exhibiting the course of human progression. The great misfortune of biology has been that, because its phenomena partake largely of the characteristics of the foregoing sciences, it has been extremely difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of the vast accession to material existence which takes place on the institution of vitality, and therefore to introduce the positive spirit into this order of researches. The theological or metaphysical spirit seemed for long the only protection against the intrusion of the inorganic spirit; and how such protection must compromise the scientific spirit, I need not stop to prove. The situation produced by the necessary resistance of modern reason to the old system was curiously exemplified by the opposition of biological doctrine to obvious facts, as in the case of Descartes' theory of the automatism of brutes, which held its ground for above a century, and was in some degree adopted by Buffon himself, though his own contemplations must have shown him its absurdity. He was sensible of the danger of mathematical usurpation in science; but he preferred it to theologico-metaphysical tutelage, which was then the only alternative. We have seen how the difficulty was solved by Bichat's two great conceptions;—the one, physiological and dynamical, distinguishing the organic or vegetative from the animal life,—a distinction which forms the basis of sound biological philosophy; and the other, anatomical and statical, the great theory of elementary tissues, which is in biology the philosophical equivalent of the molecular theory in physico-chemistry. This statical conception is contributory to the dynamical by enabling us to assign a special seat to each of the two kinds of life. Bichat did not contemplate the extension of his theory beyond man: but, confined to the most complex case, it could never have become really rational. We owe the power of extending it, and therefore of establishing the rationality of the science, to the

comparative method, which discloses to us the gradual succession of the degrees of organization or life. Lamarck, Oken, and De Blainville have given us possession of this chief logical instrument of the science, which is also the preponderant idea of all lofty biological contemplation, because the anatomical and physiological aspects there coalesce with the taxonomical. The consideration of the medium was once everything: but here the consideration of the organism rises more and more through the long series of vital systems of growing complexity. Ideas of order and harmony were originated by inorganic studies; but their highest manifestation, in the form of classification and a hierarchy, could issue only from biological science, whence it was to extend to social science. At present, little more is done in biology than assigning the position of its different questions; and the chasms between them are many and wide: but the science has assumed its due character of generality in the hands of its most eminent interpreters; and its scientific constitution is as rational as that of any of its predecessors: but that it is not yet complete is proved by the continuance of the controversy between the theologico-metaphysical school on the one hand, and the physico-chemical school on the other, and by the difficulties still encountered by the great conception of vital spontaneity being developed, in determinate degrees, within the limits of the laws of universal existence. One remedy will be found in such an education as will enable biologists to apply the truths of other sciences to their own, without admitting intrusion from either restricted science or false philosophy: but the intervention of sociology is also necessary,—the last biological degree, the intellectual and moral life, bordering so closely as it does upon the social. The smallness of the results yet obtained from the admirable conception of Gall is owing to the insufficiency of the individual, that is, the biological, view of Man: and the best conceptions of the science can never acquire complete efficacy, or even stability, till they are attached to the basis of social science. Thus only can they be safe from the prolonged dominion of the old philosophy on the one hand, and from the usurpations of the mathematical spirit on the other, in the physico-chemical form; and thus alone can the same conception, in biology as in social science, fulfil the conditions at once of order and of progress.

The accession of real existence then, occasioned by its extension from the individual to the collective organism, is the originating cause of the only science which can be final. If the definitive complexity is of a different kind from the three preceding, it is quite as indisputable. It is as evident as the implication of the mathematical with the physical; the physical with the chemical; and the chemical with the biological: and it also accords with the decreasing generality of successive phenomena. The continuous expansion and almost indefi-

*The Socio-  
logical.*



nite perpetuity which characterize the social organism separate this case widely from the biological, though their elements are necessarily homogeneous; and the separation will be the more indisputable, if we take into the account, as we are scientifically bound to do, the whole of the human race, instead of the portion whose history we have explored. In a logical view, we have seen that individual investigation would not yield us the method of filiation: and in a scientific view, it is equally clear that the knowledge of the laws of individual life can never enable us to make deductions of successive social phenomena; for each stage is deducible only from the one immediately preceding, though the aggregate must be in agreement with the system of biological ideas. While this separation is indispensable, it appears to constitute the chief difficulty, logical and scientific, of the most advanced minds, on account of the tendency of the earlier sciences to absorb the later, in virtue of their earlier positivity and their natural relations; tendencies so specious in this most recent case as to have ensnared almost every eminent thinker of our age. By the establishment of sociology we now witness the systematic fulfilment of the eternal conditions of the originality and pre-eminence of social speculations, which theology and metaphysics have instinctively struggled to maintain, though very insufficiently since the positive method began to prevail more and more in the modern mental evolution. In the name of positivism and rationality we have demanded and reconstructed the philosophical ascendancy of social speculation, by undoing the work of the theological and metaphysical schools, which strove to isolate moral and political research from that system of natural philosophy with which we have now incorporated it. We see that the coalescing logical and scientific needs prescribe the subordination of this final science to all the rest, over which it then becomes preponderant by its philosophical reaction. This is the ground of my anxiety to point out the direct relations which result from the nature of the respective studies, on account of the constant necessity of the preparatory knowledge of the medium of the social evolution on the one hand, and the agent on the other. The place assigned to sociology in the encyclopedical scale is thus confirmed on all possible occasions, apart from the logical obligation to raise the positive method, by this successive procedure, to the sociological phase. But, whatever may be the importance of the ideas communicated by the inorganic sciences to sociology, the scientific office must especially belong to biology, which, from the nature of the subjects concerned, must always furnish the fundamental ideas that must guide sociological research; and often even rectify or improve the results. Moreover, it is biology which presents to us the domestic state, intermediate between individual and social existence, which is more or less common to all the superior animals, and which is, in our species, the true primitive basis of the more

vast collective organism. However, the first elaboration of this new science could not but be essentially dynamical; so that the laws of harmony have nearly throughout been implicitly considered among the laws of succession, in which alone social physics can at present consist. The scientific link between biology and sociology is the connection of their two series, by which the second may be regarded as the prolongation of the first, though the terms of the one may be successive, and of the other coexisting. With this difference, we find that the essential character of the human evolution results from the growing power of the superior attributes which place Man at the head of the animal hierarchy, where they also enable us to assign the chief degrees of animality. Thus we see the vast organic system really connecting the humblest vegetative existence with the noblest social life through a long succession, which, if necessarily discontinuous, is not the less essentially homogeneous. And, in as far as the principle of such a connection consists in the decreasing generality of the chief phenomena, this double organic series is connected with the rudimentary inorganic, the interior succession of which is determined by the same principle. The necessary direction of the human movement being thus ascertained, the only remaining task, in constituting sociology, was to mark out its general course. This was done by my ascertaining the law of evolution, which in connection with the hierarchical law, establishes a true philosophical system, the two chief elements of which are absolutely interconnected. In this dynamical conception, sociology is radically connected with biology, since the original state of humanity essentially coincides with that in which the superior animals are detained by their organic imperfection,—their speculative ability never transcending the primitive fetishism from which man could not have issued but for the strong impulsion of the collective development. The resemblance is yet stronger in the practical aspect. The sociological theory being thus constituted, nothing remained but to put it to the proof by an historical application of it to the intellectual and social progression of the most advanced portion of the human race through forty centuries. This test has discredited all the historical conceptions proposed before, and has shown the reality of the theory by explaining and estimating each phase as it passed in review, so as to enable us to do honour to the services of the most opposite influences,—as in the case of the polytheistic and monotheistic states. A political and philosophical preparation like this was necessary to emancipate the mind of the inquirer from the old philosophy and critical prejudices, and to substitute for them the scientific condition of mind which is indispensable for the humblest speculations, but far more necessary, and at the same time more difficult, in the case of the most transcendent and the most impassioned researches that the human mind can undertake. Thus the same conditions which

required this task, at this time, are especially favourable to it. Its practical efficacy is inseparable from its theoretical soundness, because it connects the present, under all possible aspects, with the whole of the past, so as to exhibit at once the former course and the future tendency of every important phenomenon ; and thence results, in a political view, the possibility of a natural connection between the science and the art of modern society. New as is this science, it has already fulfilled the essential conditions of its institution, so that it has only to pursue its special development. Its complexity is more than compensated by its interconnection, and the consequent preponderance of the collective spirit over the spirit of detail : and from its origin, therefore, it is superior in rationality to all the foregoing sciences, and is evidently destined to extend its own collective spirit over them by its reactive influence, thus gradually repairing the mischiefs of the dispersive tendencies proper to the preparatory stages of genuine knowledge.

Thus the scientific and the logical estimate are complete, and found to have attained the same point ; and the long and difficult preparation proposed and begun by Descartes and Bacon is accomplished, and all made ready for the advent of the true modern philosophy. It only remains for me to show the action of this philosophy, intellectual and social, as far as it is at present rationally ascertainable by means of a last and extreme application of our theory of human evolution.

## CHAPTER XV.

## ESTIMATE OF THE FINAL ACTION OF THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

No preceding revolutions could modify human existence to anything like the degree that will be experienced under the full establishment of the positive philosophy, which we have seen to be the only possible issue from the great crisis which has agitated Europe for half a century past. We have already perceived what must be the political task and character of this philosophy in a rapidly approaching time; and I have only therefore to point out, in a more general way, the natural action of the new philosophical system when it shall have assumed its throne. I will sketch the great impending philosophical regeneration from the four points of view which my readers will at once anticipate;—the scientific, or rather rational; the moral; the political; and finally, the æsthetic.

The positive state will, in the first place, be one of entire intellectual consistency, such as has never yet existed in *The scientific action.* an equal degree, among the best organized and most advanced minds. The kind of speculative unity which existed under the polytheistic system, when all human conceptions presented a uniformly religious aspect, was liable to perpetual disturbance from a spontaneous positivity of ideas on individual and familiar matters. In the scholastic period, the nearest approach to harmony was a precarious and incomplete equilibrium: and the present transition involves such contradiction that the highest minds are perpetually subject to three incompatible systems. It is impossible to conceive of the contrasting harmony which must arise from all conceptions being fully positive, without the slightest necessary intermixture of any heterogeneous philosophy. We may best form some idea of it by anticipating the total and final extension of the popular good sense, which, long confined to partial and practical operations, has at length taken possession of the speculative province. We are naturally familiar with the general wisdom which prevails with regard to the simplest affairs of life; and, when we shall habitually restrict our inquiries to accessible subjects, and understand, as of course, the relative character of all human know-

ledge, our approximation towards the truth, which can never be completely attained by human faculties, will be thorough and satisfactory as far as it goes; and it will proceed as far as the state of human progress will admit. This logical view will completely agree with the scientific conviction of an invariable natural order, independent of us and our action, in which our intervention can occasion none but secondary modifications; these modifications however being infinitely valuable, because they are the basis of human action. We have never experienced, and can therefore only imperfectly imagine, the state of unmingled conviction with which men will regard that natural order when all disturbing intrusions, such as we are now subject to from lingering theological influences, shall have been cast out by the spontaneous certainty of the invariableness of natural laws. Again, the absolute tendencies of the old philosophies prevent our forming any adequate conception of the privilege of intellectual liberty which is secured by positive philosophy. Our existing state is so unlike all this, that we cannot yet estimate the importance and rapidity of the progress which will be thus secured; our only measure being the ground gained during the last three centuries, under an imperfect and even vicious system, which has occasioned the waste of the greater part of our intellectual labour. The best way of showing what advance may be made in sciences which are, as yet, scarcely out of the cradle, when systematically cultivated in an atmosphere of intellectual harmony, will be to consider the effect of positivity on abstract speculation first, then on concrete studies, and lastly on practical ideas.

In abstract science men will be spared the preliminary labour which has hitherto involved vast and various error, *Abstract speculation.* scientific and logical, and will be set forward far and firmly by the full establishment of the rational method. When the ascendancy of the sociological spirit shall have driven out that of the scientific, there will be an end of the vain struggle to connect every order of phenomena with one set of laws, and the desired unity will be seen to consist in the agreement of various orders of laws,—each set governing and actuating its own province; and thus will the free expansion of each kind of knowledge be provided for, while all are analogous in their method of treatment, and identical in their destination. Then there will be an end to the efforts of the anterior sciences to absorb the more recent, and of the more recent to maintain their superiority by boasting of sanction from the old philosophies; and the positive spirit will decide the claims of each, without oppression or anarchy, and with the necessary assent of all. The same unquestionable order will be established in the interior of each science; and every proved conception will be secured from such attacks as all are now liable to from the irregular ambition or empiricism of unqualified minds. Though

abstract science must hold the first place, as Bacon so plainly foresaw, the direct construction of concrete science is one of the chief offices of the new philosophical spirit, exercised under historical guidance, which can alone afford the necessary knowledge of the successive states of everything that exists. Besides the light which will thus be cast on the elementary laws of all kinds of action, and the valuable practical suggestions which must be thus obtained, there will be another result which I ought to point out, which could not be otherwise obtained, and which relates especially to the highest and most complex phenomena. I mean the fixing,—not yet possible, but then certainly practicable,—of the general duration assigned by the whole economy to each of the chief kinds of existence; and, among others, to the rising condition of the human race. This great evolution, which has scarcely yet escaped from its preparatory stage, must certainly continue to be progressive through a long course of centuries, beyond which it would be equally inopportune and irrational to speculate; yet it is of consequence to the development of the philosophical spirit to admit in principle that the collective organism is necessarily subject, like the individual, to a spontaneous decline, independently of changes in the medium. The one has no more tendency to rejuvenescence than the other; and the only difference in the two cases is in the immensity of duration and slow progression in the one, compared with the brief existence, so rapidly run through, of the other. There is no reason why, because we decline the metaphysical notion of indefinite perfectibility, we should be discouraged in our efforts to ameliorate the social state; as the health of individuals is ministered to when destruction is certainly near at hand. Nor need we attempt to determine the last aspects that the philosophical spirit will assume, in an extremely remote future, always ready as that spirit is to recognize, without any fruitless disturbance, any destiny which is clearly inevitable, in order to solace the natural pain of decline by nobly sustaining the dignity of humanity. It is too soon in infancy to prepare for old age; and there would be less wisdom in such preparation in the collective than in the individual case. As to the case of practical knowledge,—the most obvious prospect is of the permanent agreement that will be established between the practical point of view and the speculative, when both are alike subordinated to the philosophical. The practical development must go on rapidly under the ascendancy of rational positivity; and, on the other hand, technical advancement will be equally efficacious in proving the immense superiority of the true scientific system to the desultory state of speculation that existed before. The sense of action and that of prevision are closely connected, through their common dependence on the principle of natural law; and this connection must tend to popularize and consolidate the new philosophy, in which each one

will perceive the realization of the same general course with regard to all subjects accessible to our reason. The medical art, and the political, will be instances, when they shall rise out of their present infantile state, and be rationalized under the influence of a true philosophical unity, and concrete studies shall, at the same time, have been properly instituted. As the most complex phenomena are the most susceptible of modification, the true relation between speculation and action will be most conspicuous in the provinces which are most nearly concerned with the human condition and progress. Such will be the results in the intellectual portion of future human life.

As to the moral,—its antagonism with the intellectual will be proved to be what we have shown it—merely provisional; and dissolved at once when the sociological point of view is established as the only true one. I need not dwell on so clear a point as the moral tendency of the scientific elevation of the social point of view, and of the logical supremacy of collective conceptions, such as characterize the positive philosophy. In our present state of anarchy, we see nothing that can give us an idea of the energy and tenacity that moral rules must acquire when they rest on a clear understanding of the influence that the actions and the tendencies of every one of us must exercise on human life. There will be an end then of the subterfuges by which even sincere believers have been able to elude moral prescriptions, since religious doctrines have lost their social efficacy. The sentiment of fundamental order will then retain its steadiness in the midst of the fiercest disturbance. The intellectual unity of that time will not only determine practical moral convictions in individual minds, but will also generate powerful public prepossession, by disclosing a plenitude of assent, such as has never existed in the same degree, and will supply the insufficiency of private efforts, in cases of very imperfect culture, or entanglement of passion. The instrumentality will not be merely the influence of moral doctrine, which would seldom avail to restrain vicious inclinations: there would be first the action of a universal education, and then the steady intervention of a wise discipline, public and private, carried on by the same moral power which had superintended the earlier training. The results cannot be even imagined without the guidance of the doctrines themselves, under their natural division into personal, domestic, and social morality.

Morality must become more practical than it ever could be under religious influences, because personal morality will be seen in its true relations,—withdrawn from all influences of personal prudence, and recognized as the basis of all morality whatever, and therefore as a matter of general concern and public rule. The ancients had some sense of this, which they could not carry out; and Catholicism lost it by introducing a

selfish and imaginary aim. We should fix our attention on the advantages that must arise from the concentration of human efforts on an actual life, individual and collective, which Man is impelled to ameliorate as much as possible in its whole economy, according to the whole of the means within his power,—among which, moral rules certainly hold the very first place, because they especially admit of the universal concurrence in which our chief power resides. If we are thus brought back from an immoderate regard to the future by a sense of the value of the present, this will equalize life by discouraging excessive economical preparation; while a sound appreciation of our nature, in which vicious or unregulated propensities originally abound, will render common and unanimous the obligation to discipline, and regulate our various inclinations. Again, the scientific and moral conception of Man as the chief of the economy of nature will be a steady stimulus to the cultivation of the noble qualities, affective as well as intellectual, which place him at the head of the living hierarchy. There can be no danger of apathy in a position like this,—with the genuine and just pride of such pre-eminence stirring within us; and above us the type of perfection, below which we must remain, but which will ever be inviting us upwards. The result will be a noble boldness in developing the greatness of Man in all directions, free from the oppression of any fear, and limited only by the conditions of life itself. As for domestic morality, we have seen what is the subordination prescribed by *Domestic.* nature in the cases of sex and of age. It is here, where sociology and biology meet, that we find how profoundly natural social relations are, as they are immediately connected with the mode of existence of all the higher animals, of which Man is only the more complete development: and an application of the uniform positive principle of classification, abstract and concrete, will consolidate this elementary subordination, by connecting it with the whole of the speculative constitution. It will moreover be found that progression will develop more and more the natural differences on which such an economy is based, so that each element will tend towards the mode of existence most suitable to itself, and consonant with the general welfare. While the positive spirit will consolidate the great moral ideas which belong to this first stage of association, it will exhibit the increasing importance of domestic life for the vast majority of men, as modern sociality approaches its truest condition; and the natural order, by which domestic life becomes the proper introduction to social, will be established, past risk of change.

The positive philosophy is the first that has ascertained the true point of view of social morality. The metaphysical philosophy sanctioned egotism; and the theological *Social.* subordinated real life to an imaginary one; while the new philos-



ophy takes social morality for the basis of its whole system. The two former systems were so little favourable to the rise of the purely disinterested affections, that they often led to a dogmatic denial of their existence; the one being addicted to scholastic subtleties, and the other to considerations of personal safety. No set of feelings can be fully developed otherwise than by special and permanent exercise; and especially if they are not naturally very prominent; and the moral sense,—the social degree of which is its completest manifestation,—could be only imperfectly instituted by the indirect and factitious culture of a preparatory stage. We have yet to witness the moral superiority of a philosophy which connects each of us with the whole of human existence, in all times and places. The restriction of our expectations to actual life must furnish new means of connecting our individual development with the universal progression, the growing regard to which will afford the only possible, and the utmost possible, satisfaction to our natural aspiration after eternity. For instance, the scrupulous respect for human life, which has always increased with our social progression, must strengthen more and more as the chimerical hope dies out which disparages the present life as merely accessory to the one in prospect. The philosophical spirit being only an extension of good sense, it is certain that it alone, in its spontaneous form, has for three centuries maintained any general agreement against the dogmatic disturbances occasioned or tolerated by the ancient philosophy, which would have overthrown the whole modern economy if popular wisdom had not restrained the social application of it. The effects are, at best, only too evident; the practical intervention of the old philosophy taking place only in cases of very marked disorder, such as must be always impending and ever renewed while the intellectual anarchy which generates it yet exists. By its various aptitudes, positive morality will tend more and more to exhibit the happiness of the individual as depending on the complete expansion of benevolent acts and sympathetic emotions towards the whole of our race; and even beyond our race, by a gradual extension to all sentient beings below us, in proportion to their animal rank and their social utility. The relative nature of the new philosophy will render it applicable, with equal facility and accuracy, to the exigencies of each case, individual or social, whereas we see how the absolute character of religious morality has deprived it of almost all force in cases which, arising after its institution, could not have been duly provided for. Till the full rational establishment of positive morality has taken place, it is the business of true philosophers, ever the precursors of their race, to confirm it in the estimation of the world by the sustained superiority of their own conduct, personal, domestic, and social; giving the strongest conceivable evidence of the possibility of developing, on human grounds alone, a sense of general morality

complete enough to inspire an invincible repugnance to moral offence, and an irresistible impulse to steady practical devotedness.

The political results of the positive philosophy have been so mixed up with the whole treatment of the future in this volume, and the near future has been so expressly exhibited in the twelfth chapter, that I need say little here under that head. I have only to glance at the growth and application of the division between the spiritual or theoretical organism and the temporal or practical, the beginning of which I have already sufficiently described. *Political action.*

We have seen that Catholicism afforded the suggestion of a double government of this kind, and that the Catholic institution of it shared the discredit of the philosophy to which it was attached: and again, that the Greek Utopia of a Reign of Mind (well called by Mr Mill a Pedantocracy), transmitted to the modern metaphysical philosophy, gained ground till its disturbing influence rendered it a fit subject for our judgment and sentence. *Double government.* The present state of things is that we have a deep and indestructible, though vague and imperfect, sense of the political requirements of existing civilization, which assigns a distinct province, in all affairs, to the material and the intellectual authority, the separation and co-ordination of which are reserved for the future. The Catholic division was instituted on the ground of a mystical opposition between heavenly and earthly interests, as is shown by the terms spiritual and temporal, and not at all from any sound intellectual and social appreciation, which was not then possible, nor is possible even yet; and when the terrestrial view prevailed over the celestial, the principle of separation was seriously endangered, from there being no longer any logical basis which could sustain it against the extravagances of the revolutionary spirit. The positive polity must therefore go back to the earliest period of the division, and re-establish it on evidence afforded by the whole human evolution; and, in its admission of the scientific and logical preponderance of the social point of view, it will not reject it in the case of morality, which must always allow its chief application, and in which everything must be referred, not to Man, but to Humanity. Moral laws, like the intellectual, are much more appreciable in the collective than in the individual case; and, though the individual nature is the type of the general, all human advancement is much more completely characterized in the general than in the individual case; and thus morality will always, on both grounds, be connected with polity. Their separation will arise from that distinction between theory and practice which is indispensable to the common destination of both. We may already sum up the ultimate conditions of positive polity by conceiving of its systematic wisdom as reconciling the opposing qualities of that spontaneous human wisdom successively manifested in antiquity

and in the Middle Ages; for there was a social tendency involved in the ancient subordination of morality to policy, however carried to an extreme under polytheism; and the monotheistic system had the merit of asserting, though not very successfully, the legitimate independence, or rather the superior dignity, of morality. Antiquity alone offered a complete and homogeneous political system; and the Middle Ages exhibit an attempt to reconcile the opposite qualities of two heterogeneous systems, the one of which claimed supreme authority for theory, and the other for practice. Such a reconciliation will take place hereafter, on the ground of the systematic distinction between the claims of education and of action. We find something like an example of how this may be done,—theory originating practice, but never interfering with it except in a consultative way,—in the existing relations between art and science, the extension of which to the most important affairs, under the guidance of sound philosophy, contemplating the whole range of human relations. If the whole experience of modern progress has sanctioned the independence, amidst co-operation, of theory and practice, in the simplest cases, we must admit its imperative necessity, on analogous grounds, in the most complex. Thus far, in complex affairs, practical wisdom has shown itself far superior to theoretical; but this is because much of the proudest theory has been ill-established. However this evil may be diminished when social speculation becomes better founded, the general interest will always require the common preponderance of the practical or material authority, as long as it keeps within its proper limits, admitting the independence of the theoretical authority; and the necessity of including abstract indications among the elements of every concrete conclusion. No true statesman would think of disputing this, when once the philosophers had evinced the scientific character and the political aspect adapted to their social destination. It may be well however to present, in a summary way, the rational securities which will exist against any encroachment of moral upon political government, in order to meet the instinctive prejudices which still oppose the advent of what I have shown to be the first social condition of final regeneration.

In treating of the training for such an organization, I insisted on limiting it to the five nations of Western Europe, in order to secure its distinctness and originality from the confusion of modern speculative habits. But such a restriction must give way when we contemplate the final extension of the positive organism, first to the whole of the white race, and at length to the whole of mankind, as their preparation becomes complete. It was the theological philosophy which divided Western Europe into independent nationalities for five centuries past; and their interconnection, determined by their positive progression, can be systematized only by the process of total renovation. The European case must be much fitter, than

the national for manifesting the qualities of the spiritual constitution; and it will acquire new consistence and efficacy after each new extension of the positive organism, which will thus become more and more moral, and less and less political; the practical authority all the while preserving its active preponderance. By a necessary reaction, liberty will gain as much as order by this inevitable progression; for as intellectual and moral association becomes confirmed by extension, the temporal authority which is now necessary to keep the social system together will naturally relax as repression becomes less and less needed. As for the influence of human passions, which will arise under the new system as under every other, I have already spoken of them, so as to need only to say here that they will affect the early institution of the system more than its normal development. We have still to reap some of the bitter fruits of our intellectual and moral anarchy: and especially, in the quarrels between capitalists and labourers first, and afterwards in the unsettled rivalry between town and country. In short, whatever is now systematized must be destroyed; and whatever is not systematized, and therefore has vitality, must occasion collisions which we are not yet able accurately to foresee or adequately to restrain. This will be the test of the positive philosophy, and at the same time the stimulus to its social ascendancy. With this troubled initiation, the worst will be over. The difficulties proper to the action of the new *régime*, the same in kind, will be far less in degree, and will disappear as the conditions of order and progress become more and more thoroughly reconciled. We have seen that the advent of the positive economy will have been owing to the affinity between philosophical tendencies and popular impulses: and if so, it is easy to see how that affinity must become the most powerful permanent support of the system. The same philosophy which asserts the intellectual supremacy of the general reason cannot but admit, without any danger of anarchy, the moral supremacy of genuine popular needs, by establishing the universal source of morality, governing at once scientific energies and political passions. And thus, after some passing troubles, occasioned by the temporary development of practical exigencies and theoretical satisfactions, the positive philosophy, in its political form, will necessarily lead up the human race to the social system which is most suitable to the nature of man, and which will greatly surpass in unity, extension, and stability all that the past has ever produced.

One of the least anticipated results of this working out of opinions, morals, and institutions under the guidance of positive philosophy, is the development which must take place in the modes of expressing them. For five centuries, society has been seeking an æsthetic constitution correspondent to its civilization. In the time to come,—apart from all consideration of the genius that will arise, which is wholly out of the reach

*The æsthetic action.*

of anticipation,—we may see how Art must eminently fulfil its chief service, of charming and improving the humblest and the loftiest minds, elevating the one, and soothing the other. For this service it must gain much by being fitly incorporated with the social economy, from which it has hitherto been essentially excluded. Our philosophical speculation has shown us how favourable the human view and collective spirit must be to the rise and spread of æsthetic tastes; and our historical survey had before taught us, that a progressive social condition, marked and durable, is indispensable to the completeness of such a development. On both grounds, the future is full of promise. The public life and military existence of antiquity are exhausted; but the laborious and pacific activity proper to modern civilization is scarcely yet instituted, and has never yet been æsthetically regarded; so that modern art, like modern science and industry, is so far from being worn out, that it is as yet only half formed. The most original and popular species of modern art which forms a preparation for that which is to ensue, has treated of private life, for want of material in public life. But public life will be such as will admit of idealization: for the sense of the good and the true cannot be actively conspicuous without eliciting a sense of the beautiful; and the action of the positive philosophy is in the highest degree favourable to all the three. The systematic regeneration of human conceptions must also furnish new philosophical means of æsthetic expansion, secure at once of a noble aim and a steady impulsion. There must certainly be an inexhaustible resource of poetic greatness in the positive conception of Man as the supreme head of the economy of Nature, which he modifies at will, in a spirit of boldness and freedom, within no other limits than those of natural law. This is yet an untouched wealth of idealization, as the action of Man upon Nature was hardly recognized as a subject of thought till art was declining from the exhaustion of the old philosophy. The marvellous wisdom of Nature has been sung, in imitation of the ancients, and with great occasional exaggeration; and the conquests of Man over nature, with science for his instrument, and sociality for his atmosphere, remains, promising much more interest and beauty than the representation of an economy in which he has no share, and in which magnitude was the original object of admiration, and material grandeur continues to be most dwelt upon. There is no anticipating what the popular enthusiasm will be when the representations of Art shall be in harmony with the noble instinct of human superiority, and with the collective rational convictions of the human mind. To the philosophical eye it is plain that the universal reorganization will assign to modern Art at once inexhaustible material in the spectacle of human power and achievement, and a noble social destination in illustrating and endearing the final economy of human life. What philosophy

elaborates, Art will propagate and adapt for propagation, and will thus fulfil a higher social office than in its most glorious days of old.—I have here spoken of the first of the arts only,—of Poetry, which by its superior amplitude and generality has always superintended and led the development of them all: but the conditions which are favourable to one mode of expression are propitious to all, in their natural succession. While the positive spirit remained in its first phase, the mathematical, it was reproached for its anti-æsthetic tendency: but we now see how, when it is systematized from a sociological centre, it becomes the basis of an æsthetic organization no less indispensable than the intellectual and social renovation from which it is inseparable.

The five elements of this great process will each bring their own special contribution to the new system, which will *The Five Nations.* inseparably combine them all. France will bring a philosophical and political superiority; England, an earnest predilection for reality and utility; Germany, a natural aptitude for systematic generalization; Italy, its genius for art; and Spain, its familiar combined sense of personal dignity and universal brotherhood. By their natural co-operation, the positive philosophy will lead us on to a social condition the most conformable to human nature, in which our characteristic qualities will find their most perfect respective confirmation, their completest mutual harmony, and the freest expansion for each and all.

THE END.